Using particular examples runs the

Using particular examples runs the risk of alienating readers. But my concern is not really with the good and bad sides of gun ownership in America. My point is the more general one that to couch moral debate in terms of rights is unproductive and distorting for these reasons: if the reference is to ‘natural rights’, it suggests that moral claims can be established straightforwardly by looking at nature or human nature (and sometimes, confusedly, by looking at the law or constitution). This is generally false in that what constitutes human nature and what is, more broadly, natural are not simple givens, and in that it erroneously assumes that if something is the case it is right that it should be. The language of rights takes emphasis off duties, and very often contingently leads to emphasis on ‘my’ or ‘our’ rights without corresponding concern for the rights of others, and thus tends to provide a lop-sided view of morality. It is framed in individualistic, inflexible, and demanding terms, which, not surprisingly, lead to confrontation, conflict, and litigation. Thus, on one side, people simply assert their ‘right’ to be free of second-hand smoke, without any consideration of the complex issue of whether, even assuming that second-hand smoke is a serious hazard, it follows that the non-smoker has a moral case for preventing the smoker from smoking any more than he has a right to stop the driver from driving (it being clear that the danger from car exhaust is at least as great). On the other hand, normally sane and reasonable adults demand to be compensated for illness caused by a habit that, notwithstanding the false advertising of tobacco companies, they have always known to be harmful and that they chose to adopt. For yet another indirect consequence of thinking in terms of rights is that it tends to weaken our sense of personal responsibility. In sum, it is counterproductive in terms of developing, nurturing, and spreading moral sensibility and responsibility and in terms of thinking reasonably about morality or specific moral issues, since its most notable effect is to reduce moral debate to the incompatible claims of two conflicting rights, whether simply yours and mine, or yours to do X and mine to do Y.
Reference to litigation brings me to the other notable tendency of the times that gets in the way of proper moral debate: a preoccupation with procedural justice, which is particularly prevalent in institutions. We can agree straightaway that we do want our procedures to be just, whether we are referring to a court of law, the rules for hiring, promoting, and firing in business or the professions, or the way in which we sort out informal disputes in the family or among friends. We want the courts to abide by the law and we want that law to be in accord with our sense of justice. (A phrase commonly used here would be ‘natural justice’, which is, however, open to the same objections as is talk of ‘natural rights’: what justice is natural and how do you know? In what sense is the justice of ‘an eye for an eye’ more or less natural than other kinds of justice? In what sense of ‘natural’? Does the word actually serve to do any more than indicate that this is the type of justice the speaker believes in?) Similarly, we want employees to be treated justly and we want all procedures, ranging from the composition of a committee of inquiry through to the rules relating to conditions of work, reward, punishment, promotion, reprimand, and firing to be just. The objection, then, is not to the claim that there should be just procedures. As with rights, the objection is to the consequences of this way of talking, to framing our thinking about good and bad behaviour in an institutional or corporate setting in terms of procedural justice. For procedural justice is not enough. While our procedures should be just, they must also be capable of delivering substantive justice: we must be concerned that the end state of affairs is just. In the context of politics, it may be reasonable to say that a certain democratic system is to be admired in that it is fair, free, and in other respects genuinely democratic, even though the decisions made by this democratic body may often be regrettable. But in the context of morality, it is not all right to say that if the procedures for decision-making are morally defensible, it does not matter what the decisions are. Yet a quite common phenomenon in offices and universities today is for careful attention to be paid to such procedural matters as ensuring representative membership of a disciplinary panel, ensuring that charges are made formally and opportunity for reply afforded, ensuring protection of witnesses, etc., but little or no attention at all is paid to the questions of whether such a panel proceeding in such a way is likely to make a sound and just decision, and whether the practices that are variously accepted and condemned are so categorized on morally acceptable grounds. Did this woman actually deserve to be promoted? Is cheating of that sort acceptable in this university? Ought an individual to be penalized for flirting with a colleague? Questions such as these are all too often not being addressed in any serious way, while the focus is entirely on ensuring that the rules governing the decision-making process are clearly adhered to. That is plainly inadequate. A duly constituted jury or panel, representative proportionately of all members of the community, and deliberating according to clearly formulated rules, can still deliver outrageous judgements or substantive injustice.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Menggunakan contoh-contoh tertentu menjalankan risiko mengasingkan pembaca. Tetapi kekhawatiran saya adalah tidak benar-benar dengan sisi baik dan buruk kepemilikan senjata di Amerika. Maksud saya adalah yang lebih umum untuk sofa perdebatan moral dalam hal hak yang produktif dan menyimpang untuk alasan ini: jika referensi 'hak-hak alamiah', menunjukkan bahwa klaim moral dapat didirikan tedeng aling-aling oleh memandang sifat atau kodrat manusia (dan kadang-kadang, bingung, dengan melihat hukum atau Konstitusi). Hal ini umumnya palsu dalam bahwa apa yang merupakan sifat manusia dan apa adalah, lebih luas, alam adalah tidak sederhana givens, dan bahwa itu keliru mengasumsikan bahwa jika sesuatu terjadi memang benar bahwa itu harus. Bahasa hak mengambil penekanan dari tugas-tugas, dan sangat sering contingently mengarah pada penekanan pada hak-hak 'saya' atau 'kami' tanpa mempedulikan sesuai hak orang lain, dan dengan demikian cenderung untuk memberikan pandangan yang seimbang dari moralitas. Ini adalah dibingkai dalam istilah individualistis, fleksibel dan menuntut, yang, tidak mengherankan, menyebabkan konfrontasi, konflik dan litigasi. Dengan demikian, di satu sisi, orang hanya menegaskan mereka 'hak' untuk menjadi bebas dari kedua tangan asap, tanpa pertimbangan isu kompleks Apakah, bahkan dengan asumsi bahwa kedua tangan asap adalah bahaya serius, maka bahwa non-perokok memiliki kasus moral untuk mencegah perokok untuk Merokok lebih daripada ia memiliki hak untuk menghentikan driver dari mengemudi (itu menjadi jelas bahwa bahaya dari knalpot mobil setidaknya sama besar). Di sisi lain, biasanya waras dan masuk akal orang dewasa permintaan untuk diberikan kompensasi atas penyakit yang disebabkan oleh kebiasaan itu, meskipun iklan palsu tembakau perusahaan, mereka selalu tahu berbahaya dan bahwa mereka memilih untuk mengadopsi. Lain tidak langsung akibat dari berpikir dalam istilah hak adalah bahwa ia cenderung untuk melemahkan rasa tanggung jawab pribadi kita. Singkatnya, itu kontraproduktif dalam hal mengembangkan, memelihara, dan menyebarkan kepekaan moral dan tanggung jawab dan dalam hal berpikir cukup tentang moral atau isu-isu moral tertentu, karena efek yang paling penting untuk mengurangi perdebatan moral mengenai klaim tidak kompatibel dua hak bertentangan, apakah hanya milik Anda dan saya, atau milikmu untuk melakukan X dan tambang untuk melakukan Y.Reference to litigation brings me to the other notable tendency of the times that gets in the way of proper moral debate: a preoccupation with procedural justice, which is particularly prevalent in institutions. We can agree straightaway that we do want our procedures to be just, whether we are referring to a court of law, the rules for hiring, promoting, and firing in business or the professions, or the way in which we sort out informal disputes in the family or among friends. We want the courts to abide by the law and we want that law to be in accord with our sense of justice. (A phrase commonly used here would be ‘natural justice’, which is, however, open to the same objections as is talk of ‘natural rights’: what justice is natural and how do you know? In what sense is the justice of ‘an eye for an eye’ more or less natural than other kinds of justice? In what sense of ‘natural’? Does the word actually serve to do any more than indicate that this is the type of justice the speaker believes in?) Similarly, we want employees to be treated justly and we want all procedures, ranging from the composition of a committee of inquiry through to the rules relating to conditions of work, reward, punishment, promotion, reprimand, and firing to be just. The objection, then, is not to the claim that there should be just procedures. As with rights, the objection is to the consequences of this way of talking, to framing our thinking about good and bad behaviour in an institutional or corporate setting in terms of procedural justice. For procedural justice is not enough. While our procedures should be just, they must also be capable of delivering substantive justice: we must be concerned that the end state of affairs is just. In the context of politics, it may be reasonable to say that a certain democratic system is to be admired in that it is fair, free, and in other respects genuinely democratic, even though the decisions made by this democratic body may often be regrettable. But in the context of morality, it is not all right to say that if the procedures for decision-making are morally defensible, it does not matter what the decisions are. Yet a quite common phenomenon in offices and universities today is for careful attention to be paid to such procedural matters as ensuring representative membership of a disciplinary panel, ensuring that charges are made formally and opportunity for reply afforded, ensuring protection of witnesses, etc., but little or no attention at all is paid to the questions of whether such a panel proceeding in such a way is likely to make a sound and just decision, and whether the practices that are variously accepted and condemned are so categorized on morally acceptable grounds. Did this woman actually deserve to be promoted? Is cheating of that sort acceptable in this university? Ought an individual to be penalized for flirting with a colleague? Questions such as these are all too often not being addressed in any serious way, while the focus is entirely on ensuring that the rules governing the decision-making process are clearly adhered to. That is plainly inadequate. A duly constituted jury or panel, representative proportionately of all members of the community, and deliberating according to clearly formulated rules, can still deliver outrageous judgements or substantive injustice.