A Council of Defence was establishe

A Council of Defence was established with Dutch and English participants and very quickly a combined expedition to the Philippines was undertaken to prevent the Chinese from trading on Manila and to cruise between China and Japan. However, the expected booty did not materialize and on 19 June the commanders decided to move the fleet towards Hirado. Great opportunities were lost by this decision: two days later the richly loaded frigates from China appeared in Manila, whereas on 28 July the silver ships from Acapulco arrived.76 At the end of the year the Council of Defence sent another fleet to the Philippines, which stayed there until May 1622, i.e. almost one and a half year, and which managed to capture a large number of junks with food and some with valuable cargo. More or less in the same period a combined English/Dutch fleet cruised in the Indian Ocean, using Surat as a refreshment station, whereas the Dutch on their own attempted a new blockade of the Malacca Straits. Their greatest success was the disaster inflicted upon the Carreira da India near Mozambique in July 1622.77
In the meantime, in 1620, even the Heeren XVII had become convinced that an annual blockade of Manila, also directed against Chinese ships, would be very useful to 'spoil the Chinese trade of the enemy and to attract this to some of our locations, so that we will be able to make it a stable business'.78 Because the alternative for the Chinese of sailing all the way to Batavia could hardly be attractive in view of the risks and the long distance, the directors advised Batavia six months later to send two ships to Chincheo, so that they could pre-warn the Chinese of the Dutch blockade awaiting them before Manila and offer them to buy their silk directly on the spot.79 Another half a year later they repeated this advice, mentioning among others Ilha Formosa 'or other nearby easily accessible places, to have a good trade with the Chinese, ensuring for them security and the least risk'.80
By 1623 the Dutch had ninety ships with an adequate number of sailors in Asia, and two thousand white troops, spread over twenty forts, of which Batavia, Banda, Amboina and Ternate had the largest garrisons, whilst the total assets of the VOC were valued at 6 million guilders. Altogether, during the years 1621-1623 something like thirty Dutch ships were engaged in blockades and privateering activities. They might have caused a short interruption of the Portuguese Carreira, but also according to Coen,81 they had done very little for the Company in Asia.
As far as Manila was concerned, the blockades only led to a discontented mood because of the rise in food prices. On the other hand, according to Souza, Chinese imports into Manila suffered large drops in the years 1623, 1624, 1628 and 1629. The Portuguese in Macao also had their problems in 1623, 1624 and 1629 and Portugue-se imports from other directions suffered in 1624, 1627 and 1628.82 It is possible that these fluctuations were indeed caused by the Dutch-English blockades, but they did not present any threat to the Philippine economy: the imports of silver, public and private, were not molested and continued to rise.83 Nor did the blockades bring military or strategic gains: the VOC would have had an opportunity to set foot on land by taking sides in an internal conflict, but it was never tried.84
Also with respect to the objective to move the Chinese trade to Bantam and later to Batavia, the blockades of Manila were unsuccessful. As from 1621 the Dutch were able to deliver minute quantities of silk to the Japanese market,85 which were probably taken from Chinese junks, but the Chinese simply moved their trade on to smaller ships which could stay out of reach of the large Dutch vessels.
Around 1625 the enthusiasm for the blockades of Manila began to diminish. In the first place, after the 'massacre' or 'resurrec-tion' of Amboina in February 1623, the bottom had fallen out of the Anglo-Dutch co-operation.