. Thus, while there seems to be an

. Thus, while there seems to be an implicit agreement that something has changed in the discourse around risk management, to date it remains largely obscure what pre- cisely has changed. Critical approaches, we argue therefore in the following, can strongly benefit from an analysis of why risk management is still going strong even after the financial crisis.
Identifying the causes and mechanisms leading to the global financial crisis of 2008 is a daunting task which is beyond this paper. One of the first comprehensive attempts to shed light on the crisis from a sociological point of view is the collection of papers delivered by Lounsbury and Hirsch (2010a,b). Perrow (2010), for example, provides an interesting assessment of some of the explanations for the crisis. He argues that the crisis can neither be under- stood as a normal accident (Perrow, 1984) – since the reasons do not lie in the financial system as such – nor can the crisis be simply reduced to neoinstitutional explanations which focus on ideologies, worldviews and cognitive frames. Rather, he sees financial elites, well aware of the dangers of their behaviour, at the heart of the crisis (for a similar argument cf. Roberts (2009)). This is where risk management enters the frame. Excessive risk-taking has frequently been found to have played a pivotal role in the crisis (cf. Dobbin and Jung, 2010), and risk management is seen as playing a complex role in backing the financial elites taking such risks, for example by camouflaging the magnitude of the risks taken or even by stimulating the risk appetite in the first place through the performative role of risk management theories (MacKenzie, 2006a,b, 2009). Another phenomenon which demonstrates the power risk management gives to financial elites is regulatory arbi- trage in which risks are transferred from one jurisdiction to another in order to exploit the spaces between national regulations. In this sense risk management maybe more powerful than national law (Calomiris and Mason, 2004).

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

. Dengan demikian, walaupun tampaknya ada kesepakatan implisit bahwa sesuatu telah berubah dalam wacana di sekitar manajemen risiko, sampai saat ini masih sebagian besar jelas cisely pra-apa yang telah berubah. Pendekatan yang kritis, karena itu kami berpendapat dalam berikut, dapat sangat benefit dari analisis mengapa manajemen risiko masih akan kuat bahkan setelah krisis financial.Identifying the causes and mechanisms leading to the global financial crisis of 2008 is a daunting task which is beyond this paper. One of the first comprehensive attempts to shed light on the crisis from a sociological point of view is the collection of papers delivered by Lounsbury and Hirsch (2010a,b). Perrow (2010), for example, provides an interesting assessment of some of the explanations for the crisis. He argues that the crisis can neither be under- stood as a normal accident (Perrow, 1984) – since the reasons do not lie in the financial system as such – nor can the crisis be simply reduced to neoinstitutional explanations which focus on ideologies, worldviews and cognitive frames. Rather, he sees financial elites, well aware of the dangers of their behaviour, at the heart of the crisis (for a similar argument cf. Roberts (2009)). This is where risk management enters the frame. Excessive risk-taking has frequently been found to have played a pivotal role in the crisis (cf. Dobbin and Jung, 2010), and risk management is seen as playing a complex role in backing the financial elites taking such risks, for example by camouflaging the magnitude of the risks taken or even by stimulating the risk appetite in the first place through the performative role of risk management theories (MacKenzie, 2006a,b, 2009). Another phenomenon which demonstrates the power risk management gives to financial elites is regulatory arbi- trage in which risks are transferred from one jurisdiction to another in order to exploit the spaces between national regulations. In this sense risk management maybe more powerful than national law (Calomiris and Mason, 2004).