The Effects of Equalization A numbe

The Effects of Equalization A number of economics studies have evaluated the
effects of school finance equalization. These studies generally agree that equalization
laws have had the intended effect of equalizing school spending across communities,
and spending equalization appears to have led to an equalization in
student outcomes as well. Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998), for example, concluded
that court -ordered equalizations reduced in -state spending inequality by
19 to 34%. Card and Payne (2002) found that equalizations narrowed the gap in
average SAT scores between children with highly educated and children with
poorly educated parents by 8 points, or roughly 5% of the gap.
There is less agreement about whether this equalization has come about by
raising spending among low -spending districts, lowering spending among
high-spending districts, or both. A careful study of this question is provided by
Hoxby (2001), who computed the tax price of school equalization schemes,
the amount of revenue a local district would have to raise in order to gain
$1 more of spending. California districts face an infinite tax price: no matter
how much revenue they raise through local taxation, they can’t raise their local
education spending to more than $350 per pupil above the lowest district.
New Jersey’s districts mostly have tax prices of less than 1: a district might raise
$0.60 of its own revenue in order to receive $0.40 in state aid for a total of
$1 in increased spending. This district would thus have a tax price of 0.6.
Hoxby found that extreme equalization schemes with very high tax prices,
such as California’s, lead to an overall reduction in per -pupil spending. Since any
taxes that towns raise beyond the minimum level (plus $350) are simply taken by
the state and redistributed to other districts, there is an incentive to cut taxes and
reduce spending. California’s equalization caused a drop in per -pupil spending
of 15%; New Mexico’s spending dropped by 13%; and Oklahoma’s, Utah’s, and
Arizona’s spending dropped by 10%. States like California equalized per -pupil
spending but only by “leveling down”—that is, lowering the overall education
spending across all districts. The result has been a general deterioration in the
quality of public schools and a flight to private schools by students who can
afford it. Equalization schemes with low tax prices, such as those in New Jersey New York, and Pennsylvania, actually raised per -pupil spending by 7–8%; these
states therefore managed to “level up.” Thus, school finance equalization can
achieve its intended effects of improving the educational spending of low -wealth
districts only if the system is designed in a way that gives those districts incentive
to raise their spending without excessively penalizing higher -wealth districts.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

The Effects of Equalization A number of economics studies have evaluated theeffects of school finance equalization. These studies generally agree that equalizationlaws have had the intended effect of equalizing school spending across communities,and spending equalization appears to have led to an equalization instudent outcomes as well. Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998), for example, concludedthat court -ordered equalizations reduced in -state spending inequality by19 to 34%. Card and Payne (2002) found that equalizations narrowed the gap inaverage SAT scores between children with highly educated and children withpoorly educated parents by 8 points, or roughly 5% of the gap.There is less agreement about whether this equalization has come about byraising spending among low -spending districts, lowering spending amonghigh-spending districts, or both. A careful study of this question is provided byHoxby (2001), who computed the tax price of school equalization schemes,the amount of revenue a local district would have to raise in order to gain$1 more of spending. California districts face an infinite tax price: no matterhow much revenue they raise through local taxation, they can’t raise their localeducation spending to more than $350 per pupil above the lowest district.New Jersey’s districts mostly have tax prices of less than 1: a district might raise$0.60 of its own revenue in order to receive $0.40 in state aid for a total of$1 dalam peningkatan pengeluaran. Distrik ini sehingga akan memiliki harga pajak 0,6.Hoxby menemukan bahwa ekstrim pemerataan skema dengan harga yang sangat tinggi pajak,seperti California, mengarah pada pengurangan keseluruhan per - murid pengeluaran. Sejak apapunpajak yang meningkatkan kota melampaui tingkat minimum (ditambah $350) hanya diambil olehnegara dan disebarluaskan ke kabupaten lainnya, ada insentif untuk memotong pajak danmengurangi pengeluaran. California pemerataan disebabkan penurunan dalam per - murid pengeluaran15%; New Mexico pengeluaran dijatuhkan oleh 13%; dan Oklahoma, Utah, danArizona pengeluaran menurun sebesar 10%. Negara-negara seperti California dipersamakan siapa per - muridpengeluaran tetapi hanya oleh "meratakan" — yaitu menurunkan keseluruhan pendidikanmenghabiskan di semua daerah. Hasilnya telah kemundurankualitas sekolah umum dan penerbangan ke sekolah-sekolah swasta dengan siswa yang dapatmembelinya. Pemerataan skema dengan pajak rendah harga, seperti di New Jersey New York, dan Pennsylvania, benar-benar dibesarkan per - murid menghabiskan 7-8%; iniSerikat karena itu berhasil "tingkat atas." Dengan demikian, dapat perimbangan keuangan sekolahmencapai efek yang dimaksudkan untuk meningkatkan pendidikan pengeluaran rendah - kekayaanKabupaten hanya jika sistem ini dirancang dengan cara yang memberikan insentif distrik tersebutuntuk meningkatkan pengeluaran mereka tanpa berlebihan menghukum lebih tinggi - kekayaan daerah.