Internal political communication –

Internal political communication – the Conservatives
The Conservatives for their part have also had problems with internal communication, both in and out of government. Despite the success of its political
marketing since the mid-1970s, the party found itself in some difficulty in the
1987 campaign. Confronted on the one hand by an unprecedentedly professional Labour campaign, on the other their own efforts were hampered by
a lack of co-ordination between key elements of the communications
apparatus. Mrs Thatcher made a number of ‘gaffes’ during the campaign
including, on Labour’s ‘health day’, her insistence on her moral right to attend
a private hospital. Tory difficulties culminated in ‘wobbly Thursday’, when it
began to seem that Labour might win the election. In the end, Tory fears were
misplaced and Mrs Thatcher achieved a third election victory with an overall
majority in three figures. Nevertheless, the party leadership’s dissatisfaction
with what it perceived to be a weak campaign led to a restructuring of the
public relations organisation.
Party chairman Peter Brooke divided Central Office functions into three –
communication, research and organisation – and appointed Brendan Bruce as
Director of communications. A communication audit conducted by Shandwick
PR in 1991 led to the appointment of regional communications officers to liaise
with the local media in their areas. In 1991 too, after a period of cool relations,
COMMUNICATING POLITICS
142
the Conservatives reappointed Saatchi and Saatchi to plan and co-ordinate
communications strategy in all its aspects. The agency developed a ‘long’
campaign, stressing the Tories’ economic competence and raising anxieties
about Labour’s ‘tax and spend’ plans. ‘The government was urged to seize the
opportunity to dominate the news, exploiting ministerial statements, parliamentary questions, control of parliamentary time, and, ultimately, the Budget’
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1992, p. 81).
The ‘short’ campaign, when it came, was generally perceived as being
much more successful than that of 1987 (although in the election itself the
government’s majority was cut to 22). In 1992, unlike 1987,
10 Downing Street was to be intimately linked with operations in
Central Office and there would be close relations between the Prime
Minister and the party chairman; there would be a coherent
communications strategy to which all party spokesmen would be
expected to adhere; there would be no battle between rival advertising agencies, for advertising was exclusively in the hands of
Saatchi andSaatchi; there would be a major effort to co-ordinate
the content and timing of ministers’ speeches, press conferences,
election broadcasts, and photo-opportunities, and key ministers
would accord priority to appearing on regional television.
(Ibid., p. 86)
In so far as this strategy resulted in electoral victory, it was undeniably
successful. While, as we have seen, John Major’s image was self-consciously
‘unconstructed’, the co-ordination and synchronisation of the Tories’ overall
political message was carefully planned and expertly executed.
Between 1992 and 1997, however, it all went wrong for the Conservatives.
As noted above, a series of ‘sleaze’ scandals and major policy differences over
European union destroyed its capacity to control and shape the news agenda,
leaving the leadership helpless in the face of self-inflicted, self-destructive
division and in-fighting. When the 1997 election campaign began, it was, we
can now see with hindsight, already over, with the Tories reduced to their
worst electoral showing for more than a century. Much of this collapse was
the product of poor internal communication, as candidates failed to receive
adequate leadership from the party’s central office and factions developed
around contrasting approaches to Europe. In 1997 the Tories were as ineffectual in their internal communication and campaign co-ordination as the
Labour Party had ever been.
Following the 1997 defeat the Tories elected a new leader, William Hague,
but remained unable to mount a serious challenge to Tony Blair’s government. As was to be expected, the scale of the 1997 defeat set in motion
a process of reform and renewal in both the content and the style of
Conservative communication which was always going to be difficult (even if
POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
143
Labour had been weak and vulnerable to an effective challenge, which it was
not), and which by the election of 2001 was far from complete. Following
defeat in that year’s general election the Tories elected Iain Duncan Smith as
leader. Following an ineffective and brief period in the post, he was succeeded
by Michael Howard, the former Home Secretary. Howard presided over
another defeat in 2005, despite the contribution to the party’s campaign of
Australian political PR guru Lynton Crosby. In September 2005 the party
elected the youthful David Cameron to lead it. As noted above, David
Cameron was presented to the British electorate as a Tory version of Tony
Blair, prepared to reform his party’s policies and image. He embraced a range
of issues not hitherto associated with the Conservatives, such as the environment, and campaigned for more women and ethnic minority parliamentary
candidates. He was, in short, to the old Tory party what Blair had been to
Labour when elected leader in 1994. In an echo of the Blair-Campbell
relationship, Cameron in 2007 appointed former News Of The Worldeditor
Andy Coulson as his director of communication. His aim, like Blair’s with
Campbell, was to have access to the communication expertise of a senior
popular journalist. David Cameron’s qualified victory in the 2010 election,
where his party emerged with the largest number of parliamentary seats (but
no overall majority) was seen by some as the outcome of a flawed communications strategy, and as this edition went to press Coulson had yet to
prove himself as a spin doctor of the calibre of Alistair Campbell.
Information management
Finally in this discussion of party political public relations, we turn to the
techniques and practices involved in information management by government. By this is meant activities designed to control or manipulate the flow
of information from institutions of government to the public sphere beyond.
Steinberg defines governmental communication as ‘those techniques
which government officials and agencies employ to keep the public informed
and to disseminate information about the activities of various departments’
(1958, p. 327). The dissemination of information is not, however, the only
purpose of governmental communication. Information is a power resource,
the astute deployment of which can play a major role in the management of
public opinion. As Denton and Woodward note, ‘information is power, and
the control of information is the first step in propaganda’ (1990, p. 42).
Information can be freely given out in the pursuit of democratic government,
but it can also be suppressed, censored, leaked, and manufactured in
accordance with the more particular interests of a government and the
organs of state power. As former civil servant Clive Ponting puts it, writing
of the British government, public opinion may be regarded as ‘something to
be manipulated rather than a voice that might alter government policy’
(1989, p. 189). In Britain, he noted then, ‘the tradition is that government is
COMMUNICATING POLITICS
144
a matter for insiders and not something that need concern the general public.
Decisions are taken in secret by a small group of ministers and senior civil
servants and then the effort is made to sell those policies to the public
through the government propaganda machine’ (ibid., p. 177). Governmental
communication for this observer, himself a former Whitehall ‘insider’, is
about the control and management of information for the purpose of
protecting and insulating power from the critical gaze of the public, rather
than empowering the latter and drawing them into the governmental
process. Cockerell et al.concur that ‘what government chooses to tell us
through its public relations machine is one thing; the information in use by
participants in the country’s real government is another’ (1984, p. 9).
The British government first established an apparatus of media management during the First World War. Known as the Official Press Bureau, the
principles of secrecy to which it adhered have been retained in the governmental information apparatus ever since. In this respect British political
culture may be seen as ‘closed’ and secretive, as distinct from the relative
openness of the US system. This is reflected in legislation such as the Official
Secrets Act and the disclosure rules which prevent some official secrets being
revealed to the public for 30, 40, or even 100 years after the event. One of
the key pledges of the new Labour government in 1997 was to introduce for
the first time in Britain, a Freedom of Information Act. FOI was duly enacted
in January 2005 and has had a significant impact on government communication. Stephen Coleman discusses the implications of Freedom of
Information for UK government communication in a recent essay (2009).
He, like most observers, welcomes the enhanced transparency surrounding official data, but some have argued that too much access to official
information can make government more difficult, not less. One dramatic
story made possible by FOI was the exposure of UK MPs’ expenses by the
Daily Telegraphnewspaper in 2009. Over a period of months, becoming
years, every detail of MPs’ more bizarre expense claims – such as the
installation of a duck pond in one MP’s garden – was made public. The
British political class was plunged into crisis as some resigned, others were
prosecuted, and many were removed from office at the 2010 election. The
expenses scandal was seen by many observers as a major contributing factor
to the Labour g

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Internal political communication – the ConservativesThe Conservatives for their part have also had problems with internal communication, both in and out of government. Despite the success of its politicalmarketing since the mid-1970s, the party found itself in some difficulty in the1987 campaign. Confronted on the one hand by an unprecedentedly professional Labour campaign, on the other their own efforts were hampered bya lack of co-ordination between key elements of the communicationsapparatus. Mrs Thatcher made a number of ‘gaffes’ during the campaignincluding, on Labour’s ‘health day’, her insistence on her moral right to attenda private hospital. Tory difficulties culminated in ‘wobbly Thursday’, when itbegan to seem that Labour might win the election. In the end, Tory fears weremisplaced and Mrs Thatcher achieved a third election victory with an overallmajority in three figures. Nevertheless, the party leadership’s dissatisfactionwith what it perceived to be a weak campaign led to a restructuring of thepublic relations organisation.Party chairman Peter Brooke divided Central Office functions into three –communication, research and organisation – and appointed Brendan Bruce asDirector of communications. A communication audit conducted by ShandwickPR in 1991 led to the appointment of regional communications officers to liaisewith the local media in their areas. In 1991 too, after a period of cool relations,KOMUNIKASI POLITIK142Konservatif diangkat kembali Saatchi dan Saatchi untuk merencanakan dan mengoordinasikanstrategi komunikasi dalam segala aspeknya. Badan dikembangkan 'panjang'kampanye, menekankan yang Tories ekonomi kompetensi dan meningkatkan kecemasantentang tenaga kerja di 'pajak dan habiskan' rencana. ' Pemerintah mendesak untuk merebutkesempatan untuk mendominasi Berita, mengeksploitasi pernyataan Menteri, pertanyaan Parlemen, kontrol waktu Parlemen, dan, akhirnya, anggaran '(Butler dan Kavanagh, 1992, ms. 81).Kampanye 'pendek', ketika tiba, umumnya dianggap sebagaijauh lebih sukses daripada 1987 (meskipun dalam pemilihan itu sendiripemerintah mayoritas dipotong-22). Pada tahun 1992, tidak seperti tahun 1987,10 Downing Street adalah untuk menjadi erat dikaitkan dengan operasi diKantor Pusat dan akan ada hubungan yang erat antara PerdanaMenteri dan ketua Partai; akan ada koherenstrategi komunikasi yang semua pihak jurubicara akandiharapkan untuk mengikuti; tidak akan ada pertempuran antara agen saingan iklan, karena iklan secara eksklusif di tanganSaatchi andSaatchi; akan ada upaya besar untuk mengkoordinasikanisi dan waktu pidato Menteri, konferensi pers,pemilihan siaran, dan kesempatan foto, dan Menteri kuncisesuai prioritas untuk muncul di televisi regional.(Ibid., ms. 86)Sejauh strategi ini mengakibatkan kemenangan pemilu, itu adalah bisa disangkalsukses. Sementara, seperti yang kita lihat, John Major gambar adalah sadar diri'unconstructed', koordinasi dan sinkronisasi yang Tories keseluruhanpesan politik hati-hati direncanakan dan ahli dieksekusi.Antara 1992 dan 1997, namun, itu semua pergi salah untuk kaum konservatif.Seperti disebutkan di atas, serangkaian skandal 'pekerjaan buruk' dan kebijakan utama perbedaan atasUni Eropa hancur kapasitas untuk mengontrol dan membentuk agenda Berita,meninggalkan kepemimpinan yang tak berdaya di wajah diakibatkan diri sendiri, merusak diri sendiriDivisi dan dalam memerangi. Ketika kampanye pemilu 1997 mulai, itu adalah, kitasekarang dapat melihat dengan melihat ke belakang, sudah berakhir, dengan Tories dikurangi untuk merekaterburuk pemilihan menampilkan selama lebih dari satu abad. Banyak keruntuhanproduk dari Malang komunikasi internal, sebagai calon gagal untuk menerimamemadai kepemimpinan dari Partai kantor pusat dan faksi berkembangdi sekitar kontras pendekatan ke Eropa. Pada tahun 1997 yang Tories itu sebagai tidak efektif dalam mereka internal kampanye komunikasi dan koordinasi sebagaiPartai Buruh pernah.Setelah kekalahan 1997 Tories Terpilih pemimpin baru, William Hague,tapi tetap tidak dapat me-mount tantangan serius pemerintah Tony Blair. Seperti dapat diperkirakan, mengatur skala kekalahan 1997 bergerak proses reformasi dan pembaruan dalam isi dan gayaKomunikasi konservatif yang selalu akan menjadi sulit (bahkan jikaPOLITIK HUBUNGAN MASYARAKAT143Buruh telah lemah dan rentan terhadap tantangan yang efektif, yang sebenarnyatidak), dan yang dengan pemilihan 2001 adalah jauh dari selesai. Berikutkekalahan dalam pemilihan umum tahun yang Tories dipilih Iain Duncan Smith sebagaipemimpin. Setelah periode yang tidak efektif dan singkat dalam posting, ia digantikanoleh Michael Howard, mantan Menteri dalam negeri. Howard memimpinkekalahan lain pada tahun 2005, meskipun kontribusi untuk kampanye PartaiAustralia politik PR guru Lynton Crosby. Pada bulan September 2005 Partaidipilih Cameron David muda untuk memimpin. Seperti disebutkan di atas, DavidCameron disampaikan kepada pemilih Inggris sebagai versi Tory TonyBlair, siap untuk reformasi kebijakan dan gambar partainya. Dia memeluk berbagaimasalah tidak sampai sekarang terkait dengan konservatif, seperti lingkungan, dan berkampanye untuk wanita dan etnis minoritas Parlemenkandidat. Dia adalah, Singkatnya, Partai Tory lama apa yang telah Blair keBuruh ketika pemimpin terpilih pada tahun 1994. Di Gema dari Blair-Campbellhubungan, Cameron pada tahun 2007 ditunjuk mantan berita dari The WorldeditorAndy Coulson sebagai nya Direktur komunikasi. Tujuannya, seperti Blair denganCampbell, adalah untuk memiliki akses ke keahlian komunikasi seniorwartawan yang populer. David Cameron yang memenuhi syarat kemenangan dalam pemilu 2010mana partainya muncul dengan jumlah terbesar kursi Parlemen (tapitidak mayoritas keseluruhan) dianggap oleh beberapa sebagai hasil dari strategi komunikasi Cacat, dan karena edisi ini pergi ke tekan Coulson belummembuktikan dirinya sebagai spin dokter kaliber Alistair Campbell. Informasi manajemenAkhirnya dalam diskusi Humas partai politik, kita beralih keteknik dan praktek-praktek yang terlibat dalam manajemen informasi oleh pemerintah. Dengan ini dimaksudkan kegiatan-kegiatan yang dirancang untuk mengontrol atau memanipulasi aliraninformasi dari lembaga-lembaga pemerintah untuk ruang publik di luar.Steinberg mendefinisikan komunikasi pemerintah sebagai ' orang-orang teknikpejabat pemerintah dan badan-badan yang mempekerjakan untuk menjaga informasi publikdan menyebarkan informasi tentang kegiatan dari berbagai departemen(1958, mukasurat 327). Penyebaran informasi ini tidak, bagaimanapun, satu-satunyatujuan komunikasi pemerintah. Informasi adalah sumber daya,penyebaran cerdas yang dapat memainkan peran utama dalam pengelolaanopini publik. Sebagai catatan Denton dan Woodward, ' informasi adalah kekuatan, dankontrol informasi adalah langkah pertama dalam propaganda' (1990, hal 42).Informasi dapat secara bebas diberikan dalam mengejar pemerintah demokratis,tetapi dapat juga ditekan, disensor, bocor, dan diproduksi disesuai dengan kepentingan tertentu lebih pemerintah danorgan kekuasaan negara. Sebagai mantan pegawai negeri sipil Clive Ponting dikatakan, menulisof the British government, public opinion may be regarded as ‘something tobe manipulated rather than a voice that might alter government policy’(1989, p. 189). In Britain, he noted then, ‘the tradition is that government isCOMMUNICATING POLITICS144a matter for insiders and not something that need concern the general public.Decisions are taken in secret by a small group of ministers and senior civilservants and then the effort is made to sell those policies to the publicthrough the government propaganda machine’ (ibid., p. 177). Governmentalcommunication for this observer, himself a former Whitehall ‘insider’, isabout the control and management of information for the purpose ofprotecting and insulating power from the critical gaze of the public, ratherthan empowering the latter and drawing them into the governmentalprocess. Cockerell et al.concur that ‘what government chooses to tell usthrough its public relations machine is one thing; the information in use byparticipants in the country’s real government is another’ (1984, p. 9).The British government first established an apparatus of media management during the First World War. Known as the Official Press Bureau, theprinciples of secrecy to which it adhered have been retained in the governmental information apparatus ever since. In this respect British politicalculture may be seen as ‘closed’ and secretive, as distinct from the relativeopenness of the US system. This is reflected in legislation such as the OfficialSecrets Act and the disclosure rules which prevent some official secrets beingrevealed to the public for 30, 40, or even 100 years after the event. One ofthe key pledges of the new Labour government in 1997 was to introduce forthe first time in Britain, a Freedom of Information Act. FOI was duly enactedin January 2005 and has had a significant impact on government communication. Stephen Coleman discusses the implications of Freedom ofInformation for UK government communication in a recent essay (2009).He, like most observers, welcomes the enhanced transparency surrounding official data, but some have argued that too much access to officialinformation can make government more difficult, not less. One dramaticstory made possible by FOI was the exposure of UK MPs’ expenses by theDaily Telegraphnewspaper in 2009. Over a period of months, becomingyears, every detail of MPs’ more bizarre expense claims – such as theinstallation of a duck pond in one MP’s garden – was made public. TheBritish political class was plunged into crisis as some resigned, others wereprosecuted, and many were removed from office at the 2010 election. Theexpenses scandal was seen by many observers as a major contributing factorto the Labour g