(Bruun, 1993; Gold, 1989; Hershkovi

(Bruun, 1993; Gold, 1989; Hershkovitz, 1985; Schell, 1984; Young, 1995).
To some degree, these consumer attitudes reflect historical experiences with
a planned economy and socialism, and parallels exist between marketplace
anxieties in China and other postsocialist contexts (Humphrey, 2002; see
also Kaneff, 2002). In China, traditional mistrust of merchants (Mann,
1987) interweaves with a more recent history of planned economics, state-
mandated prices, and a resulting inexperience with the markets (Stockman,
1992). A clear generation gap exists between young and old Chinese, and
in Harbin, older people were the most likely to convey unease with the new
ambiguities of price and style and the dangers of fake merchandise. ‘The
country’s economy has developed and changed so fast’, one retired cadre
told me, ‘but older people are slow to accept these changes.’ Many of these
market anxieties are general to the working class, and so while the prolif-
eration of bazaars and markets has provided urbanites with vastly expanded
shopping options, even today urban shoppers regard
geti
sellers with
distrust and moral distaste and view
geti
merchandise as cheap and of
dubious quality (Veeck, 2000).
The threat of purchasing fake or poor quality goods often creates more
anxiety than haggling over prices. Like many developing economies, China’s
marketplaces are rife with shoddy merchandise, copycat and fake brands,
and numerous schemes to cheat or deceive consumers. Many people have
personal experiences of being ‘cheated’ (
shangdang
) in some way, though
usually on the relatively small scale of being over charged for something or
being sold a defective item. Ann Veeck’s (2000) description of Nanjing resi-
dents toting their own scales to outdoor food markets captures a pervasive
consumer sentiment in China. Beverly Hooper (2000) notes the growth of
consumer complaints related to quality, safety, and product deception
through the 1980s and 1990s and the publicizing of these issues through
newspaper reports, television programs, and even the Internet. The sense
of danger and distrust associated with shopping is heightened by regular
media reports on consumer marketplace deceptions and scams. For
example, in 2001, Harbin local and Chinese national media reported on
numerous incidents relating to the quality of consumer goods, including a
faulty medicine,
Meihua K
, that poisoned more than 70 people in south-
western Hunan province, and the discovery of a reputable manufacturer in
the city of Nanjing using year-old, moldy filling to produce moon cakes for
the Mid-Autumn festival.
2
In a context where a market economy is still
relatively new and of questionable legitimacy, these reports of fraud and
deception have contributed to what sociologist Sun Liping (2003) has
termed a general ‘crisis of trust’ (
xinren weiji
) in China.
In both news reports and in popular opinion, many of these problems
are blamed on
geti
merchants. As a result, most department stores try to
distance themselves from untrustworthy
geti
markets by offering customers
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explicit guarantees for merchandise quality and customer satisfaction.
Although the state made efforts, in the early years of reforms, to keep state-
run retailers and
geti
merchants clearly separate by restricting the rental of
counter space by state stores (Liu, 1989; Qiao, 1989), by 2001 some state-
owned stores had shifted entirely to renting counter space to independent
geti
merchants and some new shopping centers that often looked like
department stores were also entirely rented out. As a result, distinctions
between
geti
settings and more reputable ‘big stores’ had become increas-
ingly difficult to perceive.
But for many customers, risk-free shopping comes at too high a monetary
price. Given the rock-bottom prices offered by
geti
merchants, who often
have few overhead costs, low taxes, and can survive on very slim profit
margins, many Harbin residents were willing or felt compelled to give up
the more expensive security of respectable stores for lower-priced but risky
market venues. As one retired man remarked, ‘The common people
(
laobaixing
) rarely buy fancy things . . . buying from a
geti
merchant is good
enough.’ Not only do such attitudes suggest that state department stores
are losing their target clientele, but, as I explore below, shopping in the
geti
marketplace calls forth a whole set of defensive practices – ranging from
intensive haggling over prices to microscopic inspections of merchandise –
that have become a deeply ingrained working-class orientation towards
shopping in general.
The crisis of trust at Harbin No. X
At the Harbin No. X Department Store, this broader consumer environ-
ment combined with a changing retail sector to produce a crisis of trust
within the store’s walls. On the one hand, as noted above, customers
could no longer clearly distinguish between many
geti
settings and a store
run by a centralized management, with uniform quality, return, and
exchange policies. Despite the fact that Harbin No. X did
not
rent out
counter space to private merchants, there was no obvious way for a
customer to know that Harbin No. X had remained largely impermeable
to these
geti
influences. The store also maintained a carefully respected
return policy – with a receipt, full refunds were allowed up to 30 days
after purchase – and secured its merchandise from large, well-respected
manufacturers. Nevertheless, the sales floors of Harbin No. X had been
invaded by
geti
market practices through the vehicle of wary, skeptical
customers and their shopping strategies. The consequences for sales clerks
were daily encounters with distrustful customers and the repeated need
to re-establish trust.