PreparationsThe first step involved

Preparations

The first step involved the establishment at 5:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1 (while the P-valve lines were still on fire), of an “emergency response unit” at Aisin to centralize and coordinate efforts to deal with the crisis in an orderly and organized manner. At 6:30 a.m., the unit was reorganized and divided into four teams, dealing respectively with production (for example, the setting up of alternative production sites), materials handling (for example, the delivery of materials to those sites), liaison with customers (for example, Toyota, which was immediately contacted), and general affairs (e.g., negotiations with Aisin’s union). The unit’s first meeting was held at noon; twenty-seven meetings subsequently took place until February 21. The second step involved contacting potential collaborators and deciding who would do what, since many kinds of P-valves were needed (there are more than 100 main types of P-valves) and available equipment and capacity differed from firm to firm. After consulting its clients on which P-valves should be given priority, Aisin started as early as Sunday, February 2 (the day after the fire), to fax design drawings to various firms that had already voluntarily offered their help (e.g., Taiho Kogyo, which had contacted Aisin on hearing about the fire on the radio) or had agreed to the request of Aisin or its clients (for example, Kayaba, which was asked for help on the day of the fire by Mitsubishi Motors and the next day by Toyota and Aisin).

In many respects, of course, the firms that “voluntarily” offered their help were forced to cooperate with Aisin and Toyota. Failure to do so might have jeopardized future business relations with Toyota-group firms; moreover, because of JIT, most suppliers were losing millions of yen every day that Toyota plants remained shut down. Still, cooperation worked both ways. For example, Toyota chose not to put pressure on Aisin to give priority to its own models to the detriment of Aisin’s other clients, such as Mitsubishi, even though it could have easily done so given Aisin’s financial and commercial dependence on Toyota. Pressuring Aisin would have yielded Toyota short-term gains, but in the long run, the parties concerned would remember such actions and possibly retaliate in some fashion.

After reviewing the faxed design drawings, its equipment availability, and its pertinent technical capabilities, each firm had to notify Aisin of its decision on whether to participate in the recovery effort. The process was not easy because most of the firms had never produced P-valves and knew little about the technical implications of P-valve production. Moreover, the design drawings they received lacked necessary technical details for first-timers and needed to be decoded into something more readily understandable.

To make matters worse, P-valve production had to be organized without Aisin’s special-purpose machines and drills because these were seriously damaged in the fire. As noted earlier, P-valves require highly precise machining, and to manufacture more than 30,000 of them a day requires highly customized jigs, drills, and transfer machines. Instead, firms would have to rely on general-purpose machines such as machining centers to manufacture P-valves, which most firms already possessed. This method would mean much higher labor content and lower productivity than usual.

Compounding the problem, Aisin’s know-how was largely restricted to the special-purpose transfer machines, making it difficult for Aisin to instruct firms on how to manufacture P-valves by other means. Furthermore, although a few drills were salvaged from the fire, there were only enough to allocate one drill per firm, which slowed down production because the drill had to be used with extra caution to avoid breaking. Moreover, not one but many different drills were needed, and the scarce ones received from Aisin were not a perfect match for machining centers.

Yet another problem was the difficulty in controlling quality without Aisin’s special-purpose gauges. To ensure the reliability and durability of the brake system, quality control is very strict, involving at least seventy inspection steps per piece. Even though Aisin was to double-check every incoming P-valve, firms had to conduct some form of quality control before delivery, using general-purpose gauges.

Finally, in the first few days of the crisis, Aisin was in a state of chaos and was difficult to contact. Indeed, so confused were conditions at Aisin that during the evening of the first day of the fire, Taiho Kogyo’s director of production control was wrongly informed that master cylinders, not P-valves, were the main problem for Aisin. Within days, Aisin installed 250 additional fixed phones and 300 mobile phones in an attempt to accommodate skyrocketing inquiries. The magnitude of incoming calls, however, overwhelmed Aisin’s capacity to respond.

Because Aisin lacked sufficient resources to provide direct assistance to every firm at once, collaborating firms had to figure out by themselves how to program their machining centers for P-valve production and find or make appropriate drills. For example, Denso scrambled for drills from all over Japan and even sourced some special ones from a U.S. maker arranged for by Denso’s Tennessee plant. Although Aisin supported these efforts as much as it could by setting up a “drill center” to coordinate drill purchases and by organizing meetings to discuss technical problems and solutions, firms had to rely largely on their own capabilities to begin P-valve production.

For all these reasons, many firms declined to help at all, judging their equipment and capabilities insufficient to manufacture P-valves. But many accepted, including Denso, Taiho, Kayaba, and Toyota, which agreed to manufacture between two and five types of P-valves each. These and other firms then immediately started preparations for P-valve production.

At this point, significant differences in the firms’ approaches to P-valve production emerged. Denso gave full priority to in-house P-valve production, and some of Denso’s other processes were temporarily outsourced to make room for P-valves. In all, about forty machining centers were made available at Denso for P-valve production. Taiho met with thirty of its suppliers the day after the fire to plan an appropriate division of labor, eventually involving eleven suppliers in the effort, with Taiho itself taking charge of the final processes. Fifty machining centers were made available at two of the firm’s three local plants.

Toyota set up temporary production sites in its Honsha plant, entrusting P-valve production to the division responsible for experimental prototype production and machinery maintenance, whose engineers and operators possessed considerable knowhow in setting up machines for new models and preparing the transition to volume production. Kayaba’s approach involved outsourcing P-valves to three of its suppliers, with no actual P-valve production taking place in any of its own factories. It chose three prototype specialists, the largest with 110 employees and the others with only sixteen and six employees, respectively. Originally Kayaba had contacted about ten suppliers, of which three were chosen on the basis of equipment availability and technical capabilities.

At this stage, the collaborating firms established their own “emergency response units” to coordinate P-valve production activities. A challenge for many firms was to ensure close collaboration among usually remotely related units. Kayaba set up a special team, under the direction of Kayaba’s director of production engineering, to centralize control and coordinate activities with the suppliers concerned; the team was composed of sixteen employees from the quality assurance, production engineering, and purchasing departments. Three salespeople were also dispatched to Aisin to obtain real-time information and feedback. At Toyota, the production control department was put in charge of coordinating in-house P-valve production and direct assistance to Aisin.

Production Begins

Preparations

The first step involved the establishment at 5:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1 (while the P-valve lines were still on fire), of an “emergency response unit” at Aisin to centralize and coordinate efforts to deal with the crisis in an orderly and organized manner. At 6:30 a.m., the unit was reorganized and divided into four teams, dealing respectively with production (for example, the setting up of alternative production sites), materials handling (for example, the delivery of materials to those sites), liaison with customers (for example, Toyota, which was immediately contacted), and general affairs (e.g., negotiations with Aisin’s union). The unit’s first meeting was held at noon; twenty-seven meetings subsequently took place until February 21. The second step involved contacting potential collaborators and deciding who would do what, since many kinds of P-valves were needed (there are more than 100 main types of P-valves) and available equipment and capacity differed from firm to firm. After consulting its clients on which P-valves should be given priority, Aisin started as early as Sunday, February 2 (the day after the fire), to fax design drawings to various firms that had already voluntarily offered their help (e.g., Taiho Kogyo, which had contacted Aisin on hearing about the fire on the radio) or had agreed to the request of Aisin or its clients (for example, Kayaba, which was asked for help on the day of the fire by Mitsubishi Motors and the next day by Toyota and Aisin).

In many respects, of course, the firms that “voluntarily” offered their help were forced to cooperate with Aisin and Toyota. Failure to do so might have jeopardized future business relations with Toyota-group firms; moreover, because of JIT, most suppliers were losing millions of yen every day that Toyota plants remained shut down. Still, cooperation worked both ways. For example, Toyota chose not to put pressure on Aisin to give priority to its own models to the detriment of Aisin’s other clients, such as Mitsubishi, even though it could have easily done so given Aisin’s financial and commercial dependence on Toyota. Pressuring Aisin would have yielded Toyota short-term gains, but in the long run, the parties concerned would remember such actions and possibly retaliate in some fashion.

After reviewing the faxed design drawings, its equipment availability, and its pertinent technical capabilities, each firm had to notify Aisin of its decision on whether to participate in the recovery effort. The process was not easy because most of the firms had never produced P-valves and knew little about the technical implications of P-valve production. Moreover, the design drawings they received lacked necessary technical details for first-timers and needed to be decoded into something more readily understandable.

To make matters worse, P-valve production had to be organized without Aisin’s special-purpose machines and drills because these were seriously damaged in the fire. As noted earlier, P-valves require highly precise machining, and to manufacture more than 30,000 of them a day requires highly customized jigs, drills, and transfer machines. Instead, firms would have to rely on general-purpose machines such as machining centers to manufacture P-valves, which most firms already possessed. This method would mean much higher labor content and lower productivity than usual.

Compounding the problem, Aisin’s know-how was largely restricted to the special-purpose transfer machines, making it difficult for Aisin to instruct firms on how to manufacture P-valves by other means. Furthermore, although a few drills were salvaged from the fire, there were only enough to allocate one drill per firm, which slowed down production because the drill had to be used with extra caution to avoid breaking. Moreover, not one but many different drills were needed, and the scarce ones received from Aisin were not a perfect match for machining centers.

Yet another problem was the difficulty in controlling quality without Aisin’s special-purpose gauges. To ensure the reliability and durability of the brake system, quality control is very strict, involving at least seventy inspection steps per piece. Even though Aisin was to double-check every incoming P-valve, firms had to conduct some form of quality control before delivery, using general-purpose gauges.

Finally, in the first few days of the crisis, Aisin was in a state of chaos and was difficult to contact. Indeed, so confused were conditions at Aisin that during the evening of the first day of the fire, Taiho Kogyo’s director of production control was wrongly informed that master cylinders, not P-valves, were the main problem for Aisin. Within days, Aisin installed 250 additional fixed phones and 300 mobile phones in an attempt to accommodate skyrocketing inquiries. The magnitude of incoming calls, however, overwhelmed Aisin’s capacity to respond.

Because Aisin lacked sufficient resources to provide direct assistance to every firm at once, collaborating firms had to figure out by themselves how to program their machining centers for P-valve production and find or make appropriate drills. For example, Denso scrambled for drills from all over Japan and even sourced some special ones from a U.S. maker arranged for by Denso’s Tennessee plant. Although Aisin supported these efforts as much as it could by setting up a “drill center” to coordinate drill purchases and by organizing meetings to discuss technical problems and solutions, firms had to rely largely on their own capabilities to begin P-valve production.

For all these reasons, many firms declined to help at all, judging their equipment and capabilities insufficient to manufacture P-valves. But many accepted, including Denso, Taiho, Kayaba, and Toyota, which agreed to manufacture between two and five types of P-valves each. These and other firms then immediately started preparations for P-valve production.

At this point, significant differences in the firms’ approaches to P-valve production emerged. Denso gave full priority to in-house P-valve production, and some of Denso’s other processes were temporarily outsourced to make room for P-valves. In all, about forty machining centers were made available at Denso for P-valve production. Taiho met with thirty of its suppliers the day after the fire to plan an appropriate division of labor, eventually involving eleven suppliers in the effort, with Taiho itself taking charge of the final processes. Fifty machining centers were made available at two of the firm’s three local plants.

Toyota set up temporary production sites in its Honsha plant, entrusting P-valve production to the division responsible for experimental prototype production and machinery maintenance, whose engineers and operators possessed considerable knowhow in setting up machines for new models and preparing the transition to volume production. Kayaba’s approach involved outsourcing P-valves to three of its suppliers, with no actual P-valve production taking place in any of its own factories. It chose three prototype specialists, the largest with 110 employees and the others with only sixteen and six employees, respectively. Originally Kayaba had contacted about ten suppliers, of which three were chosen on the basis of equipment availability and technical capabilities.

At this stage, the collaborating firms established their own “emergency response units” to coordinate P-valve production activities. A challenge for many firms was to ensure close collaboration among usually remotely related units. Kayaba set up a special team, under the direction of Kayaba’s director of production engineering, to centralize control and coordinate activities with the suppliers concerned; the team was composed of sixteen employees from the quality assurance, production engineering, and purchasing departments. Three salespeople were also dispatched to Aisin to obtain real-time information and feedback. At Toyota, the production control department was put in charge of coordinating in-house P-valve production and direct assistance to Aisin.

Production Begins

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PreparationsThe first step involved the establishment at 5:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1 (while the P-valve lines were still on fire), of an “emergency response unit” at Aisin to centralize and coordinate efforts to deal with the crisis in an orderly and organized manner. At 6:30 a.m., the unit was reorganized and divided into four teams, dealing respectively with production (for example, the setting up of alternative production sites), materials handling (for example, the delivery of materials to those sites), liaison with customers (for example, Toyota, which was immediately contacted), and general affairs (e.g., negotiations with Aisin’s union). The unit’s first meeting was held at noon; twenty-seven meetings subsequently took place until February 21. The second step involved contacting potential collaborators and deciding who would do what, since many kinds of P-valves were needed (there are more than 100 main types of P-valves) and available equipment and capacity differed from firm to firm. After consulting its clients on which P-valves should be given priority, Aisin started as early as Sunday, February 2 (the day after the fire), to fax design drawings to various firms that had already voluntarily offered their help (e.g., Taiho Kogyo, which had contacted Aisin on hearing about the fire on the radio) or had agreed to the request of Aisin or its clients (for example, Kayaba, which was asked for help on the day of the fire by Mitsubishi Motors and the next day by Toyota and Aisin).In many respects, of course, the firms that “voluntarily” offered their help were forced to cooperate with Aisin and Toyota. Failure to do so might have jeopardized future business relations with Toyota-group firms; moreover, because of JIT, most suppliers were losing millions of yen every day that Toyota plants remained shut down. Still, cooperation worked both ways. For example, Toyota chose not to put pressure on Aisin to give priority to its own models to the detriment of Aisin’s other clients, such as Mitsubishi, even though it could have easily done so given Aisin’s financial and commercial dependence on Toyota. Pressuring Aisin would have yielded Toyota short-term gains, but in the long run, the parties concerned would remember such actions and possibly retaliate in some fashion.After reviewing the faxed design drawings, its equipment availability, and its pertinent technical capabilities, each firm had to notify Aisin of its decision on whether to participate in the recovery effort. The process was not easy because most of the firms had never produced P-valves and knew little about the technical implications of P-valve production. Moreover, the design drawings they received lacked necessary technical details for first-timers and needed to be decoded into something more readily understandable.To make matters worse, P-valve production had to be organized without Aisin’s special-purpose machines and drills because these were seriously damaged in the fire. As noted earlier, P-valves require highly precise machining, and to manufacture more than 30,000 of them a day requires highly customized jigs, drills, and transfer machines. Instead, firms would have to rely on general-purpose machines such as machining centers to manufacture P-valves, which most firms already possessed. This method would mean much higher labor content and lower productivity than usual.Compounding the problem, Aisin’s know-how was largely restricted to the special-purpose transfer machines, making it difficult for Aisin to instruct firms on how to manufacture P-valves by other means. Furthermore, although a few drills were salvaged from the fire, there were only enough to allocate one drill per firm, which slowed down production because the drill had to be used with extra caution to avoid breaking. Moreover, not one but many different drills were needed, and the scarce ones received from Aisin were not a perfect match for machining centers.Yet another problem was the difficulty in controlling quality without Aisin’s special-purpose gauges. To ensure the reliability and durability of the brake system, quality control is very strict, involving at least seventy inspection steps per piece. Even though Aisin was to double-check every incoming P-valve, firms had to conduct some form of quality control before delivery, using general-purpose gauges.
Finally, in the first few days of the crisis, Aisin was in a state of chaos and was difficult to contact. Indeed, so confused were conditions at Aisin that during the evening of the first day of the fire, Taiho Kogyo’s director of production control was wrongly informed that master cylinders, not P-valves, were the main problem for Aisin. Within days, Aisin installed 250 additional fixed phones and 300 mobile phones in an attempt to accommodate skyrocketing inquiries. The magnitude of incoming calls, however, overwhelmed Aisin’s capacity to respond.

Because Aisin lacked sufficient resources to provide direct assistance to every firm at once, collaborating firms had to figure out by themselves how to program their machining centers for P-valve production and find or make appropriate drills. For example, Denso scrambled for drills from all over Japan and even sourced some special ones from a U.S. maker arranged for by Denso’s Tennessee plant. Although Aisin supported these efforts as much as it could by setting up a “drill center” to coordinate drill purchases and by organizing meetings to discuss technical problems and solutions, firms had to rely largely on their own capabilities to begin P-valve production.

For all these reasons, many firms declined to help at all, judging their equipment and capabilities insufficient to manufacture P-valves. But many accepted, including Denso, Taiho, Kayaba, and Toyota, which agreed to manufacture between two and five types of P-valves each. These and other firms then immediately started preparations for P-valve production.

At this point, significant differences in the firms’ approaches to P-valve production emerged. Denso gave full priority to in-house P-valve production, and some of Denso’s other processes were temporarily outsourced to make room for P-valves. In all, about forty machining centers were made available at Denso for P-valve production. Taiho met with thirty of its suppliers the day after the fire to plan an appropriate division of labor, eventually involving eleven suppliers in the effort, with Taiho itself taking charge of the final processes. Fifty machining centers were made available at two of the firm’s three local plants.

Toyota set up temporary production sites in its Honsha plant, entrusting P-valve production to the division responsible for experimental prototype production and machinery maintenance, whose engineers and operators possessed considerable knowhow in setting up machines for new models and preparing the transition to volume production. Kayaba’s approach involved outsourcing P-valves to three of its suppliers, with no actual P-valve production taking place in any of its own factories. It chose three prototype specialists, the largest with 110 employees and the others with only sixteen and six employees, respectively. Originally Kayaba had contacted about ten suppliers, of which three were chosen on the basis of equipment availability and technical capabilities.

At this stage, the collaborating firms established their own “emergency response units” to coordinate P-valve production activities. A challenge for many firms was to ensure close collaboration among usually remotely related units. Kayaba set up a special team, under the direction of Kayaba’s director of production engineering, to centralize control and coordinate activities with the suppliers concerned; the team was composed of sixteen employees from the quality assurance, production engineering, and purchasing departments. Three salespeople were also dispatched to Aisin to obtain real-time information and feedback. At Toyota, the production control department was put in charge of coordinating in-house P-valve production and direct assistance to Aisin.

Production Begins

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Persiapan Langkah pertama melibatkan pembentukan di 5:30 pada Sabtu, 1 Februari (sedangkan garis P-katup masih terbakar), sebuah "unit tanggap darurat" di Aisin untuk memusatkan dan mengkoordinasikan upaya-upaya untuk menangani krisis di secara tertib dan teratur. At 6:30 am, unit direorganisasi dan dibagi menjadi empat tim, masing-masing berurusan dengan produksi (misalnya, mendirikan tempat produksi alternatif), bahan penanganan (misalnya, pengiriman bahan ke situs tersebut), penghubung dengan pelanggan (misalnya, Toyota, yang segera menghubungi), dan urusan umum (misalnya, negosiasi dengan serikat Aisin). Pertemuan pertama unit diadakan pada siang hari; dua puluh tujuh pertemuan selanjutnya berlangsung sampai Februari 21. Langkah kedua melibatkan menghubungi kolaborator potensial dan memutuskan siapa yang akan melakukan apa, karena banyak jenis P-katup yang dibutuhkan (ada lebih dari 100 jenis utama dari P-katup) dan peralatan yang tersedia dan kapasitas berbeda dari perusahaan ke perusahaan. Setelah konsultasi klien yang P-katup harus diberikan prioritas, Aisin mulai sedini Minggu 2 Februari (hari setelah kebakaran), fax gambar desain untuk berbagai perusahaan yang telah secara sukarela menawarkan bantuan mereka (misalnya, Taiho Kogyo , yang telah menghubungi Aisin mendengar tentang api di radio) atau telah menyetujui permintaan Aisin atau klien (misalnya, Kayaba, yang meminta bantuan pada hari api dengan Mitsubishi Motors dan hari berikutnya oleh Toyota dan Aisin). Dalam banyak hal, tentu saja, perusahaan-perusahaan yang "sukarela" menawarkan bantuan mereka dipaksa untuk bekerja sama dengan Aisin dan Toyota. Kegagalan untuk melakukannya mungkin membahayakan hubungan bisnis masa depan dengan perusahaan Toyota-kelompok; Selain itu, karena JIT, sebagian besar pemasok kehilangan jutaan yen setiap hari bahwa tanaman Toyota tetap ditutup. Namun, kerja sama bekerja dua arah. Sebagai contoh, Toyota memilih untuk tidak memberikan tekanan pada Aisin untuk memberikan prioritas untuk model sendiri yang merugikan klien lain Aisin, seperti Mitsubishi, meskipun itu bisa dengan mudah melakukannya mengingat ketergantungan keuangan dan komersial Aisin pada Toyota. Menekan Aisin akan menghasilkan Toyota keuntungan jangka pendek, tapi dalam jangka panjang, pihak yang bersangkutan akan mengingat tindakan tersebut dan mungkin membalas dalam beberapa mode. Setelah meninjau gambar yang dikirim melalui faks desain, ketersediaan peralatan, serta kemampuan teknis yang bersangkutan, setiap perusahaan harus memberitahukan Aisin dari keputusannya apakah akan berpartisipasi dalam upaya pemulihan. Proses itu tidak mudah karena sebagian besar perusahaan tidak pernah diproduksi P-katup dan tahu sedikit tentang implikasi teknis produksi P-katup. Selain itu, gambar desain yang mereka terima tidak memiliki rincian teknis yang diperlukan untuk pertama-timer dan perlu diterjemahkan menjadi sesuatu yang lebih mudah dipahami. Untuk membuat keadaan menjadi lebih buruk, produksi P-katup harus diselenggarakan tanpa mesin tujuan khusus Aisin dan latihan karena ini adalah rusak parah dalam api. Seperti disebutkan sebelumnya, P-katup membutuhkan mesin yang sangat tepat, dan untuk memproduksi lebih dari 30.000 dari mereka sehari membutuhkan sangat disesuaikan jig, latihan, dan mesin transfer. Sebaliknya, perusahaan akan harus bergantung pada mesin untuk keperluan umum seperti pusat mesin untuk memproduksi P-katup, yang sebagian besar perusahaan sudah dimiliki. Metode ini berarti konten tenaga kerja jauh lebih tinggi dan produktivitas rendah dari biasanya. Peracikan masalah, Aisin tahu-bagaimana sebagian besar terbatas pada mesin transfer tujuan khusus, sehingga sulit bagi Aisin untuk menginstruksikan perusahaan mengenai cara pembuatan P-katup oleh lainnya berarti. Selanjutnya, meskipun beberapa latihan yang diselamatkan dari api, ada hanya cukup untuk mengalokasikan satu bor per perusahaan, yang melambat produksi karena bor harus digunakan dengan ekstra hati-hati untuk menghindari melanggar. Selain itu, bukan hanya satu tapi banyak berbeda latihan yang diperlukan, dan yang langka yang diterima dari Aisin tidak cocok untuk mesin pusat. Namun masalah lain adalah kesulitan dalam mengontrol kualitas tanpa Aisin tujuan khusus alat pengukur. Untuk menjamin kehandalan dan daya tahan sistem rem, kontrol kualitas sangat ketat, melibatkan setidaknya tujuh langkah pemeriksaan per potong. Meskipun Aisin adalah untuk melipatgandakan-memeriksa setiap masuk P-katup, perusahaan harus melakukan beberapa bentuk kontrol kualitas sebelum pengiriman, menggunakan alat pengukur tujuan umum. Akhirnya, dalam beberapa hari pertama krisis, Aisin adalah dalam keadaan chaos dan sulit untuk menghubungi. Memang, jadi bingung adalah kondisi di Aisin bahwa selama malam hari pertama api, direktur Taiho Kogyo tentang pengendalian produksi keliru diberitahu bahwa master silinder, tidak P-katup, adalah masalah utama bagi Aisin. Dalam beberapa hari, Aisin dipasang 250 telepon tetap tambahan dan 300 ponsel dalam upaya untuk mengakomodasi melonjaknya permintaan. Besarnya panggilan masuk, namun, kewalahan kapasitas Aisin untuk merespon. Karena Aisin tidak memiliki sumber daya yang cukup untuk memberikan bantuan langsung kepada setiap perusahaan sekaligus, berkolaborasi perusahaan harus mencari tahu sendiri bagaimana program pusat mesin mereka untuk produksi P-katup dan menemukan atau membuat latihan yang sesuai. Misalnya, Denso bergegas untuk latihan dari seluruh Jepang dan bahkan bersumber beberapa yang khusus dari pembuat AS diatur oleh Denso tanaman Tennessee. Meskipun Aisin mendukung upaya ini sebanyak itu bisa dengan mendirikan sebuah "pusat bor" untuk mengkoordinasikan pembelian bor dan dengan menyelenggarakan pertemuan untuk membahas masalah teknis dan solusi, perusahaan harus mengandalkan sebagian besar pada kemampuan mereka sendiri untuk memulai produksi P-katup. Untuk semua alasan ini, banyak perusahaan menolak untuk membantu sama sekali, menilai peralatan dan kemampuan mereka tidak cukup untuk memproduksi P-katup. Tapi banyak diterima, termasuk Denso, Taiho, Kayaba, dan Toyota, yang setuju untuk memproduksi antara dua dan lima jenis P-katup setiap. Ini dan perusahaan lain kemudian segera mulai persiapan untuk produksi P-katup. Pada titik ini, perbedaan yang signifikan dalam pendekatan perusahaan 'produksi P-katup muncul. Denso memberikan prioritas penuh untuk produksi P-katup di-rumah, dan beberapa proses lainnya Denso untuk sementara outsourcing untuk membuat ruang untuk P-katup. Dalam semua, sekitar empat puluh pusat mesin dibuat tersedia di Denso untuk produksi P-katup. Taiho bertemu dengan tiga puluh pemasoknya hari setelah kebakaran untuk merencanakan pembagian yang tepat kerja, akhirnya melibatkan sebelas pemasok dalam upaya, dengan Taiho sendiri mengambil alih proses akhir. Lima puluh pusat mesin dibuat tersedia di dua dari tiga tanaman lokal perusahaan. Toyota menyiapkan tempat produksi sementara di pabrik Honsha nya, mempercayakan produksi P-katup ke divisi yang bertanggung jawab untuk produksi prototipe eksperimental dan pemeliharaan mesin, yang insinyur dan operator memiliki knowhow cukup dalam mendirikan mesin untuk model-model baru dan mempersiapkan transisi ke volume produksi. Pendekatan Kayaba terlibat Outsourcing P-katup tiga pemasoknya, dengan tidak ada produksi P-katup yang sebenarnya terjadi di salah satu pabrik sendiri. Ini memilih tiga spesialis prototipe, yang terbesar dengan 110 karyawan dan lain-lain dengan hanya enam belas dan enam karyawan, masing-masing. Awalnya Kayaba telah menghubungi sekitar sepuluh pemasok, yang tiga dipilih atas dasar ketersediaan peralatan dan kemampuan teknis. Pada tahap ini, perusahaan berkolaborasi mendirikan sendiri "unit tanggap darurat" mereka untuk mengkoordinasikan kegiatan produksi P-katup. Sebuah tantangan bagi banyak perusahaan adalah untuk memastikan kolaborasi yang erat antara unit-unit biasanya jauh terkait. Kayaba membentuk tim khusus, di bawah arahan sutradara Kayaba teknik produksi, untuk memusatkan kontrol dan mengkoordinasikan kegiatan dengan pemasok yang bersangkutan; Tim itu terdiri dari enam belas karyawan dari jaminan kualitas, teknik produksi, dan departemen pembelian. Tiga penjual juga dikirim ke Aisin untuk mendapatkan informasi real-time dan umpan balik. Di Toyota, departemen pengendalian produksi ditugaskan koordinasi di-rumah produksi P-katup dan bantuan langsung kepada Aisin. Produksi Dimulai

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