Rorty’s Contingency , Irony , and S

Rorty’s Contingency , Irony , and Solidarity
M any of us who were in graduate school in the 1960s remember the tightly reasoned arguments for mind-body identity theory that Richard Rorty provided. It was my pleasure to get to know Rorty personally when I served as Executive Director of the American Philosophical Association and Rorty served for part of that time as Chair of the standing committee The Status and Future of the Profession. The philosophical community had great dif fi culty accepting Rorty’s interest in postmodernism and his acceptance of pragmatism. He left the Philosophy Department at Princeton and took a position as University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia. After providing a summary of Rorty’s position in Contingency , Irony , and Solidarity , I will argue that Rorty’s emphasis on literature has led him astray in his epistemology. Although strongly infl u enced by Dewey, Rorty forgot that Dewey insisted that artistic creation was a doing and undergoing in response to an artistic medium. The artist usually cannot just impose his or her idea on the medium, the medium constrains what the artist can accomplish. Literature imposes the least constraints of any of the arts. 6 However, in sculpture or pottery the medium places severe constraints on what the artist can accomplish. This fact has been vividly driven home to me by the fortunate fact that I have been married for over 25 years to a master ceramic sculptor and have watched her test the limits of what you can do with clay and glass. Contingency , Irony and Solidarity begins with a claim of radical contingency “…where we treat everything-our language, our conscience, our community-as a product of time and chance.” 7 Rorty claims that Wittgenstein had adopted such a position with respect to language. Rorty believes that the acceptance of radical contingency undermines the notion of objective truth. “The truth cannot be out therecannot exist independently of the human mind-because sentences cannot so exist or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.” 8 Except for the emphasis on language, I frankly think that so far there is much in common with Rorty’s position and Kant’s position in the fi r st Critique-an ironic turn of events. After all for Kant we can never know the world beyond our experience, the “selbst an sich”. But then Rorty departs widely from Kant. From this understanding of truth, Rorty goes on to paint a non-traditional picture of science. Science does not discover truth about the world. Rather, “great scientists invent descriptions of the world which are useful for purposes of predicting and controlling what happens.” 9 Pragmatists are less interested in having science discover Truth and more interested in what science can accomplish to make life better for people through its methods to explain and predict. But Rorty is not content to leave matters here. He goes on to argue that even successfully invented descriptions that enable us to explain and predict do not get us any closer to truth. R orty claims there is no sense in which any of these descriptions is an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself. “…the world does not provide us with any criterion of choice between alternative metaphors, that we can only compare languages or metaphors with one another, not with something beyond language called fact”. 10 I t is here that Rorty’s argument seems invalid. Even if science is about inventing metaphors that enable us to explain and predict, it does not follow that the world does not provide criteria that enable us to compare metaphors. Some metaphors are successful at explaining and predicting and some are unsuccessful. What accounts for the difference? Surely nothing intrinsic to the metaphor. The difference results because some metaphors are more accurately in tune with the world or they come closer to picturing how the world is. If a scienti fi c metaphor would have us approach the world as if the world contained contradictions, the metaphor would fail and the metaphor would fail because a world where explaining and predicting can occur is not a world where there can be contradictions. Perhaps science does not get us to truth with a capital T about the world, but unsuccessful scientifi c metaphors certainly tell us some things that are false about the world. Scientifi c metaphors which do not enable us to explain and predict do not get it right about the world. I f scientifi c language is metaphorical and not able to get us to objective knowledge about the world , it should come as no surprise that Rorty maintains that language about ourselves and about communities is similarly metaphorical and similarly unable to get us to truth. Ethical claims suffer the same fate. Rorty believes that it is wrong to be cruel, but he admits that on his view there can be no arguments for the belief. “For liberal ironists, there is no answer to the question “Why not be cruel?”-no noncircular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is horrible.” 11 There can be no argument because what counts as good reasons is historically and socially contingent on Rorty’s view. It may not be too strong to say that such radical contingency undermines the distinction between what is rational and what is irrational. For Rorty, it certainly seems to be the case that what count as rational is historically and socially contingent. Rorty abandons reason and argument in the traditional sense that reason provides objectivity, but he certainly does not end up in nihilism. Societies are bound together by common hopes and common vocabularies. But how do societies with different languages and different values communicate with and appreciate one another? Through the ability of imagination, especially the ability to imagine the humiliation that others feel when their vocabulary is not taken seriously. 12 If we are on the look out for “marginalized people” we can develop our imagination. As a result we forge a solidarity with others rather than recognize solidarity. Solidarity is made rather then seen. I agree that solidarity is an important good and I think it is made although I also think it is seen. It is seen when we recognize another human being as a person in Kant’s sense-a person who should be treated with respect and never used merely as a means. Rorty’s use of imagination as a way of gaining solidarity strikes me as rather naïve. Compare Rorty to David Hume when Hume said that we care more about losing the tip of one of our fi n gers than we do about the starvation death of thousands in a far away land. Alas I think human history including contemporary history shows that Hume is a lot closer to the mark than Rorty. For my own part, I want to argue that solidarity is more readily created through trade and business relationships, for example. To evaluate this suggestion we will need to consider Rorty’s specifi c remarks about business. First I want to suggest that Rorty’s radical contingency results in part because he appeals to the wrong art form- to literature rather than ceramic sculpture.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Rorty's kontingensi, ironi dan solidaritas M any of us who were in graduate school in the 1960s remember the tightly reasoned arguments for mind-body identity theory that Richard Rorty provided. It was my pleasure to get to know Rorty personally when I served as Executive Director of the American Philosophical Association and Rorty served for part of that time as Chair of the standing committee The Status and Future of the Profession. The philosophical community had great dif fi culty accepting Rorty’s interest in postmodernism and his acceptance of pragmatism. He left the Philosophy Department at Princeton and took a position as University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia. After providing a summary of Rorty’s position in Contingency , Irony , and Solidarity , I will argue that Rorty’s emphasis on literature has led him astray in his epistemology. Although strongly infl u enced by Dewey, Rorty forgot that Dewey insisted that artistic creation was a doing and undergoing in response to an artistic medium. The artist usually cannot just impose his or her idea on the medium, the medium constrains what the artist can accomplish. Literature imposes the least constraints of any of the arts. 6 However, in sculpture or pottery the medium places severe constraints on what the artist can accomplish. This fact has been vividly driven home to me by the fortunate fact that I have been married for over 25 years to a master ceramic sculptor and have watched her test the limits of what you can do with clay and glass. Contingency , Irony and Solidarity begins with a claim of radical contingency “…where we treat everything-our language, our conscience, our community-as a product of time and chance.” 7 Rorty claims that Wittgenstein had adopted such a position with respect to language. Rorty believes that the acceptance of radical contingency undermines the notion of objective truth. “The truth cannot be out therecannot exist independently of the human mind-because sentences cannot so exist or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.” 8 Except for the emphasis on language, I frankly think that so far there is much in common with Rorty’s position and Kant’s position in the fi r st Critique-an ironic turn of events. After all for Kant we can never know the world beyond our experience, the “selbst an sich”. But then Rorty departs widely from Kant. From this understanding of truth, Rorty goes on to paint a non-traditional picture of science. Science does not discover truth about the world. Rather, “great scientists invent descriptions of the world which are useful for purposes of predicting and controlling what happens.” 9 Pragmatists are less interested in having science discover Truth and more interested in what science can accomplish to make life better for people through its methods to explain and predict. But Rorty is not content to leave matters here. He goes on to argue that even successfully invented descriptions that enable us to explain and predict do not get us any closer to truth. R orty claims there is no sense in which any of these descriptions is an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself. “…the world does not provide us with any criterion of choice between alternative metaphors, that we can only compare languages or metaphors with one another, not with something beyond language called fact”. 10 I t is here that Rorty’s argument seems invalid. Even if science is about inventing metaphors that enable us to explain and predict, it does not follow that the world does not provide criteria that enable us to compare metaphors. Some metaphors are successful at explaining and predicting and some are unsuccessful. What accounts for the difference? Surely nothing intrinsic to the metaphor. The difference results because some metaphors are more accurately in tune with the world or they come closer to picturing how the world is. If a scienti fi c metaphor would have us approach the world as if the world contained contradictions, the metaphor would fail and the metaphor would fail because a world where explaining and predicting can occur is not a world where there can be contradictions. Perhaps science does not get us to truth with a capital T about the world, but unsuccessful scientifi c metaphors certainly tell us some things that are false about the world. Scientifi c metaphors which do not enable us to explain and predict do not get it right about the world. I f scientifi c language is metaphorical and not able to get us to objective knowledge about the world , it should come as no surprise that Rorty maintains that language about ourselves and about communities is similarly metaphorical and similarly unable to get us to truth. Ethical claims suffer the same fate. Rorty believes that it is wrong to be cruel, but he admits that on his view there can be no arguments for the belief. “For liberal ironists, there is no answer to the question “Why not be cruel?”-no noncircular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is horrible.” 11 There can be no argument because what counts as good reasons is historically and socially contingent on Rorty’s view. It may not be too strong to say that such radical contingency undermines the distinction between what is rational and what is irrational. For Rorty, it certainly seems to be the case that what count as rational is historically and socially contingent. Rorty abandons reason and argument in the traditional sense that reason provides objectivity, but he certainly does not end up in nihilism. Societies are bound together by common hopes and common vocabularies. But how do societies with different languages and different values communicate with and appreciate one another? Through the ability of imagination, especially the ability to imagine the humiliation that others feel when their vocabulary is not taken seriously. 12 If we are on the look out for “marginalized people” we can develop our imagination. As a result we forge a solidarity with others rather than recognize solidarity. Solidarity is made rather then seen. I agree that solidarity is an important good and I think it is made although I also think it is seen. It is seen when we recognize another human being as a person in Kant’s sense-a person who should be treated with respect and never used merely as a means. Rorty’s use of imagination as a way of gaining solidarity strikes me as rather naïve. Compare Rorty to David Hume when Hume said that we care more about losing the tip of one of our fi n gers than we do about the starvation death of thousands in a far away land. Alas I think human history including contemporary history shows that Hume is a lot closer to the mark than Rorty. For my own part, I want to argue that solidarity is more readily created through trade and business relationships, for example. To evaluate this suggestion we will need to consider Rorty’s specifi c remarks about business. First I want to suggest that Rorty’s radical contingency results in part because he appeals to the wrong art form- to literature rather than ceramic sculpture.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:

Rorty yang Contingency, Irony, dan Solidaritas
M salah satu dari kami yang berada di sekolah pascasarjana pada tahun 1960 mengingat argumen beralasan erat teori identitas pikiran-tubuh yang Richard Rorty disediakan. Itu adalah kesenangan saya untuk mengenal Rorty secara pribadi ketika saya menjabat sebagai Direktur Eksekutif American Philosophical Association dan Rorty disajikan untuk bagian dari waktu itu sebagai Ketua komite Status dan Masa Depan Profesi. Komunitas filosofis memiliki besar Kesulitan menerima bunga Rorty dalam postmodernisme dan penerimaannya pragmatisme. Dia meninggalkan Departemen Filsafat di Princeton dan mengambil posisi sebagai Profesor Universitas Humaniora di Universitas Virginia. Setelah memberikan ringkasan posisi Rorty di Contingency, Irony, dan Solidaritas, saya akan berpendapat bahwa penekanan Rorty pada literatur telah menyebabkan dia tersesat di epistemologinya. Meskipun kuat dalam fl u enced oleh Dewey, Rorty lupa bahwa Dewey menegaskan bahwa penciptaan artistik yang melakukan dan menjalani dalam menanggapi media artistik. Artis biasanya tidak bisa hanya memaksakan atau idenya pada media, media membatasi apa artis dapat menyelesaikan. Sastra memaksakan kendala paling salah satu seni. 6 Namun, di patung atau tembikar media menempatkan kendala parah pada apa yang artis dapat menyelesaikan. Fakta ini telah jelas didorong rumah kepada saya oleh fakta beruntung bahwa saya telah menikah selama lebih dari 25 tahun untuk seorang pematung keramik guru dan telah menyaksikan dia menguji batas-batas apa yang dapat Anda lakukan dengan tanah liat dan kaca. Contingency, Irony dan Solidaritas dimulai dengan klaim kontingensi radikal "... di mana kita memperlakukan semua-kami bahasa, hati nurani kita, masyarakat kita-produk waktu dan kesempatan." 7 Rorty mengklaim bahwa Wittgenstein telah mengadopsi posisi tersebut sehubungan dengan bahasa. Rorty berpendapat bahwa penerimaan kontingensi radikal merusak gagasan kebenaran obyektif. "Kebenaran tidak bisa keluar therecannot ada secara independen dari pikiran manusia-karena kalimat tidak bisa jadi ada atau berada di luar sana. Dunia di luar sana, namun deskripsi dunia tidak. "8 Kecuali untuk penekanan pada bahasa, saya terus terang berpikir bahwa sejauh ini banyak kesamaan dengan posisi Rorty dan posisi Kant dalam fi r st Kritik-an ironi peristiwa. Setelah semua untuk Kant kita tidak pernah tahu dunia luar pengalaman kami, "selbst an sich". Tapi kemudian Rorty berangkat luas dari Kant. Dari pemahaman ini kebenaran, Rorty melanjutkan dengan melukis gambar non-tradisional ilmu pengetahuan. Sains tidak menemukan kebenaran tentang dunia. Sebaliknya, "ilmuwan besar menciptakan gambaran dunia yang berguna untuk tujuan memprediksi dan mengendalikan apa yang terjadi." 9 pragmatis kurang tertarik untuk memiliki ilmu discover Kebenaran dan lebih tertarik pada apa yang ilmu pengetahuan dapat mencapai untuk membuat hidup lebih baik bagi orang-orang melalui metode yang untuk menjelaskan dan memprediksi. Tapi Rorty tidak puas untuk meninggalkan hal-hal di sini. Dia melanjutkan dengan mengatakan bahwa deskripsi bahkan berhasil diciptakan yang memungkinkan kita untuk menjelaskan dan memprediksi tidak mendapatkan kita lebih dekat dengan kebenaran. R Orty mengklaim tidak ada rasa di mana salah satu deskripsi ini adalah representasi akurat dari cara dunia itu sendiri. "... Dunia tidak menyediakan kami dengan kriteria pilihan antara metafora alternatif, bahwa kita hanya dapat membandingkan bahasa atau metafora dengan satu sama lain, bukan dengan sesuatu di luar bahasa yang disebut fakta". 10 Saya t di sini bahwa argumen Rorty tampaknya tidak valid. Bahkan jika ilmu tentang menciptakan metafora yang memungkinkan kita untuk menjelaskan dan memprediksi, itu tidak berarti bahwa dunia tidak memberikan kriteria yang memungkinkan kita untuk membandingkan metafora. Beberapa metafora yang berhasil menjelaskan dan memprediksi dan beberapa tidak berhasil. Apakah penyebab perbedaan? Tentunya tidak ada yang intrinsik metafora. Perbedaannya hasil karena beberapa metafora yang lebih akurat selaras dengan dunia atau mereka datang lebih dekat dengan membayangkan bagaimana dunia ini. Jika ilmiah metafora ingin kita mendekati dunia seolah-olah dunia terdapat kontradiksi, metafora akan gagal dan metafora akan gagal karena dunia di mana menjelaskan dan memprediksi dapat terjadi bukanlah sebuah dunia di mana bisa ada kontradiksi. Mungkin ilmu tidak mendapatkan kita untuk kebenaran dengan T modal tentang dunia, tapi tidak berhasil ilmiah metafora tentu memberitahu kita beberapa hal yang salah tentang dunia. Ilmiah metafora yang tidak memungkinkan kita untuk menjelaskan dan memprediksi tidak mengerti benar tentang dunia. Aku f ilmiah bahasa fi k adalah metafora dan tidak mampu untuk mendapatkan kita untuk pengetahuan obyektif tentang dunia, itu harus datang tidak mengejutkan bahwa Rorty mempertahankan bahasa yang tentang diri sendiri dan tentang masyarakat juga sama metafora dan juga mampu untuk mendapatkan kita untuk kebenaran. Klaim etis mengalami nasib yang sama. Rorty berpendapat bahwa itu salah untuk menjadi kejam, tapi ia mengakui bahwa pada pandangannya tidak ada argumen untuk keyakinan. "Untuk ironists liberal, tidak ada jawaban atas pertanyaan" Mengapa tidak kejam? "- Tidak ada cadangan teoritis bukan lingkaran untuk keyakinan bahwa kekejaman mengerikan." 11 Tidak akan ada argumen karena apa yang dianggap alasan yang baik secara historis dan kontingen sosial pada pandangan Rorty itu. Ini mungkin tidak terlalu kuat untuk mengatakan bahwa contingency radikal merusak perbedaan antara apa yang rasional dan apa yang irasional. Untuk Rorty, tentu tampaknya menjadi kasus bahwa apa yang dianggap sebagai rasional secara historis dan kontingen sosial. Rorty meninggalkan akal dan argumen dalam arti tradisional alasan yang menyediakan obyektivitas, namun ia tentu tidak berakhir di nihilisme. Masyarakat terikat bersama oleh harapan umum dan kosa kata umum. Tapi bagaimana masyarakat dengan bahasa yang berbeda dan nilai-nilai yang berbeda berkomunikasi dengan dan menghargai satu sama lain? Melalui kemampuan imajinasi, terutama kemampuan untuk membayangkan penghinaan yang lain rasakan ketika kosakata mereka tidak dianggap serius. 12 Jika kita berada di melihat keluar untuk "orang-orang yang terpinggirkan" kita dapat mengembangkan imajinasi kita. Sebagai hasilnya kita menjalin solidaritas dengan orang lain daripada mengakui solidaritas. Solidaritas yang dibuat ketimbang dilihat. Saya setuju bahwa solidaritas adalah baik penting dan saya pikir itu dibuat meskipun saya juga berpikir itu terlihat. Hal ini terlihat ketika kita mengenali manusia lain sebagai orang di Kant akal-orang yang harus diperlakukan dengan hormat dan tidak pernah digunakan hanya sebagai alat. Penggunaan Rorty tentang imajinasi sebagai cara untuk mendapatkan solidaritas bagi saya, agak naif. Bandingkan Rorty ke David Hume ketika Hume mengatakan bahwa kita lebih peduli tentang kehilangan ujung salah satu fi n gers kita daripada kita lakukan tentang kematian kelaparan ribuan di negeri jauh. Alas Saya pikir sejarah manusia termasuk sejarah kontemporer menunjukkan bahwa Hume jauh lebih dekat ke tanda dari Rorty. Bagi saya sendiri, saya ingin menyatakan bahwa solidaritas lebih mudah diciptakan melalui hubungan perdagangan dan bisnis, misalnya. Untuk mengevaluasi saran ini kita akan perlu mempertimbangkan Rorty yang spesifik komentar tentang bisnis. Pertama saya ingin menunjukkan bahwa hasil kontingensi radikal Rorty di sebagian karena ia menarik bagi seni yang salah form- sastra ketimbang patung keramik.