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The New Generation of Scholars Appl

The New Generation of Scholars Applying Kant to Business Ethics
scholars particularly, as mentioned, the work of Barbara Herman. Although I am completing a paper that uses the traditional perfect imperfect distinction to specify what is required of corporations to help society, I fi n d the Dubbink/Liedekerke approach to be innovative and thought provoking. Another debate about corporate social responsibility is whether corporations can be held to be suffi c iently like persons to be held morally responsible. Dubbink and Smith consider this issue from a Kantian perspective in their paper “A Political Account of Corporate Social Responsibility.” 55 In this article Dubbink and Smith revisit an issue that has longed plagued business ethicists, Does a business organization have the necessary and suf fi cient characteristics of personhood so that it can be held morally responsible independently of any individual or individuals in the corporation. John Ladd and Manny Velasquez were among the early scholars who claimed that a corporation did not have those characteristics. However, in a series of articles, Peter French argued that a corporate internal decision structure did provide a suf fi cient analogy to human personhood so that a corporation could be held morally responsible. 56 Dubbink and Smith propose a set of weaker conditions that would still allow us to speak of corporations per se of either taking or not taking ethical decisions into account. And surprising they appeal to Kantian theory to do so. I say surprisingly because Kant’s theory of ascribing moral responsibility intuitively is very strict. They argue that we humans have reason to look upon corporations as administrators of duty. “Corporations are administrators of duty to the extent that citizens come to expect that the corporation will take into account a relevant set of moral principles when it renders a judgment or decision about what course of action to take.” 57 For Dubbink and Smith, corporate moral responsibility is not about making moral judgments of praise or blame or even of being held accountable for legal sanctions. They note correctly that Kant’s ethics cannot say much about that because, as Kant observed, it is very hard to determine a person’s true motive. With that in mind what Dubbink and Smith need to show is that corporations per se have the ability to take into account moral factors in their decision making process. It should be noted that they accept as fact that corporations have a corporate internal decision making structures along the lines that French presented. The crux of their argument then seems to be as follows: 1. Corporations are capable of rational action planning. Observation and Corporate Internal Decision Making Structures 2. Corporations can act on reasons Observation
55 Dubbink, W. and J. Smith. (2011). “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, XIV(2), 223–246. 56 Ladd, John. (1970). “Morality and the Idea of Rationality in Formal Organizations,” The Monist, 54(4), 47–60 and Velasquez, Manuel. (2003). “Debunking Moral Responsibility,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 13, 531–562; French, Peter. (1979). “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 16(3), 207–215. 57 Dubbink and Smith. “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” p. 233.
70 4 Kantian Themes
3. Corporations can act on moral reasons, because there is nothing special that distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons. Analogy 4 . T he moral reasons that a corporation must take into account are dictated by society Observation 5 . 1 –4 are suffi c ient to say that corporations are able to take ethical considerations into account in their decision making capacity. What corporations cannot do is re fl ectively endorse the moral principles. Corporations are not persons to that extent. Later in the paper, Dubbink and Smith point out that it is one thing to adopt an ethical principle as a reason and quite another to justify that principle or the use of that principle in a particular case. Given their comments about endorsement, I assume they think that corporations cannot give justifi c ations for principles. But I am not convinced here. Is it meaningful to speak of a corporation justifying a principle of fi nance, accounting or marketing? I think it is? Then why can’t it give a justi fi cation of a moral principle as well. See premise 3 in the argument above. What I am arguing is that if the corporate internal decision-making structure is good enough to ground corporate reasons, it is good enough to provide justi fi cation for the reasons it adopts. Either a corporate decision structure works for both or it works for neither. The rub of course is that a corporation is not a conscious being so it cannot refl e ctively endorse. That, I suppose is why we have premise 4. But doesn’t any kind of rational decision making presuppose either consciousness or something suffi c iently analogous? I assume that the corporate internal decision structure is what is supposed to be suffi c iently analogous. Whether the corporation internal decision structure is suffi c iently analogous returns us to the original debate. A s to whether a company can also justify a moral principle if it can comply with a moral principle, Dubbink in correspondence responded as follows: You are right to argue that if a corporation can comply with a moral principle, it can also justify a moral principle-even if we would say that the actual work is done by human beings. Yet we would like to make a distinction between complying with moral principles, justifying moral principles, and grounding moral principles. Grounding is not justifying. It is more like “self-constitution” in Korsgaard’s sense. That is an interesting move and the business ethics community should look forward to more elaboration on the importance of the distinction among these three concepts. Let me return to the earlier issue of corporate personhood. Dubbink and Smith have tried to fi nesse the metaphysical question of corporate personhood be letting the moral principles be determined by society and thus eliminating the need for justifi c ation. In correspondence with Professor Dubbink on this issue, he stated that “We want to get away from ontology as far as possible. So what corporations are or are not is unimportant to us.” However, from my perspective that simply makes the theory of corporate personhood too thin. However, my correspondence with Dubbink throws some additional light on this point. A corporation per se cannot constitute itself because corporations work through proxies (human agents). Thus, corporations are different from human agents. They are “administrators of duty.” Upon further refl e ction, I think that Dubbink and Smith are really closer to the view of Ladd and Velasquez than it might appear at fi rst. Obviously there is great potential here to reopen the corporate personhood debate and the Dubbink/Smith Kantian twist is a genuine contribution to the debate.



Conclusion
I continue to believe as I said in Business Ethics : A Kantian Perspective that the great ethicists such as Aristotle, Kant, and John Stuart Mill have something important to contribute to applied ethics in general and to business ethics in particular. After all if ethical theory cannot be applied by people in their daily lives as they struggle with ethical issues, then we need to rethink whether in fact these ethicists really do have signifi c ant ethical theories. Of course these theories cannot be applied deductively and in the absence of a consideration of context and situation. Applied ethics is not simply a matter of reaching into the ethical theory tool box and picking the right theory to immediately fi x an ethical dilemma. But an ethical theory can help especially once the ethical situation confronting a person or institution is fully examined. All these theories make important contributions but I continue to believe that Kant’s ethical theory is the one that is most robust in business ethics. I am delighted that others fi nd his work inspiring in that regard as well.
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The New Generation of Scholars Applying Kant to Business Ethics scholars particularly, as mentioned, the work of Barbara Herman. Although I am completing a paper that uses the traditional perfect imperfect distinction to specify what is required of corporations to help society, I fi n d the Dubbink/Liedekerke approach to be innovative and thought provoking. Another debate about corporate social responsibility is whether corporations can be held to be suffi c iently like persons to be held morally responsible. Dubbink and Smith consider this issue from a Kantian perspective in their paper “A Political Account of Corporate Social Responsibility.” 55 In this article Dubbink and Smith revisit an issue that has longed plagued business ethicists, Does a business organization have the necessary and suf fi cient characteristics of personhood so that it can be held morally responsible independently of any individual or individuals in the corporation. John Ladd and Manny Velasquez were among the early scholars who claimed that a corporation did not have those characteristics. However, in a series of articles, Peter French argued that a corporate internal decision structure did provide a suf fi cient analogy to human personhood so that a corporation could be held morally responsible. 56 Dubbink and Smith propose a set of weaker conditions that would still allow us to speak of corporations per se of either taking or not taking ethical decisions into account. And surprising they appeal to Kantian theory to do so. I say surprisingly because Kant’s theory of ascribing moral responsibility intuitively is very strict. They argue that we humans have reason to look upon corporations as administrators of duty. “Corporations are administrators of duty to the extent that citizens come to expect that the corporation will take into account a relevant set of moral principles when it renders a judgment or decision about what course of action to take.” 57 For Dubbink and Smith, corporate moral responsibility is not about making moral judgments of praise or blame or even of being held accountable for legal sanctions. They note correctly that Kant’s ethics cannot say much about that because, as Kant observed, it is very hard to determine a person’s true motive. With that in mind what Dubbink and Smith need to show is that corporations per se have the ability to take into account moral factors in their decision making process. It should be noted that they accept as fact that corporations have a corporate internal decision making structures along the lines that French presented. The crux of their argument then seems to be as follows: 1. Corporations are capable of rational action planning. Observation and Corporate Internal Decision Making Structures 2. Corporations can act on reasons Observation 55 Dubbink, W. and J. Smith. (2011). “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, XIV(2), 223–246. 56 Ladd, John. (1970). “Morality and the Idea of Rationality in Formal Organizations,” The Monist, 54(4), 47–60 and Velasquez, Manuel. (2003). “Debunking Moral Responsibility,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 13, 531–562; French, Peter. (1979). “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 16(3), 207–215. 57 Dubbink and Smith. “A Political Account of the Corporation as a Morally Responsible Actor,” p. 233. 70 4 Kantian Themes 3. Corporations can act on moral reasons, because there is nothing special that distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons. Analogy 4 . T he moral reasons that a corporation must take into account are dictated by society Observation 5 . 1 –4 are suffi c ient to say that corporations are able to take ethical considerations into account in their decision making capacity. What corporations cannot do is re fl ectively endorse the moral principles. Corporations are not persons to that extent. Later in the paper, Dubbink and Smith point out that it is one thing to adopt an ethical principle as a reason and quite another to justify that principle or the use of that principle in a particular case. Given their comments about endorsement, I assume they think that corporations cannot give justifi c ations for principles. But I am not convinced here. Is it meaningful to speak of a corporation justifying a principle of fi nance, accounting or marketing? I think it is? Then why can’t it give a justi fi cation of a moral principle as well. See premise 3 in the argument above. What I am arguing is that if the corporate internal decision-making structure is good enough to ground corporate reasons, it is good enough to provide justi fi cation for the reasons it adopts. Either a corporate decision structure works for both or it works for neither. The rub of course is that a corporation is not a conscious being so it cannot refl e ctively endorse. That, I suppose is why we have premise 4. But doesn’t any kind of rational decision making presuppose either consciousness or something suffi c iently analogous? I assume that the corporate internal decision structure is what is supposed to be suffi c iently analogous. Whether the corporation internal decision structure is suffi c iently analogous returns us to the original debate. A s to whether a company can also justify a moral principle if it can comply with a moral principle, Dubbink in correspondence responded as follows: You are right to argue that if a corporation can comply with a moral principle, it can also justify a moral principle-even if we would say that the actual work is done by human beings. Yet we would like to make a distinction between complying with moral principles, justifying moral principles, and grounding moral principles. Grounding is not justifying. It is more like “self-constitution” in Korsgaard’s sense. That is an interesting move and the business ethics community should look forward to more elaboration on the importance of the distinction among these three concepts. Let me return to the earlier issue of corporate personhood. Dubbink and Smith have tried to fi nesse the metaphysical question of corporate personhood be letting the moral principles be determined by society and thus eliminating the need for justifi c ation. In correspondence with Professor Dubbink on this issue, he stated that “We want to get away from ontology as far as possible. So what corporations are or are not is unimportant to us.” However, from my perspective that simply makes the theory of corporate personhood too thin. However, my correspondence with Dubbink throws some additional light on this point. A corporation per se cannot constitute itself because corporations work through proxies (human agents). Thus, corporations are different from human agents. They are “administrators of duty.” Upon further refl e ction, I think that Dubbink and Smith are really closer to the view of Ladd and Velasquez than it might appear at fi rst. Obviously there is great potential here to reopen the corporate personhood debate and the Dubbink/Smith Kantian twist is a genuine contribution to the debate.


Conclusion
I continue to believe as I said in Business Ethics : A Kantian Perspective that the great ethicists such as Aristotle, Kant, and John Stuart Mill have something important to contribute to applied ethics in general and to business ethics in particular. After all if ethical theory cannot be applied by people in their daily lives as they struggle with ethical issues, then we need to rethink whether in fact these ethicists really do have signifi c ant ethical theories. Of course these theories cannot be applied deductively and in the absence of a consideration of context and situation. Applied ethics is not simply a matter of reaching into the ethical theory tool box and picking the right theory to immediately fi x an ethical dilemma. But an ethical theory can help especially once the ethical situation confronting a person or institution is fully examined. All these theories make important contributions but I continue to believe that Kant’s ethical theory is the one that is most robust in business ethics. I am delighted that others fi nd his work inspiring in that regard as well.
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The New Generation of Scholars Menerapkan Kant ke Etika Bisnis
ulama khususnya, seperti yang disebutkan, karya Barbara Herman. Meskipun saya menyelesaikan sebuah makalah yang menggunakan perbedaan yang tidak sempurna tradisional yang sempurna untuk menentukan apa yang dibutuhkan perusahaan-perusahaan untuk membantu masyarakat, saya fi nd pendekatan Dubbink / Liedekerke untuk menjadi inovatif dan merangsang pemikiran. Perdebatan lain tentang tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan adalah apakah perusahaan dapat dianggap suf fi c iently seperti orang yang akan bertanggung jawab secara moral. Dubbink dan Smith mempertimbangkan masalah ini dari perspektif Kantian dalam makalah mereka "Account Politik Corporate Social Responsibility." 55 Dalam artikel ini Dubbink dan Smith kembali masalah yang telah merindukan ahli etika bisnis terganggu, Apakah organisasi bisnis memiliki diperlukan dan suf fi Karakteristik efisien kepribadian sehingga dapat diselenggarakan secara moral bertanggung jawab secara independen dari setiap individu atau individu dalam korporasi. John Ladd dan Manny Velasquez di antara para ulama awal yang menyatakan bahwa sebuah perusahaan tidak memiliki karakteristik. Namun, dalam serangkaian artikel, Peter Perancis berpendapat bahwa struktur keputusan internal perusahaan memang memberikan analogi yang mencukupi untuk kepribadian manusia sehingga perusahaan bisa bertanggung jawab secara moral. 56 Dubbink dan Smith mengusulkan serangkaian kondisi lemah yang masih akan memungkinkan kita untuk berbicara tentang perusahaan per se baik mengambil atau tidak mengambil keputusan etis ke rekening. Dan mengejutkan mereka menarik bagi teori Kantian untuk melakukannya. Saya katakan mengejutkan karena teori Kant menganggap tanggung jawab moral intuitif sangat ketat. Mereka berpendapat bahwa kita manusia memiliki alasan untuk memandang perusahaan sebagai administrator tugas. "Korporasi adalah administrator tugas sejauh warga datang untuk mengharapkan bahwa perusahaan akan mempertimbangkan satu set relevan prinsip-prinsip moral ketika membuat sebuah penilaian atau keputusan tentang tindakan apa yang harus diambil." 57 Untuk Dubbink dan Smith, perusahaan tanggung jawab moral bukan tentang membuat penilaian moral pujian atau menyalahkan atau bahkan yang bertanggung jawab atas sanksi hukum. Mereka mencatat dengan benar bahwa etika Kant tidak bisa mengatakan banyak tentang hal itu karena, seperti Kant mengamati, sangat sulit untuk menentukan motif sejati seseorang. Dengan itu dalam pikiran apa yang Dubbink dan Smith perlu menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan per se memiliki kemampuan untuk memperhitungkan faktor-faktor moral dalam proses pengambilan keputusan mereka. Perlu dicatat bahwa mereka menerima sebagai fakta bahwa perusahaan memiliki keputusan internal perusahaan membuat struktur sepanjang garis yang disajikan Perancis. Inti dari argumen mereka kemudian tampaknya sebagai berikut: 1. Perusahaan mampu perencanaan tindakan rasional. Observasi dan Corporate internal Struktur Pengambilan Keputusan 2. Perusahaan dapat bertindak atas alasan Pengamatan
55 Dubbink, W. dan J. Smith. (2011). "Akun Politik Corporation sebagai Aktor moral bertanggung jawab," Teori Etika dan Moral Practice, XIV (2), 223-246. 56 Ladd, John. (1970). "Moralitas dan Ide Rasionalitas dalam Organisasi Formal," The Monist, 54 (4), 47-60 dan Velasquez, Manuel. (2003). "Membongkar Tanggung Jawab Moral," Etika Bisnis Quarterly, 13, 531-562; Perancis, Peter. (1979). "The Corporation sebagai Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (3), 207-215. 57 Dubbink dan Smith. "Akun Politik Corporation sebagai Aktor moral bertanggung jawab," hal. 233.
70 4 Kantian Tema
3. Perusahaan dapat bertindak atas alasan moral, karena tidak ada yang khusus yang membedakan alasan moral dari jenis lain alasan. Analogi 4. T dia alasan moral bahwa sebuah perusahaan harus memperhitungkan ditentukan oleh Pengamatan masyarakat 5. 1 -4 adalah suf ​​fi c recipient untuk mengatakan bahwa perusahaan dapat mengambil pertimbangan etika dipertimbangkan dalam keputusan mereka membuat kapasitas. Apa perusahaan tidak bisa lakukan adalah kembali fl ectively mendukung prinsip-prinsip moral. Perusahaan tidak orang sejauh itu. Kemudian di koran, Dubbink dan Smith menunjukkan bahwa itu adalah satu hal untuk mengadopsi prinsip etika sebagai alasan dan cukup lain untuk membenarkan bahwa prinsip atau penggunaan prinsip bahwa dalam kasus tertentu. Mengingat komentar mereka tentang dukungan, saya menganggap mereka berpikir bahwa perusahaan tidak bisa memberikan pembenaran fi c negosiasi untuk prinsip-prinsip. Tapi aku tidak yakin di sini. Apakah berarti berbicara tentang sebuah perusahaan yang membenarkan prinsip keuangan, akuntansi atau pemasaran? Saya pikir itu? Lalu mengapa tidak bisa itu memberikan fi kasi pembenaran dari prinsip moral juga. Lihat premis 3 dalam argumen di atas. Apa yang saya berdebat adalah bahwa jika internal struktur pengambilan keputusan perusahaan cukup baik untuk tanah alasan perusahaan, itu cukup baik untuk memberikan pembenaran untuk alasan itu mengadopsi. Entah struktur keputusan perusahaan bekerja untuk kedua atau bekerja untuk keduanya. Menggosok tentu saja adalah bahwa perusahaan bukanlah makhluk sadar sehingga tidak dapat kembali fl e ctively mendukung. Itu, saya kira adalah mengapa kita memiliki premis 4. Tetapi tidak setiap jenis keputusan rasional membuat mengandaikan baik kesadaran atau sesuatu suf fi c iently analog? Saya berasumsi bahwa struktur keputusan internal perusahaan adalah apa yang seharusnya SUF fi c iently analog. Apakah struktur keputusan intern perusahaan adalah suf ​​fi c iently kembali analog kita untuk perdebatan aslinya. Sebuah s apakah sebuah perusahaan juga dapat membenarkan prinsip moral jika dapat mematuhi prinsip moral, Dubbink dalam korespondensi menanggapi sebagai berikut: Anda benar untuk menyatakan bahwa jika sebuah perusahaan dapat mematuhi prinsip moral, juga dapat membenarkan moral Prinsip-bahkan jika kita akan mengatakan bahwa pekerjaan yang sebenarnya dilakukan oleh manusia. Namun kami ingin membuat perbedaan antara mematuhi prinsip-prinsip moral, membenarkan prinsip moral, dan landasan prinsip-prinsip moral. Grounding tidak membenarkan. Hal ini lebih seperti "self-konstitusi" dalam arti Korsgaard itu. Itu merupakan langkah yang menarik dan masyarakat etika bisnis harus melihat ke depan untuk lebih elaborasi tentang pentingnya perbedaan antara ketiga konsep. Mari saya kembali ke masalah awal kepribadian perusahaan. Dubbink dan Smith telah mencoba untuk fi Nesse pertanyaan metafisik kepribadian perusahaan menjadi membiarkan prinsip-prinsip moral ditentukan oleh masyarakat dan dengan demikian menghilangkan kebutuhan untuk pembenaran fi c asi. Dalam korespondensi dengan Profesor Dubbink tentang masalah ini, ia menyatakan bahwa "Kami ingin pergi dari ontologi sejauh mungkin. Jadi apa yang perusahaan yang atau tidak adalah penting bagi kami. "Namun, dari perspektif saya yang hanya membuat teori kepribadian perusahaan terlalu tipis. Namun, korespondensi saya dengan Dubbink melempar beberapa cahaya tambahan pada titik ini. Sebuah perusahaan per se tidak dapat merupakan sendiri karena perusahaan bekerja melalui proxy (agen manusia). Dengan demikian, perusahaan-perusahaan yang berbeda dari agen manusia. Mereka adalah "administrator tugas." Setelah kembali lanjut fl e ksi, saya berpikir bahwa Dubbink dan Smith benar-benar dekat dengan pandangan Ladd dan Velasquez daripada mungkin muncul di pertama. Jelas ada potensi besar di sini untuk membuka kembali perdebatan kepribadian perusahaan dan twist Dubbink / Smith Kantian adalah kontribusi nyata terhadap perdebatan. Kesimpulan saya tetap percaya seperti yang saya katakan di Etika Bisnis: Sebuah Perspektif Kantian bahwa ahli etika besar seperti Aristoteles, Kant, dan John Stuart Mill memiliki sesuatu yang penting untuk berkontribusi etika terapan pada umumnya dan etika bisnis pada khususnya. Setelah semua jika teori etika tidak dapat diterapkan oleh orang-orang dalam kehidupan sehari-hari mereka karena mereka berjuang dengan masalah etika, maka kita perlu memikirkan kembali apakah sebenarnya ahli etika ini benar-benar memiliki signi fi c teori etika semut. Tentu saja teori ini tidak dapat diterapkan secara deduktif dan tanpa adanya pertimbangan dari konteks dan situasi. Etika terapan bukan hanya soal menjangkau ke dalam kotak teori alat etis dan memilih teori yang tepat untuk segera fi x dilema etika. Tapi teori etika dapat membantu terutama setelah situasi etis yang dihadapi seseorang atau lembaga yang diperiksa sepenuhnya. Semua teori ini memberikan kontribusi penting tapi saya tetap percaya bahwa teori etika Kant adalah salah satu yang paling kuat dalam etika bisnis. Saya senang bahwa orang lain fi nd karyanya inspirasi dalam hal itu juga.





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