As this history illustrates, Indone

As this history illustrates, Indonesia’s Islamic schools have shown a
remarkable aptitude for competing in a fast-changing educational
marketplace. Although some schools remain aloof, the main currents
in Islamic education have adapted to the desires of parents and students
by adding general and vocational programs to their curricula.
Although market forces explain some of the Islamic sector’s dynamism,
it is clear that the religious-educational marketplace is embedded in
a larger world subject to forces more varied than price signals among
autonomous individuals.41 Indeed, and to digress for a moment into a
topic debated by economic theorists, one of the most striking features
of religious education is that, rather than just satisfying preexisting
“consumer preferences,” religious schools help to produce the very demand
to which they respond. Moreover, the goal of Islamic education
is not merely individual. Among the pious, education is seen as part of
a collective duty to Islamize society, turning believers away from things
un-Islamic and toward those commanded by God.
Viewed from this larger perspective, Indonesia’s Islamic schools
bear an at least partial resemblance to the social movements to which
political theorists have turned their attention in recent years. In Sidney
Tarrow’s oft-cited phrase, social movements are “collective challenges,
based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction
with elites, opponents, and authorities,” and seeking a fundamental
change in existing institutions and hierarchies.42 Much social
movement literature implies that the state is the primary target of
movement-leveraged change. However, there is no reason to assume
that all social movements are state-centric in orientation. As with
movements in other religious traditions, Islamic social movements
tend to be as much concerned with changing citizens and society as
they are with challenging the state.43
The parallel between social movements and Islamic schooling
is even more striking when one looks at the way in which religious
Schools, Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 71
schools create social organizations and cultural frames for perceiving
and reforming the social order. Here again a brief theoretical aside
is in order. Social movement theory arose in reaction to “strain” and
“grievance” explanations of protest movements in political sociology;
these were regarded as flawed in two ways. First, strain theories assumed
that the mere presence of injustices or tensions in society is
sufficient to generate protest movements.44 And second, in emphasizing
a unitary social psychology, strain theorists seemed to imply
that the actors who join social movements are more stressed out than
rational, seeking compensatory release rather then an effective instrument
for mobilization and change.
Social movement theorists responded to strain theory’s presuppositions
by pointing out that injustice and grievances abound in all societies,
but they do not everywhere give rise to organized social protest. The creation
of the latter depends on social processes far less automatic than
strain theories imply. In particular, theorists argued, the emergence of
social movements depends on three conditions: the existence of social
networks through which actors can communicate and mobilize; opportunity
structures in political society that provide openings through which
the mobilization can move without incurring repression; and, last but
not least, leaders capable of formulating “cultural frames” that resonate
with popular grievances, inspiring people to join the social movement.
Of course, the analogy between social movements and Islamic
schools begins to wear thin once one recalls that, historically, most
schools were founded for reasons that had little to do with creating a
unified movement. In Indonesia as in many other parts of the Muslim
world, traditionalist educators are notorious for the way in which they
jealously guard their institutional autonomy. This is not an attitude
that lends itself to the cohesive leadership highlighted in social movement
theory. By comparison with social movements, too, the ends to
which Islamic education are put are highly varied. To state the point in
more theoretical terms, education’s impact on the habits and ideals of
its charges is typically behaviorally diffuse rather than instrumentalized
toward the efficient achievement of a specific valued end.
Notwithstanding these differences, it is indisputable that Islamic
schooling creates network resources (“social capital”) with an at least
latent potential to draw social actors into organizations and projects
that extend well beyond the school yard. It is well known, for example,
72 ROBERT W. HEFNER
that pesantren education creates a bond between student and teacher
that tends to be infused with a deep sense of gratitude and obedience.
The bond in turn gives rise to enduring social solidarities that can be
deployed for ends other than those of education or piety.45 Whether
in the ulama-led peasant rebellion in late-nineteenth-century Banten
or the phoenix-like resilience of the Nahdlatul Ulama in the twentieth
century, modern Indonesian history offers endless examples of Muslim
educational networks being put to broader social uses. Indeed,
more generally, the twentieth-century political competition associated
with what are known in Indonesian studies as aliran politik (political
currents) was in part the result of what one might describe as the
“social movementization” of preexisting educational networks, both
Muslim and secular nationalist.46
The most striking parallel between Islamic schooling and social
movements, however, has to do with the “framing processes” in which
both engage.47 To create an effective movement, social movement
theorists emphasize, the cultural frames created by leaders must (1)
diagnose some chronic problem in society in a manner that resonates
with the needs of people; (2) recommend a strategy for the problem’s
remedy; and then (3) provide a rationale that motivates actors to support
the proposed course of remedial action. If any among these conditions
is unmet, the movement will not gain traction.
The most critical element in the framing process is the frame’s
ability to resonate with the perceptions and aspirations of broad masses
of people in society. As Quintan Wiktorowicz has noted, “Such
reverberation . . . depends upon not only its consistency with cultural
narratives, but also the reputation of the individual or group responsible
for articulating the frame, the personal salience of the frame for
potential participants, the consistency of the frame, and the frame’s
empirical credibility in real life.”48
Some proponents of Islamic schooling in Indonesia have long
engaged in campaigns that bear an uncanny resemblance to the framing
processes highlighted in social movement theory. For example,
in Muslim educational circles in twentieth-century Indonesia, an oftheard
line was that the main cause of the country’s problems was the
failure of ordinary Muslims to fulfill their religious obligations. The
key to improving state and society, then, lay in Muslims learning to
observe their religious duties more faithfully.
Schools, Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 73
On the question of the state, the message Muslim educators in
Indonesia have conveyed has, to say the least, varied. With the partial
exception of the tumultuous period from 1955 to 1965, when the
country was torn by a bitter rivalry among communist, nationalist, and
Islamic parties, the majority of educators has tended to downplay the
need to transform the state or engage in any other radical social project.
Indeed, the educational mainstream has long shown a stronger interest
in general moral appeals than it has in debates over the proper
form of the state. To put the matter differently, inasmuch as they
have been concerned with political issues at all, Indonesia’s Muslim
educators have tended to be nationalist and system-reforming rather
than radical Islamist and system-upending. Most align themselves
with the Islamic-but-pluralist nationalism of mainstream groups like
the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.
Since the early 1990s, however, a few school movements have
arisen and offered frames demanding a more far-reaching transformation
of politics and society. It is important to emphasize that, even
among these schools, only a tiny number follow the example of figures
like Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir of the al-Mukmin pesantren outside of Solo,
Central Java, who advocates what amounts to a revolutionary restructuring
of state and society. Islamist revolution is not the preferred
end of most of the new generation of social movement schools. The
majority steers clear of political radicalism, subscribing to the notion
that what is most needed is a gradualist and peaceful Islamization of
society and the state.
The most notable example of moderate social movement schools
of this latter sort are those associated with what has come to be known
in recent years as the “integrated Islamic school” (sekolah Islam terpadu)
movement. Integrated schools are part of a multistranded educational
movement that, to the surprise of many, became one of the fastestgrowing
trends in Islamic education in the post-Soeharto era.
The PKS and the Integrated Islam School Movement
The first principle of integrated Islamic education is that, rather than
confining religious instruction to one or two subject modules, it should
be woven into all subjects across the entire school day. Although not all
proponents of integrated Islamic schools are familiar with the broader
history, the more intellectually sophisticated understand that the
74 ROBERT W. HEFNER
movement is related to efforts by the U.S.-based (but now deceased)
Palestinian academic, Isma‘il Raji al-Faruqi. In the 1970s and 1980s,
al-Faruqi and his colleagues formulated a blistering crit

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Sebagai menggambarkan sejarah ini, sekolah Islam Indonesia telah menunjukkanbakat luar biasa untuk bersaing dalam perubahan cepat pendidikanpasar. Meskipun beberapa sekolah tetap menyendiri, arus utamadalam pendidikan Islam telah disesuaikan dengan keinginan orang tua dan siswadengan menambahkan program Umum dan kejuruan untuk kurikulum mereka.Meskipun kekuatan pasar menjelaskan beberapa sektor Islam dinamisme,jelas bahwa pasar pendidikan agama yang tertanam dalamdunia yang lebih besar tunduk pada kekuatan yang lebih beragam daripada harga sinyal antaraotonom individuals.41 memang, dan untuk ngelantur sejenak ketopik yang diperdebatkan oleh teori ekonomi, salah satu fitur yang paling mencolokpendidikan agama adalah bahwa, daripada hanya memuaskan ada sebelumnyamembantu sekolah-sekolah agama "preferensi konsumen," untuk menghasilkan permintaan sangatyang mereka merespon. Selain itu, tujuan dari pendidikan Islamini tidak hanya individu. Di antara yang saleh, pendidikan dipandang sebagai bagian daritugas kolektif masyarakat Islamize, mengubah orang-orang percaya dari hal-halIslami dan terhadap orang-orang diperintahkan oleh Allah.Melihat dari perspektif yang lebih besar ini, sekolah Islam Indonesiaberuang kemiripan gerakan sosial yang setidaknya sebagianteori politik telah mengalihkan perhatian mereka dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Di SidneyTarrow yang sering-dikutip frase, sosial gerakan adalah "kolektif tantangan,Berdasarkan tujuan umum dan solidarities sosial, dalam interaksi yang berkelanjutanwith elites, opponents, and authorities,” and seeking a fundamentalchange in existing institutions and hierarchies.42 Much socialmovement literature implies that the state is the primary target ofmovement-leveraged change. However, there is no reason to assumethat all social movements are state-centric in orientation. As withmovements in other religious traditions, Islamic social movementstend to be as much concerned with changing citizens and society asthey are with challenging the state.43The parallel between social movements and Islamic schoolingis even more striking when one looks at the way in which religiousSchools, Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 71schools create social organizations and cultural frames for perceivingand reforming the social order. Here again a brief theoretical asideis in order. Social movement theory arose in reaction to “strain” and“grievance” explanations of protest movements in political sociology;these were regarded as flawed in two ways. First, strain theories assumedthat the mere presence of injustices or tensions in society issufficient to generate protest movements.44 And second, in emphasizinga unitary social psychology, strain theorists seemed to implythat the actors who join social movements are more stressed out thanrational, seeking compensatory release rather then an effective instrumentfor mobilization and change.Social movement theorists responded to strain theory’s presuppositionsby pointing out that injustice and grievances abound in all societies,but they do not everywhere give rise to organized social protest. The creationof the latter depends on social processes far less automatic thanstrain theories imply. In particular, theorists argued, the emergence ofsocial movements depends on three conditions: the existence of socialnetworks through which actors can communicate and mobilize; opportunitystructures in political society that provide openings through whichthe mobilization can move without incurring repression; and, last butnot least, leaders capable of formulating “cultural frames” that resonatewith popular grievances, inspiring people to join the social movement.Of course, the analogy between social movements and Islamicschools begins to wear thin once one recalls that, historically, mostschools were founded for reasons that had little to do with creating aunified movement. In Indonesia as in many other parts of the Muslimworld, traditionalist educators are notorious for the way in which theyjealously guard their institutional autonomy. This is not an attitudethat lends itself to the cohesive leadership highlighted in social movementtheory. By comparison with social movements, too, the ends towhich Islamic education are put are highly varied. To state the point inmore theoretical terms, education’s impact on the habits and ideals ofits charges is typically behaviorally diffuse rather than instrumentalized
toward the efficient achievement of a specific valued end.
Notwithstanding these differences, it is indisputable that Islamic
schooling creates network resources (“social capital”) with an at least
latent potential to draw social actors into organizations and projects
that extend well beyond the school yard. It is well known, for example,
72 ROBERT W. HEFNER
that pesantren education creates a bond between student and teacher
that tends to be infused with a deep sense of gratitude and obedience.
The bond in turn gives rise to enduring social solidarities that can be
deployed for ends other than those of education or piety.45 Whether
in the ulama-led peasant rebellion in late-nineteenth-century Banten
or the phoenix-like resilience of the Nahdlatul Ulama in the twentieth
century, modern Indonesian history offers endless examples of Muslim
educational networks being put to broader social uses. Indeed,
more generally, the twentieth-century political competition associated
with what are known in Indonesian studies as aliran politik (political
currents) was in part the result of what one might describe as the
“social movementization” of preexisting educational networks, both
Muslim and secular nationalist.46
The most striking parallel between Islamic schooling and social
movements, however, has to do with the “framing processes” in which
both engage.47 To create an effective movement, social movement
theorists emphasize, the cultural frames created by leaders must (1)
diagnose some chronic problem in society in a manner that resonates
with the needs of people; (2) recommend a strategy for the problem’s
remedy; and then (3) provide a rationale that motivates actors to support
the proposed course of remedial action. If any among these conditions
is unmet, the movement will not gain traction.
The most critical element in the framing process is the frame’s
ability to resonate with the perceptions and aspirations of broad masses
of people in society. As Quintan Wiktorowicz has noted, “Such
reverberation . . . depends upon not only its consistency with cultural
narratives, but also the reputation of the individual or group responsible
for articulating the frame, the personal salience of the frame for
potential participants, the consistency of the frame, and the frame’s
empirical credibility in real life.”48
Some proponents of Islamic schooling in Indonesia have long
engaged in campaigns that bear an uncanny resemblance to the framing
processes highlighted in social movement theory. For example,
in Muslim educational circles in twentieth-century Indonesia, an oftheard
line was that the main cause of the country’s problems was the
failure of ordinary Muslims to fulfill their religious obligations. The
key to improving state and society, then, lay in Muslims learning to
observe their religious duties more faithfully.
Schools, Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 73
On the question of the state, the message Muslim educators in
Indonesia have conveyed has, to say the least, varied. With the partial
exception of the tumultuous period from 1955 to 1965, when the
country was torn by a bitter rivalry among communist, nationalist, and
Islamic parties, the majority of educators has tended to downplay the
need to transform the state or engage in any other radical social project.
Indeed, the educational mainstream has long shown a stronger interest
in general moral appeals than it has in debates over the proper
form of the state. To put the matter differently, inasmuch as they
have been concerned with political issues at all, Indonesia’s Muslim
educators have tended to be nationalist and system-reforming rather
than radical Islamist and system-upending. Most align themselves
with the Islamic-but-pluralist nationalism of mainstream groups like
the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.
Since the early 1990s, however, a few school movements have
arisen and offered frames demanding a more far-reaching transformation
of politics and society. It is important to emphasize that, even
among these schools, only a tiny number follow the example of figures
like Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir of the al-Mukmin pesantren outside of Solo,
Central Java, who advocates what amounts to a revolutionary restructuring
of state and society. Islamist revolution is not the preferred
end of most of the new generation of social movement schools. The
majority steers clear of political radicalism, subscribing to the notion
that what is most needed is a gradualist and peaceful Islamization of
society and the state.
The most notable example of moderate social movement schools
of this latter sort are those associated with what has come to be known
in recent years as the “integrated Islamic school” (sekolah Islam terpadu)
movement. Integrated schools are part of a multistranded educational
movement that, to the surprise of many, became one of the fastestgrowing
trends in Islamic education in the post-Soeharto era.
The PKS and the Integrated Islam School Movement
The first principle of integrated Islamic education is that, rather than
confining religious instruction to one or two subject modules, it should
be woven into all subjects across the entire school day. Although not all
proponents of integrated Islamic schools are familiar with the broader
history, the more intellectually sophisticated understand that the
74 ROBERT W. HEFNER
movement is related to efforts by the U.S.-based (but now deceased)
Palestinian academic, Isma‘il Raji al-Faruqi. In the 1970s and 1980s,
al-Faruqi and his colleagues formulated a blistering crit

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Sebagai sejarah ini menggambarkan, sekolah-sekolah Islam di Indonesia telah menunjukkan
bakat luar biasa untuk bersaing dalam pendidikan yang cepat berubah
pasar. Meskipun beberapa sekolah tetap menyendiri, arus utama
dalam pendidikan Islam telah disesuaikan dengan keinginan orang tua dan siswa
dengan menambahkan program umum dan kejuruan untuk kurikulum mereka.
Meskipun kekuatan pasar menjelaskan beberapa dinamika sektor Islam,
jelas bahwa agama-pendidikan pasar tertanam dalam
subjek dunia yang lebih besar untuk pasukan lebih bervariasi dari sinyal harga antara
otonom individuals.41 Memang, dan ngelantur sejenak menjadi
topik diperdebatkan oleh teori ekonomi, salah satu fitur yang paling mencolok
dari pendidikan agama adalah bahwa, daripada hanya memuaskan yang sudah ada
"preferensi konsumen," sekolah agama membantu untuk menghasilkan sangat permintaan
yang mereka merespon. Selain itu, tujuan pendidikan Islam
bukan hanya individu. Di antara orang-orang saleh, pendidikan dipandang sebagai bagian dari
tugas kolektif untuk mengislamkan masyarakat, berbalik percaya diri dari hal-hal
yang tidak Islami dan terhadap orang-orang diperintahkan oleh Allah.
Dilihat dari perspektif yang lebih besar ini, sekolah-sekolah Islam di Indonesia
menanggung setidaknya sebagian kemiripan dengan sosial gerakan yang
ahli teori politik telah mengalihkan perhatian mereka dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Di Sidney
frase Tarrow ini sering dikutip, gerakan sosial "tantangan kolektif,
berdasarkan tujuan umum dan solidaritas sosial, dalam interaksi yang berkelanjutan
dengan elit, lawan, dan otoritas, "dan mencari dasar
perubahan di lembaga-lembaga yang ada dan hierarchies.42 sosial Banyak
gerakan literatur menyiratkan bahwa negara adalah target utama dari
perubahan gerakan-leverage. Namun, tidak ada alasan untuk menganggap
bahwa semua gerakan sosial negara-sentris dalam orientasi. Seperti
gerakan dalam tradisi keagamaan lainnya, gerakan-gerakan sosial Islam
cenderung sebanyak peduli dengan mengubah warga negara dan masyarakat secara
mereka dengan menantang state.43 yang
paralel antara gerakan sosial dan sekolah Islam
bahkan lebih mencolok ketika kita melihat cara yang religius
Sekolah, Gerakan Sosial & Demokrasi di Indonesia 71
sekolah membuat organisasi sosial dan frame budaya untuk mengamati
dan mereformasi tatanan sosial. Di sini sekali lagi singkat teoritis samping
adalah dalam rangka. Teori gerakan sosial muncul sebagai reaksi terhadap "ketegangan" dan
"keluhan" penjelasan dari gerakan protes dalam sosiologi politik;
ini dianggap sebagai cacat dalam dua cara. Pertama, teori regangan diasumsikan
bahwa kehadiran dari ketidakadilan atau ketegangan dalam masyarakat adalah
cukup untuk menghasilkan protes movements.44 Dan kedua, dalam menekankan
psikologi sosial kesatuan, teori regangan sepertinya menyiratkan
bahwa aktor yang bergabung gerakan sosial yang lebih stres daripada
rasional, mencari rilis kompensasi ketimbang instrumen yang efektif
untuk mobilisasi dan perubahan.
teori gerakan sosial menanggapi ketegangan prasangka teori ini
dengan menunjukkan bahwa ketidakadilan dan keluhan berlimpah di semua masyarakat,
tetapi mereka tidak di mana-mana menimbulkan protes sosial yang diselenggarakan. Penciptaan
dari yang terakhir tergantung pada proses-proses sosial jauh lebih otomatis dari
teori regangan menyiratkan. Secara khusus, teori berpendapat, munculnya
gerakan sosial tergantung pada tiga kondisi: keberadaan sosial
jaringan melalui mana aktor dapat berkomunikasi dan memobilisasi; kesempatan
struktur dalam masyarakat politik yang menyediakan bukaan di mana
mobilisasi dapat bergerak tanpa menimbulkan represi; dan, last but
not least, pemimpin yang mampu merumuskan "frame budaya" yang beresonansi
dengan keluhan populer, menginspirasi orang untuk bergabung dengan gerakan sosial.
Tentu saja, analogi antara gerakan sosial dan Islam
sekolah mulai memakai tipis sekali kita ingat bahwa, secara historis , kebanyakan
sekolah didirikan untuk alasan yang tidak ada kaitannya dengan menciptakan
gerakan terpadu. Di Indonesia seperti di banyak bagian lain dari Muslim
dunia, pendidik tradisionalis terkenal karena cara di mana mereka
hati-hati menjaga otonomi kelembagaan mereka. Ini bukan sikap
yang cocok untuk kepemimpinan kohesif disorot dalam gerakan sosial
teori. Dibandingkan dengan gerakan sosial, juga, ujung ke
yang pendidikan Islam diletakkan sangat bervariasi. Untuk menyatakan titik di
istilah yang lebih teoritis, dampak pendidikan pada kebiasaan dan cita-cita
biaya yang biasanya perilaku menyebar daripada instrumentalized
terhadap prestasi efisien dari akhir tertentu dihargai.
Meskipun perbedaan ini, tidak bisa dibantah bahwa Islam
sekolah menciptakan sumber daya jaringan ( "modal sosial") dengan setidaknya
laten potensial untuk menarik aktor sosial dalam organisasi dan proyek-proyek
yang meluas melewati halaman sekolah. Hal ini juga diketahui, misalnya,
72 ROBERT W. HEFNER
bahwa pendidikan pesantren menciptakan ikatan antara siswa dan guru
yang cenderung diresapi dengan rasa syukur yang mendalam dan ketaatan.
Ikatan pada gilirannya menimbulkan abadi solidaritas sosial yang dapat
dikerahkan untuk tujuan selain yang pendidikan atau piety.45 Apakah
dalam pemberontakan petani ulama yang dipimpin di akhir abad kesembilan belas-Banten
atau ketahanan phoenix seperti Nahdlatul Ulama di kedua puluh
abad, sejarah Indonesia modern menawarkan contoh yang tak ada habisnya Muslim
jaringan pendidikan dimasukkan ke penggunaan sosial yang lebih luas. Memang,
lebih umum, persaingan politik abad kedua puluh terkait
dengan apa yang dikenal dalam studi bahasa Indonesia sebagai Aliran politik (politik
arus) adalah sebagian hasil dari apa yang mungkin menggambarkan sebagai
"movementization sosial" yang sudah ada sebelumnya jaringan pendidikan, baik
Muslim dan nationalist.46 sekuler
paralel paling mencolok antara sekolah Islam dan sosial
gerakan, bagaimanapun, harus dilakukan dengan "proses framing" di mana
kedua engage.47 Untuk membuat gerakan yang efektif, gerakan sosial
teori menekankan, frame budaya yang diciptakan oleh para pemimpin harus (1)
mendiagnosa beberapa masalah kronis di masyarakat dengan cara yang beresonansi
dengan kebutuhan masyarakat; (2) merekomendasikan strategi untuk masalah ini
obat; dan kemudian (3) memberikan alasan yang memotivasi pelaku untuk mendukung
program yang diusulkan dari tindakan perbaikan. Jika ada di antara kondisi ini
adalah belum terpenuhi, gerakan tidak akan mendapatkan traksi.
Unsur yang paling penting dalam proses framing adalah frame
kemampuan untuk beresonansi dengan persepsi dan aspirasi massa luas
dari orang dalam masyarakat. Sebagai Quintan Wiktorowicz telah mencatat, "seperti
gema. . . tergantung tidak hanya konsistensi dengan budaya
narasi, tetapi juga reputasi individu atau kelompok yang bertanggung jawab
untuk mengartikulasikan bingkai, arti-penting pribadi frame untuk
calon peserta, konsistensi frame, dan frame
kredibilitas empiris dalam kehidupan nyata. "48
Beberapa pendukung sekolah Islam di Indonesia telah lama
terlibat dalam kampanye yang menanggung kemiripan dengan framing
proses disorot dalam teori gerakan sosial. Misalnya,
di kalangan pendidikan Islam di abad kedua puluh Indonesia, sebuah oftheard
garis adalah bahwa penyebab utama dari masalah negara adalah
kegagalan Muslim biasa untuk memenuhi kewajiban agama mereka. The
kunci untuk meningkatkan negara dan masyarakat, kemudian, berbaring di Muslim belajar
mengamati kewajiban agama mereka lebih setia.
Sekolah, Gerakan Sosial & Demokrasi di Indonesia 73
Pada pertanyaan dari negara, pendidik Muslim pesan di
Indonesia telah disampaikan telah, mengatakan sedikit, bervariasi. Dengan parsial
pengecualian dari periode yang penuh gejolak 1955-1965, ketika
negara robek oleh persaingan sengit antara komunis, nasionalis, dan
partai-partai Islam, mayoritas pendidik cenderung mengecilkan
kebutuhan untuk mengubah negara atau terlibat dalam lainnya proyek sosial yang radikal.
Memang, arus utama pendidikan telah lama menunjukkan minat kuat
di banding moral yang umum daripada yang dalam perdebatan lebih tepat
bentuk negara. Untuk menempatkan masalah ini berbeda, karena mereka
telah peduli dengan isu-isu politik sama sekali, Muslim di Indonesia
pendidik cenderung nasionalis dan sistem-reformasi dan bukan
dari Islam radikal dan sistem-upending. Kebanyakan menyesuaikan diri
dengan nasionalisme Islam-tetapi-pluralis dari kelompok utama seperti
Muhammadiyah dan Nahdlatul Ulama.
Sejak awal 1990-an, bagaimanapun, gerakan sekolah beberapa telah
muncul dan menawarkan frame menuntut transformasi lebih jauh
dari politik dan masyarakat. Hal ini penting untuk menekankan bahwa, bahkan
di antara sekolah-sekolah ini, hanya sejumlah kecil mencontoh tokoh
seperti Abu Bakar Ba'asyir dari pesantren al-Mukmin di luar Solo,
Jawa Tengah, yang menganjurkan apa berjumlah restrukturisasi revolusioner
negara dan masyarakat. Revolusi Islam bukanlah pilihan
akhir sebagian besar generasi baru sekolah gerakan sosial. The
Mayoritas mengarahkan jelas dari radikalisme politik, berlangganan gagasan
bahwa apa yang paling dibutuhkan adalah Islamisasi gradualis dan damai
masyarakat dan negara.
Contoh yang paling terkenal dari sekolah gerakan sosial yang moderat
semacam terakhir ini yang terkait dengan apa yang telah datang ke diketahui
dalam beberapa tahun terakhir sebagai "sekolah Islam terpadu" (sekolah Islam terpadu)
gerakan. Sekolah terpadu merupakan bagian dari pendidikan multistranded
gerakan itu, yang mengejutkan banyak orang, menjadi salah satu fastestgrowing
tren dalam pendidikan Islam di era pasca-Soeharto.
PKS dan Islam Sekolah Gerakan Terpadu
Prinsip pertama pendidikan Islam terpadu adalah bahwa , daripada
membatasi pelajaran agama untuk satu atau dua modul subjek, harus
ditenun menjadi semua mata pelajaran di seluruh hari sekolah. Meskipun tidak semua
pendukung sekolah Islam terpadu yang akrab dengan luas
sejarah, lebih intelektual canggih memahami bahwa
74 ROBERT W. HEFNER
gerakan ini terkait dengan upaya oleh AS berbasis (tapi sekarang almarhum)
Palestina akademik, Ismail Raji al -Faruqi. Pada 1970-an dan 1980-an,
al-Faruqi dan rekan-rekannya merumuskan crit terik