concrete immobility. Such an econom

concrete immobility. Such an economic position leads to a situation where player
salaries have no reason to equal or perhaps even to approach their MRP (Hamilton,
1995). Yet, even without free agency, there had been variance in the individually
negotiated player salaries. NFL owners have long maintained that players were paid
for their performance, while the NFLPA had long asserted that this was not the case.
Ahlburg and Dworkin (1991), in a study of 1982 (pre-free agency) NFL player
salaries, found that player’s salary was determined by each player’s draft round,
position, and years in the league, all nonperformance related factors, as was then
contended by the NFLPA. Also significant in the analysis was a performance measure.
There were differences in salary correlated with individual performance by position,
but this relationship was not significant for every position and was not very strong
overall. Ahlburg and Dworkin’s (1991) study provides evidence that player salary
determination had been made primarily on something other than performance factors,
a significant boost to the labor position in its own right. Football player salaries had
been reflective of a skill-based compensation system, rather than a performance or
merit-based system. Many of the skill-based system criteria outlined by Gomez-Mejia
and Balkin (1992b) are reflective of the NFL. Some of this criteria includes frequent
changes in technology and organizational structure, frequent employee exchanges,
new learning opportunities, high turnover, and worker values consistent with
teamwork and participation – the latter being the very embodiment of team sports.
With the CBA, there is some evidence that the new labor market brought
performance into the equation. In a pilot sample (n=110) of the highest paid players (by
position) in the first year of the salary cap, the 1994 playing season, Carey (1994) found
performance to be highly significant (p

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imobilitas beton. Sebuah posisi ekonomi mengarah ke situasi dimana pemainGaji tidak punya alasan untuk sama atau mungkin bahkan untuk mendekati mereka MRP (Hamilton,1995). Namun, bahkan tanpa agen gratis, ada varian dalam secara individualGaji Pemain dinegosiasikan. NFL pemilik lama telah mempertahankan bahwa pemain dibayaruntuk kinerja mereka, sementara NFLPA telah lama menegaskan bahwa ini tidak adalah kasus.Ahlburg dan Dworkin (1991), dalam sebuah studi 1982 (pra-gratis agency) pemain NFLgaji, ditemukan bahwa pemain gaji ditentukan oleh setiap pemain rancangan bulat,posisi, dan tahun di Liga, semua tidak dilaksanakannya kewajiban terkait faktor, seperti yang kemudianberpendapat oleh NFLPA. Juga penting dalam analisis ini adalah ukuran kinerja.Ada perbedaan dalam gaji yang berkorelasi dengan kinerja individu oleh posisi,tetapi hubungan ini tidak signifikan untuk setiap posisi dan itu tidak sangat kuatsecara keseluruhan. Ahlburg dan Dworkin's studi (1991) memberikan bukti bahwa gaji pemainpenentuan telah dibuat terutama pada sesuatu selain faktor kinerja,dorongan signifikan ke posisi tenaga kerja dalam dirinya sendiri. Gaji Pemain sepak bola telahtelah mencerminkan sistem kompensasi berdasarkan keterampilan, daripada kinerja atausistem berdasarkan jasa. Banyak dari kriteria sistem berbasis keterampilan yang digariskan oleh Gomez-Mejiadan Balkin (1992b) reflektif dari NFL. Beberapa kriteria ini meliputi seringchanges in technology and organizational structure, frequent employee exchanges,new learning opportunities, high turnover, and worker values consistent withteamwork and participation – the latter being the very embodiment of team sports.With the CBA, there is some evidence that the new labor market broughtperformance into the equation. In a pilot sample (n=110) of the highest paid players (byposition) in the first year of the salary cap, the 1994 playing season, Carey (1994) foundperformance to be highly significant (p<.001) in a regression model of playercompensation, as well as position and the interaction of performance and draft round.In contrast to the Ahlburg and Dworkin (1991) study, neither seniority, nor draft round(as a main effect) was significant. While the sample for this study is somewhat biased,examining the highest paid players at the time, performance was a clear indicator ofcompensation for these individuals at the margin in the first capped season.As a fundamental managerial principal in HR strategy, Boxall (2003) notes that,apart from the prospect for HR advantage, firms have no incentive to pay above marketclearing wages. That performance is a factor in compensation and is a vital aspect incompensation strategy and implementation under the salary cap. If performance doesnot matter, owners have no incentive to pay above league minimums, and theircompetitive advantage or their ability to win games is a random effect. Essentially,pemain produktivitas homogen. Ini tidak akan tampak benar, karena dengan atautanpa tutup gaji, beberapa tim secara konsisten dapat memenangkan permainan, namun orang lainkonsisten kehilangan. Varians di tim menang akan jauh lebih besar jika mereka adalah hasilacak efek. Tutup gaji menciptakan sebuah nol-sum turnamen di mana biaya/manfaatutilitas menjadi isu utama. Tim di atau dekat tingkat topi harus membayar kurangsatu atau lebih pemain untuk memenuhi tingkat gaji pasar untuk hanya satu premiumpemain. Dengan demikian, kinerja adalah sebuah perbedaan penting. Karena gaji topi menghasilkanberolahraga di biaya/manfaat utilitas untuk pemilik tim, salah satu di mana mereka tahu adabatas absolut dalam kemampuan mereka untuk membeli sumber daya, perbedaan dalam produksi Disewa(didefinisikan sebagai kemenangan luar berarti) harus digambarkan secara konsisten oleh struktural