Optimal Fiscal FederalismAlthough the Tiebout model is an imperfect de terjemahan - Optimal Fiscal FederalismAlthough the Tiebout model is an imperfect de Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

Optimal Fiscal FederalismAlthough t

Optimal Fiscal Federalism
Although the Tiebout model is an imperfect description of reality, changes in
local taxation and spending do affect mobility and house prices. Given these
positive findings (that is, they support the predictions of the model about
behavior), what are the normative implications of the Tiebout model for the
optimal design of fiscal federalism? That is, what does the Tiebout model
imply should be the principles that guide the provision of public goods at different
levels of government?
The Tiebout model implies that the extent to which public goods should
be provided at the local level is determined by three factors. The first is taxbenefit
linkages, the extent to which residents view their tax payments as
directly tied to goods and services that they receive. Goods with strong tax -
benefit linkages, such as local roads, should be provided locally. There is a
direct tax -benefit linkage to spending on local roads: higher property taxes
fund better-quality roads that benefit most residents of a town. Goods with
weaker tax -benefit linkages, such as welfare payments to the lowest income
residents of a town, should be provided at the state or federal level. There is a
very limited tax -benefit linkage to spending on welfare: the majority of residents
in a town do not benefit from redistribution to low -income groups
(unless they have altruistic preferences toward the local poor).
If residents can see directly the benefits they are buying with their property
tax dollars, they will be willing to pay local taxes. If they cannot see a benefit
from their property tax payments, they will vote with their feet by moving to
a town that has lower property taxes. If a town instituted a cash welfare program,
higher-income residents would have an incentive to leave and move to a town
that did not have such a program and had lower local property taxes as a result.
The ability of individuals to vote with their feet is a fundamental limitation on a
town’s ability to pursue programs that benefit only a minority of residents.
The second factor that determines the optimal level of decentralization is the
extent of positive externalities, or spillovers, in public goods provision. If local
public goods have large spillover effects on other communities, the goods will be
underprovided by any locality. In this case, higher levels of government have a role
in promoting the provision of these public goods, for example, through grants.
The third factor that determines the optimal level of decentralization is the
economy of scale in the nature of public goods. Public goods that have large
economies of scale, such as national defense, are not efficiently provided by
many competing local jurisdictions; public goods without large economies of
scale, such as police protection, may be provided more effectively in Tiebout
competition.

tax-benefit linkages The
relationship between the taxes
people pay and the government
goods and services they get in
return.
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Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1: [Salinan]
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Optimal Fiscal FederalismAlthough the Tiebout model is an imperfect description of reality, changes inlocal taxation and spending do affect mobility and house prices. Given thesepositive findings (that is, they support the predictions of the model aboutbehavior), what are the normative implications of the Tiebout model for theoptimal design of fiscal federalism? That is, what does the Tiebout modelimply should be the principles that guide the provision of public goods at differentlevels of government?The Tiebout model implies that the extent to which public goods shouldbe provided at the local level is determined by three factors. The first is taxbenefitlinkages, the extent to which residents view their tax payments asdirectly tied to goods and services that they receive. Goods with strong tax -benefit linkages, such as local roads, should be provided locally. There is adirect tax -benefit linkage to spending on local roads: higher property taxesfund better-quality roads that benefit most residents of a town. Goods withweaker tax -benefit linkages, such as welfare payments to the lowest incomeresidents of a town, should be provided at the state or federal level. There is avery limited tax -benefit linkage to spending on welfare: the majority of residentsin a town do not benefit from redistribution to low -income groups(unless they have altruistic preferences toward the local poor).If residents can see directly the benefits they are buying with their propertytax dollars, they will be willing to pay local taxes. If they cannot see a benefitfrom their property tax payments, they will vote with their feet by moving toa town that has lower property taxes. If a town instituted a cash welfare program,higher-income residents would have an incentive to leave and move to a townthat did not have such a program and had lower local property taxes as a result.The ability of individuals to vote with their feet is a fundamental limitation on atown’s ability to pursue programs that benefit only a minority of residents.The second factor that determines the optimal level of decentralization is theextent of positive externalities, or spillovers, in public goods provision. If localpublic goods have large spillover effects on other communities, the goods will beunderprovided by any locality. In this case, higher levels of government have a rolein promoting the provision of these public goods, for example, through grants.The third factor that determines the optimal level of decentralization is theeconomy of scale in the nature of public goods. Public goods that have largeeconomies of scale, such as national defense, are not efficiently provided bymany competing local jurisdictions; public goods without large economies ofscale, such as police protection, may be provided more effectively in Tieboutcompetition.tax-benefit linkages Therelationship between the taxespeople pay and the governmentgoods and services they get inreturn.
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Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:[Salinan]
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Optimal Federalisme Fiskal
Meskipun model Tiebout adalah deskripsi yang tidak sempurna dari realitas, perubahan
perpajakan dan belanja daerah yang mempengaruhi harga mobilitas dan rumah. Mengingat
temuan positif (yaitu, mereka mendukung prediksi model tentang
perilaku), apa implikasi normatif model Tiebout untuk
desain yang optimal federalisme fiskal? Artinya, apa model Tiebout
menyiratkan harus menjadi prinsip yang memandu penyediaan barang publik di berbagai
tingkat pemerintahan?
Model Tiebout menyiratkan bahwa sejauh mana barang publik harus
diberikan di tingkat lokal ditentukan oleh tiga faktor. Yang pertama adalah taxbenefit
hubungan, sejauh mana warga melihat pembayaran pajak mereka sebagai
langsung terkait dengan barang dan jasa yang mereka terima. Barang dengan pajak yang kuat -
hubungan manfaat, seperti jalan lokal, harus disediakan secara lokal. Ada
pajak -benefit hubungan langsung ke belanja jalan lokal: pajak properti yang lebih tinggi
jalan dana baik-kualitas yang bermanfaat bagi sebagian besar penduduk kota. Barang dengan
lemah hubungan -benefit pajak, seperti pembayaran kesejahteraan untuk pendapatan terendah
penduduk kota, harus disediakan di tingkat negara bagian atau federal. Ada
yang sangat terbatas -benefit pajak linkage untuk pengeluaran kesejahteraan: mayoritas penduduk
di kota tidak mendapatkan keuntungan dari redistribusi kelompok -income rendah
(kecuali mereka memiliki preferensi altruistik terhadap orang miskin lokal).
Jika warga dapat melihat secara langsung manfaat mereka membeli dengan properti mereka
uang pajak, mereka akan bersedia membayar pajak daerah. Jika mereka tidak dapat melihat manfaat
dari pembayaran pajak properti mereka, mereka akan memilih dengan kaki mereka dengan pindah ke
sebuah kota yang memiliki pajak properti yang lebih rendah. Jika kota melembagakan program kesejahteraan tunai,
warga berpenghasilan tinggi akan memiliki insentif untuk meninggalkan dan pindah ke sebuah kota
yang tidak memiliki program seperti itu dan memiliki pajak properti lokal lebih rendah sebagai hasilnya.
Kemampuan individu untuk memberikan suara dengan kaki mereka adalah keterbatasan mendasar pada
kemampuan kota untuk mengejar program yang bermanfaat bagi hanya sebagian kecil penduduk.
Faktor kedua yang menentukan tingkat optimal desentralisasi adalah
tingkat eksternalitas positif, atau spillovers, dalam ketentuan barang publik. Jika lokal
barang publik memiliki efek spillover besar di komunitas lain, barang akan
underprovided oleh lokalitas apapun. Dalam hal ini, tingkat pemerintahan yang lebih tinggi memiliki peran
dalam mempromosikan penyediaan barang-barang publik, misalnya, melalui hibah.
Faktor ketiga yang menentukan tingkat optimal desentralisasi adalah
skala ekonomi dalam sifat barang publik. Barang publik yang memiliki besar
skala ekonomi, seperti pertahanan nasional, tidak efisien oleh
banyak bersaing yurisdiksi lokal; barang publik tanpa ekonomis yang besar
skala, seperti perlindungan polisi, dapat diberikan lebih efektif dalam Tiebout
kompetisi. pajak-manfaat keterkaitan The hubungan antara pajak orang membayar dan pemerintah barang dan jasa yang mereka dapatkan di kembali.





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