Governance and has quite a large ef

Governance and has quite a large effect on corporate agency cost and market value. Recently, many economists and financial analysts have verified that it would be helpful for reducing corporate agency cost by means of improving managers’ shareholding ratio, debt/equity ratio and ownership concentration respectively.
Previous researches mostly analyzes the relationship between capital structure and corporate performance due to difficulties in measuring agency cost when they are doing empirical researches on this issue. It should also be noticed that ownership structure plays an important role in capital structure and related researches are more concentrated on relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance especially internal shareholding ratio and firm’s performance. Such literatures do exist which directly analyzes ownership structure and agency cost, for example Sung et al. (1994), free cash flow and inferior ownership ratio are used to measure agency cost in this paper, it draws a conclusion that issuing risk protective bond has much more positive effect than issuing non-risk protective bond on shareholder wealth. At the same time, because shareholder wealth has negative correlation with agency cost, it can be deduced that agency cost could be reduced by event risk provision and shareholder wealth would be added naturally. Ang et al (2000) figures out agency cost could be replaced by administrative expenses rate ratio (administrative expense /turnover) and assets activity ratio (turnover/total asset). It suggests that agency cost will arise when there is only external managers but not internal managers; shareholding ratio has negative correlation with agency cost; numbers of non-managerial shareholder has positive correlation with agency cost; agency cost will go down under effective supervision of banks. Singh and Davidson (2003) select huge companies data as sample to do similar research. More over, Anderson et al.
(2003) begins to discuss how original race ownership would affect debt agency cost and it figures out original race ownership are quite popular in huge public companies and it was helpful for allaying conflict between shareholders and creditors.
The common point of the above literatures is: optimal capital structure will improve the efficiency of corporate governance, alleviate contradictory between client and agent. It could also restrain moral hazard of agent, decrease agency cost and eventually increase firm value. However, they do all the researches are under complete competition market and rational investment hypothesis together with contract theory of capital structure. They believe all of the agency cost would be undertaken by agent (Arrow, 1986). Obviously, it is unreasonable, in fact, clients have to control moral hazard and related agency cost by themselves.
Such researches done by Chinese domestic researchers make use of administrative expense ratio and total asset turnover to estimate agency cost between shareholders and managers, which is used to analyze the effect on agency cost. Looking up Chinese domestic research outcome, we can summarize that the most frequently used indicators are administrative expense ratio and total asset turnover as the substitution of agency cost.
Song et al. (2005) found out agency cost had negative correlation with ownership concentration and had positive correlation with ownership balance. Zhang et al. (2005) believes that managers’ shareholding ratio had obviously negative correlation with ownership agency cost; state owned ratio and circulation ratio were strongly positive correlated with ownership agency cost; debt ratio and legal person share ratio and the first major shareholders did not have negative correlation. Characters of final controller does not influence firm’s agency cost positively but negatively according to Tang xue song and Zhou xiao su (2005). In Ge bang liang and Jiang mei fang
(2010)’s paper, the authors figure out ownership concentration have nothing with agency cost but positively correlated with total asset turnover, fixed leverage ratio are negatively correlated with total asset turnover but capital structure are positively correlated with administrative expenses rate.
Based on the above Chinese domestic research conclusions we can find out, due to restrictive data and difficulties in determining agency cost, they are divided into 2 categories: firstly, they adopt traditional research methodology starting from current situation of Chinese listed companies capital structure on the basis of contract theory to deduce the effect on agency cost and propose relative countermeasures (Zhu ye, 2003). The other kind of researchers mainly make use of modern empirical methodology to indirectly judge how capital structure affects agency cost by means of testing firm’s performance.
Many financial indicators have already been used to discuss such issue, such as ownership structure, board features. They partially explained the effect on agency cost and many empirical researches seldomly used panel data which could probably fully evaluate firm’s agency cost. This paper tries to adopt 2 long term solvency indicators to reflect capital structure and 2 variables to estimate agency cost. Panel data is also used to analyze the relationship between them, hopefully, it could provide feasible suggestion to Chinese listed companies of optimizing corporate governance.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Tata Kelola dan memiliki efek cukup besar pada biaya agen perusahaan dan nilai pasar. Baru-baru ini, banyak ekonom dan analis keuangan telah memverifikasi bahwa itu akan membantu untuk mengurangi biaya perusahaan badan dengan meningkatkan manajer saham rasio, rasio utang ekuitas dan kepemilikan konsentrasi masing-masing.Previous researches mostly analyzes the relationship between capital structure and corporate performance due to difficulties in measuring agency cost when they are doing empirical researches on this issue. It should also be noticed that ownership structure plays an important role in capital structure and related researches are more concentrated on relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance especially internal shareholding ratio and firm’s performance. Such literatures do exist which directly analyzes ownership structure and agency cost, for example Sung et al. (1994), free cash flow and inferior ownership ratio are used to measure agency cost in this paper, it draws a conclusion that issuing risk protective bond has much more positive effect than issuing non-risk protective bond on shareholder wealth. At the same time, because shareholder wealth has negative correlation with agency cost, it can be deduced that agency cost could be reduced by event risk provision and shareholder wealth would be added naturally. Ang et al (2000) figures out agency cost could be replaced by administrative expenses rate ratio (administrative expense /turnover) and assets activity ratio (turnover/total asset). It suggests that agency cost will arise when there is only external managers but not internal managers; shareholding ratio has negative correlation with agency cost; numbers of non-managerial shareholder has positive correlation with agency cost; agency cost will go down under effective supervision of banks. Singh and Davidson (2003) select huge companies data as sample to do similar research. More over, Anderson et al.(2003) begins to discuss how original race ownership would affect debt agency cost and it figures out original race ownership are quite popular in huge public companies and it was helpful for allaying conflict between shareholders and creditors.The common point of the above literatures is: optimal capital structure will improve the efficiency of corporate governance, alleviate contradictory between client and agent. It could also restrain moral hazard of agent, decrease agency cost and eventually increase firm value. However, they do all the researches are under complete competition market and rational investment hypothesis together with contract theory of capital structure. They believe all of the agency cost would be undertaken by agent (Arrow, 1986). Obviously, it is unreasonable, in fact, clients have to control moral hazard and related agency cost by themselves.Such researches done by Chinese domestic researchers make use of administrative expense ratio and total asset turnover to estimate agency cost between shareholders and managers, which is used to analyze the effect on agency cost. Looking up Chinese domestic research outcome, we can summarize that the most frequently used indicators are administrative expense ratio and total asset turnover as the substitution of agency cost.Song et al. (2005) found out agency cost had negative correlation with ownership concentration and had positive correlation with ownership balance. Zhang et al. (2005) believes that managers’ shareholding ratio had obviously negative correlation with ownership agency cost; state owned ratio and circulation ratio were strongly positive correlated with ownership agency cost; debt ratio and legal person share ratio and the first major shareholders did not have negative correlation. Characters of final controller does not influence firm’s agency cost positively but negatively according to Tang xue song and Zhou xiao su (2005). In Ge bang liang and Jiang mei fang(2010)’s paper, the authors figure out ownership concentration have nothing with agency cost but positively correlated with total asset turnover, fixed leverage ratio are negatively correlated with total asset turnover but capital structure are positively correlated with administrative expenses rate.
Based on the above Chinese domestic research conclusions we can find out, due to restrictive data and difficulties in determining agency cost, they are divided into 2 categories: firstly, they adopt traditional research methodology starting from current situation of Chinese listed companies capital structure on the basis of contract theory to deduce the effect on agency cost and propose relative countermeasures (Zhu ye, 2003). The other kind of researchers mainly make use of modern empirical methodology to indirectly judge how capital structure affects agency cost by means of testing firm’s performance.
Many financial indicators have already been used to discuss such issue, such as ownership structure, board features. They partially explained the effect on agency cost and many empirical researches seldomly used panel data which could probably fully evaluate firm’s agency cost. This paper tries to adopt 2 long term solvency indicators to reflect capital structure and 2 variables to estimate agency cost. Panel data is also used to analyze the relationship between them, hopefully, it could provide feasible suggestion to Chinese listed companies of optimizing corporate governance.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Pemerintahan dan memiliki efek yang cukup besar pada biaya agen perusahaan dan nilai pasar. Baru-baru ini, banyak ekonom dan analis keuangan telah memverifikasi bahwa itu akan sangat membantu untuk mengurangi biaya keagenan perusahaan dengan cara meningkatkan rasio kepemilikan saham manajer, utang / rasio ekuitas dan konsentrasi kepemilikan masing-masing.
Penelitian sebelumnya sebagian besar analisis hubungan antara struktur modal dan kinerja perusahaan karena kesulitan dalam mengukur biaya agensi ketika mereka melakukan penelitian empiris tentang masalah ini. Hal ini juga harus diperhatikan bahwa struktur kepemilikan memainkan peran penting dalam struktur modal dan penelitian terkait lebih terkonsentrasi pada hubungan antara struktur kepemilikan dan kinerja perusahaan rasio kepemilikan saham terutama internal dan kinerja perusahaan. Literatur seperti itu ada yang langsung menganalisa struktur kepemilikan dan biaya agen, misalnya Sung et al. (1994), arus kas bebas dan rasio kepemilikan lebih rendah digunakan untuk mengukur biaya agensi dalam makalah ini, ia menarik kesimpulan bahwa penerbitan obligasi risiko pelindung memiliki efek yang jauh lebih positif daripada mengeluarkan non-risiko obligasi pelindung pada kekayaan pemegang saham. Pada saat yang sama, karena kekayaan pemegang saham memiliki korelasi negatif dengan biaya agen, dapat ditarik kesimpulan bahwa biaya agensi dapat dikurangi dengan pemberian risiko acara dan kekayaan pemegang saham akan ditambahkan secara alami. Ang et al (2000) angka keluar biaya agensi dapat digantikan oleh administrasi rasio biaya tingkat (administrasi beban / turnover) dan rasio aktivitas aset (turnover / total aset). Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa biaya agensi akan muncul ketika hanya ada manajer eksternal tetapi manajer tidak intern; Rasio kepemilikan saham memiliki korelasi negatif dengan biaya keagenan; jumlah pemegang saham non-manajerial memiliki korelasi positif dengan agency cost; biaya agensi akan turun di bawah pengawasan yang efektif dari bank. Singh dan Davidson (2003) memilih data perusahaan besar sebagai sampel untuk melakukan penelitian serupa. Lebih lebih, Anderson et al.
(2003) mulai membahas bagaimana asli ras kepemilikan akan mempengaruhi biaya agensi hutang dan angka keluar kepemilikan ras asli yang cukup populer di perusahaan publik besar dan itu membantu untuk menenangkan konflik antara pemegang saham dan kreditur.
The umum titik literatur di atas adalah: struktur modal yang optimal akan meningkatkan efisiensi tata kelola perusahaan, meringankan bertentangan antara klien dan agen. Hal ini juga bisa menahan moral hazard dari agen, mengurangi biaya agensi dan akhirnya meningkatkan nilai perusahaan. Namun, mereka semua penelitian yang di bawah pasar persaingan lengkap dan hipotesis investasi rasional bersama dengan teori kontrak struktur modal. Mereka percaya semua biaya agen akan dilakukan oleh agen (Arrow, 1986). Jelas, itu tidak masuk akal, pada kenyataannya, klien harus mengontrol moral hazard dan biaya instansi terkait sendiri.
Penelitian tersebut dilakukan oleh para peneliti domestik Cina memanfaatkan rasio beban administrasi dan perputaran total aset untuk memperkirakan biaya keagenan antara pemegang saham dan manajer, yang digunakan untuk menganalisis pengaruh biaya agensi. Mencari hasil penelitian dalam negeri Cina, kita dapat meringkas bahwa yang paling sering digunakan adalah indikator rasio beban administrasi dan total omset aset sebagai substitusi biaya agensi.
Lagu dkk. (2005) menemukan biaya agensi memiliki korelasi negatif dengan konsentrasi kepemilikan dan memiliki korelasi positif dengan saldo kepemilikan. Zhang et al. (2005) percaya bahwa rasio kepemilikan saham manajer memiliki korelasi negatif dengan jelas agency cost kepemilikan; rasio yang dimiliki negara dan rasio sirkulasi yang kuat positif berkorelasi dengan agency cost kepemilikan; rasio hutang dan rasio saham badan hukum dan pemegang saham utama pertama tidak memiliki korelasi negatif. Karakter dari pengendali akhir tidak mempengaruhi biaya agen perusahaan positif tetapi negatif menurut Tang xue lagu dan Zhou xiao su (2005). Dalam Ge Bang liang dan Jiang mei fang
kertas (2010) 's, penulis mengetahui konsentrasi kepemilikan tidak ada dengan biaya agensi tetapi berkorelasi positif dengan perputaran total aset, rasio leverage tetap berkorelasi negatif dengan total omset aset tetapi struktur modal yang berkorelasi positif . dengan biaya administrasi tingkat
Berdasarkan kesimpulan penelitian domestik Cina di atas kita dapat mengetahui, karena data yang ketat dan kesulitan dalam menentukan biaya agensi, mereka dibagi menjadi 2 kategori: pertama, mereka mengadopsi metodologi penelitian tradisional mulai dari situasi saat ini Cina yang terdaftar perusahaan struktur modal atas dasar teori kontrak untuk menyimpulkan efek biaya agen dan mengusulkan penanggulangan relatif (Zhu kamu, 2003). Jenis lain dari peneliti terutama menggunakan metodologi empiris modern untuk tidak langsung menilai bagaimana struktur modal mempengaruhi biaya agensi dengan cara kinerja pengujian perusahaan.
Banyak indikator keuangan telah digunakan untuk membahas masalah tersebut, seperti struktur kepemilikan, fitur papan. Mereka sebagian menjelaskan efek biaya agensi dan banyak penelitian empiris seldomly digunakan data panel yang mungkin bisa sepenuhnya mengevaluasi agency cost perusahaan. Tulisan ini mencoba untuk mengadopsi 2 indikator solvabilitas jangka panjang untuk mencerminkan struktur modal dan 2 variabel untuk memperkirakan biaya agensi. Data panel juga digunakan untuk menganalisis hubungan antara mereka, mudah-mudahan, bisa memberikan saran layak untuk emiten Cina mengoptimalkan tata kelola perusahaan.