‘Servants of the People’ or ‘Master

‘Servants of the People’ or ‘Masters of the Government’?
Explaining Parliamentary Behaviour in EU Affairs
Katrin Auel
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford
[e-mail]
Paper for presentation at the
11th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association
Los Angeles, April 23-25, 2009
‘Servants of the People’ or ‘Masters of the Government’?
Explaining Parliamentary Behaviour in EU Affairs
Katrin Auel, University of Oxford
March 2009
Abstract
Comparative studies using a rational choice approach have successfully explained variation
in the degree of institutional parliamentary strength in EU affairs, but they perform less
well with regard to explaining both actual parliamentary behaviour and variation thereof.
The paper therefore develops an explanation for parliamentary behaviour based on agency
theory and the model of delegation. The aim is to enrich rational choice approaches, which
have so far focused mainly on the preference of re-election and have therefore - at least
implicitly - conceptualised parliamentarians as agents of their voters or parties. In
parliamentary systems, however, MPs are not only agents of the voters (or parties), but also
principals of the government. The paper is based on Strøm’s rational choice institutionalist
conception of parliamentary roles as ‘routines, driven by reasons (preferences), and
constrained by rules’ (Strøm 1997: 158), but uses Merton’s concept of ‘role-sets’ (Merton
1957) to analyse parliamentary agent- and principal-relationships as different elements of
the role-set ‘MP’ associated with specific routines driven by specific preferences.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union (EU) has developed
into one of the major and most debated topics in European politics. Within this debate, the
role of national parliaments has generated a considerable body of literature. Much of the early
literature consisted of informative, but often descriptive, accounts of the institutional
adaptation of national parliaments to the challenges of integration, detailing institutional
provisions and scrutiny procedures. However, the last years have also seen a growing number
of comparative studies and theoretical contributions that aim at classifying national
parliaments according to their institutional position in European affairs (e.g. Bergman 2000a;
Maurer 2001), and at explaining institutional variation (Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005). The
latter have explained variation in the degree of institutional parliamentary strength in EU
affairs with two main variables, the power of parliament independent of European integration
and the electoral salience of / public opinion on European integration. However, while these
studies convincingly assess and explain institutional variation, they perform less well with
regard to actual parliamentary behaviour. First, they focus only on formal parliamentary
rights of influence and are thus based on the debatable assumption that institutional
capabilities equal parliamentary behaviour. Yet as studies have shown, national parliaments
often make little use of their institutional rights (e.g. Auel 2006, Pollack and Slominski 2003),
in other words, what parliaments can do is not necessarily what they actually do in reality.
Second, based on the - implicit or explicit - assumption that the reluctant use of institutional
rights is a sign of ‘behavioural reticence’ (Saalfeld 2003) they tend to ignore the possibility
that national parliaments have found other means to get involved in EU affairs. Indeed, while
some parliaments focus on informally influencing the position of the government for Council
negotiations, others concentrate on holding the government publicly to account for their EU
policies (Auel and Benz 2005). As a result, they are also unable to explain parliamentary
behaviour that seems counter-productive from a rational point of view, such as costly,
because time consuming, activities in EU affairs that take place behind closed doors and will
thus have few direct electoral benefits for the MPs involved. Auel and Benz (2005), in
contrast, do compare parliamentary behaviour in terms of both, the use of institutional rights
and the development of more informal strategies of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs
across a small number of parliaments. However, while they can explain the reasons for the
development of such alternative strategies they fail to provide a more general explanation for
the variation in parliamentary behaviour they observe.
The paper therefore develops an explanation for parliamentary behaviour based on
integrating the idea of parliamentary roles and the principal-agent model. As Wahlke and his
associates (1962: 9) famously argued, ‘the chief utility of the role theory model of legislative
behavior is that, unlike other models, it pinpoints those aspects of legislators’ behavior which
make the legislature an institution’. The aim is to enrich rational choice conceptions of
legislative behaviour which have so far mainly focused on the preference of re-election and
thus - implicitly - on the role of legislators as the agent of their party or voters. The main
argument is that MPs in parliamentary systems are not only agents, but also principals of the
government and that any analysis of parliamentary behaviour needs to take their preferences
as principals into account.
The paper proceeds in six sections. The first section gives a short overview over the
rational choice literature in legislative behaviour with a particular focus on Strøm’s (1997)
rational choice neo-institutionalist conception of parliamentary roles and introduces the role
of MPs as principals of the government. Section 2 uses Merton’s concept of ‘role-sets’
(Merton 1957) to discuss the three main agent- and principal-relationships associated with the
status of MP. Using agency theory, it will argue that the roles of agent of the voters, agent of
the party and principal of the government are, in turn, associated with specific preferences: As
agents, MPs’ most important preference is to secure their re-authorisation, i.e. to be reselected/re-nominated
as the agent of their party and to be re-elected by the voters. As
principals, the most important preference is to induce their agent (the government) to act in
accordance with their interests, i.e. to minimise agency loss. Section 4 discusses
parliamentary strategies MPs can use to pursue their preferences as both agents and principals
in general. Based on the assumption that MPs preferences are hierarchically ordered, with the
preference of re-authorisation as agent being more important, it will be argued that in their
role as principals MPs will choose strategies of minimising agency loss that will advance, or
at least not hurt, the realisation of their preferences as agents. Section 5 then turns to the field
of European affairs and looks in more detail at the strategies MPs can employ to minimise
agency loss. It argues that the that the choice of strategies depends on their payoff in terms of
reducing agency loss relative to their costs and discusses specific institutional incentives and
constraints that will have an impact on both. Section six draws the arguments together,
provides some empirical illustrations and concludes.
Explaining Legislative Behaviour: Rational Choice and Legislative Roles
Rational choice approaches to legislative behaviour have long been reluctant to develop
specific conceptions of legislative roles or to even use the term. Rather, rational choice
approaches have sought to explain legislative behaviour with economic models of individual
behaviour models stressing individual preferences and strategic choices (e.g., Fenno 1973;
Mayhew 1974; Shepsle 1978; Smith and Deering 1984).1
Rational choice neo-institutionalism
has expanded the perspective and paid attention to the constraining impact of institutions and
formal rules as ‘the strategic context in which optimizing behaviour takes place’ (Shepsle
1989: 35, see also for example Laver and Shepsle 1996, Huber 1996a). Theorists increasingly
understood that ‘formal models can best advance our understanding of legislatures when they
are enriched by with institutional detail’ (Shepsle and Weingast 1994: 145).
Much of literature on legislative behaviour has been developed through analysis based on
the United States Congress (but see Doering 1995) and focuses on career goals of legislators
to explain behaviour. In one of the earliest and most influential contributions, Mayhews
argued that legislative behaviour could be best understood if legislators were see as ‘singleminded
seekers of reelection’ (Mayhews 1974: 5), re-election being the preference that
‘underlies everything else, as indeed it should if we are to expect that the relations between
politicians and public will be one of accountability’ (ibid.: 16-7). Although later works have
presented a more nuanced perspective on legislators’ preferences, the re-election or career
goal remained prominent in the literature (Katznelson and Weingast 2005: 8). Schlesinger, for
example, defined the main preference of legislators by the broader term of ‘political ambition’
(Schlesinger 1991: 39f.) and distinguished between discrete ambition (the aim to gain a
specific office for one term), static ambition (to keep the office for several terms) and
progressive ambition (to gain a more powerful office). In contrast, Fenno (1973) in his
seminal work on Congress Committees, broadened the narrow focus on re-election and
included ‘influence within the House’ and ‘good public policy’ as two further basic
preferences or goals of Members of Congress. But in his later work, he still argued that
legislators ‘want to get nominated and elected, then renominated and re-elected. For most
members of Congress most of the time, this electoral goal is primary (Fenno 1977: 889).

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

'Hamba rakyat' atau 'Master pemerintah'?Menjelaskan perilaku parlemen dalam urusan-urusan Uni EropaKatrin AuelDepartemen Politik dan hubungan internasionalUniversitas [e-mail] untuk presentasi diKonferensi ke-11 dua tahunan Asosiasi studi Uni EropaLos Angeles, 23-25 April 2009'Hamba rakyat' atau 'Master pemerintah'?Menjelaskan perilaku parlemen dalam urusan-urusan Uni EropaKatrin Auel, Universitas OxfordMaret 2009AbstrakStudi banding dengan menggunakan pendekatan rasional pilihan telah berhasil menjelaskan variasidi tingkat kelembagaan Parlemen kekuatan dalam urusan EU, tetapi mereka melakukan kurangbaik berkaitan dengan menjelaskan perilaku Parlemen aktual dan variasi daripadanya.Karya itu mengembangkan penjelasan untuk Parlemen perilaku yang didasarkan pada badanteori dan model delegasi. Tujuannya adalah untuk memperkaya pilihan yang rasional yang mendekati, yangsejauh ini telah berfokus terutama pada preferensi pemilihan ulang dan karena itu - setidaknyasecara implisit - dikonsepkan parlemen sebagai agen pemilih atau pihak. Dalamsistem parlementer, namun, anggota parlemen tidak hanya agen pemilih (atau pihak), tetapi jugakepala pemerintahan. Karya ini didasarkan pada Strøm's institutionalist pilihan rasionalkonsepsi Parlemen peran sebagai ' rutinitas, didorong oleh alasan (preferensi), dandibatasi oleh aturan (Strøm 1997:158), tetapi menggunakan Merton konsep 'peran-set' (Merton1957) untuk menganalisis Parlemen agen-kepala-hubungan dan sebagai unsur yang berbedaperan-set 'MP' yang terkait dengan rutinitas tertentu yang didorong oleh preferensi khusus.PengenalanSejak awal 1990-an 'demokratis defisit' Uni Eropa (EU) telah mengembangkanmenjadi salah satu utama dan yang paling diperdebatkan topik dalam politik Eropa. Dalam perdebatan ini,peran Parlemen Nasional telah menghasilkan tubuh yang cukup besar sastra. Banyak dari awalSastra terdiri dari informatif, tapi sering deskriptif, account kelembagaanadaptasi dari Parlemen Nasional untuk tantangan integrasi, merinci kelembagaanketentuan dan tata cara pengawasan. Namun, tahun terakhir juga telah melihat semakin banyakstudi banding dan kontribusi teoritis yang bertujuan pada klasifikasi nasionalParlemen menurut posisi mereka kelembagaan dalam urusan-urusan Eropa (misalnya Bergman 2000a;Maurer 2001), dan menjelaskan institusional (Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005). Thekedua telah menjelaskan variasi dalam tingkat kekuatan Parlemen kelembagaan di Uni Eropaurusan dengan dua variabel utama, kekuatan Parlemen independen dari integrasi Eropadan arti-penting pemilihan / umum pendapat tentang integrasi Eropa. Namun, saat iniStudi meyakinkan menilai dan menjelaskan institusional, mereka melakukan kurang baik denganmenganggap aktual perilaku Parlemen. Pertama, mereka fokus hanya pada formal Parlemenhak-hak mempengaruhi dan dengan demikian didasarkan pada asumsi diperdebatkan bahwa kelembagaankemampuan sama dengan Parlemen perilaku. Namun studi telah menunjukkan, Parlemen Nasionalsering membuat sedikit menggunakan hak-hak mereka kelembagaan (misalnya Auel 2006, Pollack dan Slominski 2003), dengan kata lain, apa parlemen dapat lakukan adalah tidak selalu apa yang mereka lakukan sebenarnya dalam kenyataan.Kedua, didasarkan pada asumsi - implisit maupun eksplisit - bahwa penggunaan enggan kelembagaanhak adalah tanda 'perilaku keengganan' (2003 Saalfeld) mereka cenderung untuk mengabaikan kemungkinanbahwa Parlemen Nasional telah menemukan cara lain untuk terlibat dalam urusan EU. Memang, sementaraParlemen beberapa fokus pada informal mempengaruhi posisi pemerintah untuk Dewannegosiasi, yang lain berkonsentrasi pada memegang pemerintah secara terbuka untuk memperhitungkan mereka EUKebijakan (Auel dan Benz 2005). Sebagai akibatnya, mereka tidak juga mampu menjelaskan Parlemenperilaku yang tampaknya kontra-produktif dari sudut pandang rasional, seperti mahal,karena memakan waktu, kegiatan dalam urusan-urusan EU yang mengambil tempat di balik pintu tertutup dan akandengan demikian memiliki beberapa manfaat pemilihan langsung untuk para anggota parlemen yang terlibat. Auel dan Benz (2005), diSebaliknya, membandingkan perilaku parlemen dalam hal kedua, penggunaan hak kelembagaandan pengembangan strategi yang lebih informal Parlemen keterlibatan dalam urusan-urusan EUdi sejumlah kecil Parlemen. Namun, sementara mereka dapat menjelaskan alasan-alasanpengembangan strategi alternatif seperti mereka gagal untuk memberikan penjelasan yang lebih umum untukvariasi dalam parlemen perilaku mereka mengamati.Karya itu mengembangkan penjelasan untuk Parlemen perilaku berdasarkanmengintegrasikan gagasan Parlemen peran dan model kepala-agen. Sebagai Wahlke dan nyarekan (1962:9) terkenal berpendapat, ' utilitas utama teori panutan legislatifperilaku adalah bahwa, tidak seperti model lain, itu menunjukkan aspek-aspek dari legislator perilaku yangmembuat lembaga legislatif '. Tujuannya adalah untuk memperkaya konsepsi pilihan rasionallegislatif perilaku yang telah sejauh ini terutama berfokus pada preferensi pemilihan ulang dandengan demikian - secara implisit - peran legislator sebagai agen mereka pesta atau suara. Utamaargumen adalah bahwa MPs dalam sistem Parlemen tidak hanya agen, tetapi juga kepalapemerintah dan bahwa setiap analisis perilaku Parlemen perlu mengambil preferensi merekasebagai kepala ke account.Kertas hasil dalam enam bagian. Bagian pertama memberikan gambaran singkat atasrasional pilihan sastra di legislatif perilaku dengan fokus khusus pada Strøm's (1997)neo-institutionalist pilihan rasional konsepsi Parlemen peran dan memperkenalkan peranParlemen sebagai kepala pemerintah. Bagian 2 menggunakan Merton konsep 'peran-set'(Merton 1957) untuk membahas tiga utama agen-kepala-hubungan dan terkait denganstatus MP. Menggunakan teori badan, itu akan berpendapat bahwa peran agen dari pada pemilih, agenPartai dan kepala pemerintah yang, pada gilirannya, terkait dengan preferensi khusus: sebagaiagen, anggota parlemen preferensi yang paling penting adalah aman otorisasi ulang mereka, yaitu untuk menjadi orang/kembali-nominatedsebagai agen partai mereka dan untuk dipilih kembali oleh para pemilih. Sebagaikepala sekolah, preferensi yang paling penting adalah untuk menimbulkan agen mereka (pemerintah) untuk bertindaksesuai dengan minat mereka, yaitu untuk meminimalkan kerugian badan. Membahas Bagian 4Parlemen strategi MPs dapat menggunakan untuk mengejar preferensi mereka sebagai agen dan kepala sekolahsecara umum. Berdasarkan asumsi bahwa preferensi MPs hirarki memerintahkan, denganpreferensi kembali otorisasi sebagai agen yang lebih penting, itu akan berpendapat bahwa dalam merekaperan sebagai kepala MPs akan memilih strategi meminimalkan kerugian badan yang akan maju, atausetidaknya tidak terluka, realisasi preferensi mereka sebagai agen. Bagian 5 kemudian berubah ke bidangurusan Eropa dan terlihat lebih rinci pada strategi MPs dapat mempekerjakan untuk meminimalkanbadan kerugian. Itu berpendapat bahwa bahwa pilihan strategi tergantung pada hasil mereka dari segi mengurangi kerugian badan relatif terhadap biaya mereka dan membahas spesifik kelembagaan insentif dankendala yang akan memiliki dampak pada keduanya. Bagian enam menarik argumen bersama-sama,menyediakan beberapa ilustrasi empiris dan menyimpulkan.Menjelaskan perilaku legislatif: Pilihan yang rasional dan peran legislatifPendekatan pilihan yang rasional perilaku legislatif telah lama enggan untuk mengembangkankonsepsi spesifik peran legislatif atau bahkan menggunakan istilah. Sebaliknya, pilihan yang rasionalpendekatan telah cuba menjelaskan perilaku legislatif dengan model ekonomi dari individumodel perilaku yang menekankan preferensi individu dan pilihan-pilihan strategis (misalnya, Fenno 1973;Mayhew 1974; Shepsle 1978; Smith dan Deering 1984).1 Pilihan yang rasional neo-institutionalismtelah memperluas perspektif dan dibayar perhatian terhadap dampak memenjarakan lembaga danperaturan formal sebagai 'strategis konteks di mana perilaku mengoptimalkan terjadi' (Shepsle1989:35, lihat juga misalnya bejana dan Shepsle 1996, Huber 1996a). Teori semakinmemahami bahwa ' model formal terbaik bisa memajukan pemahaman kita tentang legislatif ketika merekaDiperkaya dengan dengan detail kelembagaan ' (Shepsle dan Weingast 1994:145).Banyak literatur tentang perilaku legislatif telah dikembangkan melalui analisis berdasarkanKongres Amerika Serikat (tapi lihat Doering 1995) dan berfokus pada tujuan karir legislatoruntuk menjelaskan perilaku. Di salah satu kontribusi paling awal dan paling berpengaruh, Mayhewsberpendapat bahwa perilaku legislatif bisa terbaik dipahami jika legislator sebagai ' singlemindedpencari terpilihnya kembali ' (Mayhews 1974:5), pemilihan kembali menjadi preferensi yang‘underlies everything else, as indeed it should if we are to expect that the relations betweenpoliticians and public will be one of accountability’ (ibid.: 16-7). Although later works havepresented a more nuanced perspective on legislators’ preferences, the re-election or careergoal remained prominent in the literature (Katznelson and Weingast 2005: 8). Schlesinger, forexample, defined the main preference of legislators by the broader term of ‘political ambition’(Schlesinger 1991: 39f.) and distinguished between discrete ambition (the aim to gain aspecific office for one term), static ambition (to keep the office for several terms) andprogressive ambition (to gain a more powerful office). In contrast, Fenno (1973) in hisseminal work on Congress Committees, broadened the narrow focus on re-election andincluded ‘influence within the House’ and ‘good public policy’ as two further basicpreferences or goals of Members of Congress. But in his later work, he still argued thatlegislators ‘want to get nominated and elected, then renominated and re-elected. For mostmembers of Congress most of the time, this electoral goal is primary (Fenno 1977: 889).