However, the unfolding credit crisi

However, the unfolding credit crisis was not a promising backdrop for persuading other
private sector institutions to stretch their balance sheet resources in taking on a troubled
bank. Having failed to find a buyer for Northern Rock, the public announcement by the
Bank of England on September 14th was recognition that Northern Rock’s predicament
had reached the point where only central bank support could avoid bank failure. The
depositor run, although dramatic on television, was an event in the aftermath of the
liquidity crisis at Northern Rock, rather than the event that triggered its liquidity crisis.
In this sense, the run on Northern Rock was not an old-fashioned bank run of the sort we
see in the movies.2

The irony of the television images is that retail deposit funding is perhaps the most stable
form of funding available to a bank. Although retail deposits can be withdrawn on
demand, their effective duration is much longer, with bankers joking that a depositor is
more likely to get divorced than switch banks. Indeed, a stable deposit base figures
prominently when valuing banks in terms of their franchise value. The textbook bank run
model in which retail depositors rush to the bank to withdraw their money fearing that
others would therefore paints an overly pessimistic view of the fragility of the capital
structure of a deposit funded bank.
So, the real question raised by the Northern Rock episode is not so much why retail
depositors are so prone to running, but instead why the plentiful short-term funding that
Northern Rock enjoyed before August of 2007 suddenly dried up. To turn the question
around, the issue is why sophisticated lenders who operate in the capital markets and the
interbank credit market chose suddenly to deny lending to another bank with an
apparently solid asset book, with virtually no subprime lending.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Namun, krisis kredit berlangsung itu tidak latar belakang menjanjikan untuk membujuk lainnyainstitusi sektor swasta untuk meregangkan sumber daya neraca mereka dalam mengambil bermasalahBank. Setelah gagal untuk menemukan pembeli untuk Northern Rock, pengumuman publik olehBank of England pada 14 September adalah pengakuan bahwa Northern Rock keadaantelah mencapai titik di mana hanya bank sentral dukungan bisa menghindari kegagalan bank. Thedeposan menjalankan, meskipun dramatis di televisi, adalah suatu peristiwa di akhirpecahnya krisis likuiditas di Northern Rock, bukan peristiwa yang memicu krisis likuiditas.Dalam pengertian ini, yang berjalan di Rock Utara bukanlah sebuah bank kuno menjalankan semacam itu kamiLihat di movies.2Ironi dari gambar televisi adalah ritel deposit dana yang mungkin yang paling stabilbentuk pendanaan tersedia bagi bank. Meskipun ritel deposito dapat ditarik padapermintaan, durasi efektif mereka lebih lama, dengan bankir bercanda bahwa deposan adalahlebih mungkin untuk bercerai daripada beralih Bank. Memang, stabil deposit angka dasarmencolok ketika menilai Bank dalam hal nilai waralaba mereka. Menjalankan bank bukumodel yang eceran deposan terburu-buru ke bank untuk menarik uang mereka takut bahwaorang lain karena itu akan cat pandangan terlalu pesimis kerapuhan ibukotastruktur deposit didanai bank.Jadi, pertanyaan diajukan oleh Northern Rock episode yang tidak begitu banyak mengapa ecerandeposan begitu rentan terhadap berjalan, tetapi mengapa banyak jangka pendek pendanaan yangNorthern Rock dinikmati sebelum Agustus 2007 tiba-tiba kering. Untuk mengubah pertanyaandi sekitar, masalahnya adalah mengapa canggih lender yang beroperasi di pasar modal danpasar antar bank kredit memilih tiba-tiba untuk menyangkal pinjaman ke bank lain denganRupanya padat aset buku, dengan hampir tidak ada pinjaman subprime.