of the structure of an institution,

of the structure of an institution, appropriately elaborated, was perfectly suited to
the structure of an activity. By taking inventory of all a community’s activities that
involved more than one person and seeing how they were structurally interrelated
(e.g., involving the same standing groups), it would be possible then to posit any
change and game out its structural effects. Retrospective analyses of changes in the
availability of traditional outrigger sailing canoes in Kiribati (the Gilbert Islands)
(Goodenough 1963a, pp. 337–43; 1963b) and the introduction of outboard motors
in Kapingamarangi in Micronesia (Lieber 1994) illustrated the utility of this ap-
proach. Looking at a community’s cultural organization of activities proved very
useful also, in describing the political organization of a stateless society (Chowning
& Goodenough 1966). The social organization of that community’s many activi-
ties followed one or another of a very few designs. Lines of authority were clearly
revealed in these designs.
A long-standing concern of anthropologists has been the search for cultural
universals. In thinking about what, in practice, we treated as cross-cultural cate-
gories for comparative purposes, I saw that these were not, in themselves, specific
to any given culture as a part of its emic makeup. In emic terms the categories
of one culture were not exactly the same as those of any other. For comparative
purposes we map these emic categories into functional types. Thus we map partic-
ular emic categories of containers into bowls, jars, etc., or particular emic criteria
for residence choices in marriage into patrilocal, matrilocal, etc. Then we say that
containers are cultural universals, instead of saying that in all cultures there are
things that people use as containers, recognizing that the universal is a functional
category rather than an emic cultural one. The common denominator of cultures is
thus to be seen as composed of functional categories, such as shelter, food quest,
food preparation, socialization of children, treatment of illness, disposal of the
dead, religion, and so on (Goodenough 1981b). The
Outline of Cultural Materials
gives a detailed list of categories that are largely of this kind (Murdock et al. 1967).
Seeing religion as a functional category struck me as having important the-
oretical implications. Definitions of religion have always centered on belief in
supernatural or spirit beings. Atheists were presumably without religion, yet the
great salvation-promising movement of the twentieth century was atheistic com-
munism. People were converted to it as to other visionary religions. Salvation is,
of course, the achievement of an ideal state of being, whether in life or after death ,
a transformation of self whether through individual endeavor or through collective
effort to transform society. When we stop to look at what the concerns are that
people are addressing through prayer, ritual, magic, etc., we find that they have
to do with the state of their selves and the selves of others who matter to them,
including the state of the groups with which people identify themselves. What is
addressed is the maintenance of selves as people wish them to be, the repair of
damage to selves (as from pollution and illness) and the enhancement of selves (as
with rites of passage and rites to earn merit). These rites may be elaborate or they
may be as simple as avoiding stepping on the cracks in the sidewalk or carrying
a rabbit’s foot. Our folk wisdom recognizes this when we speak of people doing
their morning exercises religiously or making a religion of their business. A cus-
tomary practice that is readily abandoned in favor of another lacks religious value
for people. Their selves are not threatened by it. The greater the emotional distress,
exhibited by the suggestion that a custom be abandoned, the greater the religious
(i.e., self-maintaining) value it has for those who are distressed. The equivalent of
children’s security blankets are legion. Horace Minor recognized this years ago
with his much-cited article “Body Ritual Among the Nacirema” (1956).
Looked at functionally in this way, the ethnographic description of a people’s
religious life requires examining all of their institutions and customary practices
with an eye to how they function religiously, if at all, and for whom. This is no
different from what we must do when describing a people’s economic life or their
political life. The same institution may function economically, politically, and reli-
giously. I followed this approach to describing a people’s religious life in my recent
book on pre-Christian religious tradition in Chuuk (Goodenough 2002). I was able
to do this because of the availability of psychological test materials that provided
a profile of the major concerns that were generated by the way people experienced
themselves in the framework of Chuuk’s social culture (Gladwin & Sarason 1953).
In recent years I have become interested in looking at how genetically pro-
grammed behavioral tendencies from our animal heritage are manifested in the
complex symbolic world stemming from language and culture in which we hu-
mans exist. A surprise to me in this regard was the realization that the bristling
response we call moral outrage is the human equivalent of what ethologists refer
to as the territorial response (Lorenz 1963; Ardrey 1966, p. 3). Among humans,
the rights, privileges, and immunities they have in their various social identity rela-
tionships are symbolic territories. Trespass on these territories evokes the bristling
umbrage of the animal territorial response (Goodenough 1997b). In this regard, it
is evident in the ethnographic record that there is no human society whose culture
of interpersonal relationships does not involve the definition of kinds of social
identities and kinds of possible inter-identity relationships. These relationships
are organized in terms of what are formalized in jural relationships as the com-
plementary conceptual pairs, right versus duty, no right versus privilege, power
versus liability, and no power versus immunity (Hohfeld 1919), as was observed
years ago by Hoebel (1954). Of these, right and duty are fundamental, the other
concepts being derivable from them.
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2003.32:1-12. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
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9 Aug 2003 18:52 AR AR196-AN32-01.tex AR196-AN32-01.sgm LaTeX2e(2002/01/18)
P1: GCE
10
GOODENOUGH
Rights and duties are affected by what among the four universal interactive
modes described by Fiske (1991) is appropriate to the context of a social inter-
action. These modes are communal sharing; authority ranking or priority ranking
(the cultural ordering of dominance); equality matching (everyone getting or owing
exactly the same); and market pricing (negotiation and contractual arrangement).
All but equality matching appear to be present in rudimentary form in chimpanzee

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

struktur lembaga, tepat diuraikan, adalah sangat cocok untukstruktur dari suatu kegiatan. Dengan mengambil inventarisasi semua masyarakat kegiatan yangmelibatkan lebih dari satu orang dan melihat bagaimana mereka tidak saling berhubungan secara struktural(misalnya, melibatkan kelompok berdiri sama), hal itu mungkin untuk menempatkan apapunperubahan dan permainan keluar efek struktural. Analisis retrospektif perubahanketersediaan cadik tradisional berlayar kano di Kiribati (Kepulauan Gilbert)(Goodenough 1963a, ms 337-43; 1963b) dan pengenalan outboard motorsdi Kapingamarangi di Mikronesia (Lieber 1994) digambarkan utilitas ini ap -proach. Melihat organisasi budaya masyarakat kegiatan terbukti sangatberguna juga, dalam menggambarkan organisasi politik masyarakat stateless (Chowning& Goodenough 1966). Organisasi sosial dari masyarakat di banyak Kamea-ikatan diikuti satu atau lain dari desain yang sangat sedikit. Garis otoritas yang jelasterungkap dalam desain ini.Kekhawatiran lama antropologis telah mencari budayaUniversals. Dalam memikirkan apa, dalam prakteknya, kami diperlakukan sebagai Antarbudaya cate-Gories untuk tujuan perbandingan, aku melihat bahwa ini adalah tidak, dalam diri mereka, khusussetiap budaya yang diberikan sebagai bagian dari riasan yang rinci tentang. Dalam rinci tentang syarat Kategorisatu budaya yang tidak persis sama seperti yang lain. Untuk perbandinganTujuan kami memetakan kategori rinci tentang ini menjadi jenis fungsional. Dengan demikian kita peta partic-ular rinci tentang kategori kontainer ke dalam mangkuk, guci, dll, atau kriteria rinci tentang tertenturesidence pilihan dalam perkawinan ke patrilocal, matrilocal, dll. Kemudian kami mengatakan bahwawadah yang universals budaya, bukan mengatakan bahwa dalam semua budaya adahal yang orang gunakan sebagai wadah, mengakui bahwa universal adalah fungsionalKategori daripada rinci tentang budaya. The common denominator budaya adalahdengan demikian harus dilihat sebagai terdiri dari kategori fungsional, seperti tempat penampungan, makanan pencarian,persiapan makanan, sosialisasi anak-anak, pengobatan penyakit, pembuanganmati, agama, dan sebagainya (Goodenough 1981b). TheGaris besar bahan budayamemberikan daftar rinci tentang kategori yang sebagian besar semacam ini (Murdock et al. 1967).Melihat agama sebagai merupakan kategori fungsional yang menyerang saya sebagai memiliki penting -implikasi Oretical. Definisi agama telah selalu berpusat pada kepercayaansupranatural atau makhluk-makhluk roh. Ateis yang mungkin tanpa agama, namungerakan menjanjikan keselamatan besar abad kedua puluh adalah pada ateistik com-munism. Orang telah ditaubatkan kepada itu untuk agama lain visioner. Keselamatan adalah,Tentu saja, pencapaian keadaan ideal keberadaan, baik dalam kehidupan atau setelah kematian,transformasi diri Apakah melalui usaha individu atau kolektifupaya untuk mengubah masyarakat. Ketika kita berhenti untuk melihat apa kekhawatiran adalah bahwapeople are addressing through prayer, ritual, magic, etc., we find that they haveto do with the state of their selves and the selves of others who matter to them,including the state of the groups with which people identify themselves. What isaddressed is the maintenance of selves as people wish them to be, the repair ofdamage to selves (as from pollution and illness) and the enhancement of selves (aswith rites of passage and rites to earn merit). These rites may be elaborate or theymay be as simple as avoiding stepping on the cracks in the sidewalk or carryinga rabbit’s foot. Our folk wisdom recognizes this when we speak of people doingtheir morning exercises religiously or making a religion of their business. A cus-tomary practice that is readily abandoned in favor of another lacks religious valuefor people. Their selves are not threatened by it. The greater the emotional distress,exhibited by the suggestion that a custom be abandoned, the greater the religious(i.e., self-maintaining) value it has for those who are distressed. The equivalent ofchildren’s security blankets are legion. Horace Minor recognized this years agowith his much-cited article “Body Ritual Among the Nacirema” (1956).Looked at functionally in this way, the ethnographic description of a people’sreligious life requires examining all of their institutions and customary practiceswith an eye to how they function religiously, if at all, and for whom. This is nodifferent from what we must do when describing a people’s economic life or theirpolitical life. The same institution may function economically, politically, and reli-giously. I followed this approach to describing a people’s religious life in my recentbook on pre-Christian religious tradition in Chuuk (Goodenough 2002). I was ableto do this because of the availability of psychological test materials that provideda profile of the major concerns that were generated by the way people experiencedthemselves in the framework of Chuuk’s social culture (Gladwin & Sarason 1953).In recent years I have become interested in looking at how genetically pro-grammed behavioral tendencies from our animal heritage are manifested in thecomplex symbolic world stemming from language and culture in which we hu-mans exist. A surprise to me in this regard was the realization that the bristlingresponse we call moral outrage is the human equivalent of what ethologists referto as the territorial response (Lorenz 1963; Ardrey 1966, p. 3). Among humans,the rights, privileges, and immunities they have in their various social identity rela-tionships are symbolic territories. Trespass on these territories evokes the bristlingumbrage of the animal territorial response (Goodenough 1997b). In this regard, itis evident in the ethnographic record that there is no human society whose cultureof interpersonal relationships does not involve the definition of kinds of socialidentitas dan jenis hubungan antar identitas yang mungkin. Hubungan inidisusun dalam hal apa yang diformalkan dalam hubungan jural sebagai com-Pasang konseptual plementary, tepat versus tugas, tidak tepat terhadap hak istimewa, kekuatanversus tanggung jawab, dan tidak ada kekuasaan versus kekebalan (Hohfeld 1919), sebagaimana diamatitahun yang lalu oleh Hoebel (1954). Ini, hak dan kewajiban yang mendasar, yang lainkonsep-konsep yang menjadi derivable dari mereka.LSM. Wahyu Anthropol. 2003.32:1-12. download dari www.annualreviews.orgAkses yang disediakan oleh 202.67.43.39 pada 07/03/15. Untuk penggunaan pribadi saja.9 Agustus 2003 18:52 AR AR196-AN32-01.tex AR196-AN32-01.sgm LaTeX2e(2002/01/18)P1: GCE10GOODENOUGHHak dan kewajiban yang terpengaruh oleh apa antara empat universal interaktifmode dijelaskan oleh Fiske (1991) sesuai dengan konteks sosial Inter-tindakan. Mode ini adalah komunal berbagi; Peringkat otoritas atau peringkat prioritas(budaya Pemesanan dominasi); kesetaraan pencocokan (semua orang mendapatkan atau karenapersis sama); dan pasar harga (negosiasi dan kontrak pengaturan).Semua tapi kesetaraan pencocokan tampak hadir dalam bentuk dasar dalam simpanse