Like with those associated with the

Like with those associated with the Persatuan Islam (Persis, Islamic
Unity),71 since the early decades of the twentieth century there have always
been Muslim educators who taught that nationalism is antithetical
to Islam. Although Persis schools were careful not to endorse violence,
84 ROBERT W. HEFNER
most remained resolutely opposed to nationalism as the basis of the
state. Organizations like Hizbut Tahrir make a similar point today, adding
that nationalism was invented by European imperialists to prevent
Muslims from uniting in opposition to Western hegemony.72 During
most of Soeharto’s New Order, educators who dared to voice sentiments
like these could find themselves dismissed or even imprisoned, so people
who harbored these views tended to keep them to themselves.
The criticism never stopped entirely, however. Even under Soeharto,
a small network of independent schools continued to use classrooms
as platforms for opposing the Indonesian nation-state. The schools most
consistently involved in this effort were linked to a irredentist wing of
the Darul Islam (DI), an armed movement that had rebelled against
the nationalist government in 1948 and announced the establishment
of an Islamic state.73 Today there are dozens of schools in South Sulawesi,
Central Java, parts of Sumatra, and especially West Java that are
operated by individuals once linked to the DI movement. However, the
great majority of these schools have long since accommodated themselves
to the Indonesian state and nationalism. Indeed, some, like the
enormous al-Zaytun pesantren in Indramayu, West Java, have long since
modernized their curricula, forged cordial ties with government ministries
(including the Department of Religion), and transformed themselves
into ardent supporters of the Indonesian nation.74 Nonetheless, a
smaller network of schools sympathetic to the DI’s founding radicalism
maintained itself over the long years of the New Order. In the post-
Soeharto era several emerged from underground and threw themselves
into politics. In schools of this sort today, the curriculum is often used
as a platform for relentless ideological assaults. These schools teach that
the principles of nationalism stand in such flagrant violation of God’s
commands that not to oppose them is to commit a grave sin.
Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir’s al-Mukmin pesantren outside of Solo, Central
Java, is perhaps the most famous of the schools whose curricular
materials take exception to the Indonesian nation-state in this way. It
should be noted that, in most respects, the al-Mukmin curriculum is
not the least bit radical. With funding from the Saudi-financed Indonesian
Council for Islamic Proselytization (DDII), the al-Mukmim
school was founded in 1972 by Ba‘asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar.
At the time, both were activists in the Central Javanese wing of the
DDII. Both also took a radical turn in the late 1980s, joining the unSchools,
Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 85
derground wing of the Darul Islam. They eventually broke with the DI,
but only to establish their own, more radical organization, which in the
1990s became the nucleus for the Jemaah Islamiyah.
On most matters of educational methods and content, Ba‘asyir
and Sungkar were not radical but conservative modernists. Ba‘asyir was
a graduate of the renowned modernist boarding school at Gontor, and
al-Mukmin implemented a fairly conventional modernist curriculum.
It combined general studies and high-quality instruction in foreign languages
(Arabic and English) with study of the Qur’an and Sunna (but
not the classical texts prized in traditionalist schools).
On such sensitive matters as relations with non-Muslims and the
bases of the state, however, al-Mukmin’s message was and is still today
uncompromising. For example, on the question of nationalism and the
foundation of the state, textbooks 1A and 1B of the pesantren’s Study
Materials on Aqidah (Materi Pelajaran Aqidah)75 make the following
statement (the text is used for al-Mukmin’s upper-level elementary-,
middle-, and high-school madrasas):
To act for reasons of nation is polytheistic idolatry, and polytheism
destroys the values of the Islamic profession of the faith.
Truly, a Muslim is forbidden to defend his country except if
its rules and constitution are based on Islam. If the country is
based on Islam and carries out God’s law, then a Muslim may
act to defend the country, because in this case such an act is
the same as defending Islam. However, if one acts to defend a
country that clearly refuses God’s law then that is polytheism.76
Polytheism is one of the most loathsome sins in Islam, and equating
nationalism with polytheism is harsh condemnation indeed. As
for those Muslims who insist that it is not appropriate to implement
God’s law in a country as religiously diverse as Indonesia, the text has
an equally blunt message: “That is the reason God ordered Muslims
to attack them [nonbelievers] until truly the chaos that results from
their actions can be wiped out, and truly the regulations that are applied
to this world are only those of God’s law, shari‘a Islam.”77 Pages
34 to 38 of the same Aqidah textbook go further, laying out a program
of struggle for the implementation of Islamic law. The program has
three stages: (1) building a community of believers in opposition to
86 ROBERT W. HEFNER
unbelievers; (2) preparing a well-organized army; and (3) developing
a facility in the use of firearms. Others among Ngruki’s texts warn
students against the dangers of befriending non-Muslims and even
mingling with inobservant Muslims.
It is interesting to note that, although the radical intent of passages
like these seems apparent enough, some students at al-Mukmin
hear the text’s message in an accommodating manner. In fact, many of
al-Mukmin’s students graduate and go on to state universities and otherwise
ordinary careers in business and education. Of the seven Ngruki
students my research team has interviewed since 2003, five insisted
that they had no interest in opposing the nationalist bases of the Indonesian
state. Several pointed out that, although some of Ngruki’s students
are politically radical, the majority are not. Most students, these
interviewees explained, are drawn to Ngruki because of the quality of
its educational programs and the availability of generous scholarships.
They pointed out (and educators at nearby Islamic schools agreed) that
Ngruki has a reputation for providing some of the finest instruction in
all of Central Java in Arabic, English, and computer software.
In interviews, even some teachers expressed embarrassment over
Ngruki’s ties to the 2002 Bali bombers and insisted that they and their
colleagues want nothing to do with terrorism. One teacher added
that, in the 2004 parliamentary elections, most of the staff had turned
away from the school’s previously favored party, the Crescent and
Stars Party (PBB), a conservative Islamist party loosely descendant
from the Masyumi Party of the 1950s (and an advocate of a stateleveraged
implementation of Islamic law). Most faculty cast their vote
instead for the moderately Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).
One teacher pointed to the vote as evidence that a more “moderate”
current was in the ascendance at Ngruki.78
Whatever the Ngruki staffers’ personal views, the school’s curriculum
makes it clear that the directors regard the present form of
the Indonesian state as illegitimate. In interviews and statements,
Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir has not backed away from these views, emphasizing
that both nationalism and democracy violate God’s law. His
former colleague and cofounder of al-Mukmin, Abdullah Sungkar, is
known to have been even more adamant in these views. To judge by
the behavior of groups like the Jemaah Islamiyah, some of Sungkar and
Ba‘asyir’s former students—especially those who had had the additional
Schools, Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 87
experience of participating in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan79—
have taken al-Mukmin’s curriculum at its word.
Saudi-Inspired Salafiyyah Schools
There are other Islamist groups unsympathetic to nationalism but
uninterested in channeling their objections into efforts to overthrow
the Indonesian state. The most significant representative of these
relatively “apolitical” groups is the Saudi-inspired Salafiyyah or
Wahhabi-Salafi school movement. This network of schools arguably
strains our social-movement metaphor to the limit. Although based in
Muslim society, the Wahhabi-Salafi schools are heavily dependent on
the financial aid and intellectual guidance of Middle Eastern patrons.
Although from 1999 to 2001 the Salafi leadership momentarily united
around the issue of anti-Christian jihad in Maluku, the national leadership
has otherwise been so fractiously disunited that it hardly looks like
a movement at all.
Estimates vary as to the precise number of Wahhabi-Salafi
schools now operating in Indonesia. Researchers in Yogyakarta and
Jakarta with whom I worked from 2005 to 2007 estimated that their
numbers have grown from a handful in the early 1980s to upwards
of two hundred today. That is still only a tiny percentage of Indonesia’s
47 thousand Islamic schools. Moreover, by Indonesian standards,
most of the schools are small, having only 70–150 students. The
most active among them, however, have proved adept at overcoming
their numerical marginality through their skillful use of old media like
bookstores and new media like the Internet.80
Although the terms salafi and salafiyyah have long been used to
refer to reformists inspired by great nineteenth-century modernists
like Muhammad Abduh, in recent years they have come to be identified
with the peculiarly puritanical strain of Islamic reformism associated
with Saudi-inspired Salafism. In the Indonesian setting, the most
striking feature of this movement is not an ambition to overthrow the
state but the desire to implement a strict a

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Seperti dengan orang-orang terkait dengan Persatuan Islam (Persis, IslamKesatuan), 71 sejak dekade awal abad kedua puluh ada selalutelah Muslim pendidik yang mengajarkan bahwa nasionalisme antitesisIslam. Meskipun sekolah Persis-hati untuk tidak mendukung kekerasan,84 ROBERT W. HEFNERpaling tetap tegas menentang nasionalisme sebagai dasarnegara. Organisasi seperti Hizbut Tahrir membuat titik serupa hari ini, menambahkannasionalisme yang diciptakan oleh imperialis Eropa untuk mencegahMuslim dari menyatukan bertentangan hegemony.72 Barat selamasebagian besar Orde Baru Soeharto, pendidik yang berani sentimen suaraseperti ini bisa menemukan diri mereka yang diberhentikan atau bahkan dipenjara, jadi orangyang memendam pandangan-pandangan ini cenderung untuk menjaga mereka untuk diri mereka sendiri.Kritik tidak pernah berhenti sepenuhnya, namun. Bahkan di bawah Soeharto,jaringan kecil sekolah independen terus menggunakan kelassebagai platform untuk menentang negara-bangsa Indonesia. Sekolah sebagiansecara konsisten terlibat dalam upaya ini dikaitkan dengan sayap irredentistDarul Islam (DI), yang telah memberontak menentang gerakan bersenjataPemerintah Nasionalis pada tahun 1948 dan mengumumkan pendirianstate.73 Islam hari ada puluhan sekolah di Sulawesi SelatanJawa Tengah, Sumatra, dan terutama Jawa Barat bagian yangdioperasikan oleh individu-individu yang sekali dikaitkan dengan gerakan. Namun,sebagian besar sekolah telah lama ditampung dirito the Indonesian state and nationalism. Indeed, some, like theenormous al-Zaytun pesantren in Indramayu, West Java, have long sincemodernized their curricula, forged cordial ties with government ministries(including the Department of Religion), and transformed themselvesinto ardent supporters of the Indonesian nation.74 Nonetheless, asmaller network of schools sympathetic to the DI’s founding radicalismmaintained itself over the long years of the New Order. In the post-Soeharto era several emerged from underground and threw themselvesinto politics. In schools of this sort today, the curriculum is often usedas a platform for relentless ideological assaults. These schools teach thatthe principles of nationalism stand in such flagrant violation of God’scommands that not to oppose them is to commit a grave sin.Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir’s al-Mukmin pesantren outside of Solo, CentralJava, is perhaps the most famous of the schools whose curricularmaterials take exception to the Indonesian nation-state in this way. Itshould be noted that, in most respects, the al-Mukmin curriculum isnot the least bit radical. With funding from the Saudi-financed IndonesianCouncil for Islamic Proselytization (DDII), the al-Mukmimschool was founded in 1972 by Ba‘asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar.At the time, both were activists in the Central Javanese wing of theDDII. Both also took a radical turn in the late 1980s, joining the unSchools,Gerakan sosial & demokrasi di Indonesia 85derground sayap Darul Islam. Mereka akhirnya pecah dengan DI,tapi hanya untuk mendirikan organisasi mereka sendiri, lebih radikal, yang dalamtahun 1990-an menjadi inti Jemaah Islamiyah.Hal-hal yang kebanyakan metode pendidikan dan konten, Ba'asyirdan Sungkar tidak radikal tetapi konservatif modernis. Ba'asyir adalahlulusan sekolah asrama modernis terkenal di Gontor, danAl-Mukmin menerapkan kurikulum modernis yang cukup konvensional.Gabungan studi Umum dan instruksi berkualitas tinggi dalam bahasa asing(Bahasa Arab dan bahasa Inggris) dengan studi Al Qur'an dan sunnah (tapitidak teks-teks klasik dihargai di tradisionalis sekolah).Pada hal-hal sensitif seperti hubungan dengan non-Muslim dandasar negara, namun, pesan al-Mukmin dan masih hari initanpa kompromi. Sebagai contoh, pada pertanyaan tentang nasionalisme dandasar negara, buku 1A dan 1B pesantren studiBahan-bahan di Aqidah (sepatubahan Pelajaran Aqidah) 75 membuat berikutLaporan (teks yang digunakan untuk al-Mukmin atas tingkat SD-,menengah, dan sekolah tinggi madrasas):Bertindak untuk alasan bangsa adalah berhala politeistik, dan politeismemenghancurkan nilai-nilai Islam profesi iman.Sungguh, larangan untuk mempertahankan negaranya kecuali jikaaturan dan Konstitusi berdasarkan Islam. Jika negara iniBerdasarkan Islam dan melaksanakan hukum Allah, maka mungkin Muslimact to defend the country, because in this case such an act isthe same as defending Islam. However, if one acts to defend acountry that clearly refuses God’s law then that is polytheism.76Polytheism is one of the most loathsome sins in Islam, and equatingnationalism with polytheism is harsh condemnation indeed. Asfor those Muslims who insist that it is not appropriate to implementGod’s law in a country as religiously diverse as Indonesia, the text hasan equally blunt message: “That is the reason God ordered Muslimsto attack them [nonbelievers] until truly the chaos that results fromtheir actions can be wiped out, and truly the regulations that are appliedto this world are only those of God’s law, shari‘a Islam.”77 Pages34 to 38 of the same Aqidah textbook go further, laying out a programof struggle for the implementation of Islamic law. The program hasthree stages: (1) building a community of believers in opposition to86 ROBERT W. HEFNERunbelievers; (2) preparing a well-organized army; and (3) developinga facility in the use of firearms. Others among Ngruki’s texts warnstudents against the dangers of befriending non-Muslims and evenmingling with inobservant Muslims.It is interesting to note that, although the radical intent of passageslike these seems apparent enough, some students at al-Mukminhear the text’s message in an accommodating manner. In fact, many ofal-Mukmin’s students graduate and go on to state universities and otherwiseordinary careers in business and education. Of the seven Ngrukistudents my research team has interviewed since 2003, five insistedthat they had no interest in opposing the nationalist bases of the Indonesianstate. Several pointed out that, although some of Ngruki’s studentsare politically radical, the majority are not. Most students, theseinterviewees explained, are drawn to Ngruki because of the quality ofits educational programs and the availability of generous scholarships.They pointed out (and educators at nearby Islamic schools agreed) thatNgruki has a reputation for providing some of the finest instruction inall of Central Java in Arabic, English, and computer software.In interviews, even some teachers expressed embarrassment overNgruki’s ties to the 2002 Bali bombers and insisted that they and theircolleagues want nothing to do with terrorism. One teacher addedthat, in the 2004 parliamentary elections, most of the staff had turnedaway from the school’s previously favored party, the Crescent andStars Party (PBB), a conservative Islamist party loosely descendantfrom the Masyumi Party of the 1950s (and an advocate of a stateleveragedimplementation of Islamic law). Most faculty cast their voteinstead for the moderately Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).One teacher pointed to the vote as evidence that a more “moderate”current was in the ascendance at Ngruki.78Whatever the Ngruki staffers’ personal views, the school’s curriculummakes it clear that the directors regard the present form ofthe Indonesian state as illegitimate. In interviews and statements,Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir has not backed away from these views, emphasizingthat both nationalism and democracy violate God’s law. Hisformer colleague and cofounder of al-Mukmin, Abdullah Sungkar, isknown to have been even more adamant in these views. To judge bythe behavior of groups like the Jemaah Islamiyah, some of Sungkar andBa‘asyir’s former students—especially those who had had the additionalSchools, Social Movements & Democracy in Indonesia 87experience of participating in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan79—have taken al-Mukmin’s curriculum at its word.Saudi-Inspired Salafiyyah SchoolsThere are other Islamist groups unsympathetic to nationalism butuninterested in channeling their objections into efforts to overthrowthe Indonesian state. The most significant representative of theserelatively “apolitical” groups is the Saudi-inspired Salafiyyah orWahhabi-Salafi school movement. This network of schools arguablystrains our social-movement metaphor to the limit. Although based inMuslim society, the Wahhabi-Salafi schools are heavily dependent onthe financial aid and intellectual guidance of Middle Eastern patrons.Although from 1999 to 2001 the Salafi leadership momentarily unitedaround the issue of anti-Christian jihad in Maluku, the national leadership
has otherwise been so fractiously disunited that it hardly looks like
a movement at all.
Estimates vary as to the precise number of Wahhabi-Salafi
schools now operating in Indonesia. Researchers in Yogyakarta and
Jakarta with whom I worked from 2005 to 2007 estimated that their
numbers have grown from a handful in the early 1980s to upwards
of two hundred today. That is still only a tiny percentage of Indonesia’s
47 thousand Islamic schools. Moreover, by Indonesian standards,
most of the schools are small, having only 70–150 students. The
most active among them, however, have proved adept at overcoming
their numerical marginality through their skillful use of old media like
bookstores and new media like the Internet.80
Although the terms salafi and salafiyyah have long been used to
refer to reformists inspired by great nineteenth-century modernists
like Muhammad Abduh, in recent years they have come to be identified
with the peculiarly puritanical strain of Islamic reformism associated
with Saudi-inspired Salafism. In the Indonesian setting, the most
striking feature of this movement is not an ambition to overthrow the
state but the desire to implement a strict a

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Seperti dengan orang-orang yang terkait dengan Persatuan Islam (Persis, Islam
Persatuan), 71 sejak dekade awal abad kedua puluh ada selalu
menjadi pendidik Muslim yang mengajarkan bahwa nasionalisme adalah bertentangan
dengan Islam. Meskipun sekolah Persis berhati-hati untuk tidak mendukung kekerasan,
84 ROBERT W. HEFNER
paling tetap tegas menentang nasionalisme sebagai dasar
negara. Organisasi seperti Hizbut Tahrir membuat titik yang sama hari ini, menambahkan
bahwa nasionalisme diciptakan oleh imperialis Eropa untuk mencegah
Muslim untuk bersatu menentang hegemony.72 Barat Selama
sebagian besar Orde Baru Soeharto, pendidik yang berani menyuarakan sentimen
seperti ini bisa menemukan diri mereka diberhentikan atau bahkan dipenjara, sehingga orang-orang
yang memendam pandangan ini cenderung untuk menjaga mereka untuk diri mereka sendiri.
Kritik pernah berhenti sepenuhnya, namun. Bahkan di bawah Soeharto,
jaringan kecil dari sekolah independen terus menggunakan ruang kelas
sebagai platform untuk menentang negara-bangsa Indonesia. Sekolah yang paling
konsisten terlibat dalam upaya ini terkait dengan sayap irredentis dari
Darul Islam (DI), sebuah gerakan bersenjata yang memberontak terhadap
pemerintah nasionalis pada tahun 1948 dan mengumumkan pembentukan
sebuah state.73 Islam Hari ini ada puluhan sekolah di Sulawesi Selatan,
Jawa Tengah, bagian dari Sumatera, dan terutama Jawa Barat yang
dioperasikan oleh individu sekali terkait dengan gerakan DI. Namun,
sebagian besar sekolah-sekolah ini telah lama ditampung diri
untuk negara dan nasionalisme Indonesia. Memang, beberapa, seperti
besar pesantren al-Zaytun di Indramayu, Jawa Barat, sudah lama
dimodernisasi kurikulum, ditempa hubungan mesra mereka dengan departemen pemerintah
(termasuk Departemen Agama), dan mengubah diri
menjadi pendukung fanatik dari nation.74 Indonesia Meskipun demikian,
jaringan yang lebih kecil dari sekolah bersimpati kepada DI dunia pendiri radikalisme
dipertahankan sendiri selama bertahun-tahun Orde Baru. Dalam pasca
era Soeharto beberapa muncul dari bawah tanah dan melemparkan diri
ke dalam politik. Di sekolah semacam ini hari ini, kurikulum sering digunakan
sebagai platform untuk serangan ideologis tanpa henti. Sekolah-sekolah ini mengajarkan bahwa
prinsip-prinsip nasionalisme berdiri di pelanggaran mencolok seperti Allah
perintah yang tidak menentang mereka adalah untuk melakukan dosa besar.
al-Mukmin pesantren Abu Bakar Ba'asyir di luar Solo, Central
Java, mungkin yang paling terkenal dari sekolah yang kurikuler
bahan mengambil pengecualian untuk negara-bangsa Indonesia dengan cara ini. Ini
harus dicatat bahwa, dalam banyak hal, kurikulum al-Mukmin adalah
tidak sedikit radikal. Dengan pendanaan dari Saudi dibiayai Indonesia
Dewan proselitisasi Islam (DDII), al-Mukmim
sekolah didirikan pada tahun 1972 oleh Ba'asyir dan Abdullah Sungkar akhir.
Pada saat itu, keduanya aktivis sayap Jawa Tengah dari
DDII . Keduanya juga mengambil giliran radikal pada akhir tahun 1980, bergabung dengan unSchools,
Gerakan Sosial & Demokrasi di Indonesia 85
derground sayap Darul Islam. Mereka akhirnya pecah dengan DI,
tapi hanya untuk mendirikan organisasi mereka sendiri, yang lebih radikal, yang di
tahun 1990-an menjadi inti untuk Jemaah Islamiyah.
Pada kebanyakan hal metode pendidikan dan konten, Ba'asyir
dan Sungkar tidak modernis radikal tapi konservatif . Ba'asyir adalah
lulusan dari pesantren modernis terkenal di Gontor, dan
al-Mukmin menerapkan kurikulum modernis yang cukup konvensional.
Ini gabungan studi umum dan instruksi kualitas tinggi dalam bahasa asing
(Arab dan Inggris) dengan studi Al-Qur'an dan Sunnah (tapi
tidak teks-teks klasik berharga di sekolah tradisionalis).
Pada hal-hal sensitif seperti hubungan dengan non-Muslim dan
basis negara, namun, pesan al-Mukmin itu dan masih hari
tanpa kompromi. Sebagai contoh, pada pertanyaan nasionalisme dan
dasar negara, buku teks 1A dan 1B dari pesantren studi
Materi Aqidah (Materi Pelajaran Aqidah) 75 membuat berikut
pernyataan (teks digunakan untuk al-Mukmin tingkat atas elementary- ,
menengah, dan madrasah SMA):
Untuk bertindak untuk alasan bangsa adalah penyembahan berhala politeistik, dan politeisme
menghancurkan nilai-nilai profesi Islam iman.
Sesungguhnya, seorang Muslim dilarang untuk membela negaranya, kecuali jika
aturan dan konstitusi didasarkan pada Islam. Jika negara ini
berdasarkan Islam dan melaksanakan hukum Allah, maka seorang Muslim mungkin
bertindak untuk membela negara, karena dalam hal ini tindakan tersebut adalah
sama dengan membela Islam. Namun, jika seseorang bertindak untuk membela
negara yang jelas menolak hukum Allah maka itu adalah polytheism.76
Syirik adalah salah satu dosa yang paling menjijikkan dalam Islam, dan menyamakan
nasionalisme dengan kemusyrikan adalah kecaman keras memang. Seperti
untuk orang-orang Muslim yang bersikeras bahwa tidak tepat untuk menerapkan
hukum Allah di negara sebagai agama beragam seperti Indonesia, teks memiliki
pesan yang sama tumpul: "Itulah alasan Allah memerintahkan umat Islam
untuk menyerang mereka [kafir] sampai benar-benar kekacauan bahwa hasil dari
tindakan mereka dapat dihapus, dan benar-benar peraturan yang diterapkan
ke dunia ini hanya orang-orang dari hukum Allah, syariah Islam. "77 Pages
34-38 dari buku Aqidah yang sama lebih jauh, meletakkan program
dari perjuangan untuk pelaksanaan hukum Islam. Program ini memiliki
tiga tahap: (1) membangun komunitas orang percaya bertentangan dengan
86 ROBERT W. HEFNER
kafir; (2) mempersiapkan tentara yang terorganisir dengan baik; dan (3) mengembangkan
fasilitas dalam penggunaan senjata api. Lainnya antara teks Ngruki ini memperingatkan
siswa terhadap bahaya berteman non-Muslim dan bahkan
berbaur dengan umat Islam tdk hati-hati.
Sangat menarik untuk dicatat bahwa, meskipun maksud radikal ayat-ayat
seperti ini tampaknya cukup jelas, beberapa mahasiswa di al-Mukmin
mendengar pesan teks secara akomodatif. Bahkan, banyak dari
mahasiswa al-Mukmin itu lulus dan melanjutkan ke perguruan tinggi negeri dan sebaliknya
karir biasa dalam bisnis dan pendidikan. Dari tujuh Ngruki
siswa tim penelitian saya telah mewawancarai sejak tahun 2003, lima bersikeras
bahwa mereka tidak tertarik dalam menentang basis nasionalis dari Indonesia
negara. Beberapa menunjukkan bahwa, meskipun beberapa siswa Ngruki itu
secara politik radikal, mayoritas tidak. Sebagian besar siswa, ini
diwawancarai menjelaskan, tertarik untuk Ngruki karena kualitas
program pendidikan dan ketersediaan beasiswa murah hati.
Mereka menunjukkan (dan pendidik di sekolah-sekolah Islam di dekatnya setuju) bahwa
Ngruki memiliki reputasi untuk memberikan beberapa instruksi terbaik di
seluruh Jawa Tengah dalam bahasa Arab, bahasa Inggris, dan perangkat lunak komputer.
Dalam wawancara, beberapa guru bahkan menyatakan malu atas
hubungan Ngruki untuk 2002 pengebom Bali dan bersikeras bahwa mereka dan mereka
rekan ingin tidak ada hubungannya dengan terorisme. Seorang guru menambahkan
bahwa, dalam pemilihan parlemen tahun 2004, sebagian besar staf telah berubah
jauh dari partai sebelumnya disukai sekolah, Bulan Sabit dan
Bintang Partai (PBB), sebuah partai Islam konservatif longgar keturunan
dari Partai Masyumi tahun 1950-an (dan advokat dari stateleveraged
pelaksanaan hukum Islam). Sebagian dosen memberikan suara mereka
bukan untuk Partai moderat Islam Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS).
Seorang guru menunjuk suara sebagai bukti bahwa yang lebih "moderat"
saat berada di naiknya di Ngruki.78
Apapun pandangan pribadi staf Ngruki ', sekolah ini Kurikulum
membuat jelas bahwa direksi menganggap bentuk yang sekarang dari
negara Indonesia tidak sah. Dalam wawancara dan pernyataan,
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir belum mundur dari pandangan-pandangan ini, menekankan
bahwa kedua nasionalisme dan demokrasi melanggar hukum Allah. Nya
mantan rekan dan salah seorang pendiri al-Mukmin, Abdullah Sungkar, yang
diketahui telah lebih bersikukuh dalam pandangan ini. Untuk menilai oleh
perilaku kelompok-kelompok seperti Jemaah Islamiyah, beberapa Sungkar dan
Ba'asyir mantan siswa-terutama mereka yang telah memiliki tambahan
Sekolah, Gerakan Sosial & Demokrasi di Indonesia 87
pengalaman berpartisipasi dalam jihad anti-Soviet di Afghanistan79-
telah mengambil kurikulum al-Mukmin di kata-nya.
Arab-Terinspirasi Sekolah Salafiyah
Ada kelompok-kelompok Islam lainnya tidak simpatik nasionalisme tapi
tertarik dalam menyalurkan keberatan mereka ke dalam upaya untuk menggulingkan
negara Indonesia. Wakil paling signifikan dari ini
relatif "apolitis" kelompok adalah Saudi terinspirasi Salafiyah atau
gerakan sekolah Wahhabi-Salafi. Ini jaringan sekolah bisa dibilang
strain metafora sosial-gerakan kami untuk membatasi. Meskipun berbasis di
masyarakat Muslim, sekolah-sekolah Wahhabi-Salafi sangat bergantung pada
bantuan keuangan dan bimbingan intelektual dari pelanggan Timur Tengah.
Meskipun 1999-2001 kepemimpinan Salafi sejenak bersatu
di sekitar isu jihad anti-Kristen di Maluku, kepemimpinan nasional
telah dinyatakan begitu fractiously terpecah belah itu tidak terlihat seperti
gerakan sama sekali.
Perkiraan bervariasi untuk jumlah yang tepat dari Wahhabi-Salafi
sekolah sekarang beroperasi di Indonesia. Para peneliti di Yogyakarta dan
Jakarta dengan siapa saya bekerja 2005-2007 memperkirakan bahwa mereka
nomor telah tumbuh dari segelintir pada awal tahun 1980 untuk ke atas
dari dua ratus hari. Itu masih hanya sebagian kecil dari Indonesia yang
47 ribu sekolah Islam. Selain itu, dengan standar Indonesia,
sebagian besar sekolah kecil, hanya memiliki 70-150 siswa. The
paling aktif di antara mereka, bagaimanapun, telah terbukti mahir mengatasi
keterpinggiran numerik mereka melalui penggunaan terampil mereka media lama seperti
toko buku dan media baru seperti Internet.80
Meskipun istilah salafi dan salafiyyah telah lama digunakan untuk
merujuk kepada reformis terinspirasi oleh besar modernis abad kesembilan belas
seperti Muhammad Abduh, dalam beberapa tahun terakhir mereka telah datang untuk diidentifikasi
dengan strain puritan khas dari reformisme Islam terkait
dengan Arab terinspirasi Salafisme. Dalam pengaturan Indonesia, yang paling
mencolok fitur gerakan ini bukan ambisi untuk menggulingkan
negara tetapi keinginan untuk menerapkan ketat