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Generalizations and alternative arrangementsThe general proposition that client-specific quasi-rents create a benefit toauditor size continues to hold when these quasi-rents vary across clients.However, another factor becomes important: the percentage of the auditor'stotal quasi-rent stream which is specific to any one client. In particular,clients for which client-specific quasi-rents are relatively large in a givenauditor's portfolio pose special independence problems not captured by theanalysis so far. When quasi-rents are not identical across clients, the variableof interest to consumers is the relationship between the value of an auditor'squasi-rents specific to a particular client and the value of the auditor's totalquasi-rent stream.When client-specific quasi-rents vary across clients, auditor size (asmeasured by the number of current clients) continue to serve as a surrogatefor audit quality because larger auditors possess greater total collateral.However, size alone does not inform consumers about the relationshipbetween the quasi-rents specific to one (potentially large) client and theauditor's total quasi-rent stream. Therefore, when client-specific quasi-rentsvary across clients of a given auditor, consumers can be expected to developother quality surrogates in addition to auditor size.One potential surrogate is the percentage of total audit fees dependent onretaining any one client. For example, the Cohen Report (pp. 113-114) notesthat:When one or a few large clients supply a significant portion of the totalfees of a public accounting firm, the firm will have greater difficulty inmaintaining its independence. The staff study of the Subcommittee onReports, Accounts and Management (the Metcalf Report), for example,cites the case of a relatively small firm with a single client thatrepresented 30 percent of the firm's total fees in the year 1973. In thecelebrated Equity Funding case, that company represented more than 40percent of the fees of the Wolfson, Weiner firm that audited the parentcompany.Strictly speaking, this statement is incorrect because a client could 'supply asignificant portion of the total fees of a public accounting firm' and futureclient-specific quasi-rents be zero. However, when the percentage of total feesdependent on one client is viewed as surrogate for the relative magnitude ofclient-specific quasi-rents, this fee relationship also serves as a surrogate foraudit quality.An interesting example of disclosure of the percentage of total feesdependent on retaining one client is the 1977 annual report of Peat,Marwick, Mitchell, which states that the single largest audit fee comprisesonly ½ 9/0 of total revenues. Moreover, a requirement of the new SEC practicesection of the AICPA is that members of the section disclose the existence ofclients whose fees comprise more than five percent of total audit fees. TheAccountant's International Study Group (1976) recommends that auditors beprevented from accepting clients whose fees are expected to exceed tenpercent of total income from clients.When consumers use the percentage of total fees dependent on one clientas a quality surrogate, and this percentage is perceived to be 'high' for agiven auditor-client pair, the market expects auditor independence to bereduced with respect to that client. This will affect the auditor through thefees he is able to charge. Because of these costs of reduced independence,auditors have incentives to devise arrangements which reduce the percentageof the total fees observed to depend on retaining any one client. Large auditfirms are one potential response to these costs.Large audit firms, however, are not the only potential response to costs ofreduced independence. Auditors can also increase perceived independence byincreasing their investment in collateral which is not client-specific. Ofcourse, in order to serve as a deterrent to auditor 'cheating', all collateralmust be auditor-specific. However, it need not be client-specific. For example,it could be an established reputation for uniform quality audits or otherbrand name-type collateral. 25 To the extent that brand name expendituresare not dependent on retaining a particular client, they increase an auditor'stotal collateral and therefore decrease the percentage of total quasi-rentsspecific to any one client. Consumers are likely to view brand namecollateral as a substitute for client-specific collateral, i.e., consumers viewauditors with established reputations as having 'more to lose' frommisrepresentation.26The client-specific collateral analyzed here, however, has an importantadvantage over brand name collateral. When client-specific start-up costs areviewed as an unavoidable (sunk) cost of producing audits, their use ascollateral may be less costly than incurring additional brand name-typeexpenditures. This point is made by Klein and L
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