Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) strad

Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) straddles the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His major and most well-known work is his Theodicy (1710), in which he argues that this is the best of all possible worlds: “The more we are enlightened and informed about the works of God, the more we shall be disposed to find that they are excellent and satisfactory in every way we could hope.”[285] By the best possible world, Leibniz means the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena.[286] Voltaire satirized this view ruthlessly in his Candide (1759). Leibniz was a Lutheran philosopher, and his faith is central to his philosophy. Indeed, he embarked on major ecumenical projects to bring Christians together. God, according to Leibniz, is an absolutely perfect being who possesses the perfections we find in nature to the highest degree. Leibniz concludes his Discourse on Metaphysics by reminding his readers of the difference the gospel makes. The ancient philosophers knew very little of these important truths. Jesus Christ alone has expressed them divinely well and in a manner so clear and familiar that the coarsest of minds have grasped them. Thus his gospel has entirely changed the course of human affairs: he has brought us to know the kingdom of heaven or that perfect republic of minds which deserves the title of City of God, whose admirable laws he has disclosed.[287] While we need to take the Christian dimension of Leibniz’s philosophy seriously, we should note his dangerous equation of the kingdom of God with a “republic of minds.” This alerts us to the rationalistic component of his philosophy. Leibniz rejects the view that extension—size, shape, motion—is a substance (Descartes) or an
attribute of a substance (Spinoza). For Leibniz, the basic substance is a monad or a unit of psychic force. Monads are without parts and have no causal interaction with each other, although they do accommodate each other and harmonize; they are not spatially located. Monads have an internal lawlike principle of “appetition” (desire or striving) that causes them to change. They appear to influence each other, but this is merely a reflection of the preestablished harmony by which God created them to mirror each other. A monad’s entire past and present is contained within it, so that whatever a monad does, it does by a kind of necessity. Every monad is unique; all differ qualitatively and occupy different points of view so that each mirrors the world differently and with different degrees of clarity. Every monad has a degree of psychic life[288] by which it represents external things. Monads whose perceptions are more distinct and accompanied by memory occupy a higher level. Thus, for example, the dominant monad of a dog has perceptions and memory of those perceptions. Leibniz calls this monad the “soul” to distinguish it from lower or “naked” monads. In a person the dominant monad is a “spirit,” because it is capable of reflective acts. Spirits are able to know the universe and to enter into relationship with the chief monad—namely, God. Epistemologically, Leibniz came under the influence of Spinoza with the latter’s stress on the geometrical nature of truth. Leibniz sought for those truths from which all knowledge was to be deduced. Like Galileo, he sought those truths that are immediately and intuitively certain and that force themselves upon the mind as self-evident. For Leibniz there are two types of intuitive knowledge: universal truths self-evident to reason and facts of experience. The former are timeless, the latter particular. To these two types of basic truth Leibniz attached the Cartesian marks of intuitive self-evidence: clearness and distinctness. He emphasizes the importance of distinct, as opposed to confused, ideas, and real from nominal definitions. Knowledge from experience remains confused; it is only when I can prove a priori that something is possible that my knowledge is distinct.[289] We can still doubt whether a nominal definition is possible, but we cannot doubt the possibility of a real idea. Leibniz relates real ideas to his strong, Platonic doctrine of innate ideas: “We have all these forms in our minds: we even have forms from all time.”[290] This knowledge results from God continually acting on us and communicating himself directly to us. That idea is clear which is surely distinguished from all others and so is adequate for the recognition of its object; that idea is distinct which is clear even to its particular constituent parts and to the knowledge of their combination. According to this, the a priori, “geometrical” or “metaphysical” eternal truths are clear and distinct; while on the other hand the a posteriori, or the truths relating to facts, are clear, indeed, but not distinct. . . . In the case of the former the intuitive certainty rests upon the Principle of Contradiction; in the case of the latter the possibility guaranteed by the actual fact needs still an explanation in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason.[291] Leibniz views humans as a composite of monads dominated by the spirit. The image of God is located in our minds—“Minds only are made in his image”[292]—and God is “himself the most accomplished of all Minds.”[293] Leibniz rejects the route of Cartesian doubt: “Cartesian doubt, for Leibniz, is a reckless exercise, on the skeptical cusp of gnostic alienation. If we think at all, he maintained, we are entitled to take ourselves and our world as granted in an act of primal faith, however inadequate and confused our ensuing knowledge is.”[294] Leibniz’s philosophy appears to exclude the possibility of freedom: if each monad contains its future within it and unfolds that future by necessity, how can we, as colonies of a spirit monad and lower body monads, be free? Leibniz rejects this critique: we are free in that our actions flow from our wills, and there is no contradiction in our willing other than we do. In our telling of the story of Western philosophy, a recurring motif is that the way we tell the story
is never neutral. A consistent characteristic of too much modern philosophy is a downplaying of the Christian faith of many modern philosophers, Leibniz being a notable example. Paul Hinlicky argues that most contemporary Lutheran theology runs from Luther through Kant to the present, a disastrous direction. “A path that yet can be taken, then, for Christian philosophy is ‘Leibniz by way of Luther.’”[295] Hinlicky notes that Leibniz dedicated his life to the cognitive claim of rational, natural, or philosophical theology, the very approach that Kant dismantled.[296] He argues that Leibniz conceived of Christian philosophy as the reflective extension of revealed theology and not as a foundation for it,[297] so that Leibniz is properly thought of as the Lutheran-Thomist of the seventeenth century.[298] “His purpose is not epistemologically to found science but hermeneutically to interpret its discoveries to other minds as works of God—and other minds as well as works of God.”[299] Leibniz’s approach is to see ourselves as embedded in nature under God rather than superior to nature in place of God.[300] His philosophy entails a natural theology that will comport with a revealed theology. It is not, like that of Kant, a turn to the subject, but a critical grounding of both subject and object in the nature of things—ultimately in God’s nature. For Hinlicky, it is Leibniz who most radically and helpfully challenges the received (Kantian) theological tradition. Leibniz’s theological philosophy is “one of the last great attempts in early modern Europe to found culture on the Christian doctrine of creation as parsed by the classic Lutheran thinkers.”[301] Hinlicky alerts Christians to the need to take care with how we tell the story of philosophy. Leibniz cannot simply be disposed of as a rationalist. His faith is real and decidedly not of a deist sort. However, in our view, a real tension remains in his thought. Leibniz himself asserted that “I start as a philosopher but I finish as a theologian.”[302] He was committed to Luther’s doctrine of two kingdoms, and there remains an uneasy tension between faith and reason in his thought, a tension insufficient to hold back the onslaught of Enlightenment philosophy.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) straddles abad ketujuh dan kedelapan. Karyanya yang utama dan paling terkenal adalah nya teodisi (1710), di mana ia berpendapat bahwa ini adalah yang terbaik dari semua kemungkinan dunia: "semakin kita tercerahkan dan informasi tentang pekerjaan yang dikehendaki Allah, semakin kita akan dibuang untuk menemukan bahwa mereka sangat baik dan memuaskan dalam setiap cara kita bisa berharap." [285] dengan dunia mungkin terbaik, Leibniz berarti yang paling sederhana dalam hipotesis dan terkaya di fenomena. [286] Voltaire disiarkan pandangan kejam dalam Candide nya (1759). Leibniz adalah seorang filsuf Lutheran, dan iman pusat filsafat. Memang, ia memulai proyek-proyek ekumenis yang besar untuk menyatukan orang-orang Kristen. Allah, menurut Leibniz, adalah benar-benar sempurna makhluk yang memiliki kesempurnaan yang kita temukan di alam untuk tingkat tertinggi. Leibniz menyimpulkan wacana-nya pada metafisika dengan mengingatkan pembaca perbedaan Injil membuat. Filsuf kuno tahu sangat sedikit kebenaran penting ini. Yesus Kristus telah menyatakan mereka ilahi baik dan dalam cara yang begitu jelas dan akrab bahwa coarsest pikiran telah menangkap mereka. Dengan demikian Injilnya sepenuhnya mengubah arah urusan manusia: dia telah membawa kita untuk mengetahui Kerajaan sorga atau Republik itu sempurna dari pikiran yang pantas mendapat gelar Kota Tuhan, hukum-hukum yang mengagumkan yang ia telah mengungkapkan. [287] sementara kita perlu mengambil dimensi Kristen Leibniz filosofi serius, kita harus perhatikan persamaan nya berbahaya Kerajaan Allah dengan "Republik pikiran." Ini memperingatkan kita untuk komponen berfalsafah filsafat. Leibniz menolak pandangan ekstensi itu — ukuran, bentuk, gerakan — adalah zat (Descartes) atau attribute of a substance (Spinoza). For Leibniz, the basic substance is a monad or a unit of psychic force. Monads are without parts and have no causal interaction with each other, although they do accommodate each other and harmonize; they are not spatially located. Monads have an internal lawlike principle of “appetition” (desire or striving) that causes them to change. They appear to influence each other, but this is merely a reflection of the preestablished harmony by which God created them to mirror each other. A monad’s entire past and present is contained within it, so that whatever a monad does, it does by a kind of necessity. Every monad is unique; all differ qualitatively and occupy different points of view so that each mirrors the world differently and with different degrees of clarity. Every monad has a degree of psychic life[288] by which it represents external things. Monads whose perceptions are more distinct and accompanied by memory occupy a higher level. Thus, for example, the dominant monad of a dog has perceptions and memory of those perceptions. Leibniz calls this monad the “soul” to distinguish it from lower or “naked” monads. In a person the dominant monad is a “spirit,” because it is capable of reflective acts. Spirits are able to know the universe and to enter into relationship with the chief monad—namely, God. Epistemologically, Leibniz came under the influence of Spinoza with the latter’s stress on the geometrical nature of truth. Leibniz sought for those truths from which all knowledge was to be deduced. Like Galileo, he sought those truths that are immediately and intuitively certain and that force themselves upon the mind as self-evident. For Leibniz there are two types of intuitive knowledge: universal truths self-evident to reason and facts of experience. The former are timeless, the latter particular. To these two types of basic truth Leibniz attached the Cartesian marks of intuitive self-evidence: clearness and distinctness. He emphasizes the importance of distinct, as opposed to confused, ideas, and real from nominal definitions. Knowledge from experience remains confused; it is only when I can prove a priori that something is possible that my knowledge is distinct.[289] We can still doubt whether a nominal definition is possible, but we cannot doubt the possibility of a real idea. Leibniz relates real ideas to his strong, Platonic doctrine of innate ideas: “We have all these forms in our minds: we even have forms from all time.”[290] This knowledge results from God continually acting on us and communicating himself directly to us. That idea is clear which is surely distinguished from all others and so is adequate for the recognition of its object; that idea is distinct which is clear even to its particular constituent parts and to the knowledge of their combination. According to this, the a priori, “geometrical” or “metaphysical” eternal truths are clear and distinct; while on the other hand the a posteriori, or the truths relating to facts, are clear, indeed, but not distinct. . . . In the case of the former the intuitive certainty rests upon the Principle of Contradiction; in the case of the latter the possibility guaranteed by the actual fact needs still an explanation in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason.[291] Leibniz views humans as a composite of monads dominated by the spirit. The image of God is located in our minds—“Minds only are made in his image”[292]—and God is “himself the most accomplished of all Minds.”[293] Leibniz rejects the route of Cartesian doubt: “Cartesian doubt, for Leibniz, is a reckless exercise, on the skeptical cusp of gnostic alienation. If we think at all, he maintained, we are entitled to take ourselves and our world as granted in an act of primal faith, however inadequate and confused our ensuing knowledge is.”[294] Leibniz’s philosophy appears to exclude the possibility of freedom: if each monad contains its future within it and unfolds that future by necessity, how can we, as colonies of a spirit monad and lower body monads, be free? Leibniz rejects this critique: we are free in that our actions flow from our wills, and there is no contradiction in our willing other than we do. In our telling of the story of Western philosophy, a recurring motif is that the way we tell the story is never neutral. A consistent characteristic of too much modern philosophy is a downplaying of the Christian faith of many modern philosophers, Leibniz being a notable example. Paul Hinlicky argues that most contemporary Lutheran theology runs from Luther through Kant to the present, a disastrous direction. “A path that yet can be taken, then, for Christian philosophy is ‘Leibniz by way of Luther.’”[295] Hinlicky notes that Leibniz dedicated his life to the cognitive claim of rational, natural, or philosophical theology, the very approach that Kant dismantled.[296] He argues that Leibniz conceived of Christian philosophy as the reflective extension of revealed theology and not as a foundation for it,[297] so that Leibniz is properly thought of as the Lutheran-Thomist of the seventeenth century.[298] “His purpose is not epistemologically to found science but hermeneutically to interpret its discoveries to other minds as works of God—and other minds as well as works of God.”[299] Leibniz’s approach is to see ourselves as embedded in nature under God rather than superior to nature in place of God.[300] His philosophy entails a natural theology that will comport with a revealed theology. It is not, like that of Kant, a turn to the subject, but a critical grounding of both subject and object in the nature of things—ultimately in God’s nature. For Hinlicky, it is Leibniz who most radically and helpfully challenges the received (Kantian) theological tradition. Leibniz’s theological philosophy is “one of the last great attempts in early modern Europe to found culture on the Christian doctrine of creation as parsed by the classic Lutheran thinkers.”[301] Hinlicky alerts Christians to the need to take care with how we tell the story of philosophy. Leibniz cannot simply be disposed of as a rationalist. His faith is real and decidedly not of a deist sort. However, in our view, a real tension remains in his thought. Leibniz himself asserted that “I start as a philosopher but I finish as a theologian.”[302] He was committed to Luther’s doctrine of two kingdoms, and there remains an uneasy tension between faith and reason in his thought, a tension insufficient to hold back the onslaught of Enlightenment philosophy.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) melintasi abad XVII dan XVIII. Pekerjaan utama dan paling terkenal nya adalah Teodise nya (1710), di mana ia berpendapat bahwa ini adalah yang terbaik dari semua kemungkinan dunia: "Semakin kita tercerahkan dan informasi tentang karya Allah, semakin kita harus dibuang ke menemukan bahwa mereka sangat baik dan memuaskan dalam segala hal yang kita bisa berharap. "[285] Oleh mungkin terbaik dunia, Leibniz berarti paling sederhana dalam hipotesis dan terkaya di fenomena. [286] Voltaire satir pandangan ini kejam di Candide nya (1759) . Leibniz adalah seorang filsuf Lutheran, dan imannya merupakan pusat filsafatnya. Memang, ia memulai proyek ekumenis utama untuk membawa orang-orang Kristen bersama-sama. Tuhan, menurut Leibniz, adalah makhluk benar-benar sempurna yang memiliki kesempurnaan yang kita temukan di alam ke tingkat tertinggi. Leibniz menyimpulkan Discourse on Metaphysics dengan mengingatkan para pembacanya dari perbedaan injil membuat. Para filsuf kuno tahu sedikit dari kebenaran penting. Yesus Kristus sendiri telah menyatakan mereka ilahi dengan baik dan dengan cara yang begitu jelas dan akrab bahwa coarsest pikiran telah memahami mereka. Jadi Injilnya telah sepenuhnya mengubah jalan urusan manusia: ia telah membawa kita untuk mengetahui kerajaan surga atau bahwa republik yang sempurna dari pikiran yang layak judul City of God, yang hukumnya mengagumkan ia telah diungkapkan [287] Sementara kita butuhkan. untuk mengambil dimensi Kristen filsafat Leibniz serius, kita harus mencatat persamaan yang berbahaya dari Kerajaan Allah dengan "republik pikiran." Ini mengingatkan kita pada komponen rasionalistik filsafatnya. Leibniz menolak pandangan bahwa ekstensi-ukuran, bentuk, gerak-adalah zat (Descartes) atau
atribut dari substansi (Spinoza). Untuk Leibniz, substansi dasar adalah monad atau satuan gaya psikis. Monads tanpa bagian dan tidak memiliki interaksi kausal satu sama lain, meskipun mereka mengakomodasi satu sama lain dan menyelaraskan; mereka tidak spasial berada. Monads memiliki prinsip seperti hukum internal "appetition" (keinginan atau perjuangan) yang menyebabkan mereka berubah. Mereka muncul untuk mempengaruhi satu sama lain, tapi ini hanyalah refleksi dari harmoni prapembagunan dimana Tuhan menciptakan mereka untuk cermin satu sama lain. Sebuah monad ini seluruh masa lalu dan sekarang terkandung di dalamnya, sehingga apa pun yang monad tidak, itu tidak dengan semacam keharusan. Setiap monad adalah unik; semua berbeda secara kualitatif dan menempati sudut pandang yang berbeda sehingga masing-masing mencerminkan dunia secara berbeda dan dengan derajat yang berbeda kejelasan. Setiap monad memiliki tingkat kehidupan psikis [288] oleh yang mewakili hal-hal eksternal. Monads yang persepsi yang lebih jelas dan disertai dengan memori menempati tingkat yang lebih tinggi. Jadi, misalnya, monad dominan anjing memiliki persepsi dan memori dari mereka persepsi. Leibniz menyebut monad ini "jiwa" untuk membedakannya dari yang lebih rendah atau "telanjang" monads. Dalam seseorang monad dominan adalah "roh," karena ia mampu bertindak reflektif. Spirits dapat mengetahui alam semesta dan untuk masuk ke dalam hubungan dengan kepala monad-yaitu, Allah. Epistemologis, Leibniz datang di bawah pengaruh Spinoza dengan stres yang terakhir pada sifat geometris kebenaran. Leibniz dicari bagi mereka kebenaran dari mana semua pengetahuan adalah untuk disimpulkan. Seperti Galileo, ia mencari kebenaran-kebenaran yang segera dan intuitif tertentu dan bahwa pasukan sendiri pada pikiran sebagai jelas. Untuk Leibniz ada dua jenis pengetahuan intuitif: kebenaran universal jelas untuk alasan dan fakta-fakta pengalaman. Mantan yang abadi, yang terakhir tertentu. Untuk kedua jenis kebenaran dasar Leibniz terpasang tanda Cartesian intuitif diri bukti: kejelasan dan keunikan. Dia menekankan pentingnya berbeda, sebagai lawan bingung, ide, dan nyata dari definisi nominal. Pengetahuan dari pengalaman tetap bingung; hanya ketika saya bisa membuktikan apriori bahwa sesuatu adalah mungkin bahwa pengetahuan saya berbeda. [289] Kita masih bisa meragukan apakah definisi nominal adalah mungkin, tapi kita tidak bisa meragukan kemungkinan ide yang nyata. Leibniz berhubungan ide nyata untuk kuat, doktrin Platonis tentang ide-ide bawaan: "Kami memiliki semua bentuk-bentuk ini dalam pikiran kita:. Kami bahkan memiliki bentuk dari semua waktu" [290] Pengetahuan ini hasil dari Allah terus bekerja pada kita dan berkomunikasi sendiri langsung ke kami. Ide yang jelas yang pasti dibedakan dari semua orang lain dan begitu memadai untuk pengakuan objeknya; Ide yang berbeda yang jelas bahkan untuk bagian-bagian penyusunnya tertentu dan untuk pengetahuan kombinasi mereka. Menurut ini, apriori, "geometris" atau "metafisik" kebenaran abadi yang jelas dan berbeda; sementara di sisi lain a posteriori, atau kebenaran yang berkaitan dengan fakta-fakta, yang jelas, memang, tapi tidak berbeda. . . . Dalam kasus mantan kepastian intuitif bersandar pada Prinsip Kontradiksi; dalam kasus yang terakhir kemungkinan dijamin oleh fakta yang sebenarnya perlu masih penjelasan sesuai dengan Prinsip Alasan yang cukup. [291] Leibniz pandangan manusia sebagai gabungan dari monads didominasi oleh roh. Gambar Allah terletak di minds- kami "Minds hanya dibuat dalam gambar-Nya" [292] -dan Allah adalah "dirinya yang paling dicapai dari semua Minds." [293] Leibniz menolak rute keraguan Cartesian: "Tidak diragukan Cartesian , untuk Leibniz, adalah tindakan ceroboh, pada titik puncak skeptis keterasingan gnostik. Jika kita berpikir sama sekali, dia dipertahankan, kita berhak untuk mengambil diri kita dan dunia kita seperti yang diberikan dalam tindakan iman primal, namun tidak memadai dan bingung kami berikutnya pengetahuan adalah "[294] filsafat Leibniz tampaknya mengesampingkan kemungkinan kebebasan.: jika setiap monad mengandung masa depan di dalamnya dan terbentang di masa depan bahwa dengan kebutuhan, bagaimana bisa kita, sebagai koloni semangat monad dan monad tubuh bagian bawah, bebas? Leibniz menolak kritik ini: kita bebas dalam tindakan kita mengalir dari kehendak kita, dan tidak ada kontradiksi dalam kami bersedia selain kita lakukan. Dalam menceritakan kami kisah filsafat Barat, motif berulang adalah bahwa cara kita bercerita
tidak pernah netral. Karakteristik konsisten terlalu banyak filsafat modern adalah mengecilkan iman Kristen dari banyak filsuf modern, Leibniz menjadi contoh penting. Paul Hinlicky berpendapat bahwa kebanyakan teologi Lutheran kontemporer berjalan dari Luther melalui Kant hingga saat ini, arah bencana. "Sebuah jalan yang belum bisa diambil, maka, untuk filsafat Kristen adalah 'Leibniz dengan cara Luther.'" [295] Hinlicky mencatat bahwa Leibniz mengabdikan hidupnya untuk klaim kognitif teologi rasional, natural, atau filosofis, sangat pendekatan bahwa Kant dibongkar. [296] Dia berpendapat bahwa Leibniz dikandung filsafat Kristen sebagai perpanjangan reflektif teologi mengungkapkan dan bukan sebagai dasar untuk itu, [297] sehingga Leibniz benar dianggap sebagai Lutheran-Thomis abad ketujuh belas. [298] "Tujuannya adalah tidak epistemologis untuk menemukan ilmu tapi hermeneutis untuk menafsirkan penemuan untuk pikiran lain sebagai karya Allah-dan lainnya pikiran serta pekerjaan-pekerjaan Allah." [299] Pendekatan Leibniz adalah untuk melihat diri kita sebagai tertanam di alam di bawah Allah daripada unggul alam di tempat Allah. [300] Filosofinya memerlukan teologi alami yang akan membawakan dengan teologi terungkap. Hal ini tidak, seperti yang dari Kant, giliran untuk subjek, tetapi landasan penting dari kedua subjek dan objek dalam sifat hal-akhirnya di alam Tuhan. Untuk Hinlicky, itu adalah Leibniz yang paling radikal dan membantu menantang (Kantian) tradisi teologis diterima. Filsafat teologis Leibniz adalah "salah satu upaya besar terakhir di awal Eropa modern untuk menemukan budaya pada doktrin Kristen tentang penciptaan sebagai diurai oleh pemikir Lutheran klasik." [301] Hinlicky memberitahu Kristen kebutuhan untuk berhati-hati dengan bagaimana kita memberitahu cerita filsafat. Leibniz tidak bisa hanya dibuang sebagai rasionalis. Imannya adalah nyata dan jelas bukan dari semacam deis. Namun, dalam pandangan kami, ketegangan nyata tetap dalam pikirannya. Leibniz sendiri menegaskan bahwa "saya mulai sebagai seorang filsuf tapi saya menyelesaikan sebagai seorang teolog." [302] Ia berkomitmen untuk doktrin Luther dari dua kerajaan, dan masih ada ketegangan yang tidak nyaman antara iman dan akal dalam pemikirannya, ketegangan cukup untuk menahan kembali gempuran filsafat Pencerahan.