THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES(g ) INT

THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES

(g ) INTENDED VALUES AND THE VALUE OP INTENTIONS
IN TILE PIMUITS OF VALUE

It is then quite right, although ambiguous, to describe goodness
and moral values in general as actional values. Activity, strength,
freedom and purposive effort are also actional values. Goodness
is such in another sense. It is not attached to acts (and those
the same acts) as such , but only in so far as they have a definite
quality And that quality lies in the intended value. Goodness
and, with it, all moral values are values of the intention of the
act, not values of the act itself But the quality of the intention,
which is the pomt at issue, depends on its own content, on the
intended value.
Nevertheless goodness does not inhere in the intended values.
These are and remain situational values, and cannot through
any power on earth, not even through being intended, be turned
into anything . Goodness does not spread from the intention
to the thing intended , but vice versâ, the value of the thing
aimed at only conditions (is the basis of) the goodness. The
thing aimed at is not on this account itself morally good.
The intentional value of a purposive act depends on the
character of its intention. In the expression, “the pursuit of
values as ends,” it is not the value of the intention but only
the intended values which are referred to. But exactly on this
account the expression defines, as regards content, value of the
intention. The intention is the material of goodness as it is
of the intentional value of the act. The material of the intended
value, on the other hand, is comparatively irrelevant. Granted
that happiness is in fl? way the “highest good,” yet to destroy
someone s happiness is bad, while to foster and advance it is
morally good. It is only the intentional fostering of it, not the
happiness of the other, which is “good.”
Two aspects of this rèlationship of dependence now become
clear.
In the first place, one sees that there are not two but three
different classes of value involved, which here come together,
THE GOOD 183
merge organically into one another, and form a distinct stratum
of values : (i) the intended situational values, (z) the values of
the intending acts, as such, and () the qualitative value of the
intention. The first two condition and are pre’-supposed in the
last, but they condition it in very different degree. Only the
situational value is materially basic, it alone gives to the inten
tion its direction and determines its quality. The value of the
act as such has nothing to do ;vith the content and direction
of the intention, and therefore does not affect its quality. Its
material is only the potency of the act as such, but this is a
potency for good and evil equally. Upon the intended situational
value alone, then, depends the alternative between goodness
and badness. What depends upon the value of the act itself is
the height in the scale of goodness or the degree of badness.
This does not mean that the alternative between goodness and
badness and their respective intensities is conditioned solely by
these two factors. To the former must be added the diversity of
situational values, and to the latter the differentiation in the
special moral values.
Secondly, the greatness of the difference which separates
the intended value from the value of the intention is here for
the first time made evident. The ambiguities of the term
“goodness” have repeatedly succeeded in obscuring this
difference. If we say that someone does good, we imply thereby
both that (j) what he does is good and that (z) he is good in
doing what he does. Language objectifies the goodness of the
person, and at the same time renders subjective the goodness
of the thing done. It reduces the two classes of value to one
level. Moral good is indeed founded upon the situational value,
and this relationship finds expression in our formula, the
conversion of values into ends. But the value of the moral good
is not that of the intended situation nor comparable to it , indeed
it does not even stand in any demonsttable relationship to the
intended situation in the scale of values. In fact between it and
the situational values on which jt rests must be inserted the
actional potency itself. Only with tuis does the degree of the
184 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
moral worth rise and fall but also correspondingly the
obliquity of the moral worthlessness. This is something which
the formula “the teleology of values” does not adequately
express, but which must nevertheless be understood by it
( h) THE DEPENDENCE OF GOODNESS UPON THE SCALE OP VALUES
IN RESPECT OF MATERIAL
The meaning of goodness, at which we have arrived, now
branches out farther. Were there only one value, then in saying
that goodness is the pursuit of it we should have said all that
was necessary But since we have to do with a diversity of
values which may be aimed at, goodness is also a thing of
manifold branches.
In the first place, within each series of values the direction
towards disvalue is “evil,” while that towards value is “good.”
But this difference would not at all apply to man, who is not a
Satanic being and cannot aim at negative value as such, were
it not that the diversity of values and participation in them
introduce conflict. The acceptance of one value may involve
the rejection of another ; the former may be right, the latter
wrong. This phenomenon is more striking, where there is a
question of material goods It is in the nature of these to be of
value only to those who can enjoy the use of them, others
being excluded from a share. Every situation which brings
such a.n acquisition at the same time necessarily involves a
corresponding exclusion [f then the possession is a good and
the deprivation an evil , the act which aims at possession
( whether for oneself or another), and which in so far might be
altogether good, may very well at the same time be bad, in so
far as it involves the intended exclusion of another. The con filet
of interests in society would alone suffice, therefore, to hold
open the path of evil to man, and to insure to him the freedom
and capacity for both good and evil , although he be a creature
who is ever aiming at positivç values only
But this is only a mrnor’matter The significance of goodness
THE GOOD i85
becomes infinitely more serious and varied, if one takcs into
account the diversity of the values themselves. This diversity,
as has been shown, has several dimensions The groups are
differentiated according to universality and particularity, sim-
plicity and complexity, according to strength and weakness of
determination, according to the carrier of the value, whether
it be an individuality or a collective unit, and so on -not to
mention dependence as regards content or the resting of one
value upon another Goodness is indifferent to all these various
gradations. On the other hand, it is intimately connected with
the difference of rank amongst values
All the concrete situations of life are such that several values
are involved in them at the same time. But the intention of the
person who stands in the situation cannot as a rule be directed
towards all at once [t is essential to choose one (or a few) and
to pass over the others. Now within such a constellation of
values, goodness is always the turning towards the higher value,
evil a turning towards the lower. Goodness does not require of
us the denial of the lower value (for instance, our own advantage
or happiness)— -that would be a misinterpretation of our feeling
for values and would lead to resentment • -but it does require
the surrender of the lower in favour of a higher (for instance,
another’s right or welfare). Goodness, as the value of the
intention in an act, consists materially in preferring the higher,
while evil consists in preferring the lower. It is quite consistent
with the nature of goodness to discern and appreciate the lower
The honest man knows the value of another’s property, and
as such he respects it. And only on this presupposition is his
respect for it real honesty. Only then is it a real preference for a
higher value.
This case is typical of all ethical situations. There exists
absolutely no situation in which value simply stands over
against disvalue ; there is always va ue against value. And
interest in the lower is not only ethically justifiable— perhaps
because it is natural-- -but it is 0also morally essential in the
choice of the higher. The greater tht renunciation involved in
186 THE IŒALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
choosing the higher and the greater the triumph over “natural”
desire or interest, the more completely does the character of
moral goodness reveal itself in the choice.
Preference for the axiologically higher to the lower—despite
personal interest, and even m face of much stronger interest
in the lower —is the second general and positive aspect of good
ness. It accornpanìes the pursuit of values as ends or rather is
contained in the pursuit and passes beyond it. Jf we wanted
to express both aspects at once, we could say : Goodness is
the conversion of the higher value into an end.
It would be a complete misunderstanding to interpret this
analysis as if it were intellectual. Anyone who can conceive of
preference only as a logically explicit form of judgment is
naturally not in a position to avoid the misunderstandmg The
good man does not spend time in weighing and choosing ; his
feeling for values guides him surely, even in axiologically
complicated predicaments The conflicting values need not
appear as such to him ; he does not resort primarily to delibera
bon. None the less his decision for the one value and against
the other has the weight of a deliberate preference on principle.
How this is possible, is the innermost secret of the feeling for
values. But the fact that such decisions exist- perfectly
spontaneous and unreflective— shows that the appraisement of
values consists not only in a recogniti

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

DUNIA nilai-nilai etis

(g) dimaksudkan nilai-nilai dan THE nilai OP niat
PIMUITS ubin di nilai

hal ini kemudian benar, meskipun ambigu, untuk menggambarkan kebaikan
dan nilai-nilai moral secara umum sebagai nilai-nilai actional. Kegiatan, kekuatan,
kebebasan dan usaha purposive yang juga nilai-nilai actional. Kebaikan
adalah seperti segi yang lain. Itu tidak melekat kisah (dan mereka
tindakan sama) dengan demikian, tetapi hanya sejauh mereka telah pasti
mutu dan kualitas yang terletak di nilai dimaksudkan. Kebaikan
dan, dengan itu, nilai-nilai moral yang semua nilai-nilai niat
undang-undang, bukan nilai-nilai dari undang-undang itu sendiri tapi kualitas dari niat,
yang merupakan pomt masalah, tergantung pada konten sendiri, di
dimaksudkan nilai.
demikian kebaikan tidak inhere nilai dimaksudkan.
Ini adalah dan tetap situasional nilai dan tidak melalui
kekuasaan di bumi, bahkan melalui dimaksudkan, berubah
menjadi apa-apa. Kebaikan tidak menyebar dari niat
hal yang dimaksudkan, tetapi wakil versâ, nilai hal
ditujukan hanya kondisi (adalah dasar) kebaikan.
Hal bertujuan bukanlah pada account ini sendiri baik secara moral.
Nilai yang disengaja Act purposive tergantung pada
karakter dari niat. Dalam ekspresi, "mengejar
nilai-nilai sebagai berakhir," tidaklah nilai niat tetapi hanya
nilai dimaksudkan yang disebut. Tapi persis mengenai hal ini
rekening ekspresi mendefinisikan, dalam hal konten, nilai
niat. Niat adalah bahan kebaikan karena
nilai disengaja dari undang-undang. Materi yang dimaksud
nilai, di sisi lain, relatif tidak relevan. Diberikan
bahwa kebahagiaan adalah di fl? cara "kebaikan tertinggi," namun untuk menghancurkan
seseorang s kebahagiaan buruk, sementara untuk mendorong dan memajukannya
baik secara moral. Hal ini hanya disengaja pembinaan, tidak
kebahagiaan yang lain, yang "baik."
Dua aspek ini rèlationship ketergantungan yang sekarang menjadi
jelas.
di tempat pertama, orang melihat bahwa tidak ada dua kecuali tiga
kelas yang berbeda dari nilai yang terlibat, yang di sini datang bersama-sama,
THE 183 baik
menggabungkan organik ke dalam satu sama lain, dan membentuk lapisan yang berbeda
nilai: nilai-nilai (i) yang dimaksud situasional, (z) nilai-nilai
berniat bertindak, seperti, dan () nilai kualitatif dari
niat. Dua kondisi dan pra '-seharusnya di
terakhir, tetapi mereka kondisi dalam sangat berbeda derajat. Hanya
situasional nilai material dasar, itu saja memberikan inten
tion arah dan menentukan kualitas. Nilai
tindakan seperti itu memiliki apa-apa yang harus dilakukan; vith konten dan arah
niat, dan karena itu tidak mempengaruhi kualitas. Yang
bahan adalah hanya potensi tindakan seperti itu, tapi ini
potensi untuk kebaikan dan kejahatan sama-sama. Berdasarkan dimaksud situasional
nilai sendiri, kemudian, tergantung alternatif antara kebaikan
dan keburukan. Apa tergantung pada nilai dari undang-undang itu sendiri adalah
tinggi dalam skala kebaikan atau tingkat kejahatan.
ini tidak berarti yang alternatif antara kebaikan dan
kejahatan dan intensitas mereka masing-masing ber semata-mata oleh
kedua faktor ini. Untuk yang pertama harus ditambahkan keragaman
situasional nilai, dan untuk yang terakhir diferensiasi dalam
khusus nilai-nilai moral.
kedua, kebesaran perbedaan yang memisahkan
nilai dimaksudkan dari nilai tujuan di sini adalah untuk
pertama kali dibuat jelas. Ambiguitas istilah
"kebaikan" telah berulang kali berhasil menutupi ini
perbedaan. Jika kita berkata bahwa seseorang tidak baik, kita menyiratkan sehingga
kedua itu (j) apa yang dia lakukan baik dan itu (z) ia baik di
melakukan apa yang dia lakukan. Bahasa objectifies kebaikan
orang, dan pada saat yang sama membuat subjektif kebaikan
yang dilakukan. Mengurangi dua kelas nilai satu
tingkat. Akhlak baik memang didirikan berdasarkan nilai situasional,
dan hubungan ini menemukan ekspresi di formula kami,
konversi nilai ke ujung. Tetapi nilai moral yang baik
adalah tidak bahwa situasi dimaksudkan tidak sebanding dengan itu, memang
itu tidak bahkan berdiri dalam setiap hubungan demonsttable
dimaksudkan situasi dalam skala nilai. Bahkan antara itu dan
nilai situasional pada jt yang terletak harus dimasukkan
actional potensi itu sendiri. Hanya dengan tuis tidak tingkat
184 dunia nilai-nilai etis
moral patut naik turunnya tetapi juga sejalan
obliquity moral tidak berharga. Ini adalah sesuatu yang
formula "teleology nilai-nilai" tidak belum
express, tapi yang harus tetap dipahami oleh itu
(h) ketergantungan dari kebaikan atas THE skala OP nilai
dalam rasa hormat dari bahan
arti dari kebaikan, di mana kita telah tiba, sekarang
cabang lebih jauh. Ada hanya satu nilai, kemudian mengatakan
kebaikan yang mengejar itu kita seharusnya mengatakan semua yang
diperlukan tetapi sejak kita harus lakukan dengan keragaman
nilai-nilai yang mungkin ditujukan pada, kebaikan juga hal
manifold cabang.
Di tempat pertama, dalam setiap seri nilai arah
menuju disvalue "jahat," sementara itu terhadap nilai "baik."
Tetapi perbedaan ini sama sekali tidak akan berlaku untuk pria yang tidak
menjadi setan dan tidak bisa bertujuan nilai negatif seperti,
itu tidak keragaman nilai-nilai dan partisipasi di dalamnya
memperkenalkan konflik. Penerimaan dari satu nilai mungkin melibatkan
penolakan orang lain. mantan mungkin benar, kedua
salah. Fenomena ini adalah lebih mencolok, mana ada
pertanyaan barang-barang materi yang ada dalam sifat ini menjadi
nilai hanya kepada mereka yang dapat menikmati penggunaan mereka, orang lain
dikeluarkan dari saham. Setiap situasi yang membawa
akuisisi a.n tersebut pada saat yang sama selalu melibatkan
pengecualian sesuai [f kemudian kepemilikan adalah baik dan
kekurangan sebuah kejahatan, undang-undang yang bertujuan kepemilikan
(baik untuk diri sendiri atau orang lain), dan yang di sejauh mungkin
sama sekali baik, sangat baik pada waktu yang sama mungkin buruk, dalam sehingga
jauh karena melibatkan pengecualian dimaksudkan lain. Con filet
kepentingan dalam masyarakat akan sendirian cukup, oleh karena itu, untuk memegang
membuka jalan kejahatan manusia, dan untuk memastikan kepadanya kebebasan
dan kapasitas untuk baik dan yang jahat, meskipun ia menjadi makhluk
yang pernah bertujuan untuk nilai-nilai positivç hanya
tapi ini hanya mrnor'matter pentingnya kebaikan
THE GOOD i85
menjadi jauh lebih serius dan beragam, jika satu takcs ke
rekening keragaman nilai diri mereka sendiri. Keragaman ini,
seperti yang telah ditunjukkan, memiliki beberapa dimensi kelompok-kelompok
dibedakan menurut universalitas dan kekhasan, sim-
plicity dan kompleksitas, sesuai dengan kekuatan dan kelemahan
tekad, menurut pembawa nilai, Apakah
individualitas maupun unit kolektif, dan sebagainya - tidak
menyebutkan ketergantungan dalam hal konten atau beristirahat satu
nilai atas kebaikan lain acuh tak acuh terhadap ini berbagai
gradasi. Di sisi lain, itu adalah erat dengan
perbedaan peringkat di antara nilai-nilai
semua situasi beton kehidupan sedemikian rupa sehingga beberapa nilai
terlibat di dalamnya pada waktu yang sama. Tetapi maksud
orang yang berdiri dalam situasi tidak seperti aturan diarahkan
menuju sekaligus [t penting untuk memilih satu (atau beberapa) dan
untuk lulus lebih dari yang lain. Sekarang dalam sebuah konstelasi dari
nilai-nilai, kebaikan selalu berubah ke nilai yang lebih tinggi,
jahat berbalik ke arah bawah. Kebaikan tidak memerlukan dari
kami penyangkalan terhadap nilai yang lebih rendah (misalnya, keuntungan kami sendiri
atau kebahagiaan) —-itu akan salah tafsir perasaan kita
untuk nilai-nilai dan akan mengakibatkan kebencian •- tapi itu memang memerlukan
penyerahan rendah mendukung yang lebih tinggi (misalnya,
hak atau kesejahteraan lain). Kebaikan, sebagai nilai
niat dalam tindakan, terdiri material dalam memilih semakin tinggi,
sementara kejahatan terdiri dalam memilih yang lebih rendah. Hal ini cukup konsisten
dengan hakikat dari kebaikan untuk membedakan dan menghargai rendah
Laki-laki yang jujur tahu nilai properti lain, dan
seperti ia menghormati itu. Dan hanya pada anggapan ini adalah nya
menghormati itu nyata kejujuran. Hanya kemudian Apakah preferensi nyata untuk
lebih tinggi nilai.
hal ini ciri khas dari semua situasi yang etis. Ada
benar-benar ada situasi di mana nilai hanya berdiri atas
terhadap disvalue; selalu ada va ue terhadap nilai. Dan
bunga di bawah ini tidak hanya etis dibenarkan — mungkin
karena alam--- tetapi itu adalah 0also moral penting dalam
pilihan lebih tinggi. Penolakan tht lebih terlibat dalam
IŒALM 186 nilai-nilai etis
memilih semakin tinggi dan semakin besar kemenangan atas "alam"
keinginan atau bunga, semakin benar-benar tidak karakter
kebaikan mengungkapkan dirinya dalam pilihan moral.
Preferensi untuk axiologically lebih tinggi rendah — meskipun
kepentingan pribadi, dan bahkan m wajah lebih kuat menarik
di bawah-adalah aspek kedua Umum dan positif baik
ness. Itu mengejar nilai-nilai sebagai berakhir atau lebih tepatnya adalah accornpanìes
dalam pengejaran dan tiket luar itu. Kami ingin JF
untuk mengungkapkan kedua-dua aspek sekaligus, kita bisa mengatakan: kebaikan
konversi lebih tinggi nilai ke akhir.
akan salahfaham menyeluruh menafsirkan ini
analisis seolah-olah intelektual. Siapa saja yang dapat memahami
preferensi hanya sebagai bentuk Logis eksplisit penghakiman
alami tidak dalam posisi untuk menghindari misunderstandmg
baik laki-laki tidak menghabiskan waktu di menimbang dan memilih; nya
perasaan untuk nilai menuntun dia pasti, bahkan di axiologically
rumit kesulitan nilai bentrok tidak perlu
muncul seperti itu kepadanya. ia tidak resor terutama untuk delibera
bon. Tidak ada yang kurang keputusannya untuk nilai satu dan melawan
yang lain memiliki berat preferensi disengaja pada prinsipnya.
bagaimana hal ini mungkin, adalah rahasia terdalam perasaan untuk
nilai-nilai. Tapi fakta bahwa keputusan tersebut ada - sempurna
spontan dan unreflective-menunjukkan bahwa appraisement dari
nilai terdiri tidak hanya di recogniti

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES

(g ) INTENDED VALUES AND THE VALUE OP INTENTIONS
IN TILE PIMUITS OF VALUE

It is then quite right, although ambiguous, to describe goodness
and moral values by priceecaHop" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; text-decoration: underline !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; background: transparent !important;">in general as actional values. Activity, strength,
freedom and purposive effort are also actional values. Goodness
is such in another sense. It is not attached to acts (and those
the same acts) as such , but only in so far as they have a definite
quality And that quality lies in the intended value. Goodness
and, with it, all moral values are values of the intention of the
act, not values of the act itself But the quality of the intention,
which is the pomt at issue, depends on its own content, on the
intended value.
Nevertheless goodness does not inhere in the intended values.
These are and remain situational values, and cannot through
any power on earth, not even through being intended, be turned
into anything . Goodness does not by priceecaHop" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; text-decoration: underline !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; background: transparent !important;">spread from the intention
to the thing intended , but vice versâ, the value of the thing
aimed at only conditions (is the basis of) the goodness. The
thing aimed at is not on this account itself morally good.
The intentional value of a purposive act depends on the
character of its intention. In the expression, “the pursuit of
values as ends,” it is not the value of the intention but only
the intended values which are referred to. But exactly on this
account the expression defines, as regards content, value of the
intention. The intention is the material of goodness as it is
of the intentional value of the act. The material of the intended
value, on the other hand, is comparatively irrelevant. Granted
that happiness is in fl? way the “highest good,” yet to destroy
someone s happiness is bad, while to foster and advance it is
morally good. It is only the intentional by priceecaHop" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; text-decoration: underline !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; background: transparent !important;">fostering of it, not the
happiness of the other, which is “good.”
Two aspects of this rèlationship of dependence now become
clear.
In the first place, one sees that there are not two but three
different classes of value involved, which here come together,
THE GOOD 183
merge organically into one another, and form a distinct stratum
of values : (i) the intended situational values, (z) the values of
the intending acts, as such, and () the qualitative value of the
intention. The first two condition and are pre’-supposed in the
last, but they condition it in very different degree. Only the
situational value is materially basic, it alone gives to the inten
tion its direction and determines its quality. The value of the
act as such has nothing to do ;vith the content and direction
of the intention, and therefore does not affect its quality. Its
material is only the potency of the act as such, but this is a
potency for good and evil equally. Upon the intended situational
value alone, then, depends the alternative between goodness
and badness. What depends upon the value of the act itself is
the height in the scale of goodness or the degree of badness.
This does not mean that the alternative between goodness and
badness and their respective intensities is conditioned solely by
these two factors. To the former must be added the diversity of
situational values, and to the latter the differentiation in the
special moral values.
Secondly, the greatness of the difference which separates
the intended value from the value of the intention is here for
the first time made evident. The ambiguities of the term
“goodness” have repeatedly succeeded in obscuring this
difference. If we say that someone does good, we imply thereby
both that (j) what he does is good and that (z) he is good in
doing what he does. Language objectifies the goodness of the
person, and at the same time renders subjective the goodness
of the thing done. It reduces the two classes of value to one
level. Moral good is indeed founded upon the situational value,
and this relationship finds expression in our formula, the
conversion of values into ends. But the value of the moral good
is not that of the intended situation nor comparable to it , indeed
it does not even stand in any demonsttable relationship to the
intended situation in the scale of values. In fact between it and
the situational values on which jt rests must be inserted the
actional potency itself. Only with tuis does the degree of the
184 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
moral worth rise and fall but also correspondingly the
obliquity of the moral worthlessness. This is something which
the formula “the teleology of values” does not adequately
express, but which must nevertheless be understood by it
( h) THE DEPENDENCE OF GOODNESS UPON THE SCALE OP VALUES
IN RESPECT OF MATERIAL
The meaning of goodness, at which we have arrived, now
branches out farther. Were there only one value, then in saying
that goodness is the pursuit of it we should have said all that
was necessary But since we have to do with a diversity of
values which may be aimed at, goodness is also a thing of
manifold branches.
In the first place, within each series of values the direction
towards disvalue is “evil,” while that towards value is “good.”
But this difference would not at all apply to man, who is not a
Satanic being and cannot aim at negative value as such, were
it not that the diversity of values and participation in them
introduce conflict. The acceptance of one value may involve
the rejection of another ; the former may be right, the latter
wrong. This phenomenon is more striking, where there is a
question of material goods It is in the nature of these to be of
value only to those who can enjoy the use of them, others
being excluded from a share. Every situation which brings
such a.n acquisition at the same time necessarily involves a
corresponding exclusion [f then the possession is a good and
the deprivation an evil , the act which aims at possession
( whether for oneself or another), and which in so far might be
altogether good, may very well at the same time be bad, in so
far as it involves the intended exclusion of another. The con filet
of interests in society would alone suffice, therefore, to hold
open the path of evil to man, and to by priceecaHop" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; text-decoration: underline !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; background: transparent !important;">insure to him the freedom
and capacity for both good and evil , although he be a creature
who is ever aiming at positivç values only
But this is only a mrnor’matter The significance of goodness
THE GOOD i85
becomes infinitely more serious and varied, if one takcs into
account the diversity of the values themselves. This diversity,
as has been shown, has several dimensions The groups are
differentiated according to universality and particularity, sim-
plicity and complexity, according to strength and weakness of
determination, according to the carrier of the value, whether
it be an individuality or a collective unit, and so on -not to
mention dependence as regards content or the resting of one
value upon another Goodness is indifferent to all these various
gradations. On the other hand, it is intimately connected with
the difference of rank amongst values
All the concrete situations of life are such that several values
are involved in them at the same time. But the intention of the
person who stands in the situation cannot as a rule be directed
towards all at once [t is essential to choose one (or a few) and
to pass over the others. Now within such a constellation of
values, goodness is always the turning towards the higher value,
evil a turning towards the lower. Goodness does not require of
us the denial of the lower value (for instance, our own advantage
or happiness)— -that would be a misinterpretation of our feeling
for values and would lead to resentment • -but it does require
the surrender of the lower in favour of a higher (for instance,
another’s right or welfare). Goodness, as the value of the
intention in an act, consists materially in preferring the higher,
while evil consists in preferring the lower. It is quite consistent
with the nature of goodness to discern and appreciate the lower
The honest man knows the value of another’s property, and
as such he respects it. And only on this presupposition is his
respect for it real honesty. Only then is it a real preference for a
higher value.
This case is typical of all ethical situations. There exists
absolutely no situation in which value simply stands over
against disvalue ; there is always va ue against value. And
interest in the lower is not only ethically justifiable— perhaps
because it is natural-- -but it is 0also morally essential in the
choice of the higher. The greater tht renunciation involved in
186 THE IŒALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
choosing the higher and the greater the triumph over “natural”
desire or interest, the more completely does the character of
moral goodness reveal itself in the choice.
Preference for the axiologically higher to the lower—despite
personal interest, and even m face of much stronger interest
in the lower —is the second by priceecaHop" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; text-decoration: underline !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; background: transparent !important;">general and positive aspect of good
ness. It accornpanìes the pursuit of values as ends or rather is
contained in the pursuit and passes beyond it. Jf we wanted
to express both aspects at once, we could say : Goodness is
the conversion of the higher value into an end.
It would be a complete misunderstanding to interpret this
analysis as if it were intellectual. Anyone who can conceive of
preference only as a logically explicit form of judgment is
naturally not in a position to avoid the misunderstandmg The
good man does not spend time in weighing and choosing ; his
feeling for values guides him surely, even in axiologically
complicated predicaments The conflicting values need not
appear as such to him ; he does not by priceecaHop" style="border: none !important; display: inline-block !important; text-indent: 0px !important; float: none !important; font-weight: bold !important; height: auto !important; margin: 0px !important; min-height: 0px !important; min-width: 0px !important; padding: 0px !important; vertical-align: baseline !important; width: auto !important; text-decoration: underline !important; text-transform: uppercase !important; background: transparent !important;">resort primarily to delibera
bon. None the less his decision for the one value and against
the other has the weight of a deliberate preference on principle.
How this is possible, is the innermost secret of the feeling for
values. But the fact that such decisions exist- perfectly
spontaneous and unreflective— shows that the appraisement of
values consists not only in a recogniti