In practice, the extent to which th

In practice, the extent to which the Security Council has used these two mechanisms
has varied over time. The use of both mechanisms was limited during the
Cold War by the U.S.–Soviet confrontation. A result of the Cold War confrontation
was that many, if not most, local conflicts took on geopolitical implications, as
one side in the local conflict aligned itself with one side in the Cold War, and the
other local side aligned with the other geopolitical pole. Since any kind of action by
the Security Council required the agreement of both superpowers (for reasons discussed
below), many disputes generated stalemate rather than action from the
Council.
There were, nonetheless, several occasions on which the United States and the
Soviet Union could agree on language for a Security Council resolution, either
because neither cared particularly about the conflict in question, or because they
agreed that a conflict was getting out of hand and represented a genuine threat to
international stability. One of the best known of these resolutions, and a good
example of a Chapter VI action, is Security Council Resolution 242, passed at the
end of the Arab–Israeli war in 1967. This resolution called, among other things, for
a cease-fire and withdrawal from territories occupied during the war. Even though
the resolution had little effect on the course of the war, it did have both short-term
and long-term effects. In the short term, the resolution provided the basis for a
cease-fire that both sides could agree to without having to negotiate with each other
directly. In the long-term, Resolution 242 still provides a starting point for most
discussions of conflict resolution in that part of the world. The resolution thus provided
both transparency and legitimacy in much the same way as was envisioned by
the drafters of the UN Charter.
While the use of Chapter VI actions was constrained by the Cold War, the use
of Chapter VII was, with one exception, eliminated entirely by the U.S.–Soviet
confrontation. In the Korean War, the first major use of the UN system to authorize
a collective use of force, it was the General Assembly (GA) rather than the
Security Council that legitimated the use of force. The first large-scale military
intervention authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, in the Belgian
Congo in 1960, turned into a disaster for the UN, both politically and financially.
UN forces spent four years in the Congo without a clear mandate, and the UN was
not able to raise sufficient funds over and above its standard dues to cover the costs
of the operation. The intervention went so badly that the Security Council did not
authorize another full-scale Chapter VII intervention for another three decades.
The next Chapter VII action was in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
This action, made possible by the end of the Cold War, differed from the intervention
in the Congo in that there was a clear and achievable mission (removing Iraqi
forces from Kuwait), and sufficient force and funding available to achieve it.
Between the failure of the Congo intervention and the success in Kuwait, the
Security Council created a new mechanism for promoting international peace and
security, called peacekeeping. This is the activity for which the Security Council was
known best for many years. Often referred to as “chapter six-and-a-half ” (because
it involves the use of military forces, but only with the consent of all of the parties
to a conflict), peacekeeping missions use UN-sponsored forces as buffers between
combatants to help secure cease-fires that the combatants have already agreed to.

Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 1:

Dalam prakteknya, sejauh mana Dewan Keamanan telah menggunakan mekanisme ini duatelah bervariasi dari waktu ke waktu. Penggunaan mekanisme kedua adalah terbatas selamaPerang dingin oleh konfrontasi Amerika. Hasil dari konfrontasi perang dinginitu banyak, jika tidak kebanyakan, konflik lokal mengambil geopolitik implikasi, sebagaisalah satu sisi dalam konflik lokal selaras dirinya dengan satu sisi dalam perang dingin, dansisi lain lokal selaras dengan tiang geopolitik lainnya. Sejak jenis tindakan olehDewan Keamanan diperlukan persetujuan kedua negara adidaya (untuk alasan yang dibahasdi bawah), banyak perselisihan dihasilkan kebuntuan daripada tindakan dariDewan.Ada, meskipun demikian, beberapa kesempatan di mana Amerika Serikat danUni Soviet bisa setuju pada bahasa untuk resolusi Dewan Keamanan, baikkarena tidak peduli terutama tentang konflik dalam pertanyaan, atau karena merekasetuju bahwa konflik semakin keluar dari tangan dan mewakili ancaman bagistabilitas internasional. Salah satu yang paling terkenal dari resolusi ini, dan yang baikcontoh tindakan Bab VI, adalah Dewan Keamanan Resolusi 242, lulus padaakhir Perang Arab-Israel pada tahun 1967. Resolusi ini disebut, antara lain, untuksebuah gencatan senjata dan penarikan dari wilayah yang diduduki selama perang. MeskipunResolusi memiliki sedikit efek pada jalannya perang, itu memiliki keduanya jangka pendekdan efek jangka panjang. Dalam jangka pendek, resolusi memberikan dasar untukcease-fire that both sides could agree to without having to negotiate with each otherdirectly. In the long-term, Resolution 242 still provides a starting point for mostdiscussions of conflict resolution in that part of the world. The resolution thus providedboth transparency and legitimacy in much the same way as was envisioned bythe drafters of the UN Charter.While the use of Chapter VI actions was constrained by the Cold War, the useof Chapter VII was, with one exception, eliminated entirely by the U.S.–Sovietconfrontation. In the Korean War, the first major use of the UN system to authorizea collective use of force, it was the General Assembly (GA) rather than theSecurity Council that legitimated the use of force. The first large-scale militaryintervention authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, in the BelgianCongo in 1960, turned into a disaster for the UN, both politically and financially.UN forces spent four years in the Congo without a clear mandate, and the UN wasnot able to raise sufficient funds over and above its standard dues to cover the costsof the operation. The intervention went so badly that the Security Council did notauthorize another full-scale Chapter VII intervention for another three decades.The next Chapter VII action was in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.This action, made possible by the end of the Cold War, differed from the interventionin the Congo in that there was a clear and achievable mission (removing Iraqiforces from Kuwait), and sufficient force and funding available to achieve it.Between the failure of the Congo intervention and the success in Kuwait, theSecurity Council created a new mechanism for promoting international peace andsecurity, called peacekeeping. This is the activity for which the Security Council wasknown best for many years. Often referred to as “chapter six-and-a-half ” (becauseit involves the use of military forces, but only with the consent of all of the partiesto a conflict), peacekeeping missions use UN-sponsored forces as buffers betweencombatants to help secure cease-fires that the combatants have already agreed to.