agreements and creditor control rig

agreements and creditor control rights for firms operating in non-US markets. Creditors have a stronger incentive to exercise control over corporate decision-making through
private credit agreements when they operate in environments with weak creditor protection. In such circumstances, both creditors and managers are more likely to
agree to dividend restrictions as a counterbalance to poor creditor rights.We test the substitute hypothesis for the agency costs of debt by constructing a large sample of 120,507 firm years from 16,525 unique firms across 52 countries. The sample period spans from 1990 to 2006. We begin by examining the impact of creditor rights on the likelihood of paying dividends while controlling for firm maturity,leverage, profitability, sales growth, size, cash holdings,and shareholder rights. As hypothesized, we find a positive and significant relation between creditor rights and the probability of paying dividends. In addition to payout probabilities, we examine payout amounts. Our Tobit regression results show that creditor rights are positively related to divided payouts.Weak creditor rights lead to dividend restrictions, all else equal. We find similar results for most of the individual components of the creditor rights index, including the: (1) right to repossess collateralized assets, (2) right to absolute priority over non-secured creditors, (3) right to restrict the debtor from unilaterally seeking court protection, and(4) right to replace management.We analyze the economic significance of our results and find that a reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value (four) to its lowest value (zero) leads to a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend. A similar reduction in creditor rights leads to a 60% reduction in dividend amounts (as a percent of sales). In contrast, an increase in minority shareholder rights from its lowest to its highest value leads to a 25% increase in the probability of paying a dividend and a 32% increase in dividend amounts. Cross-country variations in creditor rights have more explanatory power than cross-country variations in shareholder rights both in terms of statistical significance and economic significance

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

kreditor kontrol hak bagi perusahaan-perusahaan yang beroperasi di pasar non-AS dan perjanjian. Kreditor memiliki insentif yang kuat untuk mengendalikan pengambilan-keputusan perusahaan melaluiPerjanjian kredit pribadi ketika mereka beroperasi di lingkungan dengan perlindungan kreditor yang lemah. Dalam keadaan demikian, kreditor dan manajer yang lebih mungkin untukagree to dividend restrictions as a counterbalance to poor creditor rights.We test the substitute hypothesis for the agency costs of debt by constructing a large sample of 120,507 firm years from 16,525 unique firms across 52 countries. The sample period spans from 1990 to 2006. We begin by examining the impact of creditor rights on the likelihood of paying dividends while controlling for firm maturity,leverage, profitability, sales growth, size, cash holdings,and shareholder rights. As hypothesized, we find a positive and significant relation between creditor rights and the probability of paying dividends. In addition to payout probabilities, we examine payout amounts. Our Tobit regression results show that creditor rights are positively related to divided payouts.Weak creditor rights lead to dividend restrictions, all else equal. We find similar results for most of the individual components of the creditor rights index, including the: (1) right to repossess collateralized assets, (2) right to absolute priority over non-secured creditors, (3) right to restrict the debtor from unilaterally seeking court protection, and(4) right to replace management.We analyze the economic significance of our results and find that a reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value (four) to its lowest value (zero) leads to a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend. A similar reduction in creditor rights leads to a 60% reduction in dividend amounts (as a percent of sales). In contrast, an increase in minority shareholder rights from its lowest to its highest value leads to a 25% increase in the probability of paying a dividend and a 32% increase in dividend amounts. Cross-country variations in creditor rights have more explanatory power than cross-country variations in shareholder rights both in terms of statistical significance and economic significance

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

perjanjian dan hak kontrol kreditur bagi perusahaan-perusahaan yang beroperasi di pasar non-AS. Kreditor memiliki insentif kuat untuk melakukan kontrol atas pengambilan keputusan perusahaan melalui
perjanjian kredit pribadi ketika mereka beroperasi di lingkungan dengan perlindungan kreditor yang lemah. Dalam keadaan seperti itu, baik kreditur dan manajer lebih mungkin untuk
menyetujui pembatasan dividen sebagai penyeimbang kreditur miskin rights.We menguji hipotesis pengganti biaya agensi dari utang dengan membangun sampel besar 120.507 tahun perusahaan dari 16.525 perusahaan di seluruh 52 unik negara. Bentang periode sampel dari tahun 1990 ke tahun 2006. Kita mulai dengan memeriksa dampak dari hak kreditur pada kemungkinan membayar dividen sementara mengontrol kematangan perusahaan, leverage, profitabilitas, pertumbuhan penjualan, ukuran, posisi kas, dan hak-hak pemegang saham. Sebagai hipotesis, kita menemukan hubungan positif dan signifikan antara hak kreditur dan kemungkinan membayar dividen. Selain probabilitas payout, kita memeriksa jumlah payout. Hasil regresi Tobit kami menunjukkan bahwa hak-hak kreditur yang positif berkaitan dengan hak-hak kreditur dibagi payouts.Weak menyebabkan pembatasan dividen, semuanya sama. Kami menemukan hasil yang sama untuk sebagian besar komponen individual dari indeks hak kreditur, termasuk: (1) hak untuk menarik kembali aset yang dijaminkan, (2) hak untuk prioritas mutlak atas kreditur non-dijamin, (3) hak untuk membatasi debitur dari sepihak mencari perlindungan pengadilan, dan (4) hak untuk mengganti management.We menganalisis signifikansi ekonomi dari hasil kami dan menemukan bahwa pengurangan indeks hak kreditur dari nilai tertinggi (empat) dengan nilai terendah (nol) mengarah ke 41 pengurangan% dalam probabilitas membayar dividen. Penurunan serupa dalam hak kreditur mengarah pada penurunan 60% dalam jumlah dividen (sebagai persen dari penjualan). Sebaliknya, peningkatan hak pemegang saham minoritas dari terendah ke nilai tertinggi mengarah ke peningkatan 25% dalam probabilitas membayar dividen dan peningkatan 32% dalam jumlah dividen. Variasi lintas negara dalam hak-hak kreditur memiliki kekuatan penjelas lebih dari variasi lintas negara dalam hak-hak pemegang saham baik dari segi signifikansi statistik dan signifikansi ekonomi