policy actions, we developed an alternative measure, called fiscal imp terjemahan - policy actions, we developed an alternative measure, called fiscal imp Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

policy actions, we developed an alt

policy actions, we developed an alternative measure, called fiscal impetus (see Cohen
(1987)).
Fiscal Impetus
“Fiscal impetus” is a bottom-up approach that involves developing a measure of
each major type of state or local budget action—for example, a cut in personal taxes or an
increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates—and aggregating them into a single fiscal
indicator that quantifies the impulse to growth in real GDP coming from state and local
budget decisions. The weights used for the aggregation are based on estimates of the
effects of budgetary actions on the growth of GDP. For example, the weight applied to a
reduction in personal taxes is based on an estimate of the increase in aggregate consumer
spending induced by the tax cut—that is, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC).
Thus, fiscal impetus is model dependent. For this analysis, we use an MPC of 0.7 for
changes in taxes—in other words, we assume that a tax reduction of $1 million produces
$700,000 in additional consumption—and an MPC of 1.0 for changes in transfer
payments; changes in purchases of goods and services also receive a weight of one.
These estimates are consistent with the coefficients in the macroeconomic models used
by the Federal Reserve Board staff. The higher MPC for transfers than for taxes reflects
the fact that most transfers go to lower-income households, which are more likely to be
liquidity constrained than the taxpaying population as a whole. Our measure is designed
to quantify the first-round effects of policy changes on GDP growth. It does not take
account of subsequent multiplier effects. It also does not capture the effects of cyclical
movements in taxes and transfers.
Whenever possible, we use direct information to construct our estimates of state
and local “policy” actions—for example, we use NASBO’s figures for enacted state
revenue changes to estimate changes in state tax policy. However, we have no such
sources for either local taxes or for expenditures; thus, we have developed NIPA-based
measures of policy change that we believe are satisfactory alternatives. With regard to
local taxes, our policy indicator is the ratio of NIPA property tax receipts to nominal
potential GDP, which we dub the effective property tax rate. When this effective tax rate
is constant from one year to the next, policy is defined as being constant. Movements in
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policy actions, we developed an alternative measure, called fiscal impetus (see Cohen(1987)).Fiscal Impetus“Fiscal impetus” is a bottom-up approach that involves developing a measure ofeach major type of state or local budget action—for example, a cut in personal taxes or anincrease in Medicaid reimbursement rates—and aggregating them into a single fiscalindicator that quantifies the impulse to growth in real GDP coming from state and localbudget decisions. The weights used for the aggregation are based on estimates of theeffects of budgetary actions on the growth of GDP. For example, the weight applied to areduction in personal taxes is based on an estimate of the increase in aggregate consumerspending induced by the tax cut—that is, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC).Thus, fiscal impetus is model dependent. For this analysis, we use an MPC of 0.7 forchanges in taxes—in other words, we assume that a tax reduction of $1 million produces$700,000 in additional consumption—and an MPC of 1.0 for changes in transferpayments; changes in purchases of goods and services also receive a weight of one.These estimates are consistent with the coefficients in the macroeconomic models usedby the Federal Reserve Board staff. The higher MPC for transfers than for taxes reflectsthe fact that most transfers go to lower-income households, which are more likely to beliquidity constrained than the taxpaying population as a whole. Our measure is designedto quantify the first-round effects of policy changes on GDP growth. It does not takeaccount of subsequent multiplier effects. It also does not capture the effects of cyclicalmovements in taxes and transfers.Whenever possible, we use direct information to construct our estimates of stateand local “policy” actions—for example, we use NASBO’s figures for enacted staterevenue changes to estimate changes in state tax policy. However, we have no suchsources for either local taxes or for expenditures; thus, we have developed NIPA-basedmeasures of policy change that we believe are satisfactory alternatives. With regard tolocal taxes, our policy indicator is the ratio of NIPA property tax receipts to nominalpotential GDP, which we dub the effective property tax rate. When this effective tax rateis constant from one year to the next, policy is defined as being constant. Movements in
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langkah-langkah kebijakan, kami mengembangkan langkah alternatif, yang disebut dorongan fiskal (lihat Cohen
(1987)).
Dorongan Fiskal
"dorongan fiskal" adalah pendekatan bottom-up yang melibatkan mengembangkan ukuran
masing-masing jenis utama dari tindakan-bagi anggaran negara bagian atau lokal contoh , pemotongan pajak pribadi atau
peningkatan Medicaid penggantian suku-dan menggabungkan mereka ke dalam fiskal tunggal
indikator yang mengkuantifikasi dorongan untuk pertumbuhan PDB riil yang berasal dari negara bagian dan lokal
keputusan anggaran. Bobot yang digunakan untuk agregasi didasarkan pada perkiraan
efek tindakan anggaran terhadap pertumbuhan PDB. Misalnya, berat diterapkan pada
pengurangan pajak pribadi didasarkan pada perkiraan peningkatan konsumsi agregat
pengeluaran yang disebabkan oleh pajak cut-yaitu, kecenderungan mengkonsumsi marjinal (MPC).
Dengan demikian, dorongan fiskal tergantung modelnya. Untuk analisis ini, kita menggunakan MPC dari 0,7 untuk
perubahan pajak-dengan kata lain, kita mengasumsikan bahwa pengurangan pajak sebesar $ 1 juta menghasilkan
$ 700.000 dalam konsumsi dan tambahan sebuah MPC dari 1,0 untuk perubahan dalam transfer
pembayaran; perubahan belanja barang dan jasa juga menerima berat satu.
Perkiraan ini konsisten dengan koefisien dalam model makroekonomi yang digunakan
oleh staf Dewan Federal Reserve. Semakin tinggi MPC untuk transfer daripada pajak mencerminkan
fakta bahwa kebanyakan transfer pergi ke rumah tangga berpendapatan rendah, yang lebih mungkin
likuiditas dibatasi daripada populasi pembayar pajak secara keseluruhan. Ukuran kami dirancang
untuk mengukur efek putaran pertama dari perubahan kebijakan terhadap pertumbuhan PDB. Tidak mengambil
rekening efek multiplier berikutnya. Hal ini juga tidak menangkap efek dari siklus
pergerakan pajak dan transfer.
Bila mungkin, kami menggunakan informasi langsung untuk membangun perkiraan kami negara
dan lokal "kebijakan" tindakan-misalnya, kita menggunakan angka NASBO untuk diberlakukan negara
perubahan pendapatan untuk memperkirakan perubahan dalam kebijakan pajak negara. Namun, kami tidak memiliki seperti
sumber baik untuk pajak lokal atau pengeluaran; dengan demikian, kami telah mengembangkan LAN berbasis
langkah-langkah perubahan kebijakan yang kami percaya adalah alternatif yang memuaskan. Berkenaan dengan
pajak daerah, indikator kebijakan kami adalah rasio LAN penerimaan pajak properti untuk nominal
PDB potensial, yang kita menjuluki tarif pajak properti yang efektif. Ketika tarif pajak efektif
adalah konstan dari satu tahun ke tahun berikutnya, kebijakan didefinisikan sebagai konstan. Mutasi
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