- Teks
- Sejarah
Whatever the allocation, efficiency
Whatever the allocation, efficiency and environmental quality is not compromised, only the distributional implications are different. Therefore, those who criticize pollution permits as a right to pollute are correct only in the case where the polluters are given the permit for free. If the polluter has paid a market price for the permit, the criticism could only be that the “price” of the permit is “too low,” or the supply of permits is “too large,” which is the equivalent to saying a higher level environmental quality is desired.
Establishing a system of emission permits has relatively high management costs: (a) it requires proper definition of airshed (trading permits across airsheds would create hot spots), which in turn requires knowledge of the sources and of the movement of pollutants under the local atmospheric conditions; (b) monitoring of ambient air quality in the airshed (or water quality in the watershed) and the relationship between emissions and ambient quality; (c) capacity to monitor or randomly inspect individual emission sources to ensure that the emissions limit specified in the permit is observed; and (d) a system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades among permit holders. Depending on the type of pollutant and the content of the permit, management requirements could be significantly reduced. For example, in the case of a global pollutant such as CO 2 , there is no need to define the airshed since it makes no difference where in the world CO 2 is emitted or controlled. In the case of local pollutants, systems of self-reporting, auditing, and random inspection with sanctions for violations may suffice to replace a formal system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades. Incentives for self-enforcement and group policing can be introduced to minimize monitoring
and enforcement costs.
Tradeable emission permits are nothing but tradeable emission quotas, a concept that has wide applicability beyond air and water pollution and greenhouse gases. Consider the example of a mobile (or fugacious) resource such as an offshore fishery suffering from overfishing. Property rights cannot be assigned but a total allowable catch or aggregate catch quota can be set (at say the maximum sustainable economic yield) and allocated to existing fishermen in some equitable way (e.g., according to average historical catches). Potential entrants can be accommodated by reserving quotas for them or through the purchase of quotas from retiring fishermen. If trading is allowed, the individual tradeable quotas would gravitate towards the most efficient fishermen, ensuring that the allowable total catch is caught at the minimum possible cost. Thus overfishing is eliminated, the fishing resource is protected, economic efficiency is achieved (i.e., fishery rents are maximized), and fishermen who choose to leave the fishery, making all this possible, are fully compensated. New Zealand has successfully used this system to manage its marine fishery (see Chapter 4).
Space limitations do not allow discussion of all the available instruments in the category of market creation. Two more examples of instruments should suffice. A number of countries with substantial tourist industries are facing a serious problem of expansion and haphazard development of their most popular resorts. In fact, the more attractive a resort is the more likely it is to be degraded by overdevelopment.
Experience shows that zoning and building regulations have been ineffective in many parts of the world to regulate development and to maintain the quality of the tourist product (especially in coastal areas). Examples range from Southern Europe (e.g., Spain) to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand) to the Caribbean (e.g. Barbados). Some countries (e.g., Cyprus) were forced to introduce moratoriums on all hotel and other tourism-related development for several years. The moratoriums were later swept by the avalanche of accumulated applications, pressures for hotel development, and a rush to build mostly poor quality establishments from fear that the moratorium might be reintroduced.
This is an example of a command and control intervention that has clearly backfired, causing the rate of construction to accelerate and its quality to decline, further downgrading the island's tourist product. Policy makers are searching for instruments that will help them control and guide the pace of new development in tourist centers in desirable areas and directions and to upgrade existing establishments, thereby improving environmental conditions and the quality of their tourist product.
Tradeable development quotas are such an instrument. The relevant authorities can set a maximum allowable development (or construction) quota, measured in, say, cubic meters of buildable space (or number of rooms) for each year, in each area or zone, consistent with their objectives to limit development and improve quality. The aggregate quota in each area can then be allocated according to some equitable (widely accepted) formula. Possible alternatives include auctioning to the highest bidder with the revenue going towards the upgrading of public places in the town (e.g., developing parks, improving roads, cleaning beaches, and reducing air and noise pollution). An alternative allocation is by proportion of land-ownership in the tourist zone. Under this arrangement each recipient of a quota would have the choice of using it in his/her own land, selling it to others or simply
Establishing a system of emission permits has relatively high management costs: (a) it requires proper definition of airshed (trading permits across airsheds would create hot spots), which in turn requires knowledge of the sources and of the movement of pollutants under the local atmospheric conditions; (b) monitoring of ambient air quality in the airshed (or water quality in the watershed) and the relationship between emissions and ambient quality; (c) capacity to monitor or randomly inspect individual emission sources to ensure that the emissions limit specified in the permit is observed; and (d) a system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades among permit holders. Depending on the type of pollutant and the content of the permit, management requirements could be significantly reduced. For example, in the case of a global pollutant such as CO 2 , there is no need to define the airshed since it makes no difference where in the world CO 2 is emitted or controlled. In the case of local pollutants, systems of self-reporting, auditing, and random inspection with sanctions for violations may suffice to replace a formal system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades. Incentives for self-enforcement and group policing can be introduced to minimize monitoring
and enforcement costs.
Tradeable emission permits are nothing but tradeable emission quotas, a concept that has wide applicability beyond air and water pollution and greenhouse gases. Consider the example of a mobile (or fugacious) resource such as an offshore fishery suffering from overfishing. Property rights cannot be assigned but a total allowable catch or aggregate catch quota can be set (at say the maximum sustainable economic yield) and allocated to existing fishermen in some equitable way (e.g., according to average historical catches). Potential entrants can be accommodated by reserving quotas for them or through the purchase of quotas from retiring fishermen. If trading is allowed, the individual tradeable quotas would gravitate towards the most efficient fishermen, ensuring that the allowable total catch is caught at the minimum possible cost. Thus overfishing is eliminated, the fishing resource is protected, economic efficiency is achieved (i.e., fishery rents are maximized), and fishermen who choose to leave the fishery, making all this possible, are fully compensated. New Zealand has successfully used this system to manage its marine fishery (see Chapter 4).
Space limitations do not allow discussion of all the available instruments in the category of market creation. Two more examples of instruments should suffice. A number of countries with substantial tourist industries are facing a serious problem of expansion and haphazard development of their most popular resorts. In fact, the more attractive a resort is the more likely it is to be degraded by overdevelopment.
Experience shows that zoning and building regulations have been ineffective in many parts of the world to regulate development and to maintain the quality of the tourist product (especially in coastal areas). Examples range from Southern Europe (e.g., Spain) to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand) to the Caribbean (e.g. Barbados). Some countries (e.g., Cyprus) were forced to introduce moratoriums on all hotel and other tourism-related development for several years. The moratoriums were later swept by the avalanche of accumulated applications, pressures for hotel development, and a rush to build mostly poor quality establishments from fear that the moratorium might be reintroduced.
This is an example of a command and control intervention that has clearly backfired, causing the rate of construction to accelerate and its quality to decline, further downgrading the island's tourist product. Policy makers are searching for instruments that will help them control and guide the pace of new development in tourist centers in desirable areas and directions and to upgrade existing establishments, thereby improving environmental conditions and the quality of their tourist product.
Tradeable development quotas are such an instrument. The relevant authorities can set a maximum allowable development (or construction) quota, measured in, say, cubic meters of buildable space (or number of rooms) for each year, in each area or zone, consistent with their objectives to limit development and improve quality. The aggregate quota in each area can then be allocated according to some equitable (widely accepted) formula. Possible alternatives include auctioning to the highest bidder with the revenue going towards the upgrading of public places in the town (e.g., developing parks, improving roads, cleaning beaches, and reducing air and noise pollution). An alternative allocation is by proportion of land-ownership in the tourist zone. Under this arrangement each recipient of a quota would have the choice of using it in his/her own land, selling it to others or simply
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Apa pun alokasi, efisiensi dan kualitas lingkungan tidak terganggu, hanya implikasi distribusi berbeda. Oleh karena itu, mereka yang mengkritik polusi izin sebagai hak untuk mencemari benar hanya dalam kasus mana pencemar diberikan izin gratis. Jika pencemar telah membayar harga pasar untuk izin, kritik bisa hanya bahwa "harga" izin "terlalu rendah", atau pasokan izin "terlalu besar," yang adalah setara dengan mengatakan kualitas lingkungan tingkat yang lebih tinggi yang diinginkan.
Membangun sistem emisi izin telah relatif tinggi manajemen biaya: (a) itu memerlukan pengertian yang pantas mengenai atmosferik (perdagangan izin lintas airsheds akan membuat hot spot), yang pada gilirannya memerlukan pengetahuan tentang sumber-sumber dan gerakan polutan di bawah kondisi atmosfer setempat; (b) pemantauan kualitas udara ambien atmosferik (atau kualitas air di Das) dan hubungan antara emisi dan ambient kualitas; (c) kapasitas untuk memantau atau secara acak memeriksa sumber emisi individu untuk memastikan bahwa batas emisi yang ditentukan dalam izin yang diamati; dan (d) sistem menyetujui dan merekam kredit, offset, dan perdagangan antara pemegang izin. Tergantung pada jenis polutan dan isi dari izin, manajemen persyaratan dapat secara signifikan dikurangi. Misalnya, dalam kasus polutan global seperti CO 2, ada tidak perlu untuk menentukan atmosferik karena tidak ada bedanya mana di dunia CO 2 dipancarkan atau dikendalikan. Dalam kasus lokal polutan, sistem pemeriksaan diri pelaporan, audit dan acak dengan sanksi atas pelanggaran mungkin cukup untuk menggantikan sistem formal menyetujui dan merekam kredit, offset, dan perdagangan. Insentif bagi penegakan diri dan kebijakan grup dapat diperkenalkan untuk meminimalkan pemantauan
dan penegakan biaya.
Tradeable emisi izin adalah apa-apa tapi tradeable emisi kuota, sebuah konsep yang memiliki berbagai penerapan luar polusi udara dan air dan gas rumah kaca. Pertimbangkan contoh sumber daya mobile (atau fugacious) seperti perikanan lepas pantai yang menderita dari penangkapan yang berlebihan. Hak tidak diberikan tetapi menangkap dibolehkan total atau menangkap agregat kuota dapat mengatur (di mengatakan maksimum berkelanjutan ekonomi hasil) dan dialokasikan kepada nelayan yang ada dalam beberapa cara yang adil (misalnya, menurut tangkapan rata-rata historis). Potensi pendatang dapat ditampung oleh siap kuota untuk mereka atau melalui pembelian dari kuota dari pensiun nelayan. Jika perdagangan diizinkan, kuota tradeable individu akan tertarik nelayan paling efisien, memastikan bahwa total menangkap diijinkan tertangkap pada biaya minimum mungkin. Dengan demikian penangkapan ikan secara berlebihan dihilangkan, sumber daya perikanan dilindungi, efisiensi ekonomi dicapai (yaitu, Perikanan sewa akan maksimal), dan nelayan yang memilih untuk meninggalkan Perikanan, membuat semua ini mungkin, sepenuhnya kompensasi. Selandia Baru telah berhasil menggunakan sistem ini untuk mengelola perikanannya laut (Lihat Bab 4).
Ruang keterbatasan tidak mengizinkan diskusi dari semua instrumen tersedia dalam kategori penciptaan pasar. Dua contoh dari instrumen harus cukup. Sejumlah negara dengan industri besar wisatawan menghadapi masalah serius ekspansi dan serampangan pengembangan resor paling populer mereka. Pada kenyataannya, semakin menarik sebuah resor adalah semakin besar kemungkinan itu akan rusak oleh overdevelopment.
Pengalaman menunjukkan bahwa zonasi dan membangun peraturan telah efektif di banyak bagian dunia untuk mengatur perkembangan dan untuk menjaga kualitas produk wisata (terutama di daerah pesisir). Contoh berkisar dari Eropa Selatan (misalnya, Spanyol) ke Asia Tenggara (misalnya, Thailand) ke Karibia (misalnya Barbados). Beberapa negara (misalnya, Siprus) dipaksa untuk memperkenalkan moratoriums di semua hotel dan pengembangan pariwisata yang terkait lain selama beberapa tahun. Moratoriums kemudian tersapu oleh longsoran akumulasi aplikasi, tekanan untuk pembangunan hotel dan terburu-buru untuk membangun kebanyakan kualitas buruk pendirian dari rasa takut bahwa moratorium mungkin diperkenalkan kembali.
Ini adalah contoh dari intervensi komando dan kontrol yang telah jelas menjadi bumerang, menyebabkan tingkat konstruksi untuk mempercepat dan kualitas menurun, lebih lanjut merendahkan pulau wisata produk. Pembuat kebijakan sedang mencari instrumen yang akan membantu mereka mengontrol dan memandu laju perkembangan baru di sentra turis di daerah-daerah yang diinginkan dan arah dan meng-upgrade pendirian yang ada, dengan demikian meningkatkan kondisi lingkungan dan kualitas produk wisata mereka.
Tradeable pengembangan kuota adalah instrumen. Pihak berwenang yang relevan dapat menetapkan diperbolehkan pembangunan (atau konstruksi) kuota maksimum, diukur dalam, mengatakan, meter kubik ruang buildable (atau jumlah kamar) untuk setiap tahun, di setiap zona, atau konsisten dengan tujuan mereka untuk membatasi pengembangan dan meningkatkan kualitas. Agregat kuota di setiap daerah dapat kemudian dialokasikan menurut beberapa rumus (diterima secara luas) yang adil. Kemungkinan alternatif meliputi melelang kepada penawar tertinggi dengan pendapatan akan menuju peningkatan tempat-tempat umum di kota (misalnya, mengembangkan Taman, memperbaiki jalan, pembersihan pantai dan mengurangi udara dan polusi suara). Alokasi alternatif adalah dengan proporsi kepemilikan tanah di kawasan wisata. Di bawah pengaturan ini setiap penerima kuota akan memiliki pilihan untuk menggunakan di tanah mereka sendiri, menjualnya kepada orang lain atau hanya
Membangun sistem emisi izin telah relatif tinggi manajemen biaya: (a) itu memerlukan pengertian yang pantas mengenai atmosferik (perdagangan izin lintas airsheds akan membuat hot spot), yang pada gilirannya memerlukan pengetahuan tentang sumber-sumber dan gerakan polutan di bawah kondisi atmosfer setempat; (b) pemantauan kualitas udara ambien atmosferik (atau kualitas air di Das) dan hubungan antara emisi dan ambient kualitas; (c) kapasitas untuk memantau atau secara acak memeriksa sumber emisi individu untuk memastikan bahwa batas emisi yang ditentukan dalam izin yang diamati; dan (d) sistem menyetujui dan merekam kredit, offset, dan perdagangan antara pemegang izin. Tergantung pada jenis polutan dan isi dari izin, manajemen persyaratan dapat secara signifikan dikurangi. Misalnya, dalam kasus polutan global seperti CO 2, ada tidak perlu untuk menentukan atmosferik karena tidak ada bedanya mana di dunia CO 2 dipancarkan atau dikendalikan. Dalam kasus lokal polutan, sistem pemeriksaan diri pelaporan, audit dan acak dengan sanksi atas pelanggaran mungkin cukup untuk menggantikan sistem formal menyetujui dan merekam kredit, offset, dan perdagangan. Insentif bagi penegakan diri dan kebijakan grup dapat diperkenalkan untuk meminimalkan pemantauan
dan penegakan biaya.
Tradeable emisi izin adalah apa-apa tapi tradeable emisi kuota, sebuah konsep yang memiliki berbagai penerapan luar polusi udara dan air dan gas rumah kaca. Pertimbangkan contoh sumber daya mobile (atau fugacious) seperti perikanan lepas pantai yang menderita dari penangkapan yang berlebihan. Hak tidak diberikan tetapi menangkap dibolehkan total atau menangkap agregat kuota dapat mengatur (di mengatakan maksimum berkelanjutan ekonomi hasil) dan dialokasikan kepada nelayan yang ada dalam beberapa cara yang adil (misalnya, menurut tangkapan rata-rata historis). Potensi pendatang dapat ditampung oleh siap kuota untuk mereka atau melalui pembelian dari kuota dari pensiun nelayan. Jika perdagangan diizinkan, kuota tradeable individu akan tertarik nelayan paling efisien, memastikan bahwa total menangkap diijinkan tertangkap pada biaya minimum mungkin. Dengan demikian penangkapan ikan secara berlebihan dihilangkan, sumber daya perikanan dilindungi, efisiensi ekonomi dicapai (yaitu, Perikanan sewa akan maksimal), dan nelayan yang memilih untuk meninggalkan Perikanan, membuat semua ini mungkin, sepenuhnya kompensasi. Selandia Baru telah berhasil menggunakan sistem ini untuk mengelola perikanannya laut (Lihat Bab 4).
Ruang keterbatasan tidak mengizinkan diskusi dari semua instrumen tersedia dalam kategori penciptaan pasar. Dua contoh dari instrumen harus cukup. Sejumlah negara dengan industri besar wisatawan menghadapi masalah serius ekspansi dan serampangan pengembangan resor paling populer mereka. Pada kenyataannya, semakin menarik sebuah resor adalah semakin besar kemungkinan itu akan rusak oleh overdevelopment.
Pengalaman menunjukkan bahwa zonasi dan membangun peraturan telah efektif di banyak bagian dunia untuk mengatur perkembangan dan untuk menjaga kualitas produk wisata (terutama di daerah pesisir). Contoh berkisar dari Eropa Selatan (misalnya, Spanyol) ke Asia Tenggara (misalnya, Thailand) ke Karibia (misalnya Barbados). Beberapa negara (misalnya, Siprus) dipaksa untuk memperkenalkan moratoriums di semua hotel dan pengembangan pariwisata yang terkait lain selama beberapa tahun. Moratoriums kemudian tersapu oleh longsoran akumulasi aplikasi, tekanan untuk pembangunan hotel dan terburu-buru untuk membangun kebanyakan kualitas buruk pendirian dari rasa takut bahwa moratorium mungkin diperkenalkan kembali.
Ini adalah contoh dari intervensi komando dan kontrol yang telah jelas menjadi bumerang, menyebabkan tingkat konstruksi untuk mempercepat dan kualitas menurun, lebih lanjut merendahkan pulau wisata produk. Pembuat kebijakan sedang mencari instrumen yang akan membantu mereka mengontrol dan memandu laju perkembangan baru di sentra turis di daerah-daerah yang diinginkan dan arah dan meng-upgrade pendirian yang ada, dengan demikian meningkatkan kondisi lingkungan dan kualitas produk wisata mereka.
Tradeable pengembangan kuota adalah instrumen. Pihak berwenang yang relevan dapat menetapkan diperbolehkan pembangunan (atau konstruksi) kuota maksimum, diukur dalam, mengatakan, meter kubik ruang buildable (atau jumlah kamar) untuk setiap tahun, di setiap zona, atau konsisten dengan tujuan mereka untuk membatasi pengembangan dan meningkatkan kualitas. Agregat kuota di setiap daerah dapat kemudian dialokasikan menurut beberapa rumus (diterima secara luas) yang adil. Kemungkinan alternatif meliputi melelang kepada penawar tertinggi dengan pendapatan akan menuju peningkatan tempat-tempat umum di kota (misalnya, mengembangkan Taman, memperbaiki jalan, pembersihan pantai dan mengurangi udara dan polusi suara). Alokasi alternatif adalah dengan proporsi kepemilikan tanah di kawasan wisata. Di bawah pengaturan ini setiap penerima kuota akan memiliki pilihan untuk menggunakan di tanah mereka sendiri, menjualnya kepada orang lain atau hanya
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
Whatever the allocation, efficiency and environmental quality is not compromised, only the distributional implications are different. Therefore, those who criticize pollution permits as a right to pollute are correct only in the case where the polluters are given the permit for free. If the polluter has paid a market price for the permit, the criticism could only be that the “price” of the permit is “too low,” or the supply of permits is “too large,” which is the equivalent to saying a higher level environmental quality is desired.
Establishing a system of emission permits has relatively high management costs: (a) it requires proper definition of airshed (trading permits across airsheds would create hot spots), which in turn requires knowledge of the sources and of the movement of pollutants under the local atmospheric conditions; (b) monitoring of ambient air quality in the airshed (or water quality in the watershed) and the relationship between emissions and ambient quality; (c) capacity to monitor or randomly inspect individual emission sources to ensure that the emissions limit specified in the permit is observed; and (d) a system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades among permit holders. Depending on the type of pollutant and the content of the permit, management requirements could be significantly reduced. For example, in the case of a global pollutant such as CO 2 , there is no need to define the airshed since it makes no difference where in the world CO 2 is emitted or controlled. In the case of local pollutants, systems of self-reporting, auditing, and random inspection with sanctions for violations may suffice to replace a formal system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades. Incentives for self-enforcement and group policing can be introduced to minimize monitoring
and enforcement costs.
Tradeable emission permits are nothing but tradeable emission quotas, a concept that has wide applicability beyond air and water pollution and greenhouse gases. Consider the example of a mobile (or fugacious) resource such as an offshore fishery suffering from overfishing. Property rights cannot be assigned but a total allowable catch or aggregate catch quota can be set (at say the maximum sustainable economic yield) and allocated to existing fishermen in some equitable way (e.g., according to average historical catches). Potential entrants can be accommodated by reserving quotas for them or through the purchase of quotas from retiring fishermen. If trading is allowed, the individual tradeable quotas would gravitate towards the most efficient fishermen, ensuring that the allowable total catch is caught at the minimum possible cost. Thus overfishing is eliminated, the fishing resource is protected, economic efficiency is achieved (i.e., fishery rents are maximized), and fishermen who choose to leave the fishery, making all this possible, are fully compensated. New Zealand has successfully used this system to manage its marine fishery (see Chapter 4).
Space limitations do not allow discussion of all the available instruments in the category of market creation. Two more examples of instruments should suffice. A number of countries with substantial tourist industries are facing a serious problem of expansion and haphazard development of their most popular resorts. In fact, the more attractive a resort is the more likely it is to be degraded by overdevelopment.
Experience shows that zoning and building regulations have been ineffective in many parts of the world to regulate development and to maintain the quality of the tourist product (especially in coastal areas). Examples range from Southern Europe (e.g., Spain) to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand) to the Caribbean (e.g. Barbados). Some countries (e.g., Cyprus) were forced to introduce moratoriums on all by Apps Hat Mini" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; text-decoration: underline !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; background: transparent !important;">hotel and other tourism-related development for several years. The moratoriums were later swept by the avalanche of accumulated applications, pressures for by Apps Hat Mini" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; text-decoration: underline !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; background: transparent !important;">hotel development, and a rush to build mostly poor quality establishments from fear that the moratorium might be reintroduced.
This is an example of a command and control intervention that has clearly backfired, causing the rate of construction to accelerate and its quality to decline, further downgrading the island's tourist product. Policy makers are searching for instruments that will help them control and guide the pace of new development in tourist centers in desirable areas and directions and to upgrade existing establishments, thereby improving environmental conditions and the quality of their tourist product.
Tradeable development quotas are such an instrument. The relevant authorities can set a maximum allowable development (or construction) quota, measured in, say, cubic meters of buildable space (or number of rooms) for each year, in each area or zone, consistent with their objectives to limit development and improve quality. The aggregate quota in each area can then be allocated according to some equitable (widely accepted) formula. Possible alternatives include auctioning to the highest bidder with the revenue going towards the upgrading of public places in the town (e.g., developing parks, improving roads, cleaning beaches, and reducing air and noise pollution). An alternative allocation is by proportion of land-ownership in the tourist zone. Under this arrangement each recipient of a quota would have the choice of using it in his/her own land, selling it to others or simply
Establishing a system of emission permits has relatively high management costs: (a) it requires proper definition of airshed (trading permits across airsheds would create hot spots), which in turn requires knowledge of the sources and of the movement of pollutants under the local atmospheric conditions; (b) monitoring of ambient air quality in the airshed (or water quality in the watershed) and the relationship between emissions and ambient quality; (c) capacity to monitor or randomly inspect individual emission sources to ensure that the emissions limit specified in the permit is observed; and (d) a system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades among permit holders. Depending on the type of pollutant and the content of the permit, management requirements could be significantly reduced. For example, in the case of a global pollutant such as CO 2 , there is no need to define the airshed since it makes no difference where in the world CO 2 is emitted or controlled. In the case of local pollutants, systems of self-reporting, auditing, and random inspection with sanctions for violations may suffice to replace a formal system of approving and recording credits, offsets, and trades. Incentives for self-enforcement and group policing can be introduced to minimize monitoring
and enforcement costs.
Tradeable emission permits are nothing but tradeable emission quotas, a concept that has wide applicability beyond air and water pollution and greenhouse gases. Consider the example of a mobile (or fugacious) resource such as an offshore fishery suffering from overfishing. Property rights cannot be assigned but a total allowable catch or aggregate catch quota can be set (at say the maximum sustainable economic yield) and allocated to existing fishermen in some equitable way (e.g., according to average historical catches). Potential entrants can be accommodated by reserving quotas for them or through the purchase of quotas from retiring fishermen. If trading is allowed, the individual tradeable quotas would gravitate towards the most efficient fishermen, ensuring that the allowable total catch is caught at the minimum possible cost. Thus overfishing is eliminated, the fishing resource is protected, economic efficiency is achieved (i.e., fishery rents are maximized), and fishermen who choose to leave the fishery, making all this possible, are fully compensated. New Zealand has successfully used this system to manage its marine fishery (see Chapter 4).
Space limitations do not allow discussion of all the available instruments in the category of market creation. Two more examples of instruments should suffice. A number of countries with substantial tourist industries are facing a serious problem of expansion and haphazard development of their most popular resorts. In fact, the more attractive a resort is the more likely it is to be degraded by overdevelopment.
Experience shows that zoning and building regulations have been ineffective in many parts of the world to regulate development and to maintain the quality of the tourist product (especially in coastal areas). Examples range from Southern Europe (e.g., Spain) to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand) to the Caribbean (e.g. Barbados). Some countries (e.g., Cyprus) were forced to introduce moratoriums on all by Apps Hat Mini" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; text-decoration: underline !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; background: transparent !important;">hotel and other tourism-related development for several years. The moratoriums were later swept by the avalanche of accumulated applications, pressures for by Apps Hat Mini" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; text-decoration: underline !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; background: transparent !important;">hotel development, and a rush to build mostly poor quality establishments from fear that the moratorium might be reintroduced.
This is an example of a command and control intervention that has clearly backfired, causing the rate of construction to accelerate and its quality to decline, further downgrading the island's tourist product. Policy makers are searching for instruments that will help them control and guide the pace of new development in tourist centers in desirable areas and directions and to upgrade existing establishments, thereby improving environmental conditions and the quality of their tourist product.
Tradeable development quotas are such an instrument. The relevant authorities can set a maximum allowable development (or construction) quota, measured in, say, cubic meters of buildable space (or number of rooms) for each year, in each area or zone, consistent with their objectives to limit development and improve quality. The aggregate quota in each area can then be allocated according to some equitable (widely accepted) formula. Possible alternatives include auctioning to the highest bidder with the revenue going towards the upgrading of public places in the town (e.g., developing parks, improving roads, cleaning beaches, and reducing air and noise pollution). An alternative allocation is by proportion of land-ownership in the tourist zone. Under this arrangement each recipient of a quota would have the choice of using it in his/her own land, selling it to others or simply
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- The views and interpretation reflected i
- what ever
- can you help meTo carry this heavy box B
- Natasha St-Pier & Anggun - Vivre D'Amour
- Preface and AcknowledgementsThe plea for
- Senyum mu selalu ada buat mereka
- never
- The boy's are back
- Happy Weekend day
- Gws
- no this tine
- Maukah kau menikah denganku ???
- CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
- You are my evrything
- Iya aku mau
- Happy sunday good always be with you
- Inget seseorang
- enak
- ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL M
- @damnitstrue: I'm not a perfect person,
- International Environment Program Harvar
- Kasih ibu sepanjang masa
- selamat berakhir pekan
- Its hard to be a good person
