2.4 Presumption of EqualityMany conceptions of equality operate along  terjemahan - 2.4 Presumption of EqualityMany conceptions of equality operate along  Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

2.4 Presumption of EqualityMany con

2.4 Presumption of Equality
Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality. While more materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria; the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is here at stake is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed — particularly once the above-described approaches turn out inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. In the domain of political justice, all members of a given community, taken together as a collective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution of social goods, as well as on the distribution's fair realization. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., no ownership will be recognized without justification. Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone, regardless of differences, should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal distribution. (With different terms and arguments, this principle is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959, 111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach by Williams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by. Tugendhat (1993, 374; 1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2003); for criticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap. 10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution.
The presumption in favor of equality can be justified by the principle of equal respect together with the requirement of universal and reciprocal justification; that requirement is linked to the morality of equal respect granting each individual equal consideration in every justification and distribution. Every sort of public, political distribution is, in this view, to be justified to all relevantly concerned persons, such that they could in principle agree. Since it is immoral to force someone to do something of which he or she does not approve, only reasons acceptable to the other person can give one the moral right to treat the person in accordance with these reasons.
The impartial justification of norms rests on the reciprocity and universality of the reasons. Universal norms and rights enforced through inner or external sanctions are morally justified only if, on the one hand, they can be reciprocally justified, i.e., if one person asks no more of the other than what he or she is willing to give (reciprocity), and if, on the other hand, they are justified with respect to the interests of all concerned parties, i.e., if everyone has good reasons for accepting them and no one has a good reason for rejecting them (universality) (Forst 1994, p. 68, Scanlon 1998). In the end, only the concerned parties can themselves formulate and advocate their (true) interests. Equal respect, which we reciprocally owe to one another, thus requires respect for the autonomous decisions of each non-interchangeable individual (Wingert 1993, p. 90-96). This procedural approach to moral legitimation sees the autonomy of the individual as the standard of justification for universal rules, norms, rights etc. Only those rules can be considered legitimate to which all concerned parties can freely agree on the basis of universal, discursively applicable, commonly shared reasons. Equal consideration is thus accorded to all persons and their interests. In a public distribution anyone who claims more owes all others an adequate universal and reciprocal justification. If this cannot be provided, i.e., if there is no reason for unequal distribution that can be universally and reciprocally recognized by all (since, lets assume, all are by and large equally productive and needy), then equal distribution is the only legitimate distribution. How could it be otherwise? Any unequal distribution would mean that someone receives less, and another more. Whoever receives less can justifiably demand a reason for he or she being disadvantaged. Yet there is ex hyphothesi no such justification.
Hence, any unequal distribution is illegitimate in this case. If no convincing reasons for unequal distribution can be brought forward, there remains only the option of equal distribution. Equal distribution is therefore not merely one among many alternatives, but rather the inevitable starting point that must be assumed insofar as one takes the justificatory claims of all to be of equal weight.
The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice. The following questions would have to be answered in order to arrive at a substantial and full principle of justice.
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2.4 praduga kesetaraanMany conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality. While more materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria; the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is here at stake is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed — particularly once the above-described approaches turn out inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. In the domain of political justice, all members of a given community, taken together as a collective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution of social goods, as well as on the distribution's fair realization. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., no ownership will be recognized without justification. Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone, regardless of differences, should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal distribution. (With different terms and arguments, this principle is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959, 111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach by Williams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by. Tugendhat (1993, 374; 1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2003); for criticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap. 10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. Praduga mendukung kesetaraan dapat dibenarkan oleh prinsip penghormatan yang sama bersama-sama dengan syarat pembenaran universal dan timbal balik; kebutuhan itu dikaitkan dengan moralitas penghormatan yang sama memberikan pertimbangan sama setiap individu dalam setiap pembenaran dan distribusi. Setiap jenis Distribusi Umum, politik adalah, dalam pandangan ini, untuk dibenarkan untuk semua pihak yang relevan peduli, sehingga mereka bisa pada prinsipnya setuju. Karena it's imoral untuk memaksa seseorang untuk melakukan sesuatu yang dia atau dia tidak menyetujui, hanya alasan dapat diterima kepada orang lain dapat memberikan satu hak moral untuk memperlakukan orang sesuai dengan alasan ini. The impartial justification of norms rests on the reciprocity and universality of the reasons. Universal norms and rights enforced through inner or external sanctions are morally justified only if, on the one hand, they can be reciprocally justified, i.e., if one person asks no more of the other than what he or she is willing to give (reciprocity), and if, on the other hand, they are justified with respect to the interests of all concerned parties, i.e., if everyone has good reasons for accepting them and no one has a good reason for rejecting them (universality) (Forst 1994, p. 68, Scanlon 1998). In the end, only the concerned parties can themselves formulate and advocate their (true) interests. Equal respect, which we reciprocally owe to one another, thus requires respect for the autonomous decisions of each non-interchangeable individual (Wingert 1993, p. 90-96). This procedural approach to moral legitimation sees the autonomy of the individual as the standard of justification for universal rules, norms, rights etc. Only those rules can be considered legitimate to which all concerned parties can freely agree on the basis of universal, discursively applicable, commonly shared reasons. Equal consideration is thus accorded to all persons and their interests. In a public distribution anyone who claims more owes all others an adequate universal and reciprocal justification. If this cannot be provided, i.e., if there is no reason for unequal distribution that can be universally and reciprocally recognized by all (since, lets assume, all are by and large equally productive and needy), then equal distribution is the only legitimate distribution. How could it be otherwise? Any unequal distribution would mean that someone receives less, and another more. Whoever receives less can justifiably demand a reason for he or she being disadvantaged. Yet there is ex hyphothesi no such justification. Oleh karena itu, setiap distribusi yang tidak seimbang tidak sah dalam kasus ini. Jika ada alasan yang meyakinkan untuk distribusi tidak seimbang dapat dibawa ke depan, masih terdapat hanya pilihan distribusi setara. Distribusi setara hanyalah karena itu tidak satu di antara banyak alternatif, tapi agak tak terelakkan titik awal yang harus diasumsikan sejauh yang membawa dasar klaim semua menjadi bobot yang sama.Praduga kesetaraan menyediakan prosedur yang elegan untuk membangun sebuah teori diuntungkan keadilan. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut harus dijawab untuk sampai pada sebuah prinsip yang substansial dan penuh keadilan.
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2.4 Praduga Kesetaraan
Banyak konsepsi kesetaraan beroperasi dalam jalur prosedural melibatkan praduga kesetaraan. Sementara beton yang lebih material, pendekatan etika, seperti yang dijelaskan di bagian selanjutnya di bawah ini, prihatin dengan kriteria distributif; praduga kesetaraan, sebaliknya, adalah, prinsip prosedural formal konstruksi terletak pada tingkat formal dan argumentatif yang lebih tinggi. Apa yang dipertaruhkan di sini adalah pertanyaan tentang prinsip dengan mana konsepsi materi keadilan harus dibangun - terutama setelah pendekatan yang dijelaskan di atas ternyata tidak memadai. Anggapan kesetaraan adalah prinsip prima facie pemerataan untuk semua barang politis cocok untuk proses distribusi publik. Dalam domain keadilan politik, semua anggota suatu masyarakat, secara bersama-sama sebagai badan kolektif, harus memutuskan terpusat pada distribusi yang adil dari barang sosial, serta realisasi adil distribusi ini. Setiap klaim untuk distribusi tertentu, termasuk skema distributif yang ada, harus memihak dibenarkan, yaitu, tidak ada kepemilikan akan diakui tanpa pembenaran. Diterapkan pada domain politik ini, praduga kesetaraan mensyaratkan bahwa semua orang, tanpa memandang perbedaan, harus mendapatkan bagian yang sama dalam distribusi kecuali beberapa jenis perbedaan relevan dan membenarkan, melalui alasan diterima secara universal, distribusi yang tidak merata. (Dengan syarat dan argumen yang berbeda, prinsip ini dipahami sebagai praduga oleh Benn & Peters (1959, 111) dan oleh Bedau (1967, 19); sebagai pendekatan alasan yang relevan oleh Williams (1973); sebagai konsepsi simetri oleh. Tugendhat (1993, 374, 1997, chap 3.); sebagai pilihan default dengan Hinsch (2003), karena kritik terhadap anggapan kesetaraan, lih Westen (1990, chap 10.)) hasil anggapan ini dalam prinsip prima. facie pemerataan untuk semua barang didistribusikan. Prinsip ketat pemerataan tidak diperlukan, tetapi secara moral diperlukan untuk membenarkan memihak distribusi yang tidak merata. Beban pembuktian terletak di sisi mereka yang mendukung segala bentuk distribusi yang tidak merata.
Anggapan yang mendukung kesetaraan dapat dibenarkan dengan prinsip rasa hormat yang sama bersama-sama dengan persyaratan pembenaran universal dan timbal balik; persyaratan yang terkait dengan moralitas rasa hormat yang sama pemberian setiap pertimbangan yang sama individu dalam setiap pembenaran dan distribusi. Setiap jenis, distribusi politik publik, dalam pandangan ini, dibenarkan kepada semua orang relevan khawatir, sehingga mereka bisa pada prinsipnya setuju. Karena tidak bermoral untuk memaksa seseorang untuk melakukan sesuatu yang dia tidak menyetujui, hanya alasan yang dapat diterima oleh orang lain dapat memberikan satu hak moral untuk memperlakukan orang sesuai dengan alasan ini.
Pembenaran tentang norma-norma bertumpu pada timbal balik dan universalitas alasan. Norma-norma universal dan hak ditegakkan melalui sanksi dalam atau eksternal secara moral dibenarkan hanya jika, di satu sisi, mereka dapat saling dibenarkan, yaitu jika seseorang meminta tidak lebih dari yang lain dari apa yang dia bersedia memberikan (timbal balik) , dan jika, di sisi lain, mereka dibenarkan sehubungan dengan kepentingan semua pihak terkait, yaitu, jika setiap orang memiliki alasan yang baik untuk menerima mereka dan tidak ada yang memiliki alasan yang baik untuk menolak mereka (universalitas) (Forst 1994, p . 68, Scanlon 1998). Pada akhirnya, hanya pihak terkait dapat sendiri merumuskan dan menganjurkan mereka (benar) kepentingan. Rasa hormat yang sama, yang kita saling berutang satu sama lain, sehingga memerlukan penghormatan terhadap keputusan otonom masing-masing individu non-dipertukarkan (Wingert 1993, hal. 90-96). Pendekatan ini prosedural untuk legitimasi moral yang melihat otonomi individu sebagai standar pembenaran untuk universal aturan, norma, hak dll Hanya aturan-aturan dapat dianggap sah yang semua pihak dapat dengan bebas setuju atas dasar universal, diskursif yang berlaku, umum bersama alasan. Pertimbangan yang sama dengan demikian diberikan kepada semua orang dan kepentingan mereka. Dalam siapapun distribusi publik yang mengaku lebih berutang semua orang lain pembenaran universal dan timbal balik yang memadai. Jika hal ini tidak dapat diberikan, yaitu jika tidak ada alasan untuk distribusi yang tidak merata yang dapat universal dan timbal balik diakui oleh semua (karena, mari kita asumsikan, semua pada umumnya sama produktif dan miskin), maka pemerataan adalah satu-satunya distribusi yang sah . Bagaimana itu bisa terjadi sebaliknya? Setiap distribusi yang tidak merata akan berarti bahwa seseorang menerima kurang, dan lain lagi. Barangsiapa menyambut kurang dibenarkan dapat menuntut alasan untuk dia dirugikan. Namun ada ex hyphothesi ada pembenaran seperti itu.
Oleh karena itu, distribusi yang tidak merata tidak sah dalam kasus ini. Jika tidak ada alasan yang meyakinkan untuk distribusi yang tidak merata dapat dibawa ke depan, tetap ada hanya pilihan untuk pemerataan. Oleh karena itu pemerataan bukan hanya satu di antara banyak alternatif, melainkan titik awal yang tak terelakkan yang harus diasumsikan sepanjang satu mengambil klaim membenarkan semua menjadi berat sama.
Anggapan kesetaraan memberikan prosedur elegan untuk membangun teori distributif keadilan. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut harus dijawab dalam rangka untuk sampai pada prinsip substansial dan penuh keadilan.
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