From the end of the eighteenth cent

From the end of the eighteenth century on through the nineteenth, Thomas Reid (1710–96) was probably the most popular philosopher in the United States and United Kingdom, and he enjoyed considerable popularity in France. Nicholas Wolterstorff says that “I myself judge him to have been
one of the two great philosophers of the latter part of the eighteenth century, the other being of course Immanuel Kant.”[309] However, Reid has almost disappeared in modern philosophy courses in Western universities, although there is a renewed interest in him nowadays. A Scotsman, Reid was a contemporary of Hume and was Hume’s earliest and fiercest critic. In 1764 he published his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, the same year he was appointed professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University as Adam Smith’s successor. In 1785 he published Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, and in 1788, the same year that Kant published his Critique of Practical Reason, Reid published his Essays on the Active Powers of Man. He studied theology for three years in the course of his education and was a licensed Presbyterian preacher. Unlike Hume, who thought that philosophy’s failure to progress resulted from the failure of philosophy to use the experimental method of the new science,[310] and unlike Kant, who thought the problem was philosophy’s quest for “pure reason,” Reid argues that philosophy’s lack of progress should largely be attributed to its failure to take the principles of common sense seriously. Common sense refers to those propositions that properly functioning adult human beings implicitly believe or take for granted in their ordinary activities and practices.[311] For Reid, modern philosophy has flouted common sense because it has embraced “the Cartesian system.” The Cartesian system leads inevitably to skepticism: “From the single principle of the existence of our own thoughts, very little, if any thing, can be deduced by just reasoning, especially if we suppose that all our other faculties may be fallacious.”[312] We should therefore jettison the Cartesian system and embrace a form of foundationalism[313] that is moderate and wide. Moderate, because an idea can be worth belief without being indubitable. Wide, because many of our beliefs are warranted without being inferred from other beliefs. It is a first principle of common sense that the particular deliverances of the faculties of consciousness, perception, memory, the moral sense, and so on are immediately warranted. We should also divest ourselves of the “way of ideas”; this mechanical view does not explain how we apprehend reality, and we should rather stay with our prereflective conviction that we apprehend entities of various kinds. For Reid, we should start in the thick of human experience by attending to ordinary language use, the principles assumed in human conduct and actions, and the operations of our own minds, or what Reid calls “introspection.” “Philosophizing has to start somewhere, and Reid saw no reason that we should leave our commonsensical modes of discourse and convictions at the door when entering into the philosophical workplace.”[314] Reid grants priority to introspective consciousness—namely, perception, memory, testimony, deductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning. For Reid, these sources are not reducible to one another, and they are of equal authority. A moot question is why we should trust common sense. In this respect it is important to remember that Reid was a Christian philosopher who saw the world and humans as God’s good creation. He placed great emphasis on human free will, but unlike Kant, who positioned free will in the noumenal realm as opposed to the natural realm of necessity, Reid appropriately distinguished between laws of nature and the voluntary actions of humans. In opposition to Kant’s doctrine of necessity, Reid stressed contingency. God has created the world in a certain way, but he did not have to. Reid wrote and taught about a staggering range of topics. “Reid’s thought appeared on the world stage as at once amenable to science, Christian beliefs, the rise of a modern public sphere, and democratic politics.”[315] Kant, who probably had not read Reid thoroughly, was devastating in his critique of Reid: he thought Reid’s philosophy to be an “appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed . . . when no rational justification for one’s position can
be advanced . . . when insight and science fail.”[316] For our purposes, two of Reid’s many influences are particularly significant. He was highly influential among the Princetonian school of theology in America from its earliest days. Charles Hodge’s Systematic Theology, for example, is deeply influenced by Reid. Hodge’s use of Reid reflects the traditional, natural theological side of Reid’s philosophy of religion. In contrast, Reformed epistemologists such as Alvin Plantinga have drawn on Reid’s opposition to “classic foundationalism” in making the case for belief in God as properly basic.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Dari akhir abad ke-18 di melalui kesembilan belas, Thomas Reid (1710-96) adalah mungkin ahli falsafah paling populer di Amerika Serikat dan Inggris Raya, dan ia menikmati popularitas besar di Perancis. Nicholas Wolterstorff mengatakan bahwa "saya sendiri hakim telah menjadi one of the two great philosophers of the latter part of the eighteenth century, the other being of course Immanuel Kant.”[309] However, Reid has almost disappeared in modern philosophy courses in Western universities, although there is a renewed interest in him nowadays. A Scotsman, Reid was a contemporary of Hume and was Hume’s earliest and fiercest critic. In 1764 he published his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, the same year he was appointed professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University as Adam Smith’s successor. In 1785 he published Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, and in 1788, the same year that Kant published his Critique of Practical Reason, Reid published his Essays on the Active Powers of Man. He studied theology for three years in the course of his education and was a licensed Presbyterian preacher. Unlike Hume, who thought that philosophy’s failure to progress resulted from the failure of philosophy to use the experimental method of the new science,[310] and unlike Kant, who thought the problem was philosophy’s quest for “pure reason,” Reid argues that philosophy’s lack of progress should largely be attributed to its failure to take the principles of common sense seriously. Common sense refers to those propositions that properly functioning adult human beings implicitly believe or take for granted in their ordinary activities and practices.[311] For Reid, modern philosophy has flouted common sense because it has embraced “the Cartesian system.” The Cartesian system leads inevitably to skepticism: “From the single principle of the existence of our own thoughts, very little, if any thing, can be deduced by just reasoning, especially if we suppose that all our other faculties may be fallacious.”[312] We should therefore jettison the Cartesian system and embrace a form of foundationalism[313] that is moderate and wide. Moderate, because an idea can be worth belief without being indubitable. Wide, because many of our beliefs are warranted without being inferred from other beliefs. It is a first principle of common sense that the particular deliverances of the faculties of consciousness, perception, memory, the moral sense, and so on are immediately warranted. We should also divest ourselves of the “way of ideas”; this mechanical view does not explain how we apprehend reality, and we should rather stay with our prereflective conviction that we apprehend entities of various kinds. For Reid, we should start in the thick of human experience by attending to ordinary language use, the principles assumed in human conduct and actions, and the operations of our own minds, or what Reid calls “introspection.” “Philosophizing has to start somewhere, and Reid saw no reason that we should leave our commonsensical modes of discourse and convictions at the door when entering into the philosophical workplace.”[314] Reid grants priority to introspective consciousness—namely, perception, memory, testimony, deductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning. For Reid, these sources are not reducible to one another, and they are of equal authority. A moot question is why we should trust common sense. In this respect it is important to remember that Reid was a Christian philosopher who saw the world and humans as God’s good creation. He placed great emphasis on human free will, but unlike Kant, who positioned free will in the noumenal realm as opposed to the natural realm of necessity, Reid appropriately distinguished between laws of nature and the voluntary actions of humans. In opposition to Kant’s doctrine of necessity, Reid stressed contingency. God has created the world in a certain way, but he did not have to. Reid wrote and taught about a staggering range of topics. “Reid’s thought appeared on the world stage as at once amenable to science, Christian beliefs, the rise of a modern public sphere, and democratic politics.”[315] Kant, who probably had not read Reid thoroughly, was devastating in his critique of Reid: he thought Reid’s philosophy to be an “appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed . . . when no rational justification for one’s position can maju... ketika wawasan dan ilmu pengetahuan gagal." [316] untuk tujuan kita, dua dari Reid banyak pengaruh sangat signifikan. Ia adalah sangat berpengaruh antara Princetonian sekolah teologi di Amerika sejak awal. Charles Hodge teologi sistematis, misalnya, sangat dipengaruhi oleh Reid. Hodge's penggunaan dari Reid mencerminkan sisi teologis tradisional, alami dari Reid filsafat agama. Sebaliknya, reformasi epistemologists seperti Alvin Plantinga telah diambil pada Reid oposisi terhadap "klasik fondamentalisme" dalam membuat kasus untuk kepercayaan kepada Tuhan sebagai benar dasar.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Dari akhir abad kedelapan belas di melalui kesembilan belas, Thomas Reid (1710-1796) mungkin filsuf paling populer di Amerika Serikat dan Inggris, dan ia menikmati popularitas yang cukup di Perancis. Nicholas Wolterstorff mengatakan bahwa "Saya sendiri menilai dia telah
salah satu dari dua filsuf besar dari bagian akhir abad kedelapan belas, makhluk lain tentu saja Immanuel Kant." [309] Namun, Reid telah hampir menghilang dalam kursus filsafat modern di universitas-universitas Barat, meskipun ada minat baru dalam dirinya saat ini. Sebuah Scotsman, Reid adalah kontemporer dari Hume dan Hume awal dan sengit kritikus. Pada tahun 1764 ia menerbitkan Kirim nya ke dalam Pikiran Manusia tentang Pokok-pokok Common Sense, tahun yang sama ia diangkat sebagai profesor filsafat moral di Glasgow University sebagai pengganti Adam Smith. Pada 1785 ia menerbitkan Esai pada Intelektual Powers of Man, dan pada 1788, tahun yang sama bahwa Kant menerbitkan Critique of Practical Reason, Reid diterbitkan Essays nya pada Powers Aktif Manusia. Ia belajar teologi selama tiga tahun dalam perjalanan pendidikan dan seorang pengkhotbah Presbyterian berlisensi. Tidak seperti Hume, yang berpikir bahwa kegagalan filosofi untuk kemajuan yang dihasilkan dari kegagalan filsafat menggunakan metode eksperimen ilmu baru, [310] dan tidak seperti Kant, yang mengira masalahnya adalah pencarian filosofi untuk "alasan murni," Reid berpendapat bahwa filsafat kurangnya kemajuan harus sebagian besar dikaitkan dengan kegagalan untuk mengambil prinsip-prinsip akal sehat serius. Akal sehat mengacu pada proposisi yang berfungsi dengan manusia dewasa secara implisit percaya atau mengambil untuk diberikan dalam kegiatan dan praktek biasa mereka. [311] Untuk Reid, filsafat modern telah dilanggar akal sehat karena telah memeluk "sistem Cartesian." Sistem Cartesian mengarah pasti ke skeptisisme: ". Dari prinsip tunggal keberadaan pikiran kita sendiri, sangat sedikit, jika hal apapun, dapat disimpulkan dengan hanya penalaran, terutama jika kita menganggap bahwa semua fakultas kami yang lain mungkin keliru" [312] Kami Oleh karena itu harus membuang sistem Cartesian dan merangkul bentuk fondasionalisme [313] yang moderat dan lebar. Moderat, karena ide dapat bernilai keyakinan tanpa diragukan. Lebar, karena banyak dari keyakinan kita dijamin tanpa disimpulkan dari keyakinan lain. Ini adalah prinsip pertama dari akal sehat bahwa pelepasan tertentu dari fakultas kesadaran, persepsi, memori, arti moral, dan sebagainya segera dibenarkan. Kita juga harus divestasi diri dari "cara ide-ide"; pandangan mekanik ini tidak menjelaskan bagaimana kita memahami realitas, dan kita harus suka tinggal dengan keyakinan prereflective kami bahwa kami menangkap entitas dari berbagai jenis. Untuk Reid, kita harus mulai di tengah-pengalaman manusia dengan memperhatikan penggunaan bahasa sehari, prinsip-prinsip diasumsikan dalam perilaku manusia dan tindakan, dan operasi dari pikiran kita sendiri, atau apa yang Reid menyebut "introspeksi." "Berfilsafat harus memulai suatu tempat , dan Reid tidak melihat alasan bahwa kita harus meninggalkan mode commonsensical kami wacana dan keyakinan di pintu ketika masuk ke tempat kerja filosofis. "[314] Reid memberikan prioritas kepada introspektif kesadaran-yaitu, persepsi, memori, kesaksian, penalaran deduktif, dan penalaran induktif. Untuk Reid, sumber-sumber ini tidak dapat direduksi satu sama lain, dan mereka otoritas yang sama. Sebuah pertanyaan diperdebatkan adalah mengapa kita harus percaya akal sehat. Dalam hal ini, penting untuk diingat bahwa Reid adalah seorang filsuf Kristen yang melihat dunia dan manusia sebagai ciptaan Allah yang baik. Dia menempatkan penekanan besar pada kehendak bebas manusia, tapi tidak seperti Kant, yang diposisikan kehendak bebas di ranah nomenal yang bertentangan dengan alam natural kebutuhan, Reid tepat dibedakan antara hukum alam dan tindakan sukarela manusia. Bertentangan dengan doktrin Kant kebutuhan, Reid menekankan kontingensi. Allah telah menciptakan dunia dengan cara tertentu, tetapi ia tidak harus. Reid menulis dan mengajar tentang berbagai mengejutkan topik. "Pikiran Reid muncul di panggung dunia sebagai sekaligus setuju untuk ilmu pengetahuan, keyakinan Kristen, munculnya ruang publik modern, dan politik yang demokratis." [315] Kant, yang mungkin belum membaca Reid secara menyeluruh, itu dahsyat di kritiknya dari Reid: dia pikir filosofi Reid untuk menjadi "banding ke pendapat banyak, dari yang tepuk tangan filsuf malu. . . bila tidak ada pembenaran rasional untuk posisi seseorang bisa
maju. . . ketika wawasan dan ilmu pengetahuan gagal. "[316] Untuk tujuan kita, dua dari banyak pengaruh Reid sangat signifikan. Dia sangat berpengaruh di kalangan sekolah Princetonian teologi di Amerika dari hari-hari awal. Charles Hodge Teologi Sistematik, misalnya, sangat dipengaruhi oleh Reid. Penggunaan Hodge dari Reid mencerminkan sisi tradisional, alami teologis filsafat Reid agama. Sebaliknya, epistemologists Reformed seperti Alvin Plantinga telah ditarik pada oposisi Reid untuk "fondasionalisme klasik" dalam membuat kasus untuk percaya pada Tuhan sebagai benar mendasar.