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4Bertram F. Malledichotomy on the other is not just a curious historical accident2; it had massive theoreticalconsequences. Attribution theories after Heider ignored the intentional-unintentional distinctionand built models that applied to all behaviors alike. But it was precisely Heider’s (1958) pointthat not all behaviors are explained the same way. He specifically stated that, whereasunintentional behaviors were explained simply by causes, intentional actions were explained bythe “reasons behind the intention” (Heider, 1958, p. 110; see also pp. 125-129). But even in1976, around the peak of attribution research, Heider observed that explanations of intentionalaction by way of reasons had not been adequately treated in contemporary attribution work(Ickes, 1976, p. 14). Sadly, nothing much seems to have changed in this regard, if we take socialpsychology textbooks and major surveys of attribution research as barometers.Perhaps social psychology has held on to the simplified model of person-situationattribution because, for a long time, there was no alternative available? This can’t be quite right,because alternative viewpoints have been voiced repeatedly (e.g., Buss, 1978; Lalljee &Abelson, 1983; Locke & Pennington, 1982; Read, 1987; White, 1991). It is true, however, thatthese alternative viewpoints did not resolve the contradictions between the various models anddid not provide an integrative theory of behavior explanation. Such an integrative theory is whatI hope to offer in this chapter, but first I briefly discuss the second core claim of classicattribution theory.Kelley’s (1967) claim that covariation analysis underlies the construction of layexplanations (COV) is problematic as well. First off, the covariation claim is poorly supportedempirically. The available evidence shows that people can make use ofcovariation informationwhen it is presented to them by the experimenter (e.g., Försterling, 1992; McArthur, 1972;Sutton & McClure, 2001; Van Kleeck, Hillger, & Brown, 1988). But there is no evidence thatpeoplespontaneously search forcovariation information when trying to explain behavior. Infact, very few studies even examined whether and when people actively seek out covariationinformation in natural contexts. As a rare exception, Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham, and Jaspars (1984)asked their participants to write down the kind of information they would like to have in order toexplain various events, and covariation information was in low demand under these conditions.A few additional studies examined people’s choices between receiving covariation informationand some other information, and there, too, explainers were less interested in covariationinformation than in information about generative forces or mechanisms (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, &Gelman, 1995).The theoretical foundation for (COV) is dubious as well. The notion of covariationanalysis was a creative analogy to scientific and statistical reasoning, but it wasn’t grounded inany model of either cognitive inference or causal learning. The covariation thesis alsocontradicts what we know about behavior explanations as communicative acts (i.e., one person’sclarification for another person; Hilton, 1990; Kidd & Amabile, 1981; Turnbull & Slugoski,1988). In constructing communicative explanations, the speaker’s choice of a particular causalfactor is guided, not by covariation analysis, but by impression management (i.e., selecting aAttributions as Behavior Explanations5cause that puts the agent or explainer in a certain evaluative light; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981) andaudience design (i.e., selecting a cause that meets the listener’s wondering or expectation;Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb, & Ginsburg, 1993). So even if there are some contexts in whichcovariation analysis is important, it is clearly not the only cognitive process by whichexplanations are c
ons
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l
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but
i
on t
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ha
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ddi
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or
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t
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t
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ogni
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o t
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ount
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t
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oc
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om
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or
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a
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pe
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or
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por
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a
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gove
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n t
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c
ons
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uc
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on
of
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ons
, pr
oc
e
s
s
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us
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o pr
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di
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t
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phe
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of
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or
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A
n A
l
t
e
r
na
t
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ve
:
T
he
F
ol
k-
C
onc
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pt
ua
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T
he
or
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E
xpl
a
na
t
i
on
A
t
he
or
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be
ha
vi
or
e
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a
na
t
i
on t
ha
t
m
y c
ol
l
e
a
gue
s
a
nd I
ha
ve
de
ve
l
ope
d a
ppe
a
r
s
t
o
m
e
e
t
t
he
s
e
de
m
a
nds
a
nd m
a
y be
a
bl
e
t
o s
upe
r
s
e
de
a
t
t
r
i
but
i
on t
he
or
y a
s
a
n a
c
c
ount
of
pe
opl
e
’
s
be
ha
vi
or
e
xpl
a
na
t
i
ons
(
M
a
l
l
e
, 1999, 2001;
M
a
l
l
e
, K
nobe
, O
’
L
a
ughl
i
n, P
e
a
r
c
e
, &
N
e
l
s
on, 2000)
.
I
c
a
l
l
i
t
t
he
f
ol
k
-
c
onc
e
pt
ual
t
he
or
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of
be
hav
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or
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x
pl
anat
i
on
be
c
a
us
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i
t
s
ba
s
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a
s
s
um
pt
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ons
a
r
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gr
ounde
d i
n pe
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e
’
s
f
ol
k c
onc
e
pt
s
of
m
i
nd a
nd be
ha
vi
or
.
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he
t
he
or
y ha
s
t
hr
e
e
l
a
ye
r
s
. T
he
f
i
r
s
t
l
a
ye
r
c
onc
e
r
ns
t
he
c
on
c
e
p
t
u
al
f
r
am
e
w
or
k
t
ha
t
unde
r
l
i
e
s
be
ha
vi
or
e
xpl
a
na
t
i
ons
(
a
nd he
l
ps
m
e
e
t
t
he
f
i
r
s
t
de
m
a
nd s
pe
c
i
f
i
e
d a
bove
)
. T
he
s
t
a
r
t
i
ng
poi
nt
i
s
H
e
i
de
r
’
s
i
ns
i
ght
t
ha
t
pe
opl
e
di
s
t
i
ngui
s
h s
ha
r
pl
y be
t
w
e
e
n i
nt
e
nt
i
ona
l
a
nd uni
nt
e
nt
i
ona
l
be
ha
vi
or
a
nd c
onc
e
pt
ua
l
i
z
e
i
nt
e
nt
i
ona
l
be
ha
vi
or
ve
r
y di
f
f
e
r
e
nt
l
y f
r
om
uni
nt
e
nt
i
ona
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