Garven (2009) examines whether audi

Garven (2009) examines whether audit committees characteristics are related to the
likelihood of small positive earnings and negative abnormal discretionary expenses,
both of which are used to identify firms engaging in real earnings management. Based
on a sample of 148 firm-year observations with small positive earnings and negative
abnormal discretionary expense for years 2005-2007, she documents marginally
significant evidence that firms whose audit committee members hold more outside
directorships are more likely to engage in real earnings management. Compared to
Garven’s (2009) study, we use different measures of real earnings management and
more recent data of firms with small positive earnings.

In summary, extant studies suggest that audit committees’ multiple characteristics
may affect the effectiveness of audit committees in the oversight of financial reporting
process. However, there is limited research into the relation between audit committee
characteristics and real earnings management, which is likely to be more salient in the
post-SOX period. Thus, it is warranted to conduct more research on this topic.

Hypotheses

As an operating committee of the board of directors, the audit committee is in charge of
the oversight of financial report and disclosure. When audit committee members find
abnormal changes in revenue and expense items on the financial statements and
budgets, they should discuss these issues and review related business operations with
management. This aspect of the duties has been strengthened by SOX, which requires
audit committees to expand their understanding of the business beyond the core
competencies of accounting. Since audit committees’ duties involve the oversight of
real activities, there are expectations on audit committee members to constrain real
earnings management.

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Garven (2009) meneliti apakah karakteristik komite audit berkaitankemungkinan kecil laba positif dan negatif biaya discretionary abnormal,kedua yang digunakan untuk mengidentifikasi perusahaan-perusahaan yang terlibat dalam manajemen real penghasilan. Berdasarkanpada sampel pengamatan perusahaan tahun 148 dengan kecil pendapatan positif dan negatifabnormal discretionary biaya selama tahun 2005-2007, dia dokumen marginalbukti kuat bahwa perusahaan anggota komite audit yang memegang lain di luarjabatan Direktur lebih mungkin untuk terlibat dalam manajemen real penghasilan. Dibandingkan denganGarven's studi (2009), kami menggunakan langkah-langkah yang berbeda real penghasilan manajemen dandata terbaru perusahaan dengan pendapatan positif kecil.Singkatnya, masih ada studi menunjukkan bahwa audit komite beberapa karakteristikmungkin mempengaruhi keefektifan komite audit dalam pelaporan keuanganproses. Namun, ada penelitian terbatas hubungan antara Komite auditKarakteristik dan manajemen real penghasilan, yang cenderung lebih menonjol diperiode pasca SOX. Dengan demikian, hal itu dibenarkan untuk melakukan penelitian lebih lanjut tentang topik ini. HipotesisSebagai operasi Komite Direksi, komite audit bertanggung jawab ataspengawasan laporan keuangan dan pengungkapan. Ketika menemukan anggota komite auditperubahan abnormal dalam pendapatan dan pengeluaran barang di laporan keuangan dananggaran, mereka harus membahas masalah ini dan meninjau operasi bisnis yang terkait denganmanajemen. Aspek ini tugas yang diperkuat dengan SOX, yang memerlukanAudit Komite untuk memperluas pemahaman mereka tentang bisnis luar intikompetensi akuntansi. Sejak audit komite tugas melibatkan pengawasankegiatan nyata, ada harapan audit komite untuk membatasi realmanajemen pendapatan.