Edgeley et al.'s (2010) study ident

Edgeley et al.'s (2010) study identified a number of key themes arising from their inter views with both accountant and consultant assurance providers .First ,both types of assuror perceived that their service could provide benefits to both the management of the assured company and the company’s stakeholders .The interviewees also suggested that stakeholders views were being incorporated into the assurance process, although this was most often achieved, particularly by accountant assurors, through indirect mechanisms’(such as perusing stakeholder feedback received by the client company or acting as facilitators in bringing management and stakeholder together for meetings ) rather than by engaging directly with stakeholder .However ,a number of interviewees did express the view that over time as sustainability assurance progresses there is likely to be a move towards increased levels of direct stakeholder involvement . For at least one interviewee , greater stakeholder engagement could potentially enable the assurors to represent stakeholder voices and make the assurance process more ‘transformative’ . Assurors did raise a concern ,however , that managerial control of the assurance process means that stakeholder inclusivity is inevitably driven by management with benefits to stakeholder perhaps viewed as a useful by-product’( edgeley at al.,2010,P . 550 ) . it was also recognized that the cost,’ ignorance’; lack of interest and diversity of stakeholders are all obstacles to greater stakeholder inclusivity.
O’ Dwyer et al . ( 2011 ) also shed light on the sustainability assurance industry through interviews with assurance practitioners within a world-leading professional services firm .Their study provides evidence that in the first instance , given the voluntary nature of the exercise , assurors need to demonstrate that their service will provide benefits to their clients through improved systems and increased credibility .They also suggest that, notwithstanding a clear commitment on the part of practitioners to opening up dialogue within the assurance process, there has been, and continues to be, a problem of stakeholder indifference to sustainability assurance. A further fundamental problem identified in the study ‘has been strong resistance from (the professional services firm’s )Risk Department (which is responsible for approving the wording of assurance statements )to the expansion of assurance statements content and , relatedly , moving towards providing higher levels of assurance . Despite their disclaimers and detailing of the respective responsibilities of report preparers and assurance providers there is evidence here that firms of assurors remain concerned as to their potential liability.
This section has considered further evidence on issues that continue to affect sustainability assurance practice. of particular importance are : managerial control of the process ; limited levels of stakeholder engagement ; and assurance providers ‘ ( most notably professional accounting firms ) unwillingness , or inability ,to go further and to provide higher levels of assurance. The final section of this chapter,’future development of sustainability assurance practice ‘ considers potential development in the sustainability assurance field and questions the extent to which such developments could enhance stakeholder accountability.



future development of sustainability assurance practice:
towards enhanced stakeholder accountability ?

As we have already noted , Accountability’s approach to assurance has , from the start , been avowedly stakeholder centred, one which has culminated in the continued progress to a final exposure draft ( AA1000SES 2011 ) on the specific issue of stakeholder engagement .We have also seen that the accountability assurance standard ( AA1000AS ) has been adopted in a number of recent sustainability assurance engagements. At the same time , however , the majority of accountant assurance engagement adopt ISAE3000 and it is only in the minority of cases that this is augmented by AA1000AS. Further , evidence from assurance providers and corporate management alike suggest that stakeholder indifference is an issue and that ,to date , stakeholder inclusion is most often indirect in nature , direct stakeholder engagement in the assurance process remains the exception rather than the norm . With management driving the assurance process and exercising continued control it would appear that any stakeholder benefits that are likely to accrue are, at best, secondary .In this context it is notable that corporate managers are adamant that assurance statements should be addressed to them, and in the majority of cases (when any addressee at all is identified )this is indeed the case. Significantly , this situation contrasts with stakeholders’ views that the assurance statement should be addressed to society at large.
It is pertinent to remember here that sustainability assurance providers are required to sell their services to companies by persuading management that it will improve the company’s internal systems and enhance its external credibility (O’ Dwyer at al.,2011).As such, the whole case for sustainability assurance and stakeholder engagement seems to be based on persuading companies as to its efficacy as a driver of improved financial value. Further, O’ Dwyer et al(2011)argue that sustainability assurors have also tried to tackle the paucity of stakeholder interest by ‘identifying and constructing this somewhat mythical audience and then persuading it to confer moral legitimacy on assurance ‘(p.49).They continue that assurors’ efforts have been to create ‘expectations regarding assurance ‘and therefore an industry within which they can sell their services. Significantly though ,on transfer of power whatsoever is being contemplated, whereby stakeholder could hold the organization to account for its activities and actively enforce some degree of responsiveness to their concerns. Adams and Evans (2004),in a detailed analysis of the shortcomings of assurance practice as a vehicle for enhancing stakeholder accountability , go on to suggest concrete ways of transferring some degree of power over the process by , for example , enabling stakeholders to appoint assurance providers and to determine the scope of the exercise . Neither of these suggestions appears to have found favour in practice , but even should they do so it would still beg the question as to how stakeholders can use the assurance findings in any way that might influence organizational decision making.
It seem clear that for extending stakeholder accountability ,in the sense of meaningfully holding management to account ,the whole issue of sustainability assurance has to be looked at in the context of the wider corporate governance system in which it is embedded . Simply addressing assurance statements to stakeholders (or indeed allowing them to appoint the assurance provider and define the assurance scope ) achieves very little if the result of the exercise cannot be used In the same way the shareholders may use the result of the financial audit . Simply, there is a need to bring an external stakeholder dimension into corporate social responsibility (CSR) internal governance procedures. A role for stakeholder panels and external experts featured in the thoughts of corporate managers and stakeholders interviewed by Owen at al.(2009)and a few companies, National Grid and BT being notable examples, have adopted stakeholder panels. However, in these instances the external participants are appointed by corporate management, rather than by those they purport to represent. Hence they actually represent to one but themselves, and are therefore directly accountable to no one but themselves. By contrast, forums at which stakeholder groups are directly represented ( predominantly employee and local community groups ) are confined to consultative committee type structures completely separated from key strategic decision-making areas .
Essentially , what is missing in the whole debate over the development of sustainability assurance is some intervention by regulatory authorities in the public policy domain , designed to bring about a greater level of corporate accountability to stakeholder groups . In the current Voluntaristic climate dominating matters of CSR policy throughout Europe ( see commission of the European communities ( COM ), 2002 ) this seems highly unlikely to happen . It is indeed instructive in a UK context to note here the specific rejection of introducing a pluralistic approach towards directors ‘ duties , whereby enforceable accountability would be owed to a wider range stakeholders than merely capital providers in the long-running debate of company law reform in the UK culminating in the 2002 white paper ( see Owen at al .,2001 ; cooper and Owen , 2007 ) . Quite simply , administrative ( reporting ) reform being promoted by a growing range of assurance standard setters can achieve little in the absence of accompanying institutional reform providing a forum where such reports may be used effectively ( Owen at al ., 1997 )
Frank ( 2001 ) in a vigorous de-bunking of the pretensions of what the terms market populism ,’of which unfortunately the current wave of sustainability reporting and associated assurance exercises is increasingly forming and integral part , stresses that :
What we must have are note more focus groups or a new space where people can express themselves……but some countervailing power , some force that resists the imperatives of profit in the name of economic democracy.
By effectively side-stepping crucial issues of corporate governance reform in favour of essentially vacuous notions of stakeholder engagement , sustainability assurance practice , as currently conceived in both the reporting and standard setting arenas , fails to introduce the necessary countervailing po

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Edgeley et al.'s (2010) study identified a number of key themes arising from their inter views with both accountant and consultant assurance providers .First ,both types of assuror perceived that their service could provide benefits to both the management of the assured company and the company’s stakeholders .The interviewees also suggested that stakeholders views were being incorporated into the assurance process, although this was most often achieved, particularly by accountant assurors, through indirect mechanisms’(such as perusing stakeholder feedback received by the client company or acting as facilitators in bringing management and stakeholder together for meetings ) rather than by engaging directly with stakeholder .However ,a number of interviewees did express the view that over time as sustainability assurance progresses there is likely to be a move towards increased levels of direct stakeholder involvement . For at least one interviewee , greater stakeholder engagement could potentially enable the assurors to represent stakeholder voices and make the assurance process more ‘transformative’ . Assurors did raise a concern ,however , that managerial control of the assurance process means that stakeholder inclusivity is inevitably driven by management with benefits to stakeholder perhaps viewed as a useful by-product’( edgeley at al.,2010,P . 550 ) . it was also recognized that the cost,’ ignorance’; lack of interest and diversity of stakeholders are all obstacles to greater stakeholder inclusivity. O ' Dwyer et al. (2011) juga menumpahkan cahaya pada industri jaminan keberlanjutan melalui wawancara dengan jaminan praktisi dalam perusahaan jasa profesional terkemuka di dunia. Studi mereka memberikan bukti bahwa dalam contoh pertama, mengingat sifat sukarela latihan, assurors perlu untuk menunjukkan bahwa layanan mereka akan memberikan manfaat kepada klien mereka melalui sistem perbaikan dan meningkatkan kredibilitas. Mereka juga menyarankan bahwa, meskipun komitmen yang jelas dari praktisi untuk pembukaan dialog dalam proses jaminan, telah ada, dan terus menjadi, masalah pemangku kepentingan ketidakpedulian terhadap keberlanjutan jaminan. Masalah mendasar lebih lanjut diidentifikasi dalam studi ' telah resistance yang kuat dari Departemen risiko (layanan profesional perusahaan) (yang bertanggung jawab untuk menyetujui kata-kata pernyataan jaminan) dengan perluasan jaminan pernyataan konten dan, relatedly, bergerak ke arah menyediakan tingkat yang lebih tinggi dari jaminan. Walaupun penolakan mereka dan rincian dari tanggung jawab masing-masing laporan preparers dan jaminan penyedia ada bukti bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan dari assurors tetap khawatir mengenai kewajiban potensi mereka. This section has considered further evidence on issues that continue to affect sustainability assurance practice. of particular importance are : managerial control of the process ; limited levels of stakeholder engagement ; and assurance providers ‘ ( most notably professional accounting firms ) unwillingness , or inability ,to go further and to provide higher levels of assurance. The final section of this chapter,’future development of sustainability assurance practice ‘ considers potential development in the sustainability assurance field and questions the extent to which such developments could enhance stakeholder accountability.future development of sustainability assurance practice:towards enhanced stakeholder accountability ?As we have already noted , Accountability’s approach to assurance has , from the start , been avowedly stakeholder centred, one which has culminated in the continued progress to a final exposure draft ( AA1000SES 2011 ) on the specific issue of stakeholder engagement .We have also seen that the accountability assurance standard ( AA1000AS ) has been adopted in a number of recent sustainability assurance engagements. At the same time , however , the majority of accountant assurance engagement adopt ISAE3000 and it is only in the minority of cases that this is augmented by AA1000AS. Further , evidence from assurance providers and corporate management alike suggest that stakeholder indifference is an issue and that ,to date , stakeholder inclusion is most often indirect in nature , direct stakeholder engagement in the assurance process remains the exception rather than the norm . With management driving the assurance process and exercising continued control it would appear that any stakeholder benefits that are likely to accrue are, at best, secondary .In this context it is notable that corporate managers are adamant that assurance statements should be addressed to them, and in the majority of cases (when any addressee at all is identified )this is indeed the case. Significantly , this situation contrasts with stakeholders’ views that the assurance statement should be addressed to society at large. It is pertinent to remember here that sustainability assurance providers are required to sell their services to companies by persuading management that it will improve the company’s internal systems and enhance its external credibility (O’ Dwyer at al.,2011).As such, the whole case for sustainability assurance and stakeholder engagement seems to be based on persuading companies as to its efficacy as a driver of improved financial value. Further, O’ Dwyer et al(2011)argue that sustainability assurors have also tried to tackle the paucity of stakeholder interest by ‘identifying and constructing this somewhat mythical audience and then persuading it to confer moral legitimacy on assurance ‘(p.49).They continue that assurors’ efforts have been to create ‘expectations regarding assurance ‘and therefore an industry within which they can sell their services. Significantly though ,on transfer of power whatsoever is being contemplated, whereby stakeholder could hold the organization to account for its activities and actively enforce some degree of responsiveness to their concerns. Adams and Evans (2004),in a detailed analysis of the shortcomings of assurance practice as a vehicle for enhancing stakeholder accountability , go on to suggest concrete ways of transferring some degree of power over the process by , for example , enabling stakeholders to appoint assurance providers and to determine the scope of the exercise . Neither of these suggestions appears to have found favour in practice , but even should they do so it would still beg the question as to how stakeholders can use the assurance findings in any way that might influence organizational decision making. It seem clear that for extending stakeholder accountability ,in the sense of meaningfully holding management to account ,the whole issue of sustainability assurance has to be looked at in the context of the wider corporate governance system in which it is embedded . Simply addressing assurance statements to stakeholders (or indeed allowing them to appoint the assurance provider and define the assurance scope ) achieves very little if the result of the exercise cannot be used In the same way the shareholders may use the result of the financial audit . Simply, there is a need to bring an external stakeholder dimension into corporate social responsibility (CSR) internal governance procedures. A role for stakeholder panels and external experts featured in the thoughts of corporate managers and stakeholders interviewed by Owen at al.(2009)and a few companies, National Grid and BT being notable examples, have adopted stakeholder panels. However, in these instances the external participants are appointed by corporate management, rather than by those they purport to represent. Hence they actually represent to one but themselves, and are therefore directly accountable to no one but themselves. By contrast, forums at which stakeholder groups are directly represented ( predominantly employee and local community groups ) are confined to consultative committee type structures completely separated from key strategic decision-making areas . Essentially , what is missing in the whole debate over the development of sustainability assurance is some intervention by regulatory authorities in the public policy domain , designed to bring about a greater level of corporate accountability to stakeholder groups . In the current Voluntaristic climate dominating matters of CSR policy throughout Europe ( see commission of the European communities ( COM ), 2002 ) this seems highly unlikely to happen . It is indeed instructive in a UK context to note here the specific rejection of introducing a pluralistic approach towards directors ‘ duties , whereby enforceable accountability would be owed to a wider range stakeholders than merely capital providers in the long-running debate of company law reform in the UK culminating in the 2002 white paper ( see Owen at al .,2001 ; cooper and Owen , 2007 ) . Quite simply , administrative ( reporting ) reform being promoted by a growing range of assurance standard setters can achieve little in the absence of accompanying institutional reform providing a forum where such reports may be used effectively ( Owen at al ., 1997 )
Frank ( 2001 ) in a vigorous de-bunking of the pretensions of what the terms market populism ,’of which unfortunately the current wave of sustainability reporting and associated assurance exercises is increasingly forming and integral part , stresses that :
What we must have are note more focus groups or a new space where people can express themselves……but some countervailing power , some force that resists the imperatives of profit in the name of economic democracy.
By effectively side-stepping crucial issues of corporate governance reform in favour of essentially vacuous notions of stakeholder engagement , sustainability assurance practice , as currently conceived in both the reporting and standard setting arenas , fails to introduce the necessary countervailing po