Between 1994 and 1996, the Taliban

Between 1994 and 1996, the Taliban achieved a succession of re- markable strategic victories against their mujahedin rivals. In Sep- tember 1995 they captured the western town of Herat, and in Sep- tember 1996 they took the eastern town of Jalalabad. Within only two years, they had gained control of most of the country. They orga- nized air, armor, and infantry assaults in some locales. They negoti- ated their way into others, becoming the masters of many towns and villages without firing a shot. They gained the support of the Pash- tuns, the group commonly identified as the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and won the patronage of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In its first two years, the movement also attracted the interest of the United States. Washington championed the American oil company Unocal, which sought an Afghan inter- mediary to facilitate the transport of newly accessible Central Asian oil and natural gas to world markets, all while bypassing key rivals, Russia and Iran. To the frustration of these prospective partners, the Taliban regime soon showed ambitions beyond the securing of pipe- line routes for foreign sponsors.
In September 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul. While their lead- ers sought recognition as the winners of the Afghan civil war—and the United States and a few other countries appeared poised to of- fer it—the Taliban simultaneously launched a theatrical and bloody campaign to impose their vision of Islamic discipline on Kabul’s resi- dents. The foot soldiers of the Taliban, including many who were raised in orphanages and refugee camps in Pakistan (and had even adopted Urdu as their primary language) saw in the capital a modern- day Sodom and Gomorrah. For the first time in many of their lives, they met unveiled women and clean-shaven men. They heard music coming from the cassette sellers’ stalls at the market, saw Bollywood videos, and encountered children’s pet birds and the kites brilliantly immortalized by Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite Runner.


The brutalities that these fighters visited upon the women and girls of urban Afghanistan were largely responsible for reversing the early cooperation between the Taliban and the American oil inter- ests. Under pressure from human rights and feminist activists, the administration of President Bill Clinton publicly distanced itself from the Taliban, whose refusal to extradite bin Laden following his flight to Afghanistan in May 1996 further undermined the search for com- mon cause. And while human rights and aid groups drew attention to their repressive gender policies, the Taliban campaign in the central and northern regions continued mostly out of wider public view. There the students and clerics confronted recalcitrant non-Pashtun populations, including one of the principal enemies of their seminary learning, the Shiites. Hazara communities, in particular, became the object of murderous sectarian campaigns. Their devotion to Shiism and their outsider status, exemplified by the character Hassan in The Kite Runner, made them the targets of a systematic campaign of mass murder.
Though such actions nearly prompted war with Iran, the interna- tional community remained divided in response to a regime whose behavior seemed so unpredictable. In 2000, as drought spread through- out Afghanistan and further imperiled one of the poorest countries on earth, the Taliban called for humanitarian aid; in March 2001 they outraged international opinion by shelling the ancient Buddhist statues of Bamyan as part of their war to rid Afghanistan of “idola- try.” But even this assault produced contradictory responses. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency continued to pursue cooperation with Taliban leaders who promised to target Afghanistan’s burgeon- ing opium economy. As late as summer 2001, Washington relied on the Taliban to aid in its “war on drugs.”
Traveling by Toyota trucks and wielding guns and whips made of radio antennas, the Taliban strung television sets as well as audio and


videotapes, along with the bodies of their political opponents, on lampposts and trees in a spectacular assault on the modern world. Their reclusive leader Mullah Omar rarely appeared in person and avoided being photographed. Yet their dramatic style of rule de- manded spectators: they turned soccer stadiums into killing fields, stoned women, turned their artillery on statues, and ultimately sacri- ficed their regime rather than surrender Osama bin Laden to the Americans.
In the 1990s, journalists, scholars, and policymakers struggled to interpret the violent rule of the Taliban. They had appeared at a mo- ment when the numerous conflicts that dotted Africa, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere seemed to reflect the re- surgence of essential cultural, ethnic, tribal, and religious identities. Scholars and journalists warned that the relative stability of the Cold War world had given way to “the coming anarchy” and to new kinds of conflicts defined by “the clash of civilizations.” Defying the ideo- logical affiliations of the Cold War, the seemingly senseless and irra- tional violence of groups in Somalia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Bosnia, and elsewhere threatened the civilized world, a number of commen- tators argued, by unleashing a primitive anarchy, a “new barbarism

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Antara 1994 dan 1996, Taliban mencapai suksesi kemenangan strategis markable ulang melawan saingan mujahidin mereka. Dalam Sep- tember 1995 mereka merebut kota barat Herat, dan di Sep- tember 1996 mereka mengambil kota timur Jalalabad. Dalam hanya dua tahun, mereka telah menguasai sebagian besar negara. Mereka-organisasi pesawat terorganisasi, armor, dan serangan infanteri di beberapa locales. Mereka dinegosiasikan cara mereka ke orang lain, menjadi tuan dari banyak kota dan desa tanpa melepaskan tembakan. Mereka mendapat dukungan dari tun Pash-, kelompok umum diidentifikasi sebagai kelompok etnis terbesar di Afghanistan, dan memenangkan perlindungan Pakistan, Arab Saudi, dan Uni Emirat Arab. Dalam dua tahun pertama, gerakan ini juga menarik minat Amerika Serikat. Washington mendorong perusahaan minyak Amerika Unocal, yang dicari seorang Afghan campur mediary untuk memfasilitasi pengangkutan baru dapat diakses minyak Asia Tengah dan gas alam ke pasar dunia, sambil melewati rival utama, Rusia dan Iran. Untuk frustrasi ini calon mitra, rezim Taliban segera menunjukkan ambisi luar pengamanan rute jalur pipa untuk sponsor asing.
Pada bulan September 1996 Taliban ditangkap Kabul. Sementara para pemimpin mereka mencari pengakuan sebagai pemenang sipil Afghanistan perang-dan Amerika Serikat dan beberapa negara lainnya muncul siap untuk of-fer itu-Taliban secara bersamaan meluncurkan kampanye teater dan berdarah untuk memaksakan visi mereka tentang disiplin Islam pada penyok residen Kabul. Para prajurit kaki Taliban, termasuk banyak orang yang dibesarkan di panti asuhan dan kamp-kamp pengungsi di Pakistan (dan bahkan telah mengadopsi bahasa Urdu sebagai bahasa utama mereka) melihat di ibukota sebuah zaman modern Sodom dan Gomora. Untuk pertama kalinya dalam banyak kehidupan mereka, mereka bertemu meluncurkan perempuan dan laki-laki dicukur bersih. Mereka mendengar musik yang berasal dari warung kaset penjual di pasar, melihat video Bollywood, dan burung peliharaan anak-anak yang dihadapi dan layang-layang cemerlang diabadikan oleh Khaled Hosseini, The Kite Runner. Para kebrutalan bahwa para pejuang tersebut ditimpakan kepada perempuan dan anak perempuan dari Afghanistan perkotaan sebagian besar bertanggung jawab untuk membalikkan kerjasama awal antara Taliban dan EST antar minyak Amerika. Di bawah tekanan dari hak asasi manusia dan aktivis feminis, pemerintahan Presiden Bill Clinton secara terbuka menjauhkan diri dari Taliban, yang menolak untuk mengekstradisi bin Laden setelah penerbangan ke Afghanistan Mei 1996 lebih lanjut menggerogoti mencari penyebab yang umum. Dan sementara hak asasi manusia dan kelompok-kelompok bantuan menarik perhatian kebijakan jender represif mereka, kampanye Taliban di daerah tengah dan utara terus sebagian besar dari pandangan publik yang lebih luas. Ada mahasiswa dan ulama dihadapkan populasi non-Pashtun bandel, termasuk salah satu musuh utama pembelajaran seminari mereka, kaum Syiah. Komunitas Hazara, khususnya, menjadi objek kampanye sektarian pembunuh. Pengabdian mereka kepada Syiah dan status luar mereka, dicontohkan oleh karakter Hassan di The Kite Runner, membuat mereka sasaran kampanye sistematis pembunuhan massal. Meskipun tindakan seperti hampir diminta perang dengan Iran, masyarakat internasional tetap dibagi dalam menanggapi rezim yang perilakunya tampak begitu tak terduga. Pada tahun 2000, kekeringan menyebar throughput keluar Afghanistan dan selanjutnya membahayakan salah satu negara termiskin di dunia, Taliban menyerukan bantuan kemanusiaan; Maret 2001 mereka marah opini internasional dengan menembaki patung Budha kuno Bamiyan sebagai bagian dari perang mereka untuk membersihkan Afghanistan "idola- mencoba." Tetapi bahkan serangan ini menghasilkan respon bertentangan. AS Drug Enforcement Agency terus mengejar kerjasama dengan para pemimpin Taliban yang berjanji untuk menargetkan burgeon- ekonomi ing opium Afghanistan. Sampai akhir musim panas 2001, Washington mengandalkan Taliban untuk membantu dalam "perang melawan narkoba." Bepergian dengan truk Toyota dan menghunus senjata dan cambuk yang terbuat dari antena radio, Taliban digantung televisi serta audio dan kaset video, bersama dengan tubuh lawan politik mereka, pada tiang lampu dan pohon dalam serangan spektakuler di dunia modern. Pemimpin tertutup mereka Mullah Omar jarang muncul secara pribadi dan menghindari difoto. Namun gaya dramatis mereka aturan de- Manded penonton: mereka berbalik stadion sepak bola menjadi ladang pembunuhan, dilempari batu perempuan, berbalik artileri mereka pada patung-patung, dan akhirnya sacri- ficed rezim mereka daripada menyerah Osama bin Laden ke Amerika. Pada 1990-an, wartawan , ulama, dan para pembuat kebijakan berjuang untuk menafsirkan aturan kekerasan Taliban. Mereka telah muncul pada ment mo- ketika berbagai konflik yang tersebar Afrika, Balkan, bekas Uni Soviet, dan di tempat lain tampaknya mencerminkan surgence kembali identitas budaya, etnis, suku, dan agama penting. Para sarjana dan wartawan memperingatkan bahwa stabilitas relatif dari dunia Perang Dingin telah memberikan cara untuk "anarki datang" dan untuk jenis baru dari konflik didefinisikan oleh "benturan peradaban." Menentang afiliasi logis ideo Perang Dingin, yang tampaknya Kekerasan nasional tidak masuk akal dan irra- kelompok di Somalia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Bosnia, dan di tempat lain mengancam peradaban dunia, sejumlah tators commen- berpendapat, dengan melepaskan sebuah anarki primitif, "barbarisme baru