The Japanese model of long-term col

The Japanese model of long-term collaborative partnerships between firms and their suppliers has attracted much attention from business researchers and practitioners. Several U.S. and European auto-makers have attempted to establish similar partnerships of their own, seeking to reduce their supplier base and cultivate relationships with their best suppliers.1 As a result, the early involvement of suppliers in product-development and cost-reduction efforts is becoming standard practice in the automotive industry and beyond.2
A recent crisis involving Toyota and its supplier network suggests, however, that the Japanese model — or at least the Toyota model — involves more than a set of long-term relationships between a firm and a few select suppliers. As the Toyota group’s collaborative response to the sudden destruction of a key supplier’s plant suggests, the relationships among a firm’s suppliers are equally important. More generally, a complex mix of institutions permits self-organization during times of crisis with little need for a leader’s direct control.3 These strong relationships among many firms along with the steady but largely invisible control of a leader promote flexible and coordinated responses to crises. In addition, they foster long-term competitiveness through decentral- ized, groupwide efforts to solve day-to-day problems and improve performance.

On February 1, 1997, a fire at one of Aisin Seiki’s plants threatened to halt Toyota-group operations for weeks. Aisin Seiki, one of Toyota’s most trusted suppliers, was the sole source for proportioning valves (or P-valves, in the industry parlance), a small but crucial brake-related part used in all Toyota vehicles.4 Because of Toyota’s and Aisin’s dedication to the principles of just-in-time (JIT) production, only two or three days’ worth of stock was on hand. A shutdown of Toyota-group plants (including those of several hundred suppliers) seemed unavoidable.

The timing could not have been worse. Toyota plants were operating at full capacity with levels of overtime and use of temporary workers unheard of in years, in anticipation of a last-minute boom in automobile sales prior to the 2 percent consumption sales tax increase slated for April 1. Every day lost meant potentially huge and irretrievable losses in sales and profits for Toyota and related firms.5

Yet, remarkably, disaster was averted, and assembly plants were reopened after only two days of shutdown. The recovery was accomplished through an immediate and largely self-organized effort by firms, mostly from within but also from outside the Toyota group, to set up alternative production sites outside of Aisin.6 Within days, firms with little experience with P-valves were manufacturing and delivering the parts to Aisin, where they were assembled and inspected before being sent to Toyota’s and other clients’ assembly plants. The collaborative effort, which which involved more than 200 firms (of which approximately sixty-two took direct responsibility for P-valve production), was orchestrated with very limited direct control from Toyota and with no haggling over technical proprietary rights or financial compensation.

The Toyota group demonstrated its cohesion and resiliency at a time when many observers were discussing the weakening of traditional ties among group members. Based on data collected through in-depth interviews with key players in the incident, we describe what took place during the Aisin Seiki crisis and how individual firms came together to orchestrate the recovery effort.7 We believe that the episode holds lessons for businesses adopting the Japanese model of long-term supplier partnerships as well as for businesses moving away from that model. Of course, competition for future contracts and the pressure to maintain their reputations motivated the suppliers to cooperate with each other. Nevertheless, we argue, it was the various capabilities developed through institutionalized problem-solving activities within the Toyota group that ensured the effectiveness and rapidity of the suppliers’ collaborative effort. For businesses of many kinds, the capabilities developed through committed partnerships can enhance competitiveness, driving participants to respond effectively to emergencies and to pursue continuous improvement on a daily basis.8

The Aisin Seiki Crisis

At 4:18 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, 1997, a fire erupted in Aisin’s Kariya plant number one. By 8:52 a.m., the lines dedicated to P-valves and to two other brake-related parts (clutch master cylinders and tandem master cylinders) were almost completely destroyed, along with special-purpose machinery and drills that could take months to reorder. The near destruction of the P-valve lines was potentially disastrous for Toyota; nearly all of its vehicles used Aisin P-valves manufactured exclusively at the Kariya plant, which turned out 32,500 P-valves a day for Toyota and other Toyota-group assemblers such as Hino and Daihatsu as well as for Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Isuzu.

Used in all vehicles, P-valves control pressure on rear brakes to help prevent skidding. About the size of a pack of cigarettes, the part is mass-produced using dedicated transfer lines, which keeps costs down and ensures high productivity and reliability. Although structurally simple and inexpensive, costing only between ¥770 and ¥1,400 apiece, P-valves require complex, high-precision machining to ensure the reliability and durability essential to the safety of any brake system.

That Aisin was the sole supplier of this small but critical part was surprising to many in Japan. To reduce the risk of the very kind of disruption it was now confronting, Toyota had increased parallel sourcing. Its relationship with Aisin was distinctive, however.9 Aisin was one of Toyota’s closest suppliers in sales, personnel, and financial linkages; its outstanding cost, quality, and delivery performance record made it difficult to replace.10

Toyota suddenly found itself in crisis. As a result of JIT operations, only one day’s worth of P-valves were in immediate stock. Predictably, on Monday, February 3, when assembly lines were still running, Toyota announced the following days’ shutdown of twenty of its thirty assembly lines (including those of Toyota’s contract assemblers); from Tuesday, February 4, to Wednesday, February 5, practically all of Toyota’s and most of its related firms’ plants were closed, bringing to a halt almost the entire Toyota group.11 As a result, hundreds of tiered suppliers who would have to wait for the reopening of their clients’ plants to resume deliveries were also affected, as were local electricity, gas, and transportation companies. Such is the fragility of JIT: a surprise event can paralyze entire networks and even industries.12

Indeed, Toyota was facing one of the worst crises in its history.13 But on Tuesday, February 4, only three days after the fire, the first alternative volume P-valves (as opposed to prototype P-valves that had been delivered one day earlier) were rolling off temporary lines hastily set up by an Aisin supplier, Koritsu Sangyo, marking the beginning of the recovery process. As a result of this and many other firms’ efforts, by Thursday, February 6, Toyota’s Tahara and Hino’s Hamura plants were reopened, followed by the other car assembly plants affected the next day on a single-shift basis. By Monday, February 10, a little more than one week after the plant fire, all Toyota-group assembly plants were back to normal with production volumes of 13,000 to 14,000 vehicles per day. After another week, the plants were in full operation at the previously planned production volumes of 15,500 vehicles per day. At that time, the proportion of P-valves produced by Aisin itself was less than 10 percent of the total amount necessary; it gradually increased, however, reaching 60 percent by March 14 and almost 100 percent by the end of March. The bulk of the P-valve production was taking place at approximately sixty-two firms, including Koritsu Sangyo, which gave full priority to the restoration of P-valve production and often worked double shifts through weekends.

In total, the fire cost Aisin ¥7.8 billion and Toyota about 70,000 vehicles and ¥160 billion in revenues.14 Although Toyota officials claim to have recouped most of the lost vehicle production through increased overtime and holiday shifts, losses in the range of ¥20 billion to ¥30 billion were unavoidable, mainly because the creation of alternative P-valve sites was costly.15 In the end, however, Toyota and Aisin could only be grateful that group members achieved a rapid and effective recovery and averted what could have been a much more devastating incident.

The Recovery Effort

How could alternative P-valve production sites be organized and the delivery of the required 32,500 P-valves a day be resumed so quickly? We describe the roles played in the recovery by six firms, which we visited during our field research: Toyota, Aisin Seiki, Denso, Taiho Kogyo, Kayaba Industry, and Koritsu Sangyo. While these firms differ in size, areas of specialization, position in the value chain, and financial linkages to Toyota, they share several characteristics: a commitment to, and capabilities for, JIT production and the ability to solve problems at their source.16

From the beginning, it was clear that until Aisin could rebuild its previous capacity, outside help would be indispensable. It was decided then that firms from both inside and outside the Toyota group would be asked to set up alternative P-valve production sites as soon as possible, with Aisin providing technical assistance, design drawings, jigs (e.g., specialized drills), machine tools, and raw materials (e.g., cast iron) salvaged from the fire.17 Aisin was to immediately begin setting up alternative production sites in its other plants as well.

Sixty-two firms responded to Aisin’s call a

Hasil (Ceko) 1:

Japonský model dlouhodobé partnerství pro spolupráci mezi podniky a jejich dodavatelé přilákala pozornost od podnikání a badateli. Několik amerických a evropských automobilek se pokusili zavést podobné partnerství svých vlastních, snaží snížit jejich dodavatelů a budování vztahů s jejich nejlepší suppliers.1 v důsledku, včasné zapojení dodavatelů do vývoje produktů a úsilí o snížení nákladů se stává běžnou praxí v automobilovém průmyslu a beyond.2Nedávná krize, která se Toyota a jeho dodavatel sítě naznačuje, že japonský model – nebo alespoň modelu Toyota – zahrnuje více než řadu dlouhodobých vztahů mezi podnikem a pár vybraných dodavatelů. Jako Toyota skupiny spolupráce reakce na náhlé zničení klíčový dodavatel závodu napovídá, vztahy mezi dodavatele firmy jsou neméně důležité. Obecněji řečeno komplexní mix institucí umožňuje samoorganizace v době krize s malou potřebou přímého control.3 vůdce tyto silné vztahy mezi mnoha firem spolu stálý, ale do značné míry neviditelný kontrolu vůdce prosazovat flexibilní a koordinované reakce na krize. Kromě toho budou podporovat dlouhodobé konkurenceschopnosti prostřednictvím decentrální nou, groupwide snahy řešit každodenní problémy a zlepšit výkon.1. února 1997 požár v jednom z Aisin Seiki závodů hrozil, že zastavení operace Toyota skupiny týdnů. Aisin Seiki, jeden z nejspolehlivějších dodavatelů Toyota, byl jediným zdrojem pro dávkovací ventily (nebo P-ventily, v mluvě průmysl), v malé, ale rozhodující části související s brzdou používané ve všech Toyota vehicles.4 z důvodu Toyota a si Aisin oddanost zásadám just-in-time (JIT) výroby, pouze dva nebo tři dny v hodnotě akcií byl po ruce. Zdálo se, že vypnutí Toyota skupina rostlin (včetně těch několik stovek dodavatelů) jsou nevyhnutelné.Načasování nemohlo být horší. Toyota rostliny byly běželo na plnou kapacitu s úrovněmi přesčasů a využívání dočasných pracovníků v letech, v očekávání poslední boom v automobilových prodejů před zvýšením DPH spotřeba 2 procenta zvolil pro 1. dubna. Každý den ztratil určeny potenciálně obrovské a nenahraditelné ztráty tržeb a zisků pro Toyota a související firms.5Přesto je pozoruhodné, katastrofa byla odvrácena a montážní závody byly znovu po dvou dnech vypnutí. Zotavení bylo dosaženo prostřednictvím okamžité a do značné míry samostatně organizované úsilí firmy, většinou z v rámci, ale také z mimo skupinu Toyota nastavit alternativní výrobních míst mimo Aisin.6 ve dnech, firmy s malými zkušenostmi s P-ventily byly výroba a dodání součástky na Aisin, kde byly smontovány a kontrolovány před odesláním do Toyota a další klienti montážních závodů. Společné úsilí, který který zahrnoval více než 200 firem (z toho přibližně šedesát dva měl přímou odpovědnost za výrobu P-ventil), bylo obklíčené s velmi omezenou přímé ovládání od Toyota a bez smlouvání o technické vlastnických práv nebo finanční náhradu.Toyota skupina prokázala jeho soudržnost a odolnost v době, kdy mnozí pozorovatelé mluvili, oslabení tradičních vazeb mezi členy skupiny. Na základě údajů shromážděných prostřednictvím in-hloubkové rozhovory s klíčovými hráči v incidentu, můžeme popsat, co se stalo během Aisin Seiki krize a jak jednotlivé firmy sjelo organizovat zotavení effort.7 věříme, že tato epizoda ponaučením pro podniky zavádějící japonského modelu dlouhodobého dodavatele partnerství stejně jako u firmy pohybující se od tohoto modelu. Samozřejmě soutěž pro budoucí smlouvy a tlak udržet svou reputaci motivované dodavatelům, aby vzájemně spolupracovaly. Nicméně tvrdí, bylo různé schopnosti rozvíjet prostřednictvím institucionalizované problémů činností v rámci skupiny Toyota, která zajistila účinnost a rychlost dodavatele společného úsilí. Pro podniky mnoha druhů schopnosti rozvíjet prostřednictvím potvrzené partnerství mohou zvýšit konkurenceschopnost, řízení účastníky účinně reagovat na mimořádné události a usilovat o neustálé zlepšování na denní basis.8Aisin Seiki krizeAt 4:18 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, 1997, a fire erupted in Aisin’s Kariya plant number one. By 8:52 a.m., the lines dedicated to P-valves and to two other brake-related parts (clutch master cylinders and tandem master cylinders) were almost completely destroyed, along with special-purpose machinery and drills that could take months to reorder. The near destruction of the P-valve lines was potentially disastrous for Toyota; nearly all of its vehicles used Aisin P-valves manufactured exclusively at the Kariya plant, which turned out 32,500 P-valves a day for Toyota and other Toyota-group assemblers such as Hino and Daihatsu as well as for Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Isuzu.Used in all vehicles, P-valves control pressure on rear brakes to help prevent skidding. About the size of a pack of cigarettes, the part is mass-produced using dedicated transfer lines, which keeps costs down and ensures high productivity and reliability. Although structurally simple and inexpensive, costing only between ¥770 and ¥1,400 apiece, P-valves require complex, high-precision machining to ensure the reliability and durability essential to the safety of any brake system.That Aisin was the sole supplier of this small but critical part was surprising to many in Japan. To reduce the risk of the very kind of disruption it was now confronting, Toyota had increased parallel sourcing. Its relationship with Aisin was distinctive, however.9 Aisin was one of Toyota’s closest suppliers in sales, personnel, and financial linkages; its outstanding cost, quality, and delivery performance record made it difficult to replace.10Toyota suddenly found itself in crisis. As a result of JIT operations, only one day’s worth of P-valves were in immediate stock. Predictably, on Monday, February 3, when assembly lines were still running, Toyota announced the following days’ shutdown of twenty of its thirty assembly lines (including those of Toyota’s contract assemblers); from Tuesday, February 4, to Wednesday, February 5, practically all of Toyota’s and most of its related firms’ plants were closed, bringing to a halt almost the entire Toyota group.11 As a result, hundreds of tiered suppliers who would have to wait for the reopening of their clients’ plants to resume deliveries were also affected, as were local electricity, gas, and transportation companies. Such is the fragility of JIT: a surprise event can paralyze entire networks and even industries.12Indeed, Toyota was facing one of the worst crises in its history.13 But on Tuesday, February 4, only three days after the fire, the first alternative volume P-valves (as opposed to prototype P-valves that had been delivered one day earlier) were rolling off temporary lines hastily set up by an Aisin supplier, Koritsu Sangyo, marking the beginning of the recovery process. As a result of this and many other firms’ efforts, by Thursday, February 6, Toyota’s Tahara and Hino’s Hamura plants were reopened, followed by the other car assembly plants affected the next day on a single-shift basis. By Monday, February 10, a little more than one week after the plant fire, all Toyota-group assembly plants were back to normal with production volumes of 13,000 to 14,000 vehicles per day. After another week, the plants were in full operation at the previously planned production volumes of 15,500 vehicles per day. At that time, the proportion of P-valves produced by Aisin itself was less than 10 percent of the total amount necessary; it gradually increased, however, reaching 60 percent by March 14 and almost 100 percent by the end of March. The bulk of the P-valve production was taking place at approximately sixty-two firms, including Koritsu Sangyo, which gave full priority to the restoration of P-valve production and often worked double shifts through weekends.In total, the fire cost Aisin ¥7.8 billion and Toyota about 70,000 vehicles and ¥160 billion in revenues.14 Although Toyota officials claim to have recouped most of the lost vehicle production through increased overtime and holiday shifts, losses in the range of ¥20 billion to ¥30 billion were unavoidable, mainly because the creation of alternative P-valve sites was costly.15 In the end, however, Toyota and Aisin could only be grateful that group members achieved a rapid and effective recovery and averted what could have been a much more devastating incident.The Recovery EffortHow could alternative P-valve production sites be organized and the delivery of the required 32,500 P-valves a day be resumed so quickly? We describe the roles played in the recovery by six firms, which we visited during our field research: Toyota, Aisin Seiki, Denso, Taiho Kogyo, Kayaba Industry, and Koritsu Sangyo. While these firms differ in size, areas of specialization, position in the value chain, and financial linkages to Toyota, they share several characteristics: a commitment to, and capabilities for, JIT production and the ability to solve problems at their source.16From the beginning, it was clear that until Aisin could rebuild its previous capacity, outside help would be indispensable. It was decided then that firms from both inside and outside the Toyota group would be asked to set up alternative P-valve production sites as soon as possible, with Aisin providing technical assistance, design drawings, jigs (e.g., specialized drills), machine tools, and raw materials (e.g., cast iron) salvaged from the fire.17 Aisin was to immediately begin setting up alternative production sites in its other plants as well.
Sixty-two firms responded to Aisin’s call a

Hasil (Ceko) 3:

japonský model dlouhodobě kooperativní partnerství mezi podniky a jejich dodavateli přitahuje moc pozornosti z podnikání, výzkumu a praxe.několik amerických a evropských automobilových výrobců pokusila navázat podobné partnerství jejich vlastní, usiluje o snížení jejich dodavatelské základny a rozvíjet vztahy s jejich nejlepší dodavatelé. 1 v důsledkuvčasné zapojení dodavatelů do vývoje výrobků a snaha snižovat náklady, se stává běžnou praxí v automobilovém průmyslu a mimo. 2
nedávné krize, která se toyota a její síť dodavatelů však naznačují, že japonský model - nebo alespoň toyota model - zahrnuje více než soubor dlouhodobé vztahy mezi firmou a pár výběr dodavatelů.jako toyota group je společné reakce na náhlé zničení klíčového dodavatele zařízení, naznačuje, že vztahy mezi firmy, dodavatelé jsou stejně důležité.obecně platí, že složitá směs institucím umožňuje self - organizace v době krize s malou potřebu vůdce je přímou kontrolu.3 tyto silné vztahy mezi mnoha firem společně se stabilní, ale do značné míry neviditelný kontrolu vůdce podporuje flexibilní a koordinované reakce na krize.kromě toho, že podpoří dlouhodobé konkurenceschopnosti prostřednictvím decentralizované - vala, groupwide úsilí řešit každodenní problémy a zlepšit výkon.

z 1. února 1997,požár v jedné z elektráren aisin seiki pohrozil, že stát toyota činností skupiny na několik týdnů.aisin seiki, jeden z nejspolehlivějších dodavatelů toyota byla jediným zdrojem proportioning ventily (nebo p-valves v průmyslu hantýrce), malý, ale zásadní brzda související části používané ve všech vozidel značky toyota. 4, protože toyota a aisin je oddanost zásadám jen v čase (jit) produkce,jen dva nebo tři dny za akcie byly po ruce.na odstavení toyota skupina rostlin (včetně těch několika set dodavatelů) zdály nevyhnutelné.

načasování nemohlo být horší.toyota rostlin byly v plném provozu s limity přesčasů a využívání dočasných pracovníků neslýchaný v letechv očekávání poslední boom v prodej automobilů před 2% spotřeby, zvýšení daně z prodeje, jež se na 1. dubna.každý den o potenciálně obrovské a nenahraditelné ztráty znamenala do prodeje a zisky toyoty a příbuzných firem. 5

, je pozoruhodné, že katastrofa byla zažehnána a montážních závodech byla znovu otevřena po pouhých dvou dnech vypnutí.oživení bylo dosaženo prostřednictvím okamžité a do značné míry samo - organizovaná úsilí firem, většinou zevnitř, ale také mimo toyota group, stanovit alternativní výrobních závodů mimo aisin. 6 během několika dní, firmy s malými zkušenostmi s p-valves byly výrobu a dodání části aisin.kde byli shromážděni a zkontrolována před vysláním do toyoty a dalších klientů montážních závodech.společné úsilí, což je zapojeno více než 200 firem (což přibližně šedesát dva převzala přímou odpovědnost za p-valve výroby),