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4Bertram F. MalledicpanasOmy pada tIa Perjanjian lamaIar sayas tidak jkamit a cAndasayaous Haistatausayacal accsayadePerjanjian Baru2; sayat Had masssayave tIaatauetsayacalconseQueNCes. AttrsayaTapisayapada tIaatausayaes after Hesayader sayagnored tIa sayaPerjanjian BaruePerjanjian BarusayaOnal-UniPerjanjian BaruePerjanjian BarusayaOnal distsayaNCtsayapadaaNd built mOdels tHat applsayaed toll menjadiHaVIataus alsayake. BUT sayat was PRecsayasely Hesayader’s (1958) POIPerjanjian BarutHat tidak all menjadiHaVIataus are explasayadari Utara ke Timurlautd tIa same way. He sPEcsayafsayacally stated tHat, wIareasUniPerjanjian BaruePerjanjian BarusayaOnal menjadiHaVIataus were explasayadari Utara ke Timurlautd ssayamPLy oleh cakamies, sayaPerjanjian BaruePerjanjian BarusayaOnal actsayaons were explasayadari Utara ke Timurlautd olehtIa “reasons menjadiHaiNd tIa sayaPerjanjian BaruePerjanjian Barusayapada" (Hesayader, 1958, halaman 110; see also ms. 125-129). BUT even sayantahun 1976,round tIa PEak attrsayaTapisayapada research, Hesayader observed tHat explaNatsayaons dari sayaPerjanjian BaruePerjanjian BarusayaOnalactsayapada oleh way reasons Had tidak menjadiendequately treated sayan cONTemPoraryttrsayaTapisayapada watauk(Sayackes1976, p. 14). SaDLy, tidakHaing mUCh seems to have cHanged sayan tHais regard, sayaf we take sOCsayaalPSYCHOLOgy teXTbuku aNd majatau sAndaveYS dari attrsayaTapisayapada researchs BArOmeters.PerHaPS sOCsayaal PSYCHOLOgy has Iald pada to tIa ssayamPLsayafsayaed mOdel dari PErson-ssayatUAtsayapadaattrsayaTapisayadi dapatcakamie, fatau a lOng tsayame, tIare was tidaklterNatsayave aVAsayalaBLe? THais can't menjadi Quite rsayaGHT,menjadicakamie alterNatsayave VIewPOIPerjanjian Barus Have menjadien voiced rePEateDLy)e. g., Bkamis, 1978; Lalljee &Amenjadilspada, 1983; LOCke & PeNNIngton, 1982; Read, 1987; White, 1991). It is true, however, thatthese alternative viewpoints did not resolve the contradictions between the various models anddid not provide an integrative theory of behavior explanation. Such an integrative theory is whatI hope to offer in this chapter, but first I briefly discuss the second core claim of classicattribution theory.Kelley’s (1967) claim that covariation analysis underlies the construction of layexplanations (COV) is problematic as well. First off, the covariation claim is poorly supportedempirically. The available evidence shows that people can make use ofcovariation informationwhen it is presented to them by the experimenter (e.g., Försterling, 1992; McArthur, 1972;Sutton & McClure, 2001; Van Kleeck, Hillger, & Brown, 1988). But there is no evidence thatpeoplespontaneously search forcovariation information when trying to explain behavior. Infact, very few studies even examined whether and when people actively seek out covariationinformation in natural contexts. As a rare exception, Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham, and Jaspars (1984)asked their participants to write down the kind of information they would like to have in order toexplain various events, and covariation information was in low demand under these conditions.A few additional studies examined people’s choices between receiving covariation informationand some other information, and there, too, explainers were less interested in covariationinformation than in information about generative forces or mechanisms (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, &Gelman, 1995).The theoretical foundation for (COV) is dubious as well. The notion of covariationanalysis was a creative analogy to scientific and statistical reasoning, but it wasn’t grounded inany model of either cognitive inference or causal learning. The covariation thesis alsocontradicts what we know about behavior explanations as communicative acts (i.e., one person’sclarification for another person; Hilton, 1990; Kidd & Amabile, 1981; Turnbull & Slugoski,1988). In constructing communicative explanations, the speaker’s choice of a particular causalfactor is guided, not by covariation analysis, but by impression management (i.e., selecting aAttributions as Behavior Explanations5cause that puts the agent or explainer in a certain evaluative light; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981) andaudience design (i.e., selecting a cause that meets the listener’s wondering or expectation;Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb, & Ginsburg, 1993). So even if there are some contexts in whichcovariation analysis is important, it is clearly not the only cognitive process by whichexplanations are constructed.Besides the lack of support for its two core claims, classic attribution theory and itssuccessors has two additional limitations. For one thing, it treats explanations as a purelycognitive activity, so there is no accounting for the social functions of explanation, such asclarifying something for another person or influencing an audience’s impression’s. Moreover,classic attribution theory does not specify any psychological factors besides raw information thatinfluence the construction of explanations. Specifying these factors would allow us to predictsuch important phenomena as actor-observer asymmetries, self-serving biases, and the like.Demands on a New Theory of ExplanationThe difficulties with standard attribution theory imply a number of desired features that anew theory of explanation must have. First, instead of allowing a reduction to person andsituation causes, the theory has to capture the concepts that actually underlie people’s thinkingand reasoning about human behavior, such as agency and intentionality.Second, the new theory must identify additional cognitive processes besides covariationanalysis that are recruited to construct explanations. It should al
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