Together the devil and the deep blu

Together the devil and the deep blue sea are churning up demonic waves of blood and mayhem, and those waves are washing over the deck of the American ship of state. Yemen, the second key, has now joined Syria as a platform for a squaring off between Saudi Arabia and Iran in a new rendition of the Battle of Karbala. But Yemen is a better built platform for the purpose for two reasons: Saudi Arabia borders Yemen it but does not border Syria, and a Saudi-Egyptian alliance can come to fruition there but not in Syria because Egypt has obvious geopolitical stakes in preventing a hostile power from lording over the Bab al-Mandeb. So the Administration is now in a position concerning Yemen of having to objectively align with Egypt, a country it recently criticized for wanting to protect its own security interests in neighboring Libya despite our having largely caused their problem in the first place. (Can Egyptians bring themselves to say “chutzpah”?)

Yemen is no sideshow to the locals, and it certainly reflects badly on a U.S. policy that ended up being much too antiterrorism-heavy for its own good. But the United States has much more portentous concerns in mind. The holy grail of American policy is not in Yemen and it is not a mystery: Again, it is to prevent a cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation in the region, which would not only make the prospect of nuclear war uncomfortably large, but would risk allowing fissile material to end up in the hands of maniacal non-state actors who might one day attack us. To the Administration, the scale of that goal justifies subordinating other concerns to its demands—and thus we come quickly to key number three: Iran and the nuclear negotiations.

The problem here is that accommodating increasingly blatant Iranian aggression risks seeding the Sunni world with nuclear weapons desires and programs, from Egypt to the United Arab Emirates to Turkey to consummating longstanding Saudi deals with a nuclear Pakistan. By de-linking the nuclear negotiations from regional geopolitics, and by otherwise behaving in such a way as to persuade Saudi Arabia and its associates that Washington has handed the keys to the region to Tehran, the Administration has made the circumstance it fears most vastly more likely.

In other words, offshore balancing is accident-prone enough, but when the effort tips so obviously not toward a new regional balance that all can imagine if not see, but instead to one side in a vicious sectarian blood feud, it just compounds the dangers and fears among the regional protagonists. And fear, as Elena Bonner once put it, “gives bad advice.”

Perhaps a pickle is too glib a concept for the current situation in which the United States finds itself; maybe double-bind works better. With apologies to Gregory Bateson, who surely never intended his notion to be applied to current U.S. dilemmas in the Middle East, a double-bind is a good description of a situation that finds an American President wanting to court Iran into some kind of working relationship—and doing all sorts of things to convey the message, of which more below—but that finds him supporting from the rear, as it were, Saudi-led military action in Yemen against Iranian proxies, competing with Iranian-directed Shi’a militias around Tikrit for the favor the Iraqi government, putting up with Iranian military games in which a U.S. aircraft carrier in the putative target, and having Iran’s Supreme Leader intone “Death to America” in response to the President’s warm and respectful recent Nowruz message to the “Iranian people.”

Now about those soothing U.S. messages to Iran. With the President’s mellifluous Nowruz message a recent example, they come in different shapes and sizes, and while they may not sum to the strategic master plan some believe exists, they do accumulate into more than a series of accidents.

First and foremost, as already noted, is the absence of pushback against Iran’s aggressive probes throughout the region. Second is the fact that the U.S. air war against Da’esh turns American efforts into the de facto Shi’a air force. American warplanes are shooting at Sunnis in Syria (both Da’esh and Jabat al-Nusra Sunnis) but not Assad regime targets. And they are shooting at Sunnis in Iraq.

Third, as is by now well known, DNI General James Clapper recently removed Iran and Hizballah from the list of terrorist threats to the United States in its 2014 annual report, and made a point of noting the omission publicly. This does not take them off the official terrorism-sponsors list, only off our analytical threat assessment matrix. The signal, nevertheless, rings out loud and clear, and it beggars imagination that General Clapper would have done such a thing without White House approval or, as likely, direct encouragement.

Fourth, there have been reports that in the State Department some planning discussions have begun whose premise is an Iranian role in an eventual political settlement of the Syrian civil war. These planning notions include a U.S.-sanctioned role for Iran in Syrian security affairs. That may or may not be a moral affront, seeing as how Iran has been critical to keeping in power a regime that has murdered more than 200,000 of its own citizens, but it is certainly a sign to Tehran that the United States does not really object to its regional pretensions, but rather defers to them.

And so we come around back to the first key: U.S.-Israeli relations.

As noted above, each key of the recent shift has its own complications and internal logic. So it is possible to explain the Obama Administration’s bizarre post-March 17 behavior based entirely on the contained U.S.-Israeli political dynamic. And it has been plainly bizarre for the Administration to perseverate on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s desperate and irresponsible March 16 remarks, and their supposed shroud cast over future peace process prospects—as if they were bright in any case—at a time when the rest of the region is burning to the ground. The Arabs seem to be coming together finally (with what effect we shall see) in response to a threat from Iran (not Israel), yet the White House dial seems stuck on Jerusalem (which it, like its predecessors, insists on calling Tel Aviv). The White House’s refusal to accept the Prime Minister’s attempt to “clarify” his damaging remarks on the two-state solution is counterproductive on its face, and certainly bears the signs of a premeditated attack plan that is using Netanyahu’s March 16 remarks merely as a pretext. It also resembles the behavior of a still emotionally imbalanced adolescent. It is thus bizarre in more ways than one.

Most Israelis believe that the Administration had prepared one narrative for use had Yitzhak Herzog won the election, another if Netanyahu did. After March 17 the latter narrative lurched forth, and with it the threat to reassess U.S.-Israeli relations. That seems to mean to most observers a determination not to use the U.S. veto in the UN Security Council, and so let pass an approaching series of pro-Palestinian resolutions. (It would be passing strange, but amazingly so, if one or more of those resolutions were vetoed instead by France, which has stood to the solid right of the U.S. position on several Middle Eastern issues lately; that would bring things back to where there were in roughly 1955, when the second language in Israel was French, not English.)

A shelved U.S. veto at Turtle Bay, frankly, may be the least of what is to comeA shelved U.S. veto at Turtle Bay, frankly, may be the least of what is to come. So what is the shift in this key really about?

One interpretation is that the White House is attempting to intimidate the five to seven Democratic Senators who might otherwise help Senator Corker put together a veto-proof new sanctions bill. Maybe, even though some of these Senators may have problems with the prospective deal beyond or besides its implications for Israel.

A second, more widespread interpretation, is that this is just about pique, about outright spill-over-the-sides anger. Obama doesn’t like Netanyahu, and from the still recent “chickenshit” comment on back this has to be clear to anyone who can see and hear. The Boehner/Dermer caper that brought Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress should have marked the boiling point, given the unprecedented affront that it was. But the Administration kept its powder dry for fear of playing into Netanyahu’s hands. He won anyway, and so out poured the vitriol that had been accumulating for more than six years.

There is plenty of evidence for this interpretation. Bad relations go back to the beginning of the Administration. One of the first things the Administration did was to disavow an April 2004 memorandum of understanding, based on an exchange of letters between President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Such a disavowal had never before been done, and it deeply injured the relationship. As a result, just by the way, the President is on shaky ground in complaining about Congress’ pointing out that a mere Executive Agreement between the United States and Iran over the nuclear portfolio just might be subject to reversal in a subsequent Administration.

One of the next things the Administration did was to insist on a level of Israeli settlements constraints, including in Jerusalem, that not only contradicted the disavowed April 2004 exchange of letters but forced the Palestinian negotiating position into a high corner, where it had never before voluntarily gone and from which it could not easily escape. This initial error doomed the peace process to near stasis at a time when the sides might have been able to make at least some progress. For the Obama Administration to blame mainly Israel for the terrible record of peace process achievements over the past six years thus rankles throughout the Israeli establishment in all major parties, not ju

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Bersama-sama Iblis dan laut biru berputar atas setan gelombang darah dan kekacauan, dan gelombang tersebut mencuci atas dek kapal Amerika negara. Yaman, tombol kedua, kini telah bergabung Suriah sebagai platform untuk menegakkan off antara Arab Saudi dan Iran dalam membawakan lagu baru pertempuran Karbala. Tapi Yaman lebih baik platform dibangun untuk tujuan untuk dua alasan: Arab Saudi berbatasan Yaman itu tetapi apakah tidak perbatasan Suriah, Arab-Mesir Aliansi dan bisa berbuah ada tetapi tidak di Suriah karena Mesir telah jelas geopolitik taruhannya dalam mencegah kekuatan yang bermusuhan dari lording atas Bab al-Mandeb. Jadi administrasi adalah sekarang di posisi mengenai Yaman harus objektif sejajar dengan Mesir, sebuah negara yang baru saja dikritik karena keinginan untuk melindungi kepentingan-kepentingan keamanan sendiri di tetangga Libya meskipun kami memiliki sebagian besar disebabkan masalah mereka di tempat pertama. (Dapat Mesir membawa diri untuk mengatakan "chutzpah"?)Yemen is no sideshow to the locals, and it certainly reflects badly on a U.S. policy that ended up being much too antiterrorism-heavy for its own good. But the United States has much more portentous concerns in mind. The holy grail of American policy is not in Yemen and it is not a mystery: Again, it is to prevent a cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation in the region, which would not only make the prospect of nuclear war uncomfortably large, but would risk allowing fissile material to end up in the hands of maniacal non-state actors who might one day attack us. To the Administration, the scale of that goal justifies subordinating other concerns to its demands—and thus we come quickly to key number three: Iran and the nuclear negotiations.The problem here is that accommodating increasingly blatant Iranian aggression risks seeding the Sunni world with nuclear weapons desires and programs, from Egypt to the United Arab Emirates to Turkey to consummating longstanding Saudi deals with a nuclear Pakistan. By de-linking the nuclear negotiations from regional geopolitics, and by otherwise behaving in such a way as to persuade Saudi Arabia and its associates that Washington has handed the keys to the region to Tehran, the Administration has made the circumstance it fears most vastly more likely.In other words, offshore balancing is accident-prone enough, but when the effort tips so obviously not toward a new regional balance that all can imagine if not see, but instead to one side in a vicious sectarian blood feud, it just compounds the dangers and fears among the regional protagonists. And fear, as Elena Bonner once put it, “gives bad advice.”Perhaps a pickle is too glib a concept for the current situation in which the United States finds itself; maybe double-bind works better. With apologies to Gregory Bateson, who surely never intended his notion to be applied to current U.S. dilemmas in the Middle East, a double-bind is a good description of a situation that finds an American President wanting to court Iran into some kind of working relationship—and doing all sorts of things to convey the message, of which more below—but that finds him supporting from the rear, as it were, Saudi-led military action in Yemen against Iranian proxies, competing with Iranian-directed Shi’a militias around Tikrit for the favor the Iraqi government, putting up with Iranian military games in which a U.S. aircraft carrier in the putative target, and having Iran’s Supreme Leader intone “Death to America” in response to the President’s warm and respectful recent Nowruz message to the “Iranian people.”Now about those soothing U.S. messages to Iran. With the President’s mellifluous Nowruz message a recent example, they come in different shapes and sizes, and while they may not sum to the strategic master plan some believe exists, they do accumulate into more than a series of accidents.First and foremost, as already noted, is the absence of pushback against Iran’s aggressive probes throughout the region. Second is the fact that the U.S. air war against Da’esh turns American efforts into the de facto Shi’a air force. American warplanes are shooting at Sunnis in Syria (both Da’esh and Jabat al-Nusra Sunnis) but not Assad regime targets. And they are shooting at Sunnis in Iraq.Third, as is by now well known, DNI General James Clapper recently removed Iran and Hizballah from the list of terrorist threats to the United States in its 2014 annual report, and made a point of noting the omission publicly. This does not take them off the official terrorism-sponsors list, only off our analytical threat assessment matrix. The signal, nevertheless, rings out loud and clear, and it beggars imagination that General Clapper would have done such a thing without White House approval or, as likely, direct encouragement.Fourth, there have been reports that in the State Department some planning discussions have begun whose premise is an Iranian role in an eventual political settlement of the Syrian civil war. These planning notions include a U.S.-sanctioned role for Iran in Syrian security affairs. That may or may not be a moral affront, seeing as how Iran has been critical to keeping in power a regime that has murdered more than 200,000 of its own citizens, but it is certainly a sign to Tehran that the United States does not really object to its regional pretensions, but rather defers to them.And so we come around back to the first key: U.S.-Israeli relations.As noted above, each key of the recent shift has its own complications and internal logic. So it is possible to explain the Obama Administration’s bizarre post-March 17 behavior based entirely on the contained U.S.-Israeli political dynamic. And it has been plainly bizarre for the Administration to perseverate on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s desperate and irresponsible March 16 remarks, and their supposed shroud cast over future peace process prospects—as if they were bright in any case—at a time when the rest of the region is burning to the ground. The Arabs seem to be coming together finally (with what effect we shall see) in response to a threat from Iran (not Israel), yet the White House dial seems stuck on Jerusalem (which it, like its predecessors, insists on calling Tel Aviv). The White House’s refusal to accept the Prime Minister’s attempt to “clarify” his damaging remarks on the two-state solution is counterproductive on its face, and certainly bears the signs of a premeditated attack plan that is using Netanyahu’s March 16 remarks merely as a pretext. It also resembles the behavior of a still emotionally imbalanced adolescent. It is thus bizarre in more ways than one.Most Israelis believe that the Administration had prepared one narrative for use had Yitzhak Herzog won the election, another if Netanyahu did. After March 17 the latter narrative lurched forth, and with it the threat to reassess U.S.-Israeli relations. That seems to mean to most observers a determination not to use the U.S. veto in the UN Security Council, and so let pass an approaching series of pro-Palestinian resolutions. (It would be passing strange, but amazingly so, if one or more of those resolutions were vetoed instead by France, which has stood to the solid right of the U.S. position on several Middle Eastern issues lately; that would bring things back to where there were in roughly 1955, when the second language in Israel was French, not English.)A shelved U.S. veto at Turtle Bay, frankly, may be the least of what is to comeA shelved U.S. veto at Turtle Bay, frankly, may be the least of what is to come. So what is the shift in this key really about?One interpretation is that the White House is attempting to intimidate the five to seven Democratic Senators who might otherwise help Senator Corker put together a veto-proof new sanctions bill. Maybe, even though some of these Senators may have problems with the prospective deal beyond or besides its implications for Israel.A second, more widespread interpretation, is that this is just about pique, about outright spill-over-the-sides anger. Obama doesn’t like Netanyahu, and from the still recent “chickenshit” comment on back this has to be clear to anyone who can see and hear. The Boehner/Dermer caper that brought Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress should have marked the boiling point, given the unprecedented affront that it was. But the Administration kept its powder dry for fear of playing into Netanyahu’s hands. He won anyway, and so out poured the vitriol that had been accumulating for more than six years.There is plenty of evidence for this interpretation. Bad relations go back to the beginning of the Administration. One of the first things the Administration did was to disavow an April 2004 memorandum of understanding, based on an exchange of letters between President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Such a disavowal had never before been done, and it deeply injured the relationship. As a result, just by the way, the President is on shaky ground in complaining about Congress’ pointing out that a mere Executive Agreement between the United States and Iran over the nuclear portfolio just might be subject to reversal in a subsequent Administration.One of the next things the Administration did was to insist on a level of Israeli settlements constraints, including in Jerusalem, that not only contradicted the disavowed April 2004 exchange of letters but forced the Palestinian negotiating position into a high corner, where it had never before voluntarily gone and from which it could not easily escape. This initial error doomed the peace process to near stasis at a time when the sides might have been able to make at least some progress. For the Obama Administration to blame mainly Israel for the terrible record of peace process achievements over the past six years thus rankles throughout the Israeli establishment in all major parties, not ju

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Bersama setan dan laut biru yang berputar up gelombang setan darah dan kekacauan, dan mereka gelombang mencuci di atas dek kapal Amerika negara. Yaman, tombol kedua, kini telah bergabung dengan Suriah sebagai platform untuk mengkuadratkan off antara Arab Saudi dan Iran dalam rendition baru Pertempuran Karbala. Tapi Yaman adalah platform yang lebih baik dibangun untuk tujuan karena dua alasan: Arab Saudi berbatasan Yaman tetapi tidak berbatasan Suriah, dan aliansi Saudi-Mesir dapat datang ke hasil sana tetapi tidak di Suriah karena Mesir memiliki saham geopolitik yang jelas dalam mencegah bermusuhan kekuasaan dari lording atas Bab al-Mandeb. Jadi Administrasi sekarang dalam posisi mengenai Yaman karena harus obyektif sejajar dengan Mesir, sebuah negara baru-baru ini dikritik karena ingin melindungi kepentingan keamanan sendiri di negara tetangga Libya walaupun memiliki sebagian besar disebabkan masalah mereka kami di tempat pertama. (Bisa Mesir membawa diri untuk mengatakan "chutzpah"?) Yaman ada tontonan penduduk setempat, dan tentu mencerminkan buruk pada kebijakan AS yang akhirnya menjadi terlalu antiterorisme-berat untuk kebaikannya sendiri. Tapi Amerika Serikat memiliki banyak kekhawatiran lebih-dakwaan dalam pikiran. Grail suci kebijakan Amerika tidak di Yaman dan itu bukan misteri: Sekali lagi, itu adalah untuk mencegah riam proliferasi senjata nuklir di wilayah tersebut, yang tidak hanya akan membuat prospek perang nuklir nyaman besar, tetapi akan risiko membiarkan bahan fisil berakhir di tangan aktor non-negara gila yang mungkin suatu hari menyerang kita. Untuk Administrasi, skala tujuan itu membenarkan mensubordinasi kekhawatiran lain untuk nya tuntutan-dan dengan demikian kita datang cepat ke nomor kunci tiga:. Iran dan negosiasi nuklir Masalahnya di sini adalah bahwa menampung agresi Iran semakin terang-terangan risiko penyemaian dunia Sunni dengan nuklir keinginan senjata dan program, dari Mesir ke Uni Emirat Arab ke Turki untuk consummating penawaran Saudi lama dengan Pakistan nuklir. Dengan de-menghubungkan negosiasi nuklir dari geopolitik regional, dan dengan dinyatakan berperilaku sedemikian rupa untuk membujuk Arab Saudi dan asosiasi bahwa Washington telah menyerahkan kunci ke daerah ke Teheran, Administrasi telah membuat keadaan mereka paling takuti jauh lebih mungkin. Dengan kata lain, lepas pantai balancing adalah rawan kecelakaan yang cukup, tetapi ketika tips usaha jadi jelas tidak menuju keseimbangan regional baru yang semua bisa membayangkan jika tidak melihat, melainkan ke satu sisi dalam perseteruan darah sektarian setan, itu hanya senyawa bahaya dan ketakutan di antara protagonis daerah. Dan rasa takut, seperti Elena Bonner pernah dikatakan, "memberikan nasihat yang buruk." Mungkin acar terlalu fasih konsep untuk situasi saat ini di mana Amerika Serikat menemukan dirinya; mungkin ganda mengikat bekerja lebih baik. Dengan permintaan maaf kepada Gregory Bateson, yang pasti tidak pernah dimaksudkan gagasan untuk diterapkan pada dilema AS saat ini di Timur Tengah, ganda-mengikat adalah penjelasan yang baik dari situasi yang menemukan sebuah Presiden Amerika yang ingin ke pengadilan Iran ke dalam beberapa jenis hubungan kerja -dan melakukan segala macam hal untuk menyampaikan pesan, yang lebih bawah-tetapi menemukan dia mendukung dari belakang, seakan-akan, Saudi dipimpin aksi militer di Yaman terhadap proxy Iran, bersaing dengan milisi Syiah Iran diarahkan sekitar Tikrit untuk mendukung pemerintah Irak, memasang dengan permainan militer Iran di mana kapal induk AS di target diduga, dan memiliki Pemimpin Tertinggi Iran melagukan "Matilah Amerika" dalam menanggapi pesan Nowruz Presiden hangat dan hormat terbaru ke "rakyat Iran." Sekarang tentang mereka menenangkan pesan AS untuk Iran. Dengan pesan Nowruz merdu Presiden contoh baru-baru ini, mereka datang dalam berbagai bentuk dan ukuran, dan sementara mereka mungkin tidak berjumlah rencana induk strategis beberapa percaya ada, mereka menumpuk menjadi lebih dari serangkaian kecelakaan. Pertama dan terpenting, sebagaimana telah dicatat, adalah tidak adanya pushback terhadap probe agresif Iran di seluruh wilayah. Kedua adalah kenyataan bahwa perang udara AS terhadap Da'esh ternyata upaya Amerika ke de facto angkatan udara Syiah. Pesawat-pesawat tempur Amerika menembaki Sunni di Suriah (baik Da'esh dan Jabat al-Nusra Sunni) tetapi tidak Assad target rezim. Dan mereka menembaki Sunni di Irak. Ketiga, seperti sekarang terkenal, DNI Jenderal James Clapper baru-baru ini dihapus Iran dan Hizbullah dari daftar ancaman teroris ke Amerika Serikat dalam laporan tahunannya 2014, dan membuat titik mencatat kelalaian publik. Ini tidak mengambil mereka dari daftar terorisme-sponsor resmi, hanya off analisis penilaian ancaman matriks kami. Sinyal, bagaimanapun, cincin keras dan jelas, dan pengemis imajinasi bahwa Jenderal Clapper akan melakukan hal seperti itu tanpa persetujuan Gedung Putih atau, lebih mungkin, dorongan langsung. Keempat, ada laporan bahwa di Departemen Luar Negeri beberapa diskusi perencanaan mulai yang premis adalah peran Iran dalam penyelesaian politik akhirnya perang saudara Suriah. Konsep-konsep perencanaan termasuk peran AS-sanksi untuk Iran dalam urusan keamanan Suriah. Yang mungkin atau mungkin tidak penghinaan moral, melihat bagaimana Iran telah penting untuk menjaga kekuatan rezim yang telah membunuh lebih dari 200.000 warga sendiri, tapi pasti tanda ke Teheran bahwa Amerika Serikat tidak benar-benar objek untuk pretensi regional, melainkan menangguhkan mereka. Dan jadi kami datang sekitar kembali ke kunci pertama. hubungan AS-Israel Seperti disebutkan di atas, setiap tombol dari pergeseran baru-baru ini memiliki komplikasi sendiri dan logika internal. Jadi adalah mungkin untuk menjelaskan aneh 17 pasca-Maret perilaku Obama Administrasi seluruhnya didasarkan pada dinamika politik AS-Israel berisi. Dan telah jelas aneh untuk Administrasi untuk perseverate pada putus asa dan tidak bertanggung jawab Maret 16 komentar Perdana Menteri Netanyahu, dan kain kafan mereka seharusnya dilemparkan atas masa depan prospek-sebagai proses perdamaian jika mereka terang dalam kasus-pada saat sisa wilayah yang terbakar ke tanah. Orang-orang Arab tampaknya akan datang bersama-sama akhirnya (dengan efek apa yang akan kita lihat) dalam menanggapi ancaman dari Iran (bukan Israel), namun dial Gedung Putih tampaknya terjebak di Yerusalem (yang, seperti pendahulunya, bersikeras memanggil Tel Aviv ). Penolakan Gedung Putih untuk menerima upaya Perdana Menteri untuk "mengklarifikasi" komentar merusak nya pada solusi dua-negara yang kontraproduktif di wajahnya, dan tentu saja menanggung tanda-tanda rencana serangan terencana yang menggunakan Netanyahu 16 Maret komentar hanya sebagai dalih . Hal ini juga menyerupai perilaku remaja masih emosional seimbang. Dengan demikian aneh dalam lebih dari satu cara. Kebanyakan warga Israel percaya bahwa Administrasi telah menyiapkan satu narasi untuk digunakan memiliki Yitzhak Herzog memenangkan pemilu, lain jika Netanyahu lakukan. Setelah 17 Maret narasi yang terakhir meluncur keluar, dan dengan itu ancaman untuk menilai kembali hubungan AS-Israel. Yang tampaknya berarti sebagian besar pengamat tekad untuk tidak menggunakan hak veto AS di Dewan Keamanan PBB, dan baru sesudah itu melewati serangkaian mendekati resolusi pro-Palestina. (Ini akan melewati aneh, tapi luar biasa begitu, jika salah satu atau lebih dari resolusi yang diveto bukan oleh Perancis, yang telah berdiri di sebelah kanan solid posisi AS pada beberapa isu Timur Tengah akhir-akhir ini, yang akan membawa sesuatu kembali di mana ada berada di sekitar tahun 1955, ketika bahasa kedua di Israel Perancis, bukan bahasa Inggris.) A disimpan US veto di Turtle Bay, terus terang, mungkin sedikit dari apa yang disimpan comeA AS veto di Turtle Bay, terus terang, mungkin sedikit dari apa yang akan datang. Jadi apa adalah pergeseran dalam kunci ini benar-benar tentang? Salah satu interpretasi adalah bahwa Gedung Putih berusaha untuk mengintimidasi 06:55 Senator Demokrat yang dinyatakan mungkin membantu Senator Corker mengumpulkan sanksi baru tagihan veto-bukti. Mungkin, meskipun beberapa Senator ini mungkin memiliki masalah dengan calon kesepakatan di luar atau selain implikasinya bagi Israel. Kedua, penafsiran yang lebih luas, adalah bahwa ini hanya tentang kekesalan, sekitar langsung spill-over-the-sisi kemarahan. Obama tidak suka Netanyahu, dan dari masih baru-baru ini "pengecut" komentar di bagian belakang ini harus jelas bagi siapa saja yang bisa melihat dan mendengar. The Boehner / Dermer caper yang membawa Netanyahu untuk mengatasi sesi gabungan Kongres harus menandai titik didih, mengingat penghinaan belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya itu. Tapi Administrasi terus bubuk kering untuk takut bermain ke tangan Netanyahu. Ia memenangkan pula, dan begitu keluar menuangkan vitriol yang telah terakumulasi selama lebih dari enam tahun. Ada banyak bukti untuk interpretasi ini. Hubungan buruk kembali ke awal Administrasi. Salah satu hal pertama Administrasi lakukan adalah untuk mengingkari sebuah 2004 nota kesepahaman April, berdasarkan pertukaran surat antara Presiden George W. Bush dan Perdana Menteri Israel Ariel Sharon. Pengingkaran seperti belum pernah dilakukan, dan itu sangat melukai hubungan. Akibatnya, hanya dengan cara itu, Presiden adalah goyah dalam mengeluh tentang Kongres menunjukkan bahwa Perjanjian Eksekutif hanya antara Amerika Serikat dan Iran atas portofolio nuklir hanya mungkin dikenakan pembalikan dalam Administrasi berikutnya. Salah satu hal berikutnya Administrasi lakukan adalah untuk menuntut tingkat permukiman kendala Israel, termasuk di Yerusalem, yang tidak hanya bertentangan mengingkari pertukaran surat April 2004 tetapi memaksa posisi negosiasi Palestina ke sudut yang tinggi, di mana ia sebelumnya tidak pernah secara sukarela pergi dan dari yang tidak bisa dengan mudah melarikan diri. Kesalahan awal ini ditakdirkan proses perdamaian mendekati stasis pada saat sisi mungkin telah mampu membuat setidaknya beberapa kemajuan. Untuk Pemerintahan Obama menyalahkan terutama Israel untuk catatan buruk prestasi proses perdamaian selama enam tahun terakhir sehingga rankles seluruh pembentukan Israel di semua partai besar, tidak ju