Social constructionist approachesIn

Social constructionist approaches
Influenced by Mead, many sociologists and social
psychologists see the role of language as fundamental to
the construction and maintenance of the self. What we say about ourselves often depends on who’s listening.
In selecting what to say and not to say, we’re actively
constructing a self in relation to another person: we’re
constantly ‘making a self’. The self is not a static, internal
entity, but a constantly changing process (Petkova, 1995).
According to Harré (1985, 1989), our understanding
and experiences of ourselves as human beings, our
subjective experiences of selfhood, are laid down by
the beliefs about being a person that are implicit in our
language. The structure of our language implies certain
assumptions/beliefs about human nature, which we live
out in our daily interactions with others. For example,
the words ‘I’ and ‘me’ mislead us into believing that
each of us is represented by a coherent, unified self that
operates mechanisms and processes (the subject matter of
psychology) that are responsible for our actions. But ‘self’,
‘ego’, ‘mind’, and so on don’t refer to anything that exists
objectively in the world: they’re hypothetical constructs
which perform the very important function of helping
us to organise and structure our world (Burr, 1995).
According to Harré (1995, 1999), what ‘I’ actually
does is specify a location for the acts performed by a
speaker. It draws attention to the body of one particular
speaker who occupies a unique location, both physically
and socially. It also commits that individual to the
consequences of his/her utterance. We use words such as
‘I’ in conversation to perform actions in a moral universe:
‘I’ … is a form of life, a moral community that has
been presupposed by the uses of the first person,
not a kind of hidden inner cognitive engine
(Harré, 1989)
Similarly, Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that the
very experience of being a person, the kind of mental
life one can have, perhaps even how we experience
sensory information, are dependent on the particular
representations of selfhood, the particular ways of
accounting for/talking about ourselves available in our
culture. These ‘stories’ or accounts, whose meaning is
shared by members of a culture, are called discourses.
Since these differ from culture to culture, it follows that
members of different cultures will experience being
human (‘selves’) in different ways.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Pendekatan sosial konstruksionisDipengaruhi oleh Mead, banyak ahli sosiologi dan sosialpsikolog melihat peran bahasa seperti yang fundamentalpembangunan dan pemeliharaan diri. Apa yang kita katakan tentang diri kita sendiri sering tergantung pada siapa yang mendengarkan.Dalam memilih apa yang dikatakan dan bukan untuk mengatakan, kami sedang aktifmembangun diri dalam hubungannya dengan orang lain: kamiterus-menerus 'membuat diri'. Diri adalah tidak statis, internalentitas, tetapi terus-menerus mengubah proses (Petkova, 1995).Menurut Harré (1985, 1989), pemahaman kitadan pengalaman diri kita sebagai manusia, kamipengalaman subjektif selfhood, telah digariskan olehkeyakinan tentang menjadi orang yang tersirat dalam kamibahasa. Struktur bahasa kita menyiratkan tertentuasumsi/keyakinan tentang sifat manusia, yang kita hidupdalam interaksi sehari-hari kita dengan orang lain. Sebagai contoh,kata-kata 'Saya' dan 'aku' menyesatkan kita menjadi percaya bahwakita masing-masing diwakili oleh diri koheren, bersatu yangmengoperasikan mekanisme dan proses (pokokPsikologi) yang bertanggung jawab tindakan kita. Tapi 'diri','ego', 'pikiran', dan sebagainya tidak menyebut sesuatu yang adaobjektif di dunia: they're hipotetis konstruksiyang melakukan fungsi sangat penting membantukita untuk mengatur dan struktur dunia kita (Burr, 1995).Menurut Harré (1995, 1999), apa 'aku' benar-benarApakah yang menentukan lokasi untuk tindakan yang dilakukan olehspeaker. It draws attention to the body of one particularspeaker who occupies a unique location, both physicallyand socially. It also commits that individual to theconsequences of his/her utterance. We use words such as‘I’ in conversation to perform actions in a moral universe:‘I’ … is a form of life, a moral community that hasbeen presupposed by the uses of the first person,not a kind of hidden inner cognitive engine(Harré, 1989)Similarly, Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that thevery experience of being a person, the kind of mentallife one can have, perhaps even how we experiencesensory information, are dependent on the particularrepresentations of selfhood, the particular ways ofaccounting for/talking about ourselves available in ourculture. These ‘stories’ or accounts, whose meaning isshared by members of a culture, are called discourses.Since these differ from culture to culture, it follows thatmembers of different cultures will experience beinghuman (‘selves’) in different ways.