- Teks
- Sejarah
This is especially evident when the
This is especially evident when the impossibility denies
the essence of an individual or a kind—e.g., the impossibility
(assuming the essentiality of origin) of Winston Churchill’s being
my father, or of water’s having a molecular structure different from H2O. For example, the counterfactuals in (3) are naturally
taken to be true, while those in (4) are not, despite the fact that
the impossible antecedents are the same in the two cases.
3a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son, I
would have grown up in England in the first half of the
twentieth century.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, its
freezing and boiling points would have been different
(from what they actually are).
4a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son,
the United States would have been part of Great Britain.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, the
history of the Earth would have been no different.
The natural remedy is to expand the analysis to include worldstates
that are epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible.5 On
this analysis, (2) is true at w iff there are no A-states whatsoever
(whether metaphysically possible from w or not), or some Astates
at which B is true are more similar to w than any A-states
at which B isn’t true. The result, given a suitable similarity metric,
will be the truth of (3a,b), and the falsity of (4a,b).
But what is similarity? Not overall similarity among worldstates,
as is shown by (5).
5. If Khrushchev had pushed the button during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, there would have been nuclear war.
(5) is true despite the fact that world-states at which the button
is pushed and the missiles (miraculously) fail to launch are far
more similar overall to the actual world-state than those at which
the button is pushed and nuclear war occurs. Examples like these
show that the relation labeled “similarity” is really a placeholder
for some yet-to-be-articulated relation on world-states that is
central to the truth conditions given by the account.The strategy
for identifying this relation is to use examples in which the truth values of counterfactuals like (5) are clear to eliminate various
candidates (e.g., overall similarity) for the target relation, and to
support other candidates for the job. Since this identification requires
an independent grasp of the conditionals to be analyzed,
the Stalnaker-Lewis model does not, itself, constitute an analysis.
The methodology is illustrated by an example in which I have
coin-tossing devices A and B, which, when activated, go through
a random process that determines whether the coin will land
heads or tails. I activate A. While it is running, I offer you a bet
on heads, which you decline. The process terminates; the coin is
tossed, and lands heads. We now consider (6a,b).
6a. If you had accepted the bet, you would have won.
b. If I had used device B, the coin would still have landed
heads.
Pretheoretically, we judge (6a), but not (6b), to be true. Within
the Stalnaker-Lewis framework, this means that, among worldstates
at which the antecedent of (6a) is true, those “most similar”
to the world-state w of the example are ones in which the coin
toss has the same outcome as in w. By contrast, among worldstates
at which that antecedent of (6b) is true, those “most similar”
to w contain some at which the coin comes up heads, and
others at which it doesn’t. Thus, with (6a) sameness of outcome of
the toss contributes to the similarity of an antecedent-world to w,
while with (6b), it doesn’t. Why? The natural thought is that since
your decision about the bet has no causal influence on whether
the coin comes up heads, whereas the device used does, a different
decision shouldn’t affect the outcome, whereas a different
device might. As noted in Kment (2006), this suggests that similarities
between two world-states regarding particular matters of
fact (e.g., the coin landing heads) contribute to the “similarity” of
those states—in the relevant sense—only if these matters of fact
have the same causal history at both world-states.6
Kment goes further, suggesting a natural, though more speculative,
extension of this principle, in which ‘the same explanation’
is substituted for ‘the same causal history’.
the essence of an individual or a kind—e.g., the impossibility
(assuming the essentiality of origin) of Winston Churchill’s being
my father, or of water’s having a molecular structure different from H2O. For example, the counterfactuals in (3) are naturally
taken to be true, while those in (4) are not, despite the fact that
the impossible antecedents are the same in the two cases.
3a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son, I
would have grown up in England in the first half of the
twentieth century.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, its
freezing and boiling points would have been different
(from what they actually are).
4a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son,
the United States would have been part of Great Britain.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, the
history of the Earth would have been no different.
The natural remedy is to expand the analysis to include worldstates
that are epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible.5 On
this analysis, (2) is true at w iff there are no A-states whatsoever
(whether metaphysically possible from w or not), or some Astates
at which B is true are more similar to w than any A-states
at which B isn’t true. The result, given a suitable similarity metric,
will be the truth of (3a,b), and the falsity of (4a,b).
But what is similarity? Not overall similarity among worldstates,
as is shown by (5).
5. If Khrushchev had pushed the button during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, there would have been nuclear war.
(5) is true despite the fact that world-states at which the button
is pushed and the missiles (miraculously) fail to launch are far
more similar overall to the actual world-state than those at which
the button is pushed and nuclear war occurs. Examples like these
show that the relation labeled “similarity” is really a placeholder
for some yet-to-be-articulated relation on world-states that is
central to the truth conditions given by the account.The strategy
for identifying this relation is to use examples in which the truth values of counterfactuals like (5) are clear to eliminate various
candidates (e.g., overall similarity) for the target relation, and to
support other candidates for the job. Since this identification requires
an independent grasp of the conditionals to be analyzed,
the Stalnaker-Lewis model does not, itself, constitute an analysis.
The methodology is illustrated by an example in which I have
coin-tossing devices A and B, which, when activated, go through
a random process that determines whether the coin will land
heads or tails. I activate A. While it is running, I offer you a bet
on heads, which you decline. The process terminates; the coin is
tossed, and lands heads. We now consider (6a,b).
6a. If you had accepted the bet, you would have won.
b. If I had used device B, the coin would still have landed
heads.
Pretheoretically, we judge (6a), but not (6b), to be true. Within
the Stalnaker-Lewis framework, this means that, among worldstates
at which the antecedent of (6a) is true, those “most similar”
to the world-state w of the example are ones in which the coin
toss has the same outcome as in w. By contrast, among worldstates
at which that antecedent of (6b) is true, those “most similar”
to w contain some at which the coin comes up heads, and
others at which it doesn’t. Thus, with (6a) sameness of outcome of
the toss contributes to the similarity of an antecedent-world to w,
while with (6b), it doesn’t. Why? The natural thought is that since
your decision about the bet has no causal influence on whether
the coin comes up heads, whereas the device used does, a different
decision shouldn’t affect the outcome, whereas a different
device might. As noted in Kment (2006), this suggests that similarities
between two world-states regarding particular matters of
fact (e.g., the coin landing heads) contribute to the “similarity” of
those states—in the relevant sense—only if these matters of fact
have the same causal history at both world-states.6
Kment goes further, suggesting a natural, though more speculative,
extension of this principle, in which ‘the same explanation’
is substituted for ‘the same causal history’.
0/5000
This is especially evident when the impossibility denies
the essence of an individual or a kind—e.g., the impossibility
(assuming the essentiality of origin) of Winston Churchill’s being
my father, or of water’s having a molecular structure different from H2O. For example, the counterfactuals in (3) are naturally
taken to be true, while those in (4) are not, despite the fact that
the impossible antecedents are the same in the two cases.
3a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son, I
would have grown up in England in the first half of the
twentieth century.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, its
freezing and boiling points would have been different
(from what they actually are).
4a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son,
the United States would have been part of Great Britain.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, the
history of the Earth would have been no different.
The natural remedy is to expand the analysis to include worldstates
that are epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible.5 On
this analysis, (2) is true at w iff there are no A-states whatsoever
(whether metaphysically possible from w or not), or some Astates
at which B is true are more similar to w than any A-states
at which B isn’t true. The result, given a suitable similarity metric,
will be the truth of (3a,b), and the falsity of (4a,b).
But what is similarity? Not overall similarity among worldstates,
as is shown by (5).
5. If Khrushchev had pushed the button during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, there would have been nuclear war.
(5) is true despite the fact that world-states at which the button
is pushed and the missiles (miraculously) fail to launch are far
more similar overall to the actual world-state than those at which
the button is pushed and nuclear war occurs. Examples like these
show that the relation labeled “similarity” is really a placeholder
for some yet-to-be-articulated relation on world-states that is
central to the truth conditions given by the account.The strategy
for identifying this relation is to use examples in which the truth values of counterfactuals like (5) are clear to eliminate various
candidates (e.g., overall similarity) for the target relation, and to
support other candidates for the job. Since this identification requires
an independent grasp of the conditionals to be analyzed,
the Stalnaker-Lewis model does not, itself, constitute an analysis.
The methodology is illustrated by an example in which I have
coin-tossing devices A and B, which, when activated, go through
a random process that determines whether the coin will land
heads or tails. I activate A. While it is running, I offer you a bet
on heads, which you decline. The process terminates; the coin is
tossed, and lands heads. We now consider (6a,b).
6a. If you had accepted the bet, you would have won.
b. If I had used device B, the coin would still have landed
heads.
Pretheoretically, we judge (6a), but not (6b), to be true. Within
the Stalnaker-Lewis framework, this means that, among worldstates
at which the antecedent of (6a) is true, those “most similar”
to the world-state w of the example are ones in which the coin
toss has the same outcome as in w. By contrast, among worldstates
at which that antecedent of (6b) is true, those “most similar”
to w contain some at which the coin comes up heads, and
others at which it doesn’t. Thus, with (6a) sameness of outcome of
the toss contributes to the similarity of an antecedent-world to w,
while with (6b), it doesn’t. Why? The natural thought is that since
your decision about the bet has no causal influence on whether
the coin comes up heads, whereas the device used does, a different
decision shouldn’t affect the outcome, whereas a different
device might. As noted in Kment (2006), this suggests that similarities
between two world-states regarding particular matters of
fact (e.g., the coin landing heads) contribute to the “similarity” of
those states—in the relevant sense—only if these matters of fact
have the same causal history at both world-states.6
Kment goes further, suggesting a natural, though more speculative,
extension of this principle, in which ‘the same explanation’
is substituted for ‘the same causal history’.
the essence of an individual or a kind—e.g., the impossibility
(assuming the essentiality of origin) of Winston Churchill’s being
my father, or of water’s having a molecular structure different from H2O. For example, the counterfactuals in (3) are naturally
taken to be true, while those in (4) are not, despite the fact that
the impossible antecedents are the same in the two cases.
3a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son, I
would have grown up in England in the first half of the
twentieth century.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, its
freezing and boiling points would have been different
(from what they actually are).
4a. If I (Scott Soames) had been Winston Churchill’s son,
the United States would have been part of Great Britain.
b. If water hadn’t had the molecular structure H2O, the
history of the Earth would have been no different.
The natural remedy is to expand the analysis to include worldstates
that are epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible.5 On
this analysis, (2) is true at w iff there are no A-states whatsoever
(whether metaphysically possible from w or not), or some Astates
at which B is true are more similar to w than any A-states
at which B isn’t true. The result, given a suitable similarity metric,
will be the truth of (3a,b), and the falsity of (4a,b).
But what is similarity? Not overall similarity among worldstates,
as is shown by (5).
5. If Khrushchev had pushed the button during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, there would have been nuclear war.
(5) is true despite the fact that world-states at which the button
is pushed and the missiles (miraculously) fail to launch are far
more similar overall to the actual world-state than those at which
the button is pushed and nuclear war occurs. Examples like these
show that the relation labeled “similarity” is really a placeholder
for some yet-to-be-articulated relation on world-states that is
central to the truth conditions given by the account.The strategy
for identifying this relation is to use examples in which the truth values of counterfactuals like (5) are clear to eliminate various
candidates (e.g., overall similarity) for the target relation, and to
support other candidates for the job. Since this identification requires
an independent grasp of the conditionals to be analyzed,
the Stalnaker-Lewis model does not, itself, constitute an analysis.
The methodology is illustrated by an example in which I have
coin-tossing devices A and B, which, when activated, go through
a random process that determines whether the coin will land
heads or tails. I activate A. While it is running, I offer you a bet
on heads, which you decline. The process terminates; the coin is
tossed, and lands heads. We now consider (6a,b).
6a. If you had accepted the bet, you would have won.
b. If I had used device B, the coin would still have landed
heads.
Pretheoretically, we judge (6a), but not (6b), to be true. Within
the Stalnaker-Lewis framework, this means that, among worldstates
at which the antecedent of (6a) is true, those “most similar”
to the world-state w of the example are ones in which the coin
toss has the same outcome as in w. By contrast, among worldstates
at which that antecedent of (6b) is true, those “most similar”
to w contain some at which the coin comes up heads, and
others at which it doesn’t. Thus, with (6a) sameness of outcome of
the toss contributes to the similarity of an antecedent-world to w,
while with (6b), it doesn’t. Why? The natural thought is that since
your decision about the bet has no causal influence on whether
the coin comes up heads, whereas the device used does, a different
decision shouldn’t affect the outcome, whereas a different
device might. As noted in Kment (2006), this suggests that similarities
between two world-states regarding particular matters of
fact (e.g., the coin landing heads) contribute to the “similarity” of
those states—in the relevant sense—only if these matters of fact
have the same causal history at both world-states.6
Kment goes further, suggesting a natural, though more speculative,
extension of this principle, in which ‘the same explanation’
is substituted for ‘the same causal history’.
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
Hal ini terutama jelas ketika kemustahilan menyangkal
esensi dari seorang individu atau semacam-misalnya, ketidakmungkinan
(asumsi esensial asal) dari Winston Churchill menjadi
ayah saya, atau dari air yang memiliki struktur molekul yang berbeda dari H2O. Sebagai contoh, kontra di (3) secara alami
diambil benar, sementara mereka yang di (4) tidak, meskipun fakta bahwa
anteseden mungkin adalah sama dalam dua kasus.
3a. Jika saya (Scott Soames) telah anak Winston Churchill, saya
akan tumbuh di Inggris pada paruh pertama
abad kedua puluh.
b. Jika air tidak memiliki struktur molekul H2O, yang
beku dan titik didih akan berbeda
(dari apa yang mereka sebenarnya).
4a. Jika saya (Scott Soames) telah anak Winston Churchill,
Amerika Serikat akan menjadi bagian dari Inggris.
b. Jika air tidak memiliki struktur H2O molekul,
sejarah bumi akan ada yang berbeda.
Obat alami untuk memperluas analisis untuk menyertakan worldstates
yang epistemis, tapi tidak metafisik, possible.5 Pada
analisis ini, (2 ) berlaku di w IFF ada A-negara apapun
(baik metafisik mungkin dari w atau tidak), atau beberapa Astates
di mana B adalah benar lebih mirip dengan w daripada A-negara
di mana B tidak benar. Hasilnya, mengingat metrik kesamaan yang cocok,
akan menjadi kebenaran (3a, b), dan kepalsuan (4a, b).
Tapi apa kesamaan? Tidak keseluruhan kesamaan antara worldstates,
seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh (5).
5. Jika Khrushchev telah menekan tombol selama Kuba
Krisis Rudal, akan ada perang nuklir.
(5) adalah benar meskipun fakta bahwa dunia-negara di mana tombol
ditekan dan rudal (ajaib) gagal untuk memulai jauh
lebih mirip secara keseluruhan untuk negara-dunia nyata daripada mereka di mana
tombol ditekan dan perang nuklir terjadi. Contoh seperti ini
menunjukkan bahwa hubungan berlabel "kesamaan" benar-benar sebuah tempat
untuk beberapa hubungan belum-to-be-diartikulasikan pada dunia-negara yang
penting bagi kondisi kebenaran yang diberikan oleh strategi account.The
untuk mengidentifikasi hubungan ini adalah dengan menggunakan contoh di mana nilai-nilai kebenaran kontra seperti (5) yang jelas untuk menghilangkan berbagai
kandidat (misalnya, secara keseluruhan kesamaan) untuk target relasi, dan untuk
mendukung calon lain untuk pekerjaan itu. Karena identifikasi ini membutuhkan
pemahaman yang independen dari conditional yang akan dianalisis,
model Stalnaker-Lewis tidak, itu sendiri, merupakan suatu analisis.
Metodologi diilustrasikan oleh contoh di mana saya memiliki
perangkat melempar koin A dan B, yang, ketika diaktifkan, melalui
proses acak yang menentukan apakah koin akan mendarat
kepala atau ekor. Saya mengaktifkan A. Sementara itu berjalan, saya menawarkan taruhan
di kepala, yang Anda menolak. Proses ini berakhir; koin yang
dilemparkan, dan tanah kepala. Kami sekarang mempertimbangkan (6a, b).
6a. Jika Anda telah menerima taruhan, Anda akan menang.
b. Jika saya telah menggunakan perangkat B, koin akan tetap telah mendarat
kepala.
Pretheoretically, kita menilai (6a), tetapi tidak (6b), benar. Dalam
kerangka Stalnaker-Lewis, ini berarti bahwa, di antara worldstates
dimana anteseden (6a) benar, mereka "paling mirip"
dengan negara dunia w contoh adalah orang-orang di mana koin
lemparan memiliki hasil yang sama seperti di w. Sebaliknya, di antara worldstates
di mana bahwa anteseden (6b) benar, mereka "paling mirip"
dengan w mengandung beberapa di mana koin muncul kepala, dan
lain-lain di mana tidak. Dengan demikian, dengan (6a) kesamaan hasil
undian kontribusi terhadap kesamaan dari yg dunia untuk w,
sedangkan dengan (6b), tidak. Mengapa? Pikiran alam adalah bahwa karena
keputusan Anda tentang taruhan tidak memiliki pengaruh kausal pada apakah
koin muncul kepala, sedangkan perangkat yang digunakan tidak, berbeda
keputusan tidak akan mempengaruhi hasil, sedangkan berbeda
kekuatan perangkat. Seperti tercantum dalam Kment (2006), ini menunjukkan bahwa kesamaan
antara dua negara dunia mengenai hal-hal tertentu
sebenarnya (misalnya, kepala koin landing) berkontribusi pada "kesamaan" dari
negara-negara-dalam arti yang relevan hanya jika hal ini dari Bahkan
memiliki sejarah kausal yang sama pada kedua dunia-states.6
Kment berjalan lebih jauh, menunjukkan alami, meskipun lebih spekulatif,
perpanjangan prinsip ini, di mana 'penjelasan yang sama'
digantikan 'yang kausal sejarah yang sama'.
esensi dari seorang individu atau semacam-misalnya, ketidakmungkinan
(asumsi esensial asal) dari Winston Churchill menjadi
ayah saya, atau dari air yang memiliki struktur molekul yang berbeda dari H2O. Sebagai contoh, kontra di (3) secara alami
diambil benar, sementara mereka yang di (4) tidak, meskipun fakta bahwa
anteseden mungkin adalah sama dalam dua kasus.
3a. Jika saya (Scott Soames) telah anak Winston Churchill, saya
akan tumbuh di Inggris pada paruh pertama
abad kedua puluh.
b. Jika air tidak memiliki struktur molekul H2O, yang
beku dan titik didih akan berbeda
(dari apa yang mereka sebenarnya).
4a. Jika saya (Scott Soames) telah anak Winston Churchill,
Amerika Serikat akan menjadi bagian dari Inggris.
b. Jika air tidak memiliki struktur H2O molekul,
sejarah bumi akan ada yang berbeda.
Obat alami untuk memperluas analisis untuk menyertakan worldstates
yang epistemis, tapi tidak metafisik, possible.5 Pada
analisis ini, (2 ) berlaku di w IFF ada A-negara apapun
(baik metafisik mungkin dari w atau tidak), atau beberapa Astates
di mana B adalah benar lebih mirip dengan w daripada A-negara
di mana B tidak benar. Hasilnya, mengingat metrik kesamaan yang cocok,
akan menjadi kebenaran (3a, b), dan kepalsuan (4a, b).
Tapi apa kesamaan? Tidak keseluruhan kesamaan antara worldstates,
seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh (5).
5. Jika Khrushchev telah menekan tombol selama Kuba
Krisis Rudal, akan ada perang nuklir.
(5) adalah benar meskipun fakta bahwa dunia-negara di mana tombol
ditekan dan rudal (ajaib) gagal untuk memulai jauh
lebih mirip secara keseluruhan untuk negara-dunia nyata daripada mereka di mana
tombol ditekan dan perang nuklir terjadi. Contoh seperti ini
menunjukkan bahwa hubungan berlabel "kesamaan" benar-benar sebuah tempat
untuk beberapa hubungan belum-to-be-diartikulasikan pada dunia-negara yang
penting bagi kondisi kebenaran yang diberikan oleh strategi account.The
untuk mengidentifikasi hubungan ini adalah dengan menggunakan contoh di mana nilai-nilai kebenaran kontra seperti (5) yang jelas untuk menghilangkan berbagai
kandidat (misalnya, secara keseluruhan kesamaan) untuk target relasi, dan untuk
mendukung calon lain untuk pekerjaan itu. Karena identifikasi ini membutuhkan
pemahaman yang independen dari conditional yang akan dianalisis,
model Stalnaker-Lewis tidak, itu sendiri, merupakan suatu analisis.
Metodologi diilustrasikan oleh contoh di mana saya memiliki
perangkat melempar koin A dan B, yang, ketika diaktifkan, melalui
proses acak yang menentukan apakah koin akan mendarat
kepala atau ekor. Saya mengaktifkan A. Sementara itu berjalan, saya menawarkan taruhan
di kepala, yang Anda menolak. Proses ini berakhir; koin yang
dilemparkan, dan tanah kepala. Kami sekarang mempertimbangkan (6a, b).
6a. Jika Anda telah menerima taruhan, Anda akan menang.
b. Jika saya telah menggunakan perangkat B, koin akan tetap telah mendarat
kepala.
Pretheoretically, kita menilai (6a), tetapi tidak (6b), benar. Dalam
kerangka Stalnaker-Lewis, ini berarti bahwa, di antara worldstates
dimana anteseden (6a) benar, mereka "paling mirip"
dengan negara dunia w contoh adalah orang-orang di mana koin
lemparan memiliki hasil yang sama seperti di w. Sebaliknya, di antara worldstates
di mana bahwa anteseden (6b) benar, mereka "paling mirip"
dengan w mengandung beberapa di mana koin muncul kepala, dan
lain-lain di mana tidak. Dengan demikian, dengan (6a) kesamaan hasil
undian kontribusi terhadap kesamaan dari yg dunia untuk w,
sedangkan dengan (6b), tidak. Mengapa? Pikiran alam adalah bahwa karena
keputusan Anda tentang taruhan tidak memiliki pengaruh kausal pada apakah
koin muncul kepala, sedangkan perangkat yang digunakan tidak, berbeda
keputusan tidak akan mempengaruhi hasil, sedangkan berbeda
kekuatan perangkat. Seperti tercantum dalam Kment (2006), ini menunjukkan bahwa kesamaan
antara dua negara dunia mengenai hal-hal tertentu
sebenarnya (misalnya, kepala koin landing) berkontribusi pada "kesamaan" dari
negara-negara-dalam arti yang relevan hanya jika hal ini dari Bahkan
memiliki sejarah kausal yang sama pada kedua dunia-states.6
Kment berjalan lebih jauh, menunjukkan alami, meskipun lebih spekulatif,
perpanjangan prinsip ini, di mana 'penjelasan yang sama'
digantikan 'yang kausal sejarah yang sama'.
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
Bahasa lainnya
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- i hate myself for loving you
- Have a Safe flight and take care dear
- Revenge the fate
- We understand
- Aku punya rencana aAku punya rencana bAk
- When love makes you want to have is be y
- Aku selalu menunggu kesembuhan mu dan se
- I'm gonna pee
- When love makes you want to have is be y
- Aku selalu menunggu kesembuhan mu dan se
- Aku punya rencana aAku punya rencana bAk
- dang buon an cho do buon
- Minta number kakak... Adik nak call... N
- Aku selalu menunggu kesembuhan mu dan se
- Rindu dekat kakak sangat-sangat
- I want you nothing else, just you
- Cinta
- Reinforce
- Nak buat apa number adik
- Will you keep a life
- Swag
- Reinforce metal
- Jealous support imagination about bad th
- jangan terlalu berharap
