The Japanese model of long-term col

The Japanese model of long-term collaborative partnerships between firms and their suppliers has attracted much attention from business researchers and practitioners. Several U.S. and European auto-makers have attempted to establish similar partnerships of their own, seeking to reduce their supplier base and cultivate relationships with their best suppliers.1 As a result, the early involvement of suppliers in product-development and cost-reduction efforts is becoming standard practice in the automotive industry and beyond.2
A recent crisis involving Toyota and its supplier network suggests, however, that the Japanese model — or at least the Toyota model — involves more than a set of long-term relationships between a firm and a few select suppliers. As the Toyota group’s collaborative response to the sudden destruction of a key supplier’s plant suggests, the relationships among a firm’s suppliers are equally important. More generally, a complex mix of institutions permits self-organization during times of crisis with little need for a leader’s direct control.3 These strong relationships among many firms along with the steady but largely invisible control of a leader promote flexible and coordinated responses to crises. In addition, they foster long-term competitiveness through decentral- ized, groupwide efforts to solve day-to-day problems and improve performance.

On February 1, 1997, a fire at one of Aisin Seiki’s plants threatened to halt Toyota-group operations for weeks. Aisin Seiki, one of Toyota’s most trusted suppliers, was the sole source for proportioning valves (or P-valves, in the industry parlance), a small but crucial brake-related part used in all Toyota vehicles.4 Because of Toyota’s and Aisin’s dedication to the principles of just-in-time (JIT) production, only two or three days’ worth of stock was on hand. A shutdown of Toyota-group plants (including those of several hundred suppliers) seemed unavoidable.

The timing could not have been worse. Toyota plants were operating at full capacity with levels of overtime and use of temporary workers unheard of in years, in anticipation of a last-minute boom in automobile sales prior to the 2 percent consumption sales tax increase slated for April 1. Every day lost meant potentially huge and irretrievable losses in sales and profits for Toyota and related firms.5

Yet, remarkably, disaster was averted, and assembly plants were reopened after only two days of shutdown. The recovery was accomplished through an immediate and largely self-organized effort by firms, mostly from within but also from outside the Toyota group, to set up alternative production sites outside of Aisin.6 Within days, firms with little experience with P-valves were manufacturing and delivering the parts to Aisin, where they were assembled and inspected before being sent to Toyota’s and other clients’ assembly plants. The collaborative effort, which which involved more than 200 firms (of which approximately sixty-two took direct responsibility for P-valve production), was orchestrated with very limited direct control from Toyota and with no haggling over technical proprietary rights or financial compensation.

The Toyota group demonstrated its cohesion and resiliency at a time when many observers were discussing the weakening of traditional ties among group members. Based on data collected through in-depth interviews with key players in the incident, we describe what took place during the Aisin Seiki crisis and how individual firms came together to orchestrate the recovery effort.7 We believe that the episode holds lessons for businesses adopting the Japanese model of long-term supplier partnerships as well as for businesses moving away from that model. Of course, competition for future contracts and the pressure to maintain their reputations motivated the suppliers to cooperate with each other. Nevertheless, we argue, it was the various capabilities developed through institutionalized problem-solving activities within the Toyota group that ensured the effectiveness and rapidity of the suppliers’ collaborative effort. For businesses of many kinds, the capabilities developed through committed partnerships can enhance competitiveness, driving participants to respond effectively to emergencies and to pursue continuous improvement on a daily basis.8

The Aisin Seiki Crisis

At 4:18 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, 1997, a fire erupted in Aisin’s Kariya plant number one. By 8:52 a.m., the lines dedicated to P-valves and to two other brake-related parts (clutch master cylinders and tandem master cylinders) were almost completely destroyed, along with special-purpose machinery and drills that could take months to reorder. The near destruction of the P-valve lines was potentially disastrous for Toyota; nearly all of its vehicles used Aisin P-valves manufactured exclusively at the Kariya plant, which turned out 32,500 P-valves a day for Toyota and other Toyota-group assemblers such as Hino and Daihatsu as well as for Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Isuzu.

Used in all vehicles, P-valves control pressure on rear brakes to help prevent skidding. About the size of a pack of cigarettes, the part is mass-produced using dedicated transfer lines, which keeps costs down and ensures high productivity and reliability. Although structurally simple and inexpensive, costing only between ¥770 and ¥1,400 apiece, P-valves require complex, high-precision machining to ensure the reliability and durability essential to the safety of any brake system.

That Aisin was the sole supplier of this small but critical part was surprising to many in Japan. To reduce the risk of the very kind of disruption it was now confronting, Toyota had increased parallel sourcing. Its relationship with Aisin was distinctive, however.9 Aisin was one of Toyota’s closest suppliers in sales, personnel, and financial linkages; its outstanding cost, quality, and delivery performance record made it difficult to replace.10

Toyota suddenly found itself in crisis. As a result of JIT operations, only one day’s worth of P-valves were in immediate stock. Predictably, on Monday, February 3, when assembly lines were still running, Toyota announced the following days’ shutdown of twenty of its thirty assembly lines (including those of Toyota’s contract assemblers); from Tuesday, February 4, to Wednesday, February 5, practically all of Toyota’s and most of its related firms’ plants were closed, bringing to a halt almost the entire Toyota group.11 As a result, hundreds of tiered suppliers who would have to wait for the reopening of their clients’ plants to resume deliveries were also affected, as were local electricity, gas, and transportation companies. Such is the fragility of JIT: a surprise event can paralyze entire networks and even industries.12

Indeed, Toyota was facing one of the worst crises in its history.13 But on Tuesday, February 4, only three days after the fire, the first alternative volume P-valves (as opposed to prototype P-valves that had been delivered one day earlier) were rolling off temporary lines hastily set up by an Aisin supplier, Koritsu Sangyo, marking the beginning of the recovery process. As a result of this and many other firms’ efforts, by Thursday, February 6, Toyota’s Tahara and Hino’s Hamura plants were reopened, followed by the other car assembly plants affected the next day on a single-shift basis. By Monday, February 10, a little more than one week after the plant fire, all Toyota-group assembly plants were back to normal with production volumes of 13,000 to 14,000 vehicles per day. After another week, the plants were in full operation at the previously planned production volumes of 15,500 vehicles per day. At that time, the proportion of P-valves produced by Aisin itself was less than 10 percent of the total amount necessary; it gradually increased, however, reaching 60 percent by March 14 and almost 100 percent by the end of March. The bulk of the P-valve production was taking place at approximately sixty-two firms, including Koritsu Sangyo, which gave full priority to the restoration of P-valve production and often worked double shifts through weekends.

In total, the fire cost Aisin ¥7.8 billion and Toyota about 70,000 vehicles and ¥160 billion in revenues.14 Although Toyota officials claim to have recouped most of the lost vehicle production through increased overtime and holiday shifts, losses in the range of ¥20 billion to ¥30 billion were unavoidable, mainly because the creation of alternative P-valve sites was costly.15 In the end, however, Toyota and Aisin could only be grateful that group members achieved a rapid and effective recovery and averted what could have been a much more devastating incident.

The Recovery Effort

How could alternative P-valve production sites be organized and the delivery of the required 32,500 P-valves a day be resumed so quickly? We describe the roles played in the recovery by six firms, which we visited during our field research: Toyota, Aisin Seiki, Denso, Taiho Kogyo, Kayaba Industry, and Koritsu Sangyo. While these firms differ in size, areas of specialization, position in the value chain, and financial linkages to Toyota, they share several characteristics: a commitment to, and capabilities for, JIT production and the ability to solve problems at their source.16

From the beginning, it was clear that until Aisin could rebuild its previous capacity, outside help would be indispensable. It was decided then that firms from both inside and outside the Toyota group would be asked to set up alternative P-valve production sites as soon as possible, with Aisin providing technical assistance, design drawings, jigs (e.g., specialized drills), machine tools, and raw materials (e.g., cast iron) salvaged from the fire.17 Aisin was to immediately begin setting up alternative production sites in its other plants as well.

Sixty-two firms responded to Aisin’s call a

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Model Jepang jangka panjang kemitraan kolaboratif antara perusahaan dan pemasok mereka telah menarik banyak perhatian dari para peneliti bisnis dan praktisi. Beberapa Amerika Serikat dan Eropa auto-pembuat telah berusaha untuk membangun kemitraan yang sama mereka sendiri, mencari untuk mengurangi pemasok dasar dan memupuk hubungan dengan suppliers.1 terbaik mereka sebagai akibatnya, awal keterlibatan pemasok dalam pengembangan produk dan upaya pengurangan biaya menjadi praktik standar di industri otomotif dengan beyond.2Krisis hari melibatkan Toyota dan jaringan pemasok menunjukkan, bagaimanapun, bahwa model Jepang- atau setidaknya Toyota model — melibatkan lebih dari satu set jangka panjang hubungan antara perusahaan dan beberapa pilih pemasok. Sebagai Toyota group kolaboratif respon tiba-tiba kehancuran tanaman pemasok utama menunjukkan, hubungan antara perusahaan pemasok sama pentingnya. Lebih umum, campuran yang kompleks lembaga izin Self-organisasi selama masa krisis dengan sedikit kebutuhan untuk seorang pemimpin langsung control.3 ini hubungan yang kuat antara banyak perusahaan dengan stabil tapi sebagian besar tak terlihat kontrol seorang pemimpin mempromosikan fleksibel dan terkoordinasi tanggapan terhadap krisis. Selain itu, mereka menumbuhkan daya saing jangka panjang melalui decentral-ized, groupwide upaya untuk memecahkan masalah-masalah sehari-hari dan meningkatkan kinerja.Pada 1 Februari 1997, sebuah kebakaran di salah satu tanaman Aisin Seiki mengancam untuk menghentikan operasi Toyota-kelompok selama berminggu-minggu. Aisin Seiki, salah satu pemasok paling terpercaya Toyota, adalah satu-satunya sumber untuk proportioning katup (atau P-katup, dalam istilah industri), kecil namun penting bagian terkait rem digunakan dalam semua Toyota vehicles.4 karena Toyota dan Aisin's dedikasi kepada prinsip-prinsip just-in-time (JIT) produksi, hanya dua atau tiga hari senilai saham adalah di tangan. Shutdown Toyota-kelompok tumbuhan (termasuk beberapa ratus pemasok) tampaknya tidak dapat dihindari.Waktu tidak bisa lebih buruk. Toyota tanaman beroperasi pada kapasitas penuh dengan tingkat lembur dan penggunaan pekerja sementara terdengar dari dalam tahun, dalam mengantisipasi suatu boom menit-menit terakhir mobil penjualan sebelum kenaikan penjualan pajak konsumsi 2 persen dijadwalkan untuk April 1. Setiap hari kehilangan berarti berpotensi besar dan yg tak dpt ditebus kerugian dalam penjualan dan keuntungan untuk Toyota dan terkait firms.5Namun, sungguh, bencana dihindari, dan pabrik perakitan yang dibuka kembali setelah hanya dua hari shutdown. Pemulihan dicapai melalui upaya langsung dan sebagian besar Self-terorganisir oleh perusahaan, sebagian besar dari dalam tapi juga dari luar kelompok Toyota, untuk mengatur situs produksi alternatif di luar Aisin.6 dalam hari, perusahaan dengan sedikit pengalaman dengan P-katup manufaktur dan memberikan bagian-bagian untuk Aisin, dimana mereka berkumpul dan diperiksa sebelum dikirim ke Toyota dan pabrik perakitan klien lainnya. Upaya kolaborasi, yang yang melibatkan lebih dari 200 perusahaan (yang kira-kira enam puluh dua mengambil tanggung jawab langsung untuk produksi P-katup), adalah diatur dengan sangat terbatas kontrol langsung dari Toyota dan ada tawar-menawar atas hak-hak kepemilikan yang teknis atau kompensasi finansial.The Toyota group demonstrated its cohesion and resiliency at a time when many observers were discussing the weakening of traditional ties among group members. Based on data collected through in-depth interviews with key players in the incident, we describe what took place during the Aisin Seiki crisis and how individual firms came together to orchestrate the recovery effort.7 We believe that the episode holds lessons for businesses adopting the Japanese model of long-term supplier partnerships as well as for businesses moving away from that model. Of course, competition for future contracts and the pressure to maintain their reputations motivated the suppliers to cooperate with each other. Nevertheless, we argue, it was the various capabilities developed through institutionalized problem-solving activities within the Toyota group that ensured the effectiveness and rapidity of the suppliers’ collaborative effort. For businesses of many kinds, the capabilities developed through committed partnerships can enhance competitiveness, driving participants to respond effectively to emergencies and to pursue continuous improvement on a daily basis.8The Aisin Seiki CrisisAt 4:18 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, 1997, a fire erupted in Aisin’s Kariya plant number one. By 8:52 a.m., the lines dedicated to P-valves and to two other brake-related parts (clutch master cylinders and tandem master cylinders) were almost completely destroyed, along with special-purpose machinery and drills that could take months to reorder. The near destruction of the P-valve lines was potentially disastrous for Toyota; nearly all of its vehicles used Aisin P-valves manufactured exclusively at the Kariya plant, which turned out 32,500 P-valves a day for Toyota and other Toyota-group assemblers such as Hino and Daihatsu as well as for Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Isuzu.Used in all vehicles, P-valves control pressure on rear brakes to help prevent skidding. About the size of a pack of cigarettes, the part is mass-produced using dedicated transfer lines, which keeps costs down and ensures high productivity and reliability. Although structurally simple and inexpensive, costing only between ¥770 and ¥1,400 apiece, P-valves require complex, high-precision machining to ensure the reliability and durability essential to the safety of any brake system.That Aisin was the sole supplier of this small but critical part was surprising to many in Japan. To reduce the risk of the very kind of disruption it was now confronting, Toyota had increased parallel sourcing. Its relationship with Aisin was distinctive, however.9 Aisin was one of Toyota’s closest suppliers in sales, personnel, and financial linkages; its outstanding cost, quality, and delivery performance record made it difficult to replace.10Toyota suddenly found itself in crisis. As a result of JIT operations, only one day’s worth of P-valves were in immediate stock. Predictably, on Monday, February 3, when assembly lines were still running, Toyota announced the following days’ shutdown of twenty of its thirty assembly lines (including those of Toyota’s contract assemblers); from Tuesday, February 4, to Wednesday, February 5, practically all of Toyota’s and most of its related firms’ plants were closed, bringing to a halt almost the entire Toyota group.11 As a result, hundreds of tiered suppliers who would have to wait for the reopening of their clients’ plants to resume deliveries were also affected, as were local electricity, gas, and transportation companies. Such is the fragility of JIT: a surprise event can paralyze entire networks and even industries.12Indeed, Toyota was facing one of the worst crises in its history.13 But on Tuesday, February 4, only three days after the fire, the first alternative volume P-valves (as opposed to prototype P-valves that had been delivered one day earlier) were rolling off temporary lines hastily set up by an Aisin supplier, Koritsu Sangyo, marking the beginning of the recovery process. As a result of this and many other firms’ efforts, by Thursday, February 6, Toyota’s Tahara and Hino’s Hamura plants were reopened, followed by the other car assembly plants affected the next day on a single-shift basis. By Monday, February 10, a little more than one week after the plant fire, all Toyota-group assembly plants were back to normal with production volumes of 13,000 to 14,000 vehicles per day. After another week, the plants were in full operation at the previously planned production volumes of 15,500 vehicles per day. At that time, the proportion of P-valves produced by Aisin itself was less than 10 percent of the total amount necessary; it gradually increased, however, reaching 60 percent by March 14 and almost 100 percent by the end of March. The bulk of the P-valve production was taking place at approximately sixty-two firms, including Koritsu Sangyo, which gave full priority to the restoration of P-valve production and often worked double shifts through weekends.
In total, the fire cost Aisin ¥7.8 billion and Toyota about 70,000 vehicles and ¥160 billion in revenues.14 Although Toyota officials claim to have recouped most of the lost vehicle production through increased overtime and holiday shifts, losses in the range of ¥20 billion to ¥30 billion were unavoidable, mainly because the creation of alternative P-valve sites was costly.15 In the end, however, Toyota and Aisin could only be grateful that group members achieved a rapid and effective recovery and averted what could have been a much more devastating incident.

The Recovery Effort

How could alternative P-valve production sites be organized and the delivery of the required 32,500 P-valves a day be resumed so quickly? We describe the roles played in the recovery by six firms, which we visited during our field research: Toyota, Aisin Seiki, Denso, Taiho Kogyo, Kayaba Industry, and Koritsu Sangyo. While these firms differ in size, areas of specialization, position in the value chain, and financial linkages to Toyota, they share several characteristics: a commitment to, and capabilities for, JIT production and the ability to solve problems at their source.16

From the beginning, it was clear that until Aisin could rebuild its previous capacity, outside help would be indispensable. It was decided then that firms from both inside and outside the Toyota group would be asked to set up alternative P-valve production sites as soon as possible, with Aisin providing technical assistance, design drawings, jigs (e.g., specialized drills), machine tools, and raw materials (e.g., cast iron) salvaged from the fire.17 Aisin was to immediately begin setting up alternative production sites in its other plants as well.

Sixty-two firms responded to Aisin’s call a

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Model Jepang kemitraan kolaboratif jangka panjang antara perusahaan dan pemasok mereka telah menarik banyak perhatian dari para peneliti dan praktisi bisnis. Beberapa AS dan Eropa auto-pembuat telah berusaha untuk membangun kemitraan yang sama mereka sendiri, berusaha untuk mengurangi basis pemasok mereka dan memupuk hubungan dengan suppliers.1 terbaik mereka Akibatnya, keterlibatan awal pemasok dalam upaya pengurangan biaya pengembangan produk dan menjadi praktek standar dalam industri otomotif dan beyond.2
Krisis baru-baru ini yang melibatkan Toyota dan jaringan pemasok menyarankan, bagaimanapun, bahwa model Jepang - atau setidaknya model Toyota - melibatkan lebih dari satu set hubungan jangka panjang antara perusahaan yang dan beberapa memilih pemasok. Sebagai respon kolaboratif Toyota kelompok untuk kehancuran tiba-tiba tanaman pemasok utama menunjukkan, hubungan antara pemasok dengan perusahaan sama-sama penting. Lebih umum, campuran kompleks lembaga memungkinkan organisasi diri selama masa krisis dengan sedikit kebutuhan untuk control.3 langsung seorang pemimpin ini hubungan yang kuat antara banyak perusahaan bersama dengan kontrol stabil tapi sebagian besar tak terlihat seorang pemimpin mempromosikan tanggapan fleksibel dan terkoordinasi untuk krisis . Selain itu, mereka mendorong daya saing jangka panjang melalui decentral- terwujud, upaya groupwide untuk memecahkan masalah sehari-hari dan meningkatkan kinerja. Pada tanggal 1 Februari 1997, kebakaran di salah satu pabrik Aisin Seiki mengancam akan menghentikan operasi Toyota-kelompok untuk minggu. Aisin Seiki, salah satu pemasok terbesar Toyota, adalah satu-satunya sumber untuk proporsi katup (atau P-katup, dalam istilah industri), bagian-rem terkait kecil tapi penting yang digunakan dalam semua Toyota vehicles.4 Karena Toyota dan dedikasi Aisin dengan prinsip-prinsip just-in-time (JIT) produksi, nilainya hanya dua atau tiga hari 'saham berada di tangan. Sebuah shutdown tanaman Toyota-kelompok (termasuk beberapa ratus pemasok) tampaknya tidak dapat dihindari. Waktunya tidak bisa lebih buruk. Tanaman Toyota beroperasi pada kapasitas penuh dengan tingkat lembur dan penggunaan pekerja sementara pernah terjadi di tahun, untuk mengantisipasi ledakan-menit terakhir dalam penjualan mobil sebelum kenaikan pajak penjualan konsumsi 2 persen dijadwalkan untuk April 1. Setiap hari kehilangan dimaksudkan berpotensi kerugian besar dan bisa diperbaiki dalam penjualan dan keuntungan bagi Toyota dan firms.5 terkait Namun, sangat, bencana dihindari, dan pabrik perakitan yang dibuka kembali setelah hanya dua hari shutdown. Recovery itu dicapai melalui upaya segera dan sebagian besar diri yang diselenggarakan oleh perusahaan, sebagian besar dari dalam tapi juga dari luar kelompok Toyota, untuk mendirikan tempat produksi alternatif di luar Aisin.6 Dalam beberapa hari, perusahaan dengan sedikit pengalaman dengan P-katup yang manufaktur dan memberikan bagian untuk Aisin, di mana mereka berkumpul dan diperiksa sebelum dikirim ke Toyota dan pabrik perakitan klien lain '. Upaya kolaboratif, yang mana melibatkan lebih dari 200 perusahaan (dimana sekitar enam puluh dua mengambil tanggung jawab langsung untuk produksi P-katup), didalangi dengan kontrol langsung sangat terbatas dari Toyota dan tanpa tawar-menawar atas hak milik teknis atau kompensasi keuangan. The Kelompok Toyota menunjukkan kohesi dan ketahanan pada saat banyak pengamat mendiskusikan melemahnya ikatan tradisional antara anggota kelompok. Berdasarkan data yang dikumpulkan melalui wawancara mendalam dengan pemain kunci dalam insiden itu, kami menjelaskan apa yang terjadi selama krisis Aisin Seiki dan bagaimana perusahaan individual datang bersama-sama untuk mengatur yang effort.7 pemulihan Kami percaya bahwa episode memegang pelajaran untuk bisnis mengadopsi Model Jepang kemitraan pemasok jangka panjang serta untuk usaha bergerak menjauh dari model tersebut. Tentu saja, kompetisi untuk kontrak masa depan dan tekanan untuk memelihara reputasi mereka termotivasi pemasok untuk bekerja sama dengan satu sama lain. Namun demikian, kami berpendapat, itu adalah berbagai kemampuan yang dikembangkan melalui dilembagakan kegiatan pemecahan masalah dalam kelompok Toyota yang menjamin efektivitas dan kecepatan upaya kolaboratif pemasok '. Untuk bisnis dari berbagai jenis, kemampuan dikembangkan melalui kemitraan yang dilakukan dapat meningkatkan daya saing, mengemudi peserta untuk merespons secara efektif terhadap keadaan darurat dan untuk mengejar perbaikan terus-menerus pada basis.8 harian The Aisin Seiki Krisis Pada 04:18 pada Sabtu, 1 Februari, 1997 , api meletus di Aisin Kariya jumlah tanaman satu. Oleh 08:52, garis didedikasikan untuk P-katup dan dua bagian-rem terkait lainnya (silinder kopling tuan dan master silinder tandem) yang hampir hancur, bersama dengan mesin tujuan khusus dan latihan yang dapat mengambil bulan untuk menyusun ulang. Kehancuran dekat garis P-katup itu berpotensi bencana bagi Toyota; hampir semua kendaraan yang digunakan Aisin P-katup diproduksi secara eksklusif di pabrik Kariya, yang ternyata 32.500 P-katup per hari untuk Toyota dan perakit Toyota-kelompok lain seperti Hino dan Daihatsu serta untuk Mitsubishi, Suzuki, dan Isuzu. digunakan di semua kendaraan, P-katup mengontrol tekanan rem belakang untuk membantu mencegah penyaradan. Tentang ukuran satu pak rokok, bagian ini diproduksi secara massal menggunakan jalur pengalihan khusus, yang membuat biaya turun dan memastikan produktivitas yang tinggi dan kehandalan. Meskipun secara struktural sederhana dan murah, biaya hanya antara ¥ 770 dan ¥ 1.400 masing-masing, P-katup memerlukan kompleks, mesin presisi tinggi untuk memastikan keandalan dan daya tahan yang penting untuk keselamatan sistem rem. Itu Aisin adalah satu-satunya pemasok kecil ini tapi bagian penting adalah mengejutkan banyak di Jepang. Untuk mengurangi risiko dari sangat baik dari gangguan itu sekarang menghadapi, Toyota telah meningkatkan sumber paralel. Hubungannya dengan Aisin adalah khas, however.9 Aisin adalah salah satu pemasok terdekat Toyota dalam penjualan, personil, dan hubungan keuangan; biaya yang luar biasa, kualitas, dan pengiriman rekor kinerjanya membuatnya sulit untuk replace.10 Toyota tiba-tiba menemukan dirinya dalam krisis. Sebagai hasil dari operasi JIT, nilainya hanya satu hari dari P-katup berada di saham langsung. Bisa ditebak, Senin, 3 Februari ketika jalur perakitan yang masih berjalan, Toyota mengumumkan penutupan hari-hari berikutnya 'dari dua puluh lini perakitan tiga puluh (termasuk Toyota perakit kontrak); Selasa, 4 Februari hingga Rabu, 5 Februari hampir semua Toyota dan sebagian besar tanaman perusahaan terkait 'ditutup, membawa berhenti hampir seluruh Toyota group.11 Akibatnya, ratusan pemasok berjenjang yang harus menunggu pembukaan kembali pabrik klien mereka untuk melanjutkan pengiriman juga terpengaruh, seperti perusahaan listrik, gas, dan transportasi lokal. Tersebut adalah kerapuhan JIT: acara kejutan dapat melumpuhkan seluruh jaringan dan bahkan industries.12 Memang, Toyota menghadapi salah satu krisis terburuk dalam history.13 nya Tapi pada hari Selasa, 4 Februari hanya tiga hari setelah kebakaran, pertama Volume alternatif P-katup (sebagai lawan untuk prototipe P-katup yang telah disampaikan satu hari sebelumnya) yang bergulir dari jalur sementara buru-buru didirikan oleh pemasok Aisin, Koritsu Sangyo, menandai awal dari proses pemulihan. Sebagai hasil dari ini dan upaya banyak perusahaan lain, pada hari Kamis, 6 Februari Toyota Tahara dan tanaman Hamura Hino yang dibuka kembali, diikuti oleh pabrik perakitan mobil lain terpengaruh pada hari berikutnya secara tunggal-shift. Senin, 10 Februari sedikit lebih dari satu minggu setelah kebakaran pabrik, semua pabrik perakitan Toyota-kelompok yang kembali normal dengan volume produksi 13.000 untuk 14.000 kendaraan per hari. Setelah seminggu lagi, tanaman yang beroperasi penuh pada volume produksi yang direncanakan sebelumnya dari 15.500 kendaraan per hari. Pada saat itu, proporsi P-katup yang diproduksi oleh Aisin itu sendiri adalah kurang dari 10 persen dari total jumlah yang diperlukan; secara bertahap meningkat, bagaimanapun, mencapai 60 persen pada bulan Maret 14 dan hampir 100 persen pada akhir Maret. Sebagian besar produksi P-katup mengambil tempat di sekitar enam puluh-dua perusahaan, termasuk Koritsu Sangyo, yang memberi prioritas penuh untuk pemulihan produksi P-katup dan dua shift sering bekerja melalui akhir pekan. Secara total, biaya api Aisin ¥ 7,8 miliar dan Toyota sekitar 70.000 kendaraan dan ¥ 160.000.000.000 di revenues.14 Meskipun pejabat Toyota mengklaim telah diperoleh kembali sebagian besar produksi kendaraan hilang melalui peningkatan lembur dan liburan pergeseran, kerugian di kisaran 30 ¥ 20 miliar untuk ¥ miliar yang tidak dapat dihindari, terutama karena penciptaan alternatif situs P-katup itu costly.15 Pada akhirnya, bagaimanapun, Toyota dan Aisin bisa hanya bersyukur bahwa anggota kelompok mencapai pemulihan yang cepat dan efektif dan dihindari apa yang bisa menjadi insiden yang jauh lebih dahsyat. Pemulihan Upaya Bagaimana bisa tempat produksi alternatif P-katup diatur dan pengiriman diperlukan 32.500 P-katup sehari dilanjutkan dengan begitu cepat? Kami menggambarkan peran yang dimainkan dalam pemulihan oleh enam perusahaan, yang kami mengunjungi selama penelitian lapangan kami: Toyota, Aisin Seiki, Denso, Taiho Kogyo, Kayaba Industri, dan Koritsu Sangyo. Sementara perusahaan-perusahaan ini berbeda dalam ukuran, bidang spesialisasi, posisi dalam rantai nilai, dan hubungan keuangan untuk Toyota, mereka berbagi beberapa karakteristik: komitmen untuk, dan kemampuan untuk, produksi JIT dan kemampuan untuk memecahkan masalah di source.16 mereka Dari awalnya, jelaslah bahwa sampai Aisin bisa membangun kembali kapasitasnya sebelumnya, bantuan dari luar akan sangat diperlukan. Diputuskan kemudian bahwa perusahaan baik dari dalam dan luar kelompok Toyota akan diminta untuk mengatur alternatif lokasi produksi P-katup sesegera mungkin, dengan Aisin memberikan bantuan teknis, gambar desain, jig (misalnya, latihan khusus), peralatan mesin , dan bahan baku (misalnya, besi cor) diselamatkan dari fire.17 Aisin adalah untuk segera memulai mendirikan tempat produksi alternatif dalam tanaman lainnya juga. Enam puluh dua perusahaan menanggapi Aisin panggilan