The benefits from such a system are many. First, congestion costs in terms of loss of time and fuel are reduced, thus motorists benefit. Second, pollution is reduced because of higher speeds, less time on the road, and fewer cars running (as a result of car pooling). Third, the government raises revenue for maintenance and expansion of road infrastructure. The main objections to the system have to do with the concerns that peoples' movements are thus monitored in violation of individual freedoms. Hong Kong has considered an automatic road toll system and rejected it on these grounds. However, this objection has now been addressed through a technological innovation that automatically deducts charges from the balance on each vehicle's ID card account. An alternative solution is to allow a choice to motorists by providing separately manned toll booths for those who prefer not to use the electronic toll system, just as they are provided today for those who do not have exact change.
Road pricing in general, and the electronic toll system in particular, should be applicable in any country regardless of the level of development. Because in developing countries car owners belong to the elite and the upper middle class, a road pricing system would not only be efficient but also distributionally progressive; especially if the revenue from tolls is used to subsidize an efficient mass transit system which is less polluting and more affordable by low income groups.
Market Creation From Tradeable Emission Permits in the United States to Individual
Tradeable Fishing Quotas in New Zealand
Tradeable Emission Permits
The major applications of tradeable emission permits have been in the U.S.: (a) trading of emission rights of pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act; (b) inter-refinery trading of lead credits; and (c) trading of permits for water pollution control. Three additional uses are being initiated or actively considered: (a) acid rain; (b) CFCs; and (c) newsprint.
Interestingly, the U.S. trading of emission rights arose from an attempt to implement strict emission regulations, which in many areas could not be met within the set timetable or could be met only at substantial opportunity cost in terms of foregone economic growth. When it was realized that many states could not meet the planned emission reduction, the EPA formulated an offset policy by which new and modified emission sources were allowed in “non-attainment areas” as long as any additional emissions were offset by reductions in existing sources. This led to the 1986 Emissions Trading Policy Statement, which covers several pollutants such as carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, particulates, VOCs, and nitrogen oxides. The U.S. emissions trading program has several elements. The “netting” or “bubble” element allows “trade” of emission reductions among different sources within a firm, as long as the combined emissions under the “bubble” are within the allowable limit. The “offset” element allows firms to trade emission credits between existing and new sources within a firm and among firms, new sources of emissions can be constructed as long as the new emissions are (more than) offset by a reduction of emissions from existing sources. Finally, the “banking” element allows firms to
accumulate and store emission reduction credits for future use or sale.
It is estimated that 5,000 to 12,000 trades have taken place within firms for the modification or expansion of plants (Hahn and Hester, 1989) and 2,500 trades (some among different firms) for the locating of plants in “non-attainment” areas (Dudek and Palmisan, 1988). Large companies such as Amco, Dupont, USX, and 3M have traded emission credits, and a relatively active market for such trades has developed (Stavins, 1991). It is estimated that the U.S. emissions trading program, despite its many limitations, has saved participating firms between $5 and $12 billion in compliance costs (Stavins, 1991) by affording them greater flexibility in meeting emission limits. These are substantial savings considering that only 1% of potentially tradeable emissions was actually traded and that virtually all trading took place within firms rather than between firms where the highest cost savings are likely to be found.
The U.S. Emissions Trading Program has several weaknesses that limit participation and interfirm
trading. First, states are encouraged but not required to allow trading in their implementation of the Clean Air Act. Second, inter-firm trades must be approved by the regulators who are not accustomed to trading practices. Third, there is uncertainty about the program's future and about the content and nature of rights that are being traded.
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