The argument of Part I may be summa

The argument of Part I may be summarized as follows. We cannot turn to God or nature to find backing, legitimacy, or grounding for our moral views, for a variety of reasons ranging from our lack of clarity as to what is meant by God or nature and uncertainty as to what either of them in fact demands, to lack of obvious reason to regard whatever they ‘demand’ as necessarily moral. Similarly, it is confusing rather than helpful to think in terms of rights or procedural justice. It is not that we cannot arrive at a conclusion that certain rights should be respected or that we need not concern ourselves about having just procedures. It is that morality is about a great deal more than a list of inflexible rights or formally just procedures; sometimes just procedures and the upholding of rights combine to produce unjust situations, and, more broadly, emphasis on rights and procedures appears to be in various ways deleterious. More generally, we should avoid being intimidated by the idea that we have to choose between a number of historical schools of thought or systems of classification of moral theory. We need to give attention to what a moral theory is for, and to what we can and should expect from it.
On the other hand, positively, there are some basic facts about the nature of moral language (e.g., it is prescriptive and universalizable), and it is also the case that moral conduct is principled rather than rule-bound. There is reason to suppose that a moral sense, perhaps most conveniently represented as a sense of the importance of integrity, is as widespread and perhaps as reliable as the sense of physical sight. But, in order to arrive at a better understanding of what constitutes moral integrity or the nature of morality, one must first avoid expecting too much of moral philosophy, in particular expecting the wrong kind of thing. Moral codes are to be differentiated from moral theories. Moral philosophy is not going to lead to a vade mecum for life, because it is not supposed to. Nor should we judge the quality of a moral theory to any great extent by reference to its practical utility or its ‘user-friendliness’. Rather, in order to ensure a clear and solid foundation on which to work, we should distinguish between moral and various kinds of non-moral value, between what is right in itself and what, though it may be bad or wrong in itself, can be justified. Problems that are in practice soluble need to be distinguished from those that are in practice insoluble, and dilemmas, which are by their nature insoluble, need to be distinguished from problems of any sort. Bearing these and similar basic distinctions in mind, recognizing that to a degree we have to rely on intuition and self-evidence in moral matters, but acknowledging also that the whole enterprise is predicated on some sense of people’s well-being, we need now to build a positive theory by looking for the fundamental principles that define and hence govern the moral enterprise. Morality is certainly good for society or for people in general, even if it is admitted that there is no independent argument to dissuade an individual who wishes to and thinks he can get away with taking advantage of the system. A moral theory, like love or a library classification system, is partly given in nature in some sense, and partly man-made, but it is emphatically not arbitrary. Our objective is to lay out a moral theory by using dispassionate reason such that few, if any, will in sincerity be able to dissent from the conclusions.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Argumen dari bagian yang saya dapat diringkas sebagai berikut. Kita tidak bisa berpaling kepada Allah atau alam untuk menemukan dukungan, legitimasi atau landasan untuk pandangan kami moral, untuk berbagai alasan mulai dari kami kurangnya kejelasan mengenai apa yang dimaksud dengan Allah atau alam dan ketidakpastian mengenai apa yang salah satu dari mereka bahkan menuntut, kurangnya alasan yang jelas untuk memperhatikan apa pun mereka 'permintaan' sebagai selalu moral. Demikian pula, sangat membingungkan lebih daripada membantu untuk berpikir dalam hal hak atau keadilan prosedural. Hal ini tidak bahwa kita tidak dapat tiba di sebuah kesimpulan bahwa hak tertentu harus dihormati atau bahwa kita tidak perlu menyibukkan diri tentang memiliki hanya prosedur. Itu adalah bahwa moralitas tentang banyak lebih dari daftar hak-hak yang tidak fleksibel atau secara resmi hanya prosedur; kadang-kadang hanya prosedur dan menjunjung tinggi hak bergabung untuk menghasilkan keadaan yang tidak adil, dan lebih luas lagi, penekanan pada hak-hak dan prosedur muncul dalam berbagai cara merugikan. Lebih umum, kita harus menghindari menjadi diintimidasi oleh gagasan bahwa kita harus memilih antara beberapa sejarah sekolah pemikiran atau sistem klasifikasi teori moral. Kita perlu memberikan perhatian untuk apa teori moral untuk, dan apa yang kita dapat dan harus harapkan dari itu.On the other hand, positively, there are some basic facts about the nature of moral language (e.g., it is prescriptive and universalizable), and it is also the case that moral conduct is principled rather than rule-bound. There is reason to suppose that a moral sense, perhaps most conveniently represented as a sense of the importance of integrity, is as widespread and perhaps as reliable as the sense of physical sight. But, in order to arrive at a better understanding of what constitutes moral integrity or the nature of morality, one must first avoid expecting too much of moral philosophy, in particular expecting the wrong kind of thing. Moral codes are to be differentiated from moral theories. Moral philosophy is not going to lead to a vade mecum for life, because it is not supposed to. Nor should we judge the quality of a moral theory to any great extent by reference to its practical utility or its ‘user-friendliness’. Rather, in order to ensure a clear and solid foundation on which to work, we should distinguish between moral and various kinds of non-moral value, between what is right in itself and what, though it may be bad or wrong in itself, can be justified. Problems that are in practice soluble need to be distinguished from those that are in practice insoluble, and dilemmas, which are by their nature insoluble, need to be distinguished from problems of any sort. Bearing these and similar basic distinctions in mind, recognizing that to a degree we have to rely on intuition and self-evidence in moral matters, but acknowledging also that the whole enterprise is predicated on some sense of people’s well-being, we need now to build a positive theory by looking for the fundamental principles that define and hence govern the moral enterprise. Morality is certainly good for society or for people in general, even if it is admitted that there is no independent argument to dissuade an individual who wishes to and thinks he can get away with taking advantage of the system. A moral theory, like love or a library classification system, is partly given in nature in some sense, and partly man-made, but it is emphatically not arbitrary. Our objective is to lay out a moral theory by using dispassionate reason such that few, if any, will in sincerity be able to dissent from the conclusions.