This demonstrates for Husserl that

This demonstrates for Husserl that an expression's meaning does not need to coincide with any particular feat of intimation, which is the basis of communication. If this were so, then we would have to say that even in mental soliloquy, one uses expressions to intimate something to oneself. But what are the things indicated in the expressions of a private soliloquy? My mental states? My ideas? But why would I need to produce an expression that would stand for or indicate my ideas when I am already in possession of those ideas? What would be the point of (a) having an idea, (b) encoding it into an expression, (c) decoding that expression (i.e., inferring what the expression stands for), and (d) having an idea, when I am the one who had the original idea? Why do I need a sign of my own experiences, when I have, even better, the experiences themselves?

In soliloquy, words function as signs here as they do everywhere else. They can be still paid said to point to something. But they do not point to mental states:
In the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating. In a monologue, words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment. (Husserl, 1900/1970, p.280).

As Husserl so vividly demonstrates, indication is not necessary for meaning. "Expressions function meaningfully even in isolated mental life, where they no longer serve to indicate anything" (p.269). There is no separation of thought and sign. There is no need to perceive the sign and then work back to the mental state it points to. The two are joined in a fundamental unity and we experience them as a unity. The transmission regime communication asks us to imagine a consciousness that is prior to experience: that stands against the world, receives sensations, turns them into perceptual objects, and then bases an interpretation on them. For Husserl, there is no such separation. Indeed, his example of the soliloquy shows there is no need for such a separation. If A summons B into of both A and B, but we usually feel their connection forcing itself upon us. For example, look at this sign:

DOG

Try to see this sign as marks on paper, an arrangement of black lines on white background, without seeing it as the word "dog". It is almost impossible to separate the sign DOG (the physical marks on this page) and the word "dog" which comes complete with the meanings this word has for you. You do not see the sign DOG and then, in some separate process, search your mind for the appropriate object the word stands for, bring that object into consciousness, and bring the sign and the word together. You see the sign DOG and the word "dog" together as a fundamental unity. We are, as Husserl (1900/1970) puts it, "differently minded" (p.303) in respect of it: "it no longer seems a mere sensuous mark on paper, the physical phenomenon counts as an understood sign" (p.303). Husserl calls this "living understandingly" - "we perform no act of presentation or judgment directed upon the sign as a sensible object, but another act, quite different in kind" (p.303). It is the nature of this other act, "quite different in kind", that we now turn.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Ini menunjukkan untuk Husserl yang ekspresi berarti tidak perlu bertepatan dengan feat isyarat, yang merupakan dasar dari komunikasi setiap tertentu. Jika ini benar, maka kita harus mengatakan bahwa bahkan di mental solilokui, satu menggunakan ekspresi untuk intim sesuatu untuk diri sendiri. Tapi apa hal-hal yang ditunjukkan dalam ekspresi pribadi solilokui? Keadaan mental saya? Ide-ide saya? Tapi mengapa saya perlu menghasilkan ekspresi yang akan berdiri untuk atau menunjukkan ide-ide saya ketika saya sudah memiliki ide-ide? Apa yang akan menjadi titik () memiliki sebuah ide, (b) encoding ke ekspresi, (c) decoding ungkapan itu (yaitu, dalam menyimpulkan apa ekspresi singkatan), dan (d) memiliki sebuah ide, ketika saya yang punya ide asli? Mengapa Apakah saya perlu tanda pengalaman saya sendiri, ketika saya memiliki, bahkan lebih baik, pengalaman sendiri?Di solilokui, kata-kata yang berfungsi sebagai tanda-tanda di sini seperti yang mereka lakukan di tempat lain. Mereka dapat masih dibayar kata untuk menunjuk ke sesuatu. Tapi mereka tidak menunjukkan keadaan mental:Dalam arti asli komunikasi, ada pidato tidak dalam kasus tersebut, juga tidak satu memberitahu diri sendiri sesuatu: satu hanya membayangkan diri sendiri sebagai berbicara dan berkomunikasi. Sebuah monolog, kata-kata dapat melakukan fungsi tidak menunjukkan adanya tindakan mental, karena indikasi tersebut akan cukup memiliki tujuan. Untuk tindakan pertanyaan sendiri dialami oleh kami pada saat itu. (Husserl, 1900 tahun 1970, p.280).Seperti Husserl begitu jelas menunjukkan, indikasi tidak diperlukan untuk makna. "Ekspresi fungsi bermakna bahkan dalam kehidupan mental yang terisolasi, dimana mereka tidak lagi melayani untuk menunjukkan apa-apa" (halaman 269). Ada ada pemisahan pemikiran dan tanda. Ada tidak perlu untuk memandang tanda dan kemudian bekerja kembali ke keadaan mental yang mengarah ke. Keduanya bergabung dalam kesatuan dasar dan kita mengalami mereka sebagai satu kesatuan. Transmisi rezim komunikasi meminta kita untuk membayangkan suatu kesadaran yang sebelumnya pengalaman: yang berdiri melawan dunia, menerima sensasi, ternyata mereka ke persepsi objek, dan kemudian basis penafsiran pada mereka. Untuk Husserl, ada ada pemisahan tersebut. Memang, contoh-nya soliloquy menunjukkan ada tidak perlu untuk pemisahan tersebut. Jika panggilan B ke kedua A dan B, tetapi kita biasanya merasa hubungan mereka memaksa dirinya kepada kita. Sebagai contoh, lihatlah tanda ini: ANJINGTry to see this sign as marks on paper, an arrangement of black lines on white background, without seeing it as the word "dog". It is almost impossible to separate the sign DOG (the physical marks on this page) and the word "dog" which comes complete with the meanings this word has for you. You do not see the sign DOG and then, in some separate process, search your mind for the appropriate object the word stands for, bring that object into consciousness, and bring the sign and the word together. You see the sign DOG and the word "dog" together as a fundamental unity. We are, as Husserl (1900/1970) puts it, "differently minded" (p.303) in respect of it: "it no longer seems a mere sensuous mark on paper, the physical phenomenon counts as an understood sign" (p.303). Husserl calls this "living understandingly" - "we perform no act of presentation or judgment directed upon the sign as a sensible object, but another act, quite different in kind" (p.303). It is the nature of this other act, "quite different in kind", that we now turn.