Born a Scotsman, David Hume (1711–7

Born a Scotsman, David Hume (1711–76) published A Treatise of Human Nature at the young age of twenty-seven; it received little attention initially but later achieved great fame, and Hume came to exercise greater influence than any philosopher since Descartes. The subtitle explains the aim of Hume’s Treatise: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects—that is, to do for psychology what Newton did for physics. Hume rightly recognized the fundamental importance of anthropology for philosophy and determined to march directly to this heartland of science itself. Hume was an empiricist, and in book 1 he classifies the contents of the mind into perceptions of two types: impressions and ideas. Impressions, which include sensations and emotions, are more vivid and forceful than ideas. Ideas are perceptions related to thinking and reasoning. All of our knowledge that extends beyond the immediate input of the senses depends on the concepts of cause and effect, which therefore deserve close attention. In this respect Hume comes to a radical conclusion: our belief in a necessary connection between cause and effect results not from reasoning but custom. “Accordingly we shall find upon examination, that every demonstration, which has been produced for the necessity of a
cause, is fallacious and sophistical.”[304] Hume extends the same skepticism to time and space and similarly to anthropology: “All the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties.”[305] Book 2 deals with passions or emotions, a special type of impression. Hume distinguishes between original and secondary impressions: original impressions are sense impressions and physical pains and pleasures; secondary impressions are passions such as pride and humility. For Hume, the conflict between passion and reason is a myth, since all voluntary behavior is motivated by passion; reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. Book 3 deals with ethics, and Hume argues that not reason but only the passions can lead us to action; reason can neither cause nor judge our passions. Ought can never be derived from an is; the chief source of moral distinctions is the feeling of sympathy with others. Hume’s empiricism is a strong assertion of the limits of human reason, but this does not mean that he acquiesced to radical skepticism. By the end of his Treatise it is clear that our social and individual well-being depends on holding certain nonrational beliefs. In this way Hume seeks to prevent philosophy from becoming alienated from common beliefs and practices. As he notes, “Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or security of his acquisitions. . . . Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.”[306] This does not, however, involve an openness to religion. In 1755 Hume published The Natural History of Religion, and his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion were published posthumously in 1779. Both are attacks on natural theology, and in particular radical critiques of Locke’s natural theology. For Hume, exceeding the boundaries of our secular, common life equates to a hubris that is inappropriate for our human faculties. Two major arguments are used to support his anti-theism. First, he regards it as unwise to assent to any metaphysical beliefs that cannot be rationally justified by empirical evidence or are not the result of a universal, involuntary mechanism such as those that produce natural beliefs. Second, we should avoid those metaphysical beliefs that create psychic unease and social turmoil.[307] As James R. Peters rightly notes, Hume . . . rejects religious faith, including and especially Christian faith, as both psychologically destructive and rationally insupportable. I have argued that Hume’s negative diagnosis of Christian faith is defective. Hume fails to understand the inner life of a faith that is animated by love rather than anxiety and ignorance. Furthermore, Hume’s powerful criticisms of the Lockean reconciliation of faith and reason simply do not extend far enough to challenge the radically dissimilar outlook on faith and reason characteristic of the Augustinian tradition.[308] With Hume’s skepticism we witness the cracks in the Enlightenment edifice starting to appear. He may have stopped short of radical skepticism, but his rigorous pursuit of rational criticism led precisely in this direction. Ironically, the quest for a sure foundation in human autonomy and reason seemed to lead to doubting everything.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Lahir Scotsman, David Hume (1711 – 76) diterbitkan risalah sifat manusia pada usia muda dari dua puluh tujuh; Ia menerima sedikit perhatian pada awalnya tetapi memperoleh ketenaran besar, dan Hume datang untuk latihan pengaruh yang lebih besar daripada filsuf setiap sejak Descartes. Subjudul menjelaskan tujuan Hume's risalah: menjadi upaya untuk memperkenalkan metode eksperimental penalaran ke dalam mata pelajaran Moral —, lakukan untuk psikologi Newton apa fisika. Hume benar diakui pentingnya antropologi untuk filsafat dan bertekad untuk Maret langsung ke ini heartland ilmu itu sendiri. Hume adalah pendapat, dan dalam buku 1 Dia menggolongkan isi pikiran ke persepsi dari dua jenis: tayangan dan ide-ide. Tayangan, yang meliputi sensasi dan emosi, lebih cerah dan kuat daripada ide-ide. Ide-ide yang berkaitan dengan pemikiran dan penalaran persepsi. Semua kami pengetahuan yang melampaui langsung masukan dari indra tergantung pada konsep-konsep sebab dan akibat, yang karena itu pantas perhatian. Dalam hal ini Hume datang ke kesimpulan radikal: kepercayaan kita dalam kaitan yang penting antara sebab dan akibat hasil tidak dari penalaran tetapi kustom. "Dengan demikian kita akan menemukan setelah pemeriksaan, yang setiap demonstrasi, yang telah diproduksi untuk kebutuhan cause, is fallacious and sophistical.”[304] Hume extends the same skepticism to time and space and similarly to anthropology: “All the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties.”[305] Book 2 deals with passions or emotions, a special type of impression. Hume distinguishes between original and secondary impressions: original impressions are sense impressions and physical pains and pleasures; secondary impressions are passions such as pride and humility. For Hume, the conflict between passion and reason is a myth, since all voluntary behavior is motivated by passion; reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. Book 3 deals with ethics, and Hume argues that not reason but only the passions can lead us to action; reason can neither cause nor judge our passions. Ought can never be derived from an is; the chief source of moral distinctions is the feeling of sympathy with others. Hume’s empiricism is a strong assertion of the limits of human reason, but this does not mean that he acquiesced to radical skepticism. By the end of his Treatise it is clear that our social and individual well-being depends on holding certain nonrational beliefs. In this way Hume seeks to prevent philosophy from becoming alienated from common beliefs and practices. As he notes, “Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or security of his acquisitions. . . . Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.”[306] This does not, however, involve an openness to religion. In 1755 Hume published The Natural History of Religion, and his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion were published posthumously in 1779. Both are attacks on natural theology, and in particular radical critiques of Locke’s natural theology. For Hume, exceeding the boundaries of our secular, common life equates to a hubris that is inappropriate for our human faculties. Two major arguments are used to support his anti-theism. First, he regards it as unwise to assent to any metaphysical beliefs that cannot be rationally justified by empirical evidence or are not the result of a universal, involuntary mechanism such as those that produce natural beliefs. Second, we should avoid those metaphysical beliefs that create psychic unease and social turmoil.[307] As James R. Peters rightly notes, Hume . . . rejects religious faith, including and especially Christian faith, as both psychologically destructive and rationally insupportable. I have argued that Hume’s negative diagnosis of Christian faith is defective. Hume fails to understand the inner life of a faith that is animated by love rather than anxiety and ignorance. Furthermore, Hume’s powerful criticisms of the Lockean reconciliation of faith and reason simply do not extend far enough to challenge the radically dissimilar outlook on faith and reason characteristic of the Augustinian tradition.[308] With Hume’s skepticism we witness the cracks in the Enlightenment edifice starting to appear. He may have stopped short of radical skepticism, but his rigorous pursuit of rational criticism led precisely in this direction. Ironically, the quest for a sure foundation in human autonomy and reason seemed to lead to doubting everything.