that a firm’s idiosyncratic risk decreases as its insulation from takeovers increases.
Despite the research that has been done on the relationship among corporate value, corporate governance, and corporate risk, limited analysis has been done specifically attempting to investigate the relationship between corporate risk and corporate governance, the latter of which is measured by the widely acknowledged governance index constructed by Gompers et al. The purpose of this research is to further explore the specific nexus between corporate risk and corporate governance. More specifically, the implied volatility of stock prices is incorporated as a forward-looking measure of firm risk. While the variance of past stock prices is often used as a measure of risk, it provides no information to the market about expected future volatility. One is left assuming that past volatility perfectly predicts future volatility. Changes in corporate governance that result in lower perceived risk will not affect past volatility. Implied volatility, however, is the market’s assessment of future volatility and is a more appropriate measure.
Data for the study are from OptionMetrics and RiskMetrics as well as Compustat. Using a sample of 6,176 biannual firm-year observations spanning 1998-2006, we relate the implied volatility to a number of variables designed to capture the relationship with corporate governance as measured by the Gomper’s index. The model also includes a number of variables to control for other firm-specific factors. The empirical results suggest that dictatorship firms (as defined by Gompers (2003)) are less risky than non-dictatorship firms. Democracy firms are riskier than non-democracy firms.
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