The notion of nationalism also exte

The notion of nationalism also extended to ethnic minorities in
Thailand who wished to become Thai. Keyes made a distinction between
“ethnic minorities” and “ethno-regional” entities. By “ethno-regional”
he meant “that cultural differences [had] been taken to be characteristic
of a particular part of the country rather of a distinctive people”.12
Ethno-regionalism emerged in part as a result of the national integration
policy and the promotion of a “Thai-ness” ideology that was persistently
implemented and promoted by the Thai state.
The policy of national integration was not without resistance as
evident in the millenarian uprising (Phi Bun) in the North and Northeast
in the eary twentieth century. The movement was one of those which
had historical and cultural differences from the Siamese Thai, and spoke
different dialects or even different languages from the official Thai
language. The “Lao” in the Northeast identified themselves as Khon
Isan, a category that differentiated them from the Laotians of Laos
and from the Siamese Thai. The Khon Isan had traditionally viewed
themselves as culturally Lao but their political affiliation was to the Thai
State, and more specifically to the monarchy as they sought out and
depended upon the educational, medical, and developmental services
of the Thai state.
The “Yuan” of northern Thailand who maintained their cultural
distinctiveness from the Thais, regarded themselves as Khon Muang,
an autonym that indicated their self-perception of occupying a
social position and status different and higher than that of the hill
minorities, and separate from the dominant Thais from the Central
Plains. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
These ethno-regional groups saw themselves as Thai citizens, but felt
that they had not received the same benefits in power and resources
as compared to those in the center. In both cases, they were prohibited
from teaching their local languages and histories in schools because
their cultural practices were not viewed as standard Thai culture and
their local–regional histories were not considered part of the broader
Thai national history. Thus, while there was a tolerance of cultural
diversity, there was also a sense of ethno-regional disparity that was
often negatively represented in official Thai discourse and seen as an
obstacle to development. Ethno-regionalism was less relevant in the North
than in the Northeast, because of their differing historical processes,
therefore separatist movements did not develop in the two regions.
Economic grievances, however, did result in the regions becoming
strong bases for the Communist Party of Thailand who built popular
support in the Northeast in the 1970s and early 1980s, and to a lesser
extent in the North.13
The Hill Tribes and Nation Building:
The Root Cause of Conflict
Despite the new notion of nationalism as discussed above, the hill tribe
peoples did not feel its effect until the early 1960s when they started
to get official attention.
The hill tribes were generally understood to be ethnic minorities who
settled in Thailand around the turn of the 20th century. However, among
those classified under the category of “hill tribe” are some “indigenous
people” who in fact preceded the Thais in occupying parts of the
present-day kingdom. These include the Karen, Lua, T’in and Khmu.
The manner in which these groups have been categorized “hill tribes”
reflects the way the Thai state has viewed minorities in the context of
national integration and development.
Officially, the government held a major census of hill tribes in
1985–1988 and identified nine ethnic groups living in twenty provinces.14
The same census put the entire hill tribe population at 554,172, living
in 3,533 villages. At the same time, household registrations were also
carried out and were used as the basis for granting citizenship.15 Other
ethnic groups, such as the Shan, Yunnanese Chinese and Burmese, were
not classified as “hill tribes”. Instead they were categorised by separate The Thai State and Ethnic Minorities 
criteria or lumped together with ethno-regional groups. The term “hill
tribes” began to appear in official Thai discourse in the early 1960s;
previously each ethnic group was called by its autonym.
In the official discourse, the term “hill tribe” or Chao Khao16 reflected
embedded social meanings and values. It highlighted the “hill and valley
dichotomy” — the social relationship that existed in the pre-modern
era.17 As in Sipsonpanna and North Vietnam, the Tai/Dai/Thai always
occupied the rich lowland valleys, while the other less powerful groups
lived in higher altitudes. Asymmetry characterised relationships between
slave or serf hill people, and the master Tai/Dai/Thai. In the political
context, this structural opposition places the Chao Khao at odds with the
Chao Roa (Rao meaning us); in other words “the others and us”. Moreover,
the term Khao or mountain also carries a pejorative connotation. In the
Thai context, “mountain” means forested, remote, inaccessible, wild,
and uncivilised, whereas Muang is a political domain associated with
civilisation and morality.18 In the mid 1960s, the Thai government began
to pay serious attention to its own hill tribes as a concern for national
security grew against the backdrop of communist insurgency. Living
in poverty on the frontier and in the mountains in the North and the
West, the hill tribe peoples were viewed as being easily persuaded to
become communist insurgents and, consequently, a threat to national
security. The government also interpreted their cultural practices,
that included shifting cultivation, opium production, and illiteracy, as
“problems of the hill tribes” that were detrimental to national interests.
They were seen as “forest destroyers”, squatters, “opium cultivators”
and, more importantly, as illiterate and non-Thai, the latter two being
virtually synonymous.19 The hill areas therefore were to be contacted,
contested, and controlled.
During the mid-1960s, the Thai military took action against some
hill tribe communities that were suspected of lending support to the
communist insurgents. In a number of cases, such actions were based
on false information and cultural misperception of both the hill tribes
and the officials. The military actions against them drove the hill tribe
peoples, particularly the Hmong, to take up arms against the government.
There were, however, many of the hill tribe people that also fought
against the communist insurgents.
Keyes observed that because “of focus on the Hmong rather than the
Karen or other hill peoples”, the Thai government formulated policies  Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
that seriously slowed official relations with upland groups. The policies
presumed that most hill peoples were recent illegal immigrants, that
they cultivated opium poppies, and had few ties to Thai peoples”.20 This
perception became the basis upon which the hill tribes development
policies were formulated and justified.
Ultimately, government concern and perceptions, however fallacious,
led to the initial policy that resulted in the cessation of shifting cultivation.
Several hill tribe villages were forced to resettle in the Nikom Songkroh
Chao Khao21 (hill tribe welfare settlement) in Tak and Chiangmai provinces,
surpervised by the Public Welfare Department. The failure of the policy
prompted, the Department to develop a model of core-satellite villages
where Public Welfare units would be placed to allow officials to maintain
contact with them.
Government policy towards the hill tribes at this stage also aimed
at assimilating them into the Thai culture through education. Border
Patrol Police were assigned to establish schools in the hills to teach
children the low land curriculum. While these hill tribe children were
able to acquire competence in the Thai language and basic arithmetic,
and were successfully assimilated into the Thai culture, the policy had
the effect of severing their links with their own cultures and thus illprepared
them for life in their own villages.
During the 1970s–80s, highland development policy largely centered
on replacing opium cultivation with cash crops, linking the hill farmers
to lowland markets, and developing new forms of political-administrative
structures. According to the official discourse, the policy of assimilation
was changed during this period to one of integration. This was to allow
the hill tribes to maintain their cultures as they were being integrated
into the larger Thai society.
However, state officials and developmental workers misunderstood
certain cultural practices of the hill tribes, due to their generalised and
oversimplified model. For example, shifting cultivation was equated
with “the slash and burn” techniques that caused deforestation and
that had to be stopped. The officials, along with the United Nations
and other international developmental organizations, played important
roles in crop replacement programs, developing infrastructure, as well
as in reducing the problem of drug addiction.
Within a few years, many hill tribe people had already switched to
growing cash crops, such as coffee, cabbage, corn, ginger, cut flowers The Thai State and Ethnic Minorities 
and fruit trees. Many of them earned cash income and improved their
economic status. Opium cultivation was almost eradicated from the
northern hills. While the introduction of cash crops could be seen as an
attempt to integrate the hill tribe people into the market economy, the
hill farmers had to depend heavily on chemical fertilizers, herbicides
and insecticides. This led to soil depletion and water pollution that
exacerbated conflcits between the hill tribes and the lowland farmers.
Exclusion of the Hill Tribes from the Forest
In the making of the modern nation-state, the Thai state mapped its
territory,22 took control of forest and land, including unoccupied land,
and defined its ownership.