Should We Care?Should this inequality in revenue bases (as reflected i terjemahan - Should We Care?Should this inequality in revenue bases (as reflected i Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

Should We Care?Should this inequali

Should We Care?
Should this inequality in revenue bases (as reflected in property values) or revenues
raised (the product of property values and property tax rates) across communities
concern public policy makers? Should higher levels of government
mandate redistribution across lower levels of government to offset these differences?
As noted earlier, such redistribution is an important feature of fiscal federalism
in some nations, where the national government distributes grants to poorer
communities that largely offset differences in revenues across communities.
The broad answer to the “Should we care?” question is that it depends on the
extent to which the Tiebout model describes reality. In a perfect Tiebout world, we
would not redistribute across communities: communities would have formed
for the efficient provision of public goods, and any redistribution across them
would impede efficiency. If a town has low revenues or low spending, it is
because the residents of the town have chosen to provide a low level of public
goods, and this is the efficient outcome given their tastes. Government redistribution
in this case should focus on individuals, not on communities.
To the extent that Tiebout does not perfectly describe reality, however,
there are two arguments for redistributing from high -revenue, high -spending
communities to low -revenue, low -spending communities. The first is failures of
the Tiebout mechanism. For example, suppose that there are reasons why people
cannot effectively vote with their feet, such as restrictive zoning rules that
cause houses to be very large and expensive in communities with high public
goods (e.g., each house must be on at least a one -acre lot). In this situation,
there may be people who desire high levels of public goods but who cannot
afford the high quality of house mandated by the zoning rules. These people
could remain stuck in a town with low public goods provision, the only place
they can afford a house. In this case, it could be efficient to redistribute to the
low public goods towns to help the individuals stuck in a situation where they
are forced to underconsume public goods.
The second reason for redistribution is externalities. If a large share of local
tax revenue is spent on local public goods with spillovers or externalities for other communities, there is a standard externality argument for higher levels
of government to subsidize spending in the communities providing the externalities.
For example, suppose that high -quality elementary education in a
town leads to lower crime rates in both that town and neighboring towns. In
this case, it may be optimal for the state government to tax high -revenue
towns and redistribute to low -revenue towns to ensure that low -revenue
towns can provide a high -quality elementary education.
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Should We Care?Should this inequality in revenue bases (as reflected in property values) or revenuesraised (the product of property values and property tax rates) across communitiesconcern public policy makers? Should higher levels of governmentmandate redistribution across lower levels of government to offset these differences?As noted earlier, such redistribution is an important feature of fiscal federalismin some nations, where the national government distributes grants to poorercommunities that largely offset differences in revenues across communities.The broad answer to the “Should we care?” question is that it depends on theextent to which the Tiebout model describes reality. In a perfect Tiebout world, wewould not redistribute across communities: communities would have formedfor the efficient provision of public goods, and any redistribution across themwould impede efficiency. If a town has low revenues or low spending, it isbecause the residents of the town have chosen to provide a low level of publicgoods, and this is the efficient outcome given their tastes. Government redistributionin this case should focus on individuals, not on communities.To the extent that Tiebout does not perfectly describe reality, however,there are two arguments for redistributing from high -revenue, high -spendingcommunities to low -revenue, low -spending communities. The first is failures ofthe Tiebout mechanism. For example, suppose that there are reasons why peoplecannot effectively vote with their feet, such as restrictive zoning rules thatcause houses to be very large and expensive in communities with high publicgoods (e.g., each house must be on at least a one -acre lot). In this situation,there may be people who desire high levels of public goods but who cannotafford the high quality of house mandated by the zoning rules. These peoplecould remain stuck in a town with low public goods provision, the only placethey can afford a house. In this case, it could be efficient to redistribute to thelow public goods towns to help the individuals stuck in a situation where theyare forced to underconsume public goods.The second reason for redistribution is externalities. If a large share of localtax revenue is spent on local public goods with spillovers or externalities for other communities, there is a standard externality argument for higher levelsof government to subsidize spending in the communities providing the externalities.For example, suppose that high -quality elementary education in atown leads to lower crime rates in both that town and neighboring towns. Inthis case, it may be optimal for the state government to tax high -revenuetowns and redistribute to low -revenue towns to ensure that low -revenuetowns can provide a high -quality elementary education.
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Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:[Salinan]
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Kita Harus Peduli?
Haruskah ketidaksetaraan ini di basis pendapatan (seperti tercermin dalam nilai properti) atau pendapatan
mengangkat (produk dari nilai properti dan tarif pajak properti) di masyarakat
menyangkut pembuat kebijakan publik? Harus tingkat yang lebih tinggi dari pemerintah
mandat redistribusi di tingkat pemerintahan yang lebih rendah untuk mengimbangi perbedaan ini?
Seperti disebutkan sebelumnya, redistribusi tersebut adalah fitur penting dari federalisme fiskal
di beberapa negara, di mana pemerintah nasional mendistribusikan hibah untuk miskin
masyarakat yang sebagian diimbangi perbedaan pendapatan di masyarakat.
jawaban yang luas untuk "Haruskah kita peduli?" pertanyaan adalah bahwa hal itu tergantung pada
sejauh mana model Tiebout menggambarkan realitas. Dalam dunia Tiebout sempurna, kita
tidak akan mendistribusikan seluruh masyarakat: masyarakat akan dibentuk
untuk penyediaan barang publik yang efisien, dan redistribusi di antara mereka
akan menghambat efisiensi. Jika kota memiliki pendapatan rendah atau pengeluaran rendah, itu adalah
karena warga kota telah memilih untuk memberikan tingkat rendah publik
barang, dan ini adalah hasil yang efisien diberikan selera mereka. Redistribusi pemerintah
dalam hal ini harus fokus pada individu, bukan pada masyarakat.
Sejauh Tiebout tidak sempurna menggambarkan realitas, namun,
ada dua argumen untuk mendistribusikan dari -revenue tinggi, -spending tinggi
masyarakat untuk -revenue rendah, -spending rendah masyarakat. Yang pertama adalah kegagalan dari
mekanisme Tiebout. Misalnya, bahwa ada alasan mengapa orang
tidak dapat secara efektif suara dengan kaki mereka, seperti aturan zonasi ketat yang
menyebabkan rumah menjadi sangat besar dan mahal di masyarakat dengan publik yang tinggi
barang (misalnya, setiap rumah harus di setidaknya satu - acre lot). Dalam situasi ini,
mungkin ada orang yang menginginkan tingkat tinggi barang publik tetapi yang tidak bisa
membayar kualitas tinggi rumah diamanatkan oleh peraturan zonasi. Orang-orang ini
bisa tetap terjebak di sebuah kota dengan penyediaan barang publik yang rendah, satu-satunya tempat
mereka bisa membeli rumah. Dalam hal ini, bisa jadi efisien untuk mendistribusikan ke
kota-kota barang publik yang rendah untuk membantu individu terjebak dalam situasi di mana mereka
dipaksa untuk underconsume barang publik.
Alasan kedua untuk redistribusi adalah eksternalitas. Jika bagian besar dari lokal
penerimaan pajak yang dihabiskan untuk barang publik lokal dengan spillovers atau eksternalitas bagi masyarakat lainnya, ada eksternalitas argumen standar untuk tingkat yang lebih tinggi
dari pemerintah untuk mensubsidi belanja di masyarakat memberikan eksternalitas.
Misalnya, yang tinggi - kualitas pendidikan dasar di
kota mengarah untuk menurunkan tingkat kejahatan di kedua kota itu dan kota-kota tetangga. Dalam
hal ini, mungkin optimal untuk pemerintah negara bagian untuk pajak -revenue tinggi
kota dan mendistribusikan ke kota-kota -revenue rendah untuk memastikan bahwa -revenue rendah
kota dapat memberikan pendidikan dasar -quality tinggi.
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