Forest Management: From Tenurial Incentives in Southeast Asia to Economic Incentives in West and
Central Africa
Most countries have responded to market pressure for secure ownership of resources by imposing a
new system of private or state ownership, disregarding customary community-based use rights to
forest resources by the state. This deprived communities of any incentive to practice forest protection and sustainable forest management and led to encroachment and unsustainable harvesting practices (Panayotou and Ashton, 1992). Papua New Guinea is one of a few countries that have formally recognized customary community rights over land and forest resources. Papua New Guinea's land law builds upon the customs governing its communally held land. The country's Land Ordinance Act calls for local mediators and land courts to base settlements on existing principles of communal ownership. Consequently, 97% of the land remains communal, has been neither surveyed nor registered, and is governed by local custom (Cooter).
This communal tenure seems to provide clearer ownership rights, with all their environmental and
market implications, than private ownership. Settlements that convert communal land to freehold are often later disputed, with reversion back to customary ownership a frequent outcome. Yet, unlike the reality of state-owned land in other developing countries, communal land in Papua New Guinea is neither unowned nor public. Rather, the bundle of rights deemed “ownership” in the West does not reside in one part. For example, individual families hold the right to farm plots of land indefinitely, but the right to trade them resides in the clan (Cooter). In marked contrast to much of the developing world, only six million of Papua New Guinea's 46 million
hectares of forest land have been converted to other uses (Australian UNESCO Committee, 1976).
This should come as no surprise since those who control the land have an interest in the sustainable, productive use of its forest. Rather than dealing with a distant government in need of quick revenues and foreign exchange, companies seeking logging rights must negotiate directly with those who have secure tenure and who use the land not only to farm, but to gather fruit, hunt, and collect materials for clothing, buildings, and weapons (HIID 1988, Australian UNESCO Committee, 1976). Because the communal tenure patterns provide an entitlement to all clan members, individuals have little incentive to sacrifice future value for current use. Two conclusions may be derived from the Papua New Guinea experience with communal forest tenure:
(a) Basing land law upon customary communal tenure patterns can be a viable adaptation to
the requirements of a market economy; (b) Communal tenure may prevent deforestation more effectively than either state or private ownership if it provides an entitlement and secure tenure to a group that benefits from a forest's sustainable use.
In an effort to reverse past policies, the Philippines have recently granted 25-year communal forest leases through a Community Forest Stewardship Agreement between communities and the Forest Management Bureau. The lease is renewable for an additional 25-year period. The community
undertakes the responsibility to protect the remaining forest area in exchange for legalization of the community's occupation and use of the area and government assistance in keeping migrants out of the communal area. Fifteen agreements covering an area of 44,221 ha were reported by the end of 1990. While it is too early to evaluate the program, benefits are reported in the form of: (a) sustainable use of land and forests within the leased area, and (b) reduction of encroachment by migrant farmers (Lynch, 1991). Despite the relative success of the program, the Philippine Government is not yet prepared to increase the incentives for sustainable forest management by recognizing ancestral land ownership. (Sinesio, Mariano, et al. 1987).
Logging concessions in tropical forests are usually awarded through a long administrative process, following negotiations with logging companies, or in an arbitrary fashion that invites corruption. The concession area is typically too large to be protected and managed efficiently and the duration of the conversion is typically too short to encourage careful harvesting and regeneration for a second crop.
Forest fees and taxes are generally too low to capture timber rents and to internalize the negative externalities of logging. When forest taxation provides any incentive at all, it is a perverse one; for example, logging taxes are based on the quantity of merchantable timber removed (rather than on the timber on the site), thus encouraging high grading and damage to the remaining trees. Forest management and regeneration are not made in the interest of the concessionaire but prescribed through regulations (such as minimum diameter, maximum allowable cut, selective cutting, and replanting requirements) that are rarely monitored or enforced.
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