Based on a continuous-time model of

Based on a continuous-time model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, this paper provides an
analytically tractable framework of entrepreneurial firms' capital structure and investment
decisions under time-inconsistent preferences. Inefficiency in both investment and
default is caused due to time inconsistency, if we view the time-consistent benchmark as
efficient. Compared to the standard trade-off theory in corporate finance, we clarify that
debt financing under time-inconsistent preferences brings a new trade-off between the
alleviation effect on investment inefficiency and the aggravation effect on default inefficiency.
The impact of time-inconsistent preferences depends on the entrepreneurs' belief
regarding their future time-inconsistent behavior (i.e., sophisticated or naive). Concretely,
we find that naive entrepreneurs always choose higher leverages, while sophisticated
ones are more likely to choose lower leverages, compared to the time-consistent benchmark.
Therefore, time inconsistency can explain the observed leverage puzzle (i.e., why
firms choose different leverages even with similar fundamentals). Moreover, we demonstrate
that time-inconsistent preferences delay investment and hasten default, due to the
interaction among the three effects: option value effect, payoff value effect, and leverage
effect. In particular, naive entrepreneurs invest later and default earlier than sophisticated
ones, leading to a shorter operating period. These results support the empirical findings in
entrepreneurial finance.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Based on a continuous-time model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, this paper provides ananalytically tractable framework of entrepreneurial firms' capital structure and investmentdecisions under time-inconsistent preferences. Inefficiency in both investment anddefault is caused due to time inconsistency, if we view the time-consistent benchmark asefficient. Compared to the standard trade-off theory in corporate finance, we clarify thatdebt financing under time-inconsistent preferences brings a new trade-off between thealleviation effect on investment inefficiency and the aggravation effect on default inefficiency.The impact of time-inconsistent preferences depends on the entrepreneurs' beliefregarding their future time-inconsistent behavior (i.e., sophisticated or naive). Concretely,we find that naive entrepreneurs always choose higher leverages, while sophisticatedones are more likely to choose lower leverages, compared to the time-consistent benchmark.Therefore, time inconsistency can explain the observed leverage puzzle (i.e., whyfirms choose different leverages even with similar fundamentals). Moreover, we demonstratethat time-inconsistent preferences delay investment and hasten default, due to theinteraction among the three effects: option value effect, payoff value effect, and leverageeffect. In particular, naive entrepreneurs invest later and default earlier than sophisticatedyang, mengarah ke jangka operasi. Hasil ini mendukung hasil empiris dikewirausahaan keuangan.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Berdasarkan model kontinu-waktu pendiskontoan kuasi-hiperbolik, makalah ini menyediakan
kerangka kerja analitis penurut dari struktur modal perusahaan kewirausahaan dan investasi
keputusan di bawah preferensi waktu yang tidak konsisten. Inefisiensi dalam investasi dan
default disebabkan karena waktu inkonsistensi, jika kita melihat patokan waktu yang konsisten sebagai
efisien. Dibandingkan dengan teori trade-off standar di perusahaan keuangan, kami menjelaskan bahwa
pembiayaan utang di bawah preferensi waktu yang tidak konsisten membawa trade-off baru antara
efek pengentasan pada inefisiensi investasi dan efek kejengkelan pada inefisiensi default.
Dampak dari preferensi waktu-tidak konsisten tergantung pada keyakinan pengusaha
mengenai perilaku waktu-tidak konsisten masa depan mereka (yaitu, canggih atau naif). Konkretnya,
kami menemukan bahwa pengusaha naif selalu memilih leverage yang lebih tinggi, sementara canggih
yang lebih cenderung memilih leverage yang lebih rendah, dibandingkan dengan patokan waktu yang konsisten.
Oleh karena itu, waktu inkonsistensi dapat menjelaskan teka-teki leverage yang diamati (yaitu, mengapa
perusahaan memilih berbeda memanfaatkan bahkan dengan fundamental yang sama). Selain itu, kami menunjukkan
bahwa preferensi waktu-tidak konsisten menunda investasi dan mempercepat default, karena
interaksi antara tiga efek: efek nilai pilihan, efek nilai payoff, dan leverage
berpengaruh. Secara khusus, pengusaha naif berinvestasi kemudian dan bawaan lebih awal dari yang canggih
yang, mengarah ke periode operasi yang lebih pendek. Hasil ini mendukung temuan empiris di
bidang keuangan kewirausahaan.