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A growing interest has been given to the impact of non‐financial stakeholders such as creditors and employees on corporate decisions in corporate finance literature. This paper examines relationship between creditors as well as employees and financial leverage across countries. The purpose is to explore roles of creditors and employees in capital structure decisions under different legal and political regimes across countries.

Shareholders, creditors, and employees have heterogeneous utility functions in corporate context. Tirole (2001, 2006) asserts that corporations select optimal investment and financing decisions within the constraints of legal and political environments to which they belong. Within a company, stakeholders bargain with each other to maximize benefits of themselves. The bargaining between stakeholders is ruled and regulated by a country's legal and political regime. While legal and political regimes differ across countries, the bargaining powers of stakeholders are not identical in different countries. Interaction between creditors and shareholders is mainly through the negotiation in debt contracting. The bargaining power of creditors relies largely on creditor rights (CR) provided by a country's legal system. Employees, on the other hand, do not have voting right nor bargaining power unless they form unions or get protection from labor law. Existing literature suggests that shareholders, with the constraints of legal regime in a country, will seek a mechanism within corporations to weaken creditors and employees' bargaining powers so as to maximize payoffs. Financial leverage is a tool that shareholders can use to achieve this goal. Dronars and Deere (1991) develop a model to describe the role of debt in limiting employees' bargaining power when they form unions, while Matsa (2010) finds that debt is positively correlated with unionization rates at firm level for firms in the USA.

This paper focuses on cross‐country comparison. Using country‐level creditor right and labor right indices as proxies for bargaining powers of creditors and employees, I investigate the impacts of creditor and employee rights on capital structure across countries. I argue that when employee rights are high, employees will have stronger bargaining powers and shareholders are more likely to be exploited by employees. If so, shareholders intend to use more debt obligation to remove free cash flows so as to reduce amount of revenues employees can extract. When CR are high, creditors have more negotiation power to obtain good terms in debt contracting. If shareholders cannot get a favorable debt contract, they are likely to reduce the use of debt capital.

My study extends the literature by exploring country level factors' influences and by taking creditors and employees' roles into account when examining capital structure decisions across countries. This paper is directly related to the capital structure literature that makes cross‐country comparison of financial leverage. Empirical research on cross‐country financial leverage finds a large variation across countries[1]. Basically, these studies merely document differences in capital structure in different countries or country groups. They identify how firm‐level determinants of capital structure such as firm size, profitability, market‐to‐book ratio, retained earnings, and growth opportunities affect capital structure differently across countries and interpret generally the empirical results based on agency problems or signaling theories, without examining specifically the impacts of creditors and employees on financial leverage across countries. Treating a firm as a nexus through which shareholders and managers in the productive enterprise contract with each other, law and finance approach represented by a series of papers by La Porta, Lopez‐deoSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV hereafter) examines the relationship between a country's legal origin as well as level of protection for investors and finance. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that common law countries provide stronger protection for shareholders than civil law countries do and suggest that stronger investor protection has positive impact of financial market development. Numerous studies apply this law and finance approach and link country‐level shareholder rights (SR) to corporate finance decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Claessens and Laeven, 2003, Hail and Leuz, 2006 and Pinkowitz et al., 2006). While prior research focuses on SR, this paper extends the literature by exploring country‐level creditors and employees' roles in capital structure decisions across countries.

Around the world, countries with different legal and political systems provide different extent of supports for various stakeholders. Some countries are in favor of shareholders or creditors whereas others are in favor of employees (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005, Roe, 2004). T

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

ArtikelPengenalanBagian bagian: berikutnyaMinat telah diberikan dengan dampak non‐financial para pemangku kepentingan seperti kreditor dan karyawan pada perusahaan keputusan dalam literatur keuangan perusahaan. Karya ini mengkaji hubungan antara kreditur serta karyawan dan leverage keuangan di seluruh negara. Tujuannya adalah untuk mengeksplorasi peran kreditor dan karyawan dalam struktur permodalan keputusan di bawah rezim hukum dan politik yang berbeda di berbagai negara.Shareholders, creditors, and employees have heterogeneous utility functions in corporate context. Tirole (2001, 2006) asserts that corporations select optimal investment and financing decisions within the constraints of legal and political environments to which they belong. Within a company, stakeholders bargain with each other to maximize benefits of themselves. The bargaining between stakeholders is ruled and regulated by a country's legal and political regime. While legal and political regimes differ across countries, the bargaining powers of stakeholders are not identical in different countries. Interaction between creditors and shareholders is mainly through the negotiation in debt contracting. The bargaining power of creditors relies largely on creditor rights (CR) provided by a country's legal system. Employees, on the other hand, do not have voting right nor bargaining power unless they form unions or get protection from labor law. Existing literature suggests that shareholders, with the constraints of legal regime in a country, will seek a mechanism within corporations to weaken creditors and employees' bargaining powers so as to maximize payoffs. Financial leverage is a tool that shareholders can use to achieve this goal. Dronars and Deere (1991) develop a model to describe the role of debt in limiting employees' bargaining power when they form unions, while Matsa (2010) finds that debt is positively correlated with unionization rates at firm level for firms in the USA.This paper focuses on cross‐country comparison. Using country‐level creditor right and labor right indices as proxies for bargaining powers of creditors and employees, I investigate the impacts of creditor and employee rights on capital structure across countries. I argue that when employee rights are high, employees will have stronger bargaining powers and shareholders are more likely to be exploited by employees. If so, shareholders intend to use more debt obligation to remove free cash flows so as to reduce amount of revenues employees can extract. When CR are high, creditors have more negotiation power to obtain good terms in debt contracting. If shareholders cannot get a favorable debt contract, they are likely to reduce the use of debt capital.My study extends the literature by exploring country level factors' influences and by taking creditors and employees' roles into account when examining capital structure decisions across countries. This paper is directly related to the capital structure literature that makes cross‐country comparison of financial leverage. Empirical research on cross‐country financial leverage finds a large variation across countries[1]. Basically, these studies merely document differences in capital structure in different countries or country groups. They identify how firm‐level determinants of capital structure such as firm size, profitability, market‐to‐book ratio, retained earnings, and growth opportunities affect capital structure differently across countries and interpret generally the empirical results based on agency problems or signaling theories, without examining specifically the impacts of creditors and employees on financial leverage across countries. Treating a firm as a nexus through which shareholders and managers in the productive enterprise contract with each other, law and finance approach represented by a series of papers by La Porta, Lopez‐deoSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV hereafter) examines the relationship between a country's legal origin as well as level of protection for investors and finance. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that common law countries provide stronger protection for shareholders than civil law countries do and suggest that stronger investor protection has positive impact of financial market development. Numerous studies apply this law and finance approach and link country‐level shareholder rights (SR) to corporate finance decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Claessens and Laeven, 2003, Hail and Leuz, 2006 and Pinkowitz et al., 2006). While prior research focuses on SR, this paper extends the literature by exploring country‐level creditors and employees' roles in capital structure decisions across countries.Around the world, countries with different legal and political systems provide different extent of supports for various stakeholders. Some countries are in favor of shareholders or creditors whereas others are in favor of employees (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005, Roe, 2004). T

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Pasal
Pendahuluan
Bagian: Bagian Berikutnya
A minat telah diberikan kepada dampak stakeholder non-keuangan seperti kreditur dan karyawan pada keputusan perusahaan dalam literatur keuangan perusahaan. Makalah ini membahas hubungan antara kreditur serta karyawan dan leverage keuangan di seluruh negara. Tujuannya adalah untuk mengeksplorasi peran kreditur dan karyawan dalam keputusan struktur modal di bawah rezim hukum dan politik yang berbeda di seluruh negara.

Pemegang Saham, kreditur, dan karyawan memiliki fungsi utilitas yang heterogen dalam konteks perusahaan. Tirole (2001, 2006) menegaskan bahwa perusahaan memilih keputusan investasi dan pembiayaan yang optimal dalam keterbatasan lingkungan hukum dan politik di mana mereka berada. Dalam sebuah perusahaan, pemangku kepentingan tawar-menawar dengan satu sama lain untuk memaksimalkan manfaat dari diri mereka sendiri. Tawar-menawar antara stakeholder diperintah dan diatur oleh rezim hukum dan politik suatu negara. Sementara rezim hukum dan politik berbeda di berbagai negara, kekuatan tawar stakeholder tidak identik di berbagai negara. Interaksi antara kreditur dan pemegang saham terutama melalui negosiasi dalam kontrak utang. Daya tawar kreditor bergantung sebagian besar pada hak kreditur (CR) yang disediakan oleh sistem hukum suatu negara. Karyawan, di sisi lain, tidak memiliki hak suara atau daya tawar kecuali mereka membentuk serikat atau mendapatkan perlindungan dari hukum perburuhan. Literatur yang ada menunjukkan bahwa pemegang saham, dengan kendala rezim hukum di suatu negara, akan mencari mekanisme dalam perusahaan untuk melemahkan kreditur dan kekuatan tawar karyawan sehingga memaksimalkan hadiah. Leverage keuangan adalah alat yang dapat digunakan pemegang saham untuk mencapai tujuan ini. Dronars dan Deere (1991) mengembangkan model untuk menggambarkan peran utang dalam membatasi daya tawar karyawan ketika mereka membentuk serikat pekerja, sementara Matsa (2010) menemukan bahwa utang berkorelasi positif dengan tingkat serikat pekerja di tingkat perusahaan untuk perusahaan di Amerika Serikat.

Ini kertas berfokus pada perbandingan lintas negara. Menggunakan tingkat negara kreditur yang tepat dan tenaga kerja indeks yang tepat sebagai proxy untuk kekuatan tawar dari kreditur dan karyawan, saya menyelidiki dampak dari kreditur dan karyawan hak terhadap struktur modal di seluruh negara. Saya berpendapat bahwa ketika hak karyawan yang tinggi, karyawan akan memiliki kekuatan tawar yang lebih kuat dan pemegang saham lebih cenderung dimanfaatkan oleh karyawan. Jika demikian, pemegang saham berniat untuk menggunakan lebih kewajiban utang untuk menghapus arus kas bebas sehingga dapat mengurangi jumlah pendapatan dapat mengekstrak karyawan. Ketika CR tinggi, kreditur memiliki kekuatan negosiasi lebih untuk mendapatkan hal yang baik dalam kontrak utang. Jika pemegang saham tidak bisa mendapatkan kontrak utang menguntungkan, mereka cenderung mengurangi penggunaan modal utang.

Studi saya meluas literatur dengan mengeksplorasi tingkat negara faktor 'pengaruh dan dengan mengambil kreditur dan karyawan peran memperhitungkan ketika memeriksa keputusan struktur modal di seluruh negara. Makalah ini secara langsung berkaitan dengan literatur struktur modal yang membuat perbandingan lintas negara leverage keuangan. Penelitian empiris pada leverage keuangan lintas negara menemukan variasi yang besar di negara-negara [1]. Pada dasarnya, penelitian ini hanya mendokumentasikan perbedaan dalam struktur modal di berbagai negara atau kelompok negara. Mereka mengidentifikasi bagaimana faktor penentu tingkat perusahaan struktur modal seperti ukuran perusahaan, profitabilitas, rasio market-to-book, laba ditahan, dan peluang pertumbuhan mempengaruhi struktur modal yang berbeda di seluruh negara dan menafsirkan umumnya hasil empiris berdasarkan masalah keagenan atau teori sinyal, tanpa memeriksa secara khusus dampak kreditur dan karyawan pada leverage keuangan di seluruh negara. Mengobati suatu perusahaan sebagai nexus mana pemegang saham dan manajer dalam kontrak usaha produktif dengan satu sama lain, hukum dan keuangan pendekatan diwakili oleh serangkaian makalah oleh La Porta, Lopez-deoSilanes, Shleifer, dan Vishny (LLSV akhirat) meneliti hubungan antara hukum asal suatu negara serta tingkat perlindungan bagi investor dan keuangan. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) menemukan bahwa negara-negara hukum umum memberikan perlindungan yang lebih kuat bagi pemegang saham dari negara-negara hukum perdata dilakukan dan menunjukkan bahwa perlindungan investor kuat memiliki dampak positif dari perkembangan pasar keuangan. Sejumlah penelitian menerapkan hukum ini dan pendekatan keuangan dan hak Link tingkat negara pemegang saham (SR) untuk keputusan keuangan perusahaan (Rajan dan Zingales, 1995, Claessens dan Laeven 2003, Salam dan Leuz 2006 dan Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Sementara penelitian sebelumnya berfokus pada SR, makalah ini memperluas literatur dengan menjelajahi kreditur tingkat negara dan peran karyawan dalam keputusan struktur modal di seluruh negara.

Di seluruh dunia, negara-negara dengan sistem hukum dan politik yang berbeda memberikan tingkat yang berbeda dari dukungan untuk berbagai pemangku kepentingan. Beberapa negara yang mendukung pemegang saham atau kreditur sedangkan yang lain adalah mendukung karyawan (Gourevitch dan Shinn, 2005, Roe, 2004). T