Political marketingThe individual p

Political marketing
The individual politician in a liberal democracy is, in theory at least, the
representative of a political party. Even leaders who became as powerful and
charismatic as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair are ultimately subordinated to the party machine. While Thatcher came to embody the
Conservative Party in a way that few politicians have ever done, in the end
she was perceived as having become an electoral liability and was removed
from office. Despite having led the Labour Party to a record-breaking three
general election victories, Tony Blair spent much of his time in office fending
off criticism from within his own ranks, especially after the March 2003
invasion of Iraq and subsequent events in the Middle East. From 2005
onwards, speculation about internal dissatisfaction with, and challenges to
Blair’s leadership was a constant feature of political coverage in the UK and
overseas, fuelled by his declaration just before the 2005 election campaign
that he would resign as prime minister before the next election. For some,
this rendered him a ‘lame duck’ leader, and invited opponents to undermine
his position. Others welcomed the statement as a refreshing and honest
admission that Blair, unlike Margaret Thatcher, would not seek to go ‘on and
on’, as she put it in the late 1980s, not long before her party dumped her.
COMMUNICATING POLITICS
136
Many of the criticisms directed at Blair throughout his period in office
were premised on the notion that he was not ‘real’ Labour at all, but a Tory
in Labour clothing. In the final analysis Blair, like most political leaders, was
dependent on the approval of his own party members for his power, even if
he had successfully transformed ‘old’ Labour into New and established an
authority enjoyed by few, if any of his predecessors in office.
As the example of New Labour shows, the party has its own identity and
character which, like the personal images of its leaders, can be shaped and
moulded. As Bruce notes, ‘all effective communications strategies contain what
is called a positioning statement, a clear analysis of whatthe brand (or
company, person, political party, etc.) is for: whoit is for, and whyanyone
should be interested in choosing it’ (1992, p. 87) [his emphasis].
In designing the strategy, as we noted earlier, marketing and research
consultants must first establish the ‘core values’ of the party’s target audience, which then become the basis for selling the organisation as the one best
able to defend and reflect those values.
The previous chapter examined the uses of advertising in political
communication. Other techniques available to the image-maker include the
design of party logos and other signifiers of corporate identity. In the mid-1970s the Conservative Party adopted its ‘torch’ logo. Ten years later, as part
of its overhauling of communication strategy, Labour abandoned the
symbolism of the red flag (viewed by the leadership as a sign with negative
connotations of bureaucratic, Soviet-style socialism) in favour of the ‘red
rose’, a logo first successfully employed by the French socialists. Both parties,
as already noted, expend great efforts in the design of conference backdrops,
seeking to symbolise with colour and form their core political values.
Another important marketing technique is that of ‘product endorsement’.
In commercial terms this is achieved by positioning the product (in an
advertisement or promotional event) alongside a well-known and popular
personality, usually from the worlds of entertainment and sport. In politics
this approach has been used since the 1960s when Harold Wilson received
the Beatles at 10 Downing Street. Whether or not Mr Wilson enjoyed the
Beatles’ music, it was certainly clear to him that large numbers of the British
electorate did. To be photographed and filmed with the Beatles was an
attempt to appropriate this image and its connotations; to have his ‘product’
endorsed by young, trendy musicians. In the late 1980s, towards the end of
her period in office, Margaret Thatcher tried a similar trick with football star
Paul ‘Gazza’ Gascoigne. If some of his working-class ‘blokishness’ could rub
off on her, she apparently felt, it would assist her to retain popularity. In the
end she, like Gazza, was to fall from grace. In the Blair government’s first
year in office, the Prime Minister hosted several parties for celebrities from
the worlds of art, entertainment and youth culture at 10 Downing Street.
Meetings with Oasis’ writer and manager (Noel Gallagher and Alan McGee
respectively) were photographed and widely publicised (although the
POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
137
Gallagher brothers’ alleged fondness for cocaine and marijuana was in some
contradiction to the new government’s anti-drugs policy).
During election campaigns, rallies have become opportunities for parties
to display the stars of stage, screen and sports arena who support them. At
a rally in 1983 the Conservatives enlisted the aid of popular comedians like
the late Kenny Everett, as well as more well-known Conservative supporters
like Cilla Black and Jimmy Tarbuck. In 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005 Labour
employed ‘alternative’ comedians Ben Elton, Stephen Fry and others to
emphasise what its advisers hoped to present as a younger, more progressive
set of values. For the Labour Party, as for the Alliance and Leicester building
society,
7
endorsement from such sources was assumed to carry weight with
the target audience.
Internal political communication – Labour
The marketing techniques and promotional devices described in this chapter
and the previous one are not pursued in isolation but as part of a communications strategy which will ideally be co-ordinated and synchronised.
Parties, like commercial organisations, must develop channels of internal
communication, so that members (and particularly those involved in a public
capacity) are aware of the ‘message’ to be delivered at any given time, and
to ensure that the different elements of the public relations operation are
working with each other effectively. Failure to put in place such channels can
result in public relations disasters and electoral failures, as the Labour Party
found to its cost in the 1983 campaign. Hughes and Wintour note that ‘the
party [in 1983] ran an inept and disorganised campaign, led by one of the
least appropriate figures ever to head either of the two dominant political
parties’ (1993, p. 6). We have already referred to some of the problems
associated with then Labour leader Michael Foot’s personal image. Equally
damaging, if not more so, to the party’s campaign in 1983 was the general
lack of co-ordination and planning in the public presentation of policy.
Heffernan and Marqusee agree that the 1983 campaign was ‘badly organised
and its media strategy non-existent’ (1992, p. 28), and that defence policy in
particular was mishandled: ‘A spreading cloud of political double talk
obscured the basic humanistic message about nuclear disarmament which,
opinion polls had shown, was capable of commanding substantial public
support’ (ibid., p. 32).
Elsewhere I have examined in some detail Labour’s handling of its defence
policy in 1983 (McNair, 1988, 1989). An analysis of television news
coverage of the campaign revealed that Labour’s leadership failed to make a
coherent statement of the policy, not least because Denis Healey, Michael
Foot, Roy Hattersley, and other senior figures appeared to disagree on
important aspects of it. While the Conservatives in 1983 fought an incisive
and aggressive campaign against Labour’s non-nuclear defence programme,
COMMUNICATING POLITICS
138
the public representatives of the Labour Party showed themselves to lack
confidence and faith in their own approach to the issue.
This confusion, and other failures of the 1983 campaign, prompted Neil
Kinnock, shortly after he became party leader, to form a ‘communication and
campaigns directorate’ which would bring all of Labour’s public relations
activities within one management structure, headed by Peter Mandelson. In
1985 a Campaign Management Team was established under senior Kinnock
adviser Patricia Hewitt, with responsibility for preparing and executing
‘long’ campaigns, well in advance of the actual election. Thus, when the
1987 campaign started, party leaders had an agenda of issues and ‘theme
days’ to work through.
In 1985 Peter Mandelson, as communications director, recommended the
creation of an apparatus which could co-ordinate the party’s public relations,
marketing and advertising work. It would function within the context of an
agreed communication strategy; a unified presentation of the political
message, using all available media; and high-quality publicity materials.8
The Shadow Communications Agency, as it was called, would enlist as
many sympathetic volunteers from the world of professional communication as possible. With the help of advertising professional Philip Gould,
Mandelson and the SCA strove, with some success, to prevent the incoherence of the 1983 campaign from ever happening again. Hughes and
Wintour argue that ‘Mandelson and Gould succeeded, not because they
exploited slick advertising and media management more effectively than the
Conservatives, but because they forged between themselves an approach to
political strategy which has never before been seen. . . . They welded policy,
politics and image-creation into one weapon’ (1993, p. 183). A post-1997
Labour minister recalls that ‘Peter was fascinated by the acres of empty space
columnists and political reporters have to fill every week. It was then that he
realised that any titbit he gave them would be eagerly grabbed by the
journalist who didn’t seem to do any work for himself’.
9
In the campaign of 1987, however, even a vastly improved structure of
internal communication management could not prevent Labour’s defence
policy from once again upsetting the str

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Political marketingThe individual politician in a liberal democracy is, in theory at least, therepresentative of a political party. Even leaders who became as powerful andcharismatic as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair are ultimately subordinated to the party machine. While Thatcher came to embody theConservative Party in a way that few politicians have ever done, in the endshe was perceived as having become an electoral liability and was removedfrom office. Despite having led the Labour Party to a record-breaking threegeneral election victories, Tony Blair spent much of his time in office fendingoff criticism from within his own ranks, especially after the March 2003invasion of Iraq and subsequent events in the Middle East. From 2005onwards, speculation about internal dissatisfaction with, and challenges toBlair’s leadership was a constant feature of political coverage in the UK andoverseas, fuelled by his declaration just before the 2005 election campaignthat he would resign as prime minister before the next election. For some,this rendered him a ‘lame duck’ leader, and invited opponents to underminehis position. Others welcomed the statement as a refreshing and honestadmission that Blair, unlike Margaret Thatcher, would not seek to go ‘on andon’, as she put it in the late 1980s, not long before her party dumped her.COMMUNICATING POLITICS136Many of the criticisms directed at Blair throughout his period in officewere premised on the notion that he was not ‘real’ Labour at all, but a Toryin Labour clothing. In the final analysis Blair, like most political leaders, wasdependent on the approval of his own party members for his power, even ifhe had successfully transformed ‘old’ Labour into New and established anauthority enjoyed by few, if any of his predecessors in office.As the example of New Labour shows, the party has its own identity andcharacter which, like the personal images of its leaders, can be shaped andmoulded. As Bruce notes, ‘all effective communications strategies contain whatis called a positioning statement, a clear analysis of whatthe brand (orcompany, person, political party, etc.) is for: whoit is for, and whyanyoneshould be interested in choosing it’ (1992, p. 87) [his emphasis].In designing the strategy, as we noted earlier, marketing and researchconsultants must first establish the ‘core values’ of the party’s target audience, which then become the basis for selling the organisation as the one bestable to defend and reflect those values.The previous chapter examined the uses of advertising in politicalcommunication. Other techniques available to the image-maker include thedesign of party logos and other signifiers of corporate identity. In the mid-1970s the Conservative Party adopted its ‘torch’ logo. Ten years later, as partof its overhauling of communication strategy, Labour abandoned thesymbolism of the red flag (viewed by the leadership as a sign with negativeconnotations of bureaucratic, Soviet-style socialism) in favour of the ‘redrose’, a logo first successfully employed by the French socialists. Both parties,as already noted, expend great efforts in the design of conference backdrops,seeking to symbolise with colour and form their core political values.Another important marketing technique is that of ‘product endorsement’.In commercial terms this is achieved by positioning the product (in anadvertisement or promotional event) alongside a well-known and popularpersonality, usually from the worlds of entertainment and sport. In politicsthis approach has been used since the 1960s when Harold Wilson receivedthe Beatles at 10 Downing Street. Whether or not Mr Wilson enjoyed theBeatles’ music, it was certainly clear to him that large numbers of the Britishelectorate did. To be photographed and filmed with the Beatles was anattempt to appropriate this image and its connotations; to have his ‘product’endorsed by young, trendy musicians. In the late 1980s, towards the end ofher period in office, Margaret Thatcher tried a similar trick with football starPaul ‘Gazza’ Gascoigne. If some of his working-class ‘blokishness’ could ruboff on her, she apparently felt, it would assist her to retain popularity. In theend she, like Gazza, was to fall from grace. In the Blair government’s firstyear in office, the Prime Minister hosted several parties for celebrities fromthe worlds of art, entertainment and youth culture at 10 Downing Street.Meetings with Oasis’ writer and manager (Noel Gallagher and Alan McGeerespectively) were photographed and widely publicised (although thePOLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS137Gallagher brothers’ alleged fondness for cocaine and marijuana was in somecontradiction to the new government’s anti-drugs policy).During election campaigns, rallies have become opportunities for partiesto display the stars of stage, screen and sports arena who support them. Ata rally in 1983 the Conservatives enlisted the aid of popular comedians likethe late Kenny Everett, as well as more well-known Conservative supporterslike Cilla Black and Jimmy Tarbuck. In 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005 Labouremployed ‘alternative’ comedians Ben Elton, Stephen Fry and others toemphasise what its advisers hoped to present as a younger, more progressiveset of values. For the Labour Party, as for the Alliance and Leicester buildingsociety,7endorsement from such sources was assumed to carry weight withthe target audience.Internal political communication – LabourThe marketing techniques and promotional devices described in this chapterand the previous one are not pursued in isolation but as part of a communications strategy which will ideally be co-ordinated and synchronised.Parties, like commercial organisations, must develop channels of internalkomunikasi, sehingga anggota (dan khususnya mereka yang terlibat dalam Umumkapasitas) menyadari 'pesan' untuk disampaikan pada waktu tertentu, danuntuk memastikan bahwa elemen yang berbeda dari operasi Humasbekerja dengan satu sama lain secara efektif. Kegagalan untuk meletakkan di tempat saluran tersebut dapatmengakibatkan bencana Humas dan pemilihan kegagalan, sebagai Partai Buruhditemukan untuk biaya dalam kampanye 1983. Hughes dan Wintour dicatat bahwa 'Partai [pada tahun 1983] berlari tidak kompeten dan teratur kampanye, dipimpin oleh salah satuangka-angka yang paling sesuai untuk menuju salah satu dari dua dominan politikpihak (1993, MS 6). Kami sudah mengacu beberapa masalahterkait dengan gambar pribadi pemimpin buruh kemudian Michael kaki. Samamerusak, jika tidak lebih dari itu, kepada pihak 's kampanye di 1983 adalah Jenderalkurangnya koordinasi dan perencanaan dalam presentasi umum kebijakan.Heffernan dan Marqusee setuju bahwa kampanye 1983 adalah ' buruk diaturdan strategi media tidak ada ' (1992, hal 28), dan bahwa pertahanan kebijakankhususnya dianiaya: ' awan menyebarkan politik berbicara gandamengaburkan pesan humanistik dasar tentang perlucutan senjata nuklir yang,jajak pendapat telah menunjukkan, mampu komandan substansial Umummendukung ' (ibid., halaman 32).Di tempat lain saya telah diperiksa dalam beberapa detail buruh penanganan pembelaannyakebijakan pada tahun 1983 (McNair, 1988, 1989). Sebuah analisis dari berita televisicoverage of the campaign revealed that Labour’s leadership failed to make acoherent statement of the policy, not least because Denis Healey, MichaelFoot, Roy Hattersley, and other senior figures appeared to disagree onimportant aspects of it. While the Conservatives in 1983 fought an incisiveand aggressive campaign against Labour’s non-nuclear defence programme,COMMUNICATING POLITICS138the public representatives of the Labour Party showed themselves to lackconfidence and faith in their own approach to the issue.This confusion, and other failures of the 1983 campaign, prompted NeilKinnock, shortly after he became party leader, to form a ‘communication andcampaigns directorate’ which would bring all of Labour’s public relationsactivities within one management structure, headed by Peter Mandelson. In1985 a Campaign Management Team was established under senior Kinnockadviser Patricia Hewitt, with responsibility for preparing and executing‘long’ campaigns, well in advance of the actual election. Thus, when the1987 campaign started, party leaders had an agenda of issues and ‘themedays’ to work through.In 1985 Peter Mandelson, as communications director, recommended thecreation of an apparatus which could co-ordinate the party’s public relations,marketing and advertising work. It would function within the context of anagreed communication strategy; a unified presentation of the politicalmessage, using all available media; and high-quality publicity materials.8The Shadow Communications Agency, as it was called, would enlist asmany sympathetic volunteers from the world of professional communication as possible. With the help of advertising professional Philip Gould,Mandelson and the SCA strove, with some success, to prevent the incoherence of the 1983 campaign from ever happening again. Hughes andWintour argue that ‘Mandelson and Gould succeeded, not because theyexploited slick advertising and media management more effectively than theConservatives, but because they forged between themselves an approach topolitical strategy which has never before been seen. . . . They welded policy,politics and image-creation into one weapon’ (1993, p. 183). A post-1997Labour minister recalls that ‘Peter was fascinated by the acres of empty spacecolumnists and political reporters have to fill every week. It was then that herealised that any titbit he gave them would be eagerly grabbed by thejournalist who didn’t seem to do any work for himself’.9In the campaign of 1987, however, even a vastly improved structure ofinternal communication management could not prevent Labour’s defencepolicy from once again upsetting the str