CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERI

CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
Contrary to conventional wisdom, economic instruments are neither foreign to non-Western cultures nor new to developing countries. Traditional societies, especially in developing countries, have a wealth of customary use rights, communal management systems, and customs that provide incentives for efficient use and management of natural resources. These range from water rights in India, to communal forests and land rights in Papua New Guinea, to customary fishing rights in Brazil, Sri Lanka, and the Cote d'lvoire.
These systems, far from being outdated, contain valuable lessons and essential elements for the
design of effective modern systems of managing natural resources in developing countries.
Customary communal rights over resources is a dynamic balance between the diseconomies of
collective management and the gains from internalization of externalities. While many of these
traditional systems did not withstand the test of time and others are undergoing intense pressure from population growth, new markets, and modern technologies, they nevertheless act as prototypes of management systems that are attuned with the local cultures and provide insights into the design of modern systems of natural resource management in non-Western societies.
The developing country experience is not limited to customary use rights for communal resources.
Private water rights in India provide incentives for efficient management of increasingly scarce water resources. Concession bidding, forest fees, timber taxes, and environmental bonds are employed in West and Central Africa to promote sustainable forest management. As early as the mid-seventies Malaysia introduced a system of effluent charges for its palm oil and rubber industries, and Singapore, still a developing country at the time, instituted marginal cost pricing of access to the city center to combat traffic congestion. More recently, China introduced industrial discharge permits and emission charges, which double or triple when the allowable discharge standard is exceeded. Turkey has effectively used relocation incentives for urban-based industry. Chile has instituted both tradeable emission permits and tradeable water rights, and Puerto Rico used transferable development rights for coastal conservation. Costa Rica introduced biodiversity prospecting rights and tradeable reforestation tax credits and is currently experimenting with internationally tradeable development rights and carbon offsets. Virtually all Eastern European countries introduced pollution charges, and some of them (Poland and Lithuania) are in the process of experimenting with tradeable emission permits for industrial pollutants. The rapidly accumulating experience of these countries in the use of
economic instruments is of particular relevance to other developing or transitional economies
contemplating the introduction of a more market-based approach to environmental management. In
this chapter we review developing country applications of economic instruments in a number of
sectors.
Fisheries Management: The Experiences of Brazil, the Cote d'Ivoire and Sri Lanka with Customary
Fishing Rights Efforts to regulate fishing and prevent overfishing have ranged from quantitative controls (such as catch quotas) to area controls (such as closed areas and seasons) to economic instruments (such as taxes on catch or effort and fishing licensing schemes). Traditional fishing communities in a number of developing countries have solved the problem of over-fishing through customary territorial rights, which combine economic incentives and internally imposed quantitative controls sanctioned by the community's social organization.
Resource allocation through territorial rights—such as leasehold arrangements, franchises, or
allocations of ownership over an area or a stock—aims at creating the appropriate environment for self-management through the establishment of private or community “ownership” over common
property resources. The “owners” of the resource having an interest in its current and future
productivity would be inclined to control fishing effort so as to maximize the net benefits from the resource in much the same way as farmers regulate their farming activities to maximize the returns from their land. For such a system to be workable, however, those allocated rights to the resource should not only be in a position to deny access to others, but they should also clearly perceive that their actions have a direct and pronounced effect on the state and productivity of their portion of the resource (and hence on their future profits).

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CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCEContrary to conventional wisdom, economic instruments are neither foreign to non-Western cultures nor new to developing countries. Traditional societies, especially in developing countries, have a wealth of customary use rights, communal management systems, and customs that provide incentives for efficient use and management of natural resources. These range from water rights in India, to communal forests and land rights in Papua New Guinea, to customary fishing rights in Brazil, Sri Lanka, and the Cote d'lvoire.These systems, far from being outdated, contain valuable lessons and essential elements for thedesign of effective modern systems of managing natural resources in developing countries.Customary communal rights over resources is a dynamic balance between the diseconomies ofcollective management and the gains from internalization of externalities. While many of thesetraditional systems did not withstand the test of time and others are undergoing intense pressure from population growth, new markets, and modern technologies, they nevertheless act as prototypes of management systems that are attuned with the local cultures and provide insights into the design of modern systems of natural resource management in non-Western societies.The developing country experience is not limited to customary use rights for communal resources.Hak-hak air pribadi di India memberikan insentif untuk pengelolaan yang efisien sumber daya air semakin langka. Penawaran konsesi, hutan biaya, pajak kayu, dan Obligasi lingkungan bekerja di Barat dan tengah Afrika untuk mempromosikan pengelolaan hutan lestari. Sebagai awal sebagai Malaysia pertengahan tujuh puluhan memperkenalkan sistem limbah biaya untuk kelapa sawit dan karet industri, dan Singapura, masih negara berkembang pada waktu itu, telah menetapkan harga biaya marjinal akses ke pusat kota untuk mengatasi kemacetan lalu lintas. Baru-baru ini, industri Cina memperkenalkan discharge izin dan biaya emisi, yang double atau triple ketika standar diijinkan discharge melebihi. Turki secara efektif telah digunakan relokasi insentif untuk industri berbasis perkotaan. Chili telah melembagakan tradeable emisi izin dan hak-hak air tradeable, dan Puerto Riko digunakan hak pembangunan dipindahtangankan untuk konservasi pesisir. Costa Rica diperkenalkan hak calon pelanggan keanekaragaman hayati dan kredit pajak tradeable reboisasi dan sedang bereksperimen dengan hak pembangunan internasional tradeable dan karbon offset. Hampir semua negara Eropa Timur memperkenalkan biaya polusi, dan beberapa dari mereka (Polandia dan Lituania) sedang bereksperimen dengan tradeable emisi izin untuk polusi industri. Pengalaman dengan cepat mengumpulkan negara-negara ini dalam penggunaanekonomi instrumen penting terutama untuk ekonomi lainnya berkembang atau transisimerenungkan pengenalan pendekatan yang lebih berbasis pasar untuk manajemen lingkungan. DalamBab ini kami meninjau aplikasi negara berkembang ekonomi instrumen dalam sejumlahsektor.Pengelolaan perikanan: Pengalaman Brasil, Pantai Gading dan Sri Lanka dengan nginauMemancing hak upaya untuk mengatur memancing dan menghindari penangkapan yang berlebihan telah berkisar dari kuantitatif kontrol (seperti menangkap kuota) untuk kontrol daerah (seperti tempat-tempat yang tertutup dan seasons) untuk ekonomi instrumen (seperti pajak menangkap atau usaha dan memancing lisensi skema). Masyarakat nelayan tradisional di sejumlah negara-negara berkembang telah memecahkan masalah over-fishing melalui hak ulayat teritorial, yang menggabungkan insentif ekonomi dan internal dikenakan kontrol kuantitatif yang disetujui oleh organisasi sosial masyarakat.Alokasi sumber daya melalui hak wilayahnya — seperti pengaturan prasarana, waralaba, ataualokasi kepemilikan atas suatu daerah atau saham — bertujuan menciptakan lingkungan yang sesuai untuk manajemen mandiri melalui penetapan pribadi atau komunitas "kepemilikan" atas UmumProperti sumber daya. Para "pemilik" sumber daya yang memiliki minat pada saat ini dan masa depanproductivity would be inclined to control fishing effort so as to maximize the net benefits from the resource in much the same way as farmers regulate their farming activities to maximize the returns from their land. For such a system to be workable, however, those allocated rights to the resource should not only be in a position to deny access to others, but they should also clearly perceive that their actions have a direct and pronounced effect on the state and productivity of their portion of the resource (and hence on their future profits).