On October 30, President Bush signed legislationinto law that makes it terjemahan - On October 30, President Bush signed legislationinto law that makes it Bahasa Indonesia Bagaimana mengatakan

On October 30, President Bush signe

On October 30, President Bush signed legislation
into law that makes it possible for recipients of
water from California's Central Valley Project to
resell that water. This legislation is controversial,
because it is expected to plant the seeds for the
development of a water market in California,
Among the most frequently cited objections to
using markets to allocate water are concerns that
the results would be unfair and disruptive: In particular,
opponents argue that a move to market
prices would mean a large shift in water from
farms to cities. This change in water allocation,
they argue, would lead to reduced agricultural
income and production, lower income in agriculturally
dependent communities, and higher
food prices. In the extreme, this stylized scenario
predicts a world with fountains in Beverly Hills
and desolation in California's central valley farming
region.
This vision of the distributional consequences of
a market system for water results, in part, from
putting together two statements about price determination
and drawing the wrong conclusion.
These statements are that (a) water is extremely
valuable, and (b) that the value of a commodity is
reflected in its price. Thus, the conclusion drawn
by some is that water prices would be high in a
market system and that low income and agricultural
consumers would be severely limited
in their abilities to purchase water.
This conclusion does not necessarily follow,
however. In fact, a similar debate took place in
the economics literature in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries before being put to rest by
Alfred Marshall. Known as the "Diamond-Water
paradox:' the issue sought to explain how the
observed price of water could be below that of
other commodities, such as diamonds, given
water's high value in sustaining life. Marshall's
solution to the paradox was to recognize that
prices reflect the value of the last, or marginal,
unit, not the value of all units consumed. He
demonstrated that a commodity that has high
value to society could have a low price if it
were available in sufficient supply.
As discussed in this Weekly Letter, this insight is
relevant to the current debate. The evidence sug~
gests that water markets would not lead to a high
price for water, because while urban users now
pay a significantly higher price than agricultural
users, that reflects differences invalues of the last
unit consumed by the two groups given artificial
restrictions on trading. In fact, the eyidence suggests
that water use patterns would not be affected
significantly, implying that the effects on agricurture
and agricultural communities would not be
large.
The paradox
The diamond-water paradox was puzzled over
for nearly a hundred years in the economics literature.
Adam Smith considered the issue in the
late eighteenth century, and David Ricardo spent
considerable effort trying to understand this
seemingly logical inconsistency with relative
price determination. Why would water, which
is essential to life, carry a price that is below that
of diamonds, whose use is far less critical?
Ricardo, the father of the labor theory of value,
tried to apply that theory to this case. He argued
that the cost of a commodity reflected the embedded
labor needed to bring that product to
market. Thus, he argued that water was relatively
cheap because it required less labor effort to
acquire than did diamonds.
While seeming to solve the dilemma, it was left
to Marshall to develop the correct answer to the
paradox. Marshall's answer can be seen in the
figure. Supply and demand curves for diamonds
(good 1) and water (good 2) are shown in the
two panels of the figure. As shown in the figure,
prices are determined where supply and demand
intersect in each market (points B and G), and
given the low quantity of diamonds, the equilibrium
price of diamonds exceeds that of water.
The important factor to note is that this is a marginal
condition. Prices measure the value of the
final unit consumed. The total value derived from
use is measured by the area under the demand curve up to the last unit, areas ABCD and FGHI,
for diamonds and water, respectively. Clearly,
even though the value of the last unit of diamonds
is higher than that of the last unit of water,
the cumulative value of water far exceeds that of
diamonds.
The solution to the paradox, therefore, differentiates
between marginal value (prices) and total
value. It is not necessary for the price of water to
be high to guarantee that it be used beneficially,
nor does a low price necessarily reflect an inappropriately
low total value for the resource.
Instead, the price serves to ration water to users
by applying the criterion that the value to those
using water has to be at least as high as the price
on the last unit, while those that do not receive
water must value it at less than that price.
California water prices
Misunderstanding of this paradox underlies some
of the fears about water markets expressed by agricultural
and political groups. Concern is high in
the agricultural regions that if farmers could sell
their water, they would do so. The high prices
currently paid by urban users for water are used as evidence that markets would allow those consumers
to bid up the price paid by farmers to a
high level. Given these prices, it is argued that
selling water would be more profitable than
growing crops, which would lead to il sharp
curtailment of agriculture.
In fact, these fears are overstated. High water
prices are observed in urban areas, but those
prices are not indicative of a market price for a
farmer's water. Urban prices are higher than agricultural
prices for two basic reasons. First, urban
prices are higher because the water has to be
pumped further and treated to meet higher quality
standards. In California, for example, these
costs can exceed $100 per acre foot in many
urban areas. Those charges would continue to
be applied, which would result in a significantly
higher urban price even with a market price at
the wholesale leveL Thus, a high urban price
does not necessarily imply a high price for water
at the farm level.More importantly, current high urban prices reflect
artificial limits on urban access to water.
While those prices reflect urban users'willingness
to pay given a fixed supply, their willingness
to pay is likely to fall off sharply as more water is
made available.
To see this point, return to the two figures. Let
the figures reflect the supply and demand for water
for two consumers, one urban (good 1), and
one agricultural (good 2). Because water is not
freely traded, the price for urban users is higher
than that for agricultural users given the limited
supply available to urban users. Consider a small
transfer to urban users, however, as indicated by
the shifting supply curves in each market. In that
case, a small increase in the supply of urban
water would cause a sharp drop in urban prices
(from B to E), while causing a small increase in
agricultural prices (from G to J). This asymmetric
effect on the prices of the two user groups is the
direct result of differences in the slopes of the
demand curves of the different groups.
As with the Diamond-Water paradox, price differentials
between agricultural users' willingness
to pay and urban users' willingness to pay reflect
differences in the marginal value of water given
available supplies. If supplies were allowed to
move between the two user groups, an equilibrium
price (differing only by transportation and
processing charges) would emerge that shifts a
minimal quantity of water to urban users. Thus,
the fact that urban users are currently willing to
pay a. higher price at the margin does not mean
that they would pay that price for a large quantity
of water offered by farmers.Evidence
Some recent evidence is suggestive of the potential
effect. Vaux and Howitt (1984) estimate that
price effects on agriculture and the magnitude
of water transferred in California would be relatively
small under a market system. Using updated
figures in 1991 dollars from that article,
Schmidt and Cannon (1991) found that average
agricultural water prices might increase as little
as $2.60 per acre foot-from $54.61 to $57.23while
urban prices would fall significantly. The
model also suggests that urban consumption
would increase by less than a million acre feet
per year. (Agriculture in California consumed
approximately 28.5 of the total 34 million acre
feet in 1985, which was the last "normal" year
of water deliveries.)
These asymmetric effects on urban and agricultuial
piices reflect the features of the diagram.
Urban prices are high because quantities are
very limited. However, if supplies increase, the
prices urban users are willing to pay would
drop off sharply because their demands are very
inelastic. In contrast, agricultural consumers'
demands are more elastic at current levels of
consumption. Consequently, agricultural users
would be willing to sell some water even with
relatively small increases in water prices. (Recent
studies by agricultural economists suggest that a
10 percent increase in prices would free up 4 to
7 percent of agriculture's water which would
translate to 20 to 40 percent more for nonagricultural
users. Moreover, these estimates are for
short run responses. Over the longer run,responses
are likely to be much larger as farmers
install new technologies that save water.)
The important implication from these studies is
that the disruption caused by moving to a water
market would be small. Most fundamentally, all
users of water have downward sloping demand
curves for water. Farmers derive greater value
from the first unit of water they use than from the
last unit, and while the last unit may carry a low
value, the cumulative value of their water use is
large. Thus, it is unreasonable to think that a
slight increase in the market price of water
would cause a farmer to stop all consumptionhe
would simply move back along his demand
curve and use less.
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Pada 30 Oktober Presiden Bush menandatangani undang-undang
menjadi undang-undang yang memungkinkan untuk penerima
air dari California Central Valley proyek untuk
menjual air. Undang-undang ini kontroversial,
karena diharapkan untuk menanam benih untuk
pengembangan pasar air di California,
antara yang paling sering dikutip keberatan terhadap
menggunakan pasar untuk mengalokasikan air yang memperhatikan bahwa
Hasilnya akan tidak adil dan mengganggu: khususnya,
lawan berpendapat bahwa pindah ke pasar
harga berarti pergeseran besar dalam air dari
peternakan ke kota. Perubahan ini dalam alokasi air,
mereka berpendapat, akan mengakibatkan berkurang pertanian
pendapatan dan produksi, menurunkan pendapatan di pertanian
masyarakat yang bergantung pada, dan lebih tinggi
harga pangan. Di ujung, ini bergaya skenario
memprediksi dunia dengan air mancur di Beverly Hills
dan kehancuran di California central valley pertanian
region.
visi ini akibat distribusi
sistem pasar untuk air hasil, dalam bagian, dari
menyusun dua pernyataan tentang penentuan harga
dan menggambar kesimpulan salah.
pernyataan ini adalah bahwa air () adalah sangat
berharga, dan (b) yang nilai komoditas
tercermin dalam harga. Jadi, kesimpulan yang diambil
oleh beberapa adalah bahwa air harga akan tinggi
pasar sistem dan bahwa pendapatan rendah dan pertanian
konsumen akan sangat terbatas
dalam kemampuan mereka untuk membeli air.
kesimpulan ini tidak selalu mengikuti,
namun. Pada kenyataannya, sebuah perdebatan yang serupa terjadi di
Sastra ekonomi di kedelapan belas dan
berabad-abad kesembilan belas sebelum diletakkan untuk beristirahat oleh
Alfred Marshall. Dikenal sebagai "berlian air
paradoks:' masalah cuba menjelaskan bagaimana
diamati harga air bisa di bawah
komoditi lainnya, seperti berlian, diberikan
air tinggi nilai dalam mempertahankan kelangsungan hidup. Marshall's
solusi paradoks adalah untuk mengenali bahwa
Harga mencerminkan nilai terakhir, atau marginal,
unit, bukan nilai Semua unit yang dikonsumsi. Ia
menunjukkan bahwa komoditas yang tinggi memiliki
nilai kepada masyarakat bisa memiliki harga yang rendah jika itu
tersedia dalam cukup pasokan.
seperti yang dibahas dalam Surat ini mingguan, wawasan ini adalah
relevan saat ini perdebatan. Sug bukti ~
gests bahwa air pasar tidak akan menyebabkan tinggi
harga untuk air, karena sementara pengguna perkotaan sekarang
membayar harga yang signifikan lebih tinggi daripada pertanian
pengguna, yang mencerminkan perbedaan invalues terakhir
unit yang dikonsumsi oleh dua kelompok diberikan buatan
pembatasan pada perdagangan. Pada kenyataannya, eyidence menunjukkan
bahwa air menggunakan pola akan terpengaruh
secara signifikan, menyiratkan bahwa efek pada agricurture
dan masyarakat pertanian tidak akan
besar.
Paradoks
paradoks berlian air yang bingung atas
selama hampir seratus tahun dalam ekonomi sastra
Adam Smith dianggap masalah dalam
akhir abad kedelapan belas, dan David Ricardo menghabiskan
banyak upaya berusaha memahami hal ini
kelihatannya Logis inkonsistensi dengan relatif
penentuan harga. Mengapa akan air, yang
sangat penting untuk kehidupan, membawa harga yang di bawah itu
berlian, yang digunakan jauh lebih penting?
Ricardo, ayah dari teori nilai, tenaga kerja
mencoba menerapkan teori bahwa kasus ini. Ia berpendapat
bahwa biaya komoditas tercermin tertanam
tenaga kerja yang diperlukan untuk membawa produk tersebut ke
pasar. Dengan demikian, ia berpendapat bahwa air adalah relatif
murah karena dibutuhkan sedikit usaha kerja
memperoleh daripada berlian.
sementara tampak menyelesaikan dilema, Ianya ditinggalkan
untuk Marshall untuk mengembangkan jawaban yang benar untuk
paradoks. Marshall's jawaban dapat dilihat dalam
angka. Kurva permintaan dan berlian
(good 1) dan air (baik 2) yang ditampilkan di
dua panel gambar. Seperti yang ditunjukkan pada gambar,
harga ditentukan mana pasokan dan permintaan
berpotongan di setiap pasar (poin B dan G), dan
diberikan jumlah rendah berlian, keseimbangan
Harga berlian melebihi yang air.
faktor yang penting untuk dicatat adalah bahwa ini adalah marjinal
kondisi. Harga mengukur nilai
akhir unit yang dikonsumsi. Total nilai berasal dari
penggunaan diukur oleh area di bawah kurva permintaan ke unit terakhir, daerah ABCD dan FGHI,
untuk berlian dan air, masing-masing. Jelas,
meskipun nilai unit terakhir berlian
lebih tinggi daripada unit terakhir air,
nilai kumulatif air jauh melebihi yang
berlian.
solusi paradoks, oleh karena itu, membedakan
antara nilai marjinal (harga) dan total
nilai. Hal ini tidak diperlukan untuk harga air untuk
tinggi untuk menjamin bahwa itu digunakan menguntungkan,
maupun harga yang rendah selalu mencerminkan tidak tepat
rendah total nilai untuk sumber daya.
sebaliknya, harga menyajikan untuk jatah air untuk pengguna
dengan menerapkan kriteria yang nilai kepada mereka
menggunakan air harus setidaknya setinggi harga
pada unit terakhir, sementara mereka yang tidak menerima
air harus menghargai itu kurang dari harga itu.
California air harga
kesalahpahaman dari paradox ini mendasari beberapa
kekhawatiran tentang pasar air yang diungkapkan oleh pertanian
dan kelompok-kelompok politik. Perhatian tinggi dalam
daerah pertanian yang jika petani bisa menjual
air mereka, mereka akan melakukannya. Harga tinggi
saat ini dibayar oleh pengguna perkotaan air yang digunakan sebagai bukti bahwa pasar akan memungkinkan konsumen
untuk tawaran atas harga yang dibayar oleh petani untuk
tingkat tinggi. Mengingat harga tersebut, hal ini berpendapat bahwa
menjual air akan lebih menguntungkan daripada
tumbuh tanaman, yang akan mengakibatkan il tajam
pembatasan pertanian.
Faktanya, ketakutan ini yang dilebih-lebihkan. Air tinggi
harga yang diamati di daerah perkotaan, tetapi mereka
harga tidak menunjukkan harga pasar untuk
petani air. Perkotaan harga lebih tinggi daripada pertanian
harga untuk dua alasan dasar. Pertama, perkotaan
harga lebih tinggi karena air telah menjadi
dipompa diperlakukan untuk memenuhi kualitas yang lebih tinggi dan lebih lanjut
standar. Di California, misalnya, ini
biaya dapat melebihi $100 per hektar kaki dalam banyak
perkotaan. Biaya tersebut akan terus
diterapkan, yang akan mengakibatkan signifikan
harga perkotaan yang lebih tinggi bahkan dengan harga pasar di
Grosir tingkat dengan demikian, harga tinggi perkotaan
tidak selalu menyiratkan harga tinggi untuk air
di tingkat peternakan.Lebih penting lagi, saat ini harga tinggi perkotaan mencerminkan
batas-batas buatan perkotaan akses terhadap air.
sementara harga mereka mencerminkan keinginan perkotaan pengguna
untuk membayar mengingat suplai tetap, kesediaan mereka
untuk membayar adalah cenderung jatuh tajam seperti lebih banyak air
dibuat tersedia.
untuk melihat titik ini, kembali ke dua angka. Biarkan
angka-angka mencerminkan Penawaran dan permintaan untuk air
bagi konsumen dua, satu perkotaan (baik 1), dan
satu pertanian (baik 2). Karena air tidak
diperdagangkan secara bebas, harga untuk pengguna perkotaan lebih tinggi
daripada pertanian pengguna yang diberikan terbatas
pasokan yang tersedia bagi pengguna perkotaan. Pertimbangkan kecil
transfer ke perkotaan pengguna, namun, seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh
pergeseran kurva pasokan di setiap pasar. Yang
kasus, sebuah peningkatan kecil pasokan perkotaan
air akan menyebabkan penurunan tajam harga perkotaan
(dari B ke E), sementara menyebabkan peningkatan kecil dalam
harga pertanian (dari G hingga J). Ini asimetris
efek pada harga kelompok dua pengguna
langsung hasil dari perbedaan di lereng
permintaan kurva kelompok berbeda.
seperti dengan paradoks Diamond-air, harga perbedaan
antara kesediaan pertanian pengguna
untuk membayar dan perkotaan pengguna kesediaan untuk membayar mencerminkan
perbedaan dalam nilai marjinal air yang diberikan
pasokan yang tersedia. Jika persediaan diizinkan untuk
bergerak di antara kumpulan dua pengguna, keseimbangan
harga (berbeda hanya dengan transportasi dan
pengolahan biaya) akan muncul bahwa pergeseran
minimal jumlah air ke perkotaan pengguna. Dengan demikian,
fakta bahwa pengguna perkotaan saat ini mau
membayar harga yang lebih tinggi a. pada margin tidak berarti
bahwa mereka akan membayar harga untuk jumlah besar
air yang ditawarkan oleh petani.Bukti
beberapa bukti terbaru sugestif dari potensi
efek. Vaux dan Howitt (1984) memperkirakan bahwa
harga efek pada pertanian dan besarnya
air yang ditransfer di California akan menjadi relatif
kecil di bawah sebuah sistem pasar. Menggunakan diperbarui
angka di 1991 dolar dari artikel,
Schmidt dan meriam (1991) menemukan bahwa rata-rata
pertanian air harga mungkin meningkatkan sesedikit
sebagai $2,60 per hektar kaki-dari $54.61 untuk $57 .23while
perkotaan harga akan turun secara signifikan.
Model juga menunjukkan bahwa konsumsi perkotaan
akan meningkatkan dengan kurang dari satu juta hektar kaki
per tahun. (Pertanian di California yang dikonsumsi
sekitar 28,5 Acre 34 juta total
kaki pada tahun 1985, yang "normal" tahun terakhir
pengiriman air.)
Ini asimetris efek pada perkotaan dan agricultuial
piices mencerminkan fitur diagram.
perkotaan harga tinggi karena jumlah
sangat terbatas. Namun, jika persediaan meningkat,
perkotaan pengguna bersedia membayar harga akan
menurunkan tajam karena tuntutan mereka sangat
elastis. Sebaliknya, pertanian konsumen '
tuntutan lebih elastis pada saat ini tingkat
konsumsi. Akibatnya, pertanian pengguna
akan bersedia untuk menjual air bahkan dengan
relatif kecil kenaikan harga air. (Hari
studi oleh ekonom pertanian menyarankan bahwa
10 persen kenaikan harga akan membebaskan 4 untuk
7 persen air pertanian yang akan
diterjemahkan ke 20 sampai 40 persen lebih untuk mereka
pengguna. Selain itu, perkiraan ini adalah untuk
pendek menjalankan tanggapan. Atas tanggapan menjalankan, lagi
cenderung jauh lebih besar sebagai petani
menginstal teknologi baru yang menghemat air.)
Implikasi yang penting dari studi ini adalah
bahwa gangguan yang disebabkan oleh pindah ke air
pasar akan kecil. Paling mendasar, semua
pengguna air memiliki permintaan miring ke bawah
kurva untuk air. Petani memperoleh nilai yang lebih besar
dari unit pertama air mereka menggunakan daripada dari
terakhir unit, dan sementara terakhir unit mungkin membawa rendah
nilai, nilai kumulatif menggunakan air mereka adalah
besar. Oleh itu, ianya tidak masuk akal untuk berpikir bahwa
sedikit peningkatan harga pasar dari air
akan menyebabkan petani untuk menghentikan semua consumptionhe
hanya akan bergerak kembali sepanjang permintaan nya
kurva dan menggunakan kurang.
Sedang diterjemahkan, harap tunggu..
Hasil (Bahasa Indonesia) 2:[Salinan]
Disalin!
On October 30, President Bush signed legislation
into law that makes it possible for recipients of
water from California's Central Valley Project to
resell that water. This legislation is controversial,
because it is expected to plant the seeds for the
development of a water market in California,
Among the most frequently cited objections to
using markets to allocate water are concerns that
the results would be unfair and disruptive: In particular,
opponents argue that a move to market
prices would mean a large shift in water from
farms to cities. This change in water allocation,
they argue, would lead to reduced agricultural
income and production, lower income in agriculturally
dependent communities, and higher
food prices. In the extreme, this stylized scenario
predicts a world with fountains in Beverly Hills
and desolation in California's central valley farming
region.
This vision of the distributional consequences of
a market system for water results, in part, from
putting together two statements about price determination
and drawing the wrong conclusion.
These statements are that (a) water is extremely
valuable, and (b) that the value of a commodity is
reflected in its price. Thus, the conclusion drawn
by some is that water prices would be high in a
market system and that low income and agricultural
consumers would be severely limited
in their abilities to purchase water.
This conclusion does not necessarily follow,
however. In fact, a similar debate took place in
the economics literature in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries before being put to rest by
Alfred Marshall. Known as the "Diamond-Water
paradox:' the issue sought to explain how the
observed price of water could be below that of
other commodities, such as diamonds, given
water's high value in sustaining life. Marshall's
solution to the paradox was to recognize that
prices reflect the value of the last, or marginal,
unit, not the value of all units consumed. He
demonstrated that a commodity that has high
value to society could have a low price if it
were available in sufficient supply.
As discussed in this Weekly Letter, this insight is
relevant to the current debate. The evidence sug~
gests that water markets would not lead to a high
price for water, because while urban users now
pay a significantly higher price than agricultural
users, that reflects differences invalues of the last
unit consumed by the two groups given artificial
restrictions on trading. In fact, the eyidence suggests
that water use patterns would not be affected
significantly, implying that the effects on agricurture
and agricultural communities would not be
large.
The paradox
The diamond-water paradox was puzzled over
for nearly a hundred years in the economics literature.
Adam Smith considered the issue in the
late eighteenth century, and David Ricardo spent
considerable effort trying to understand this
seemingly logical inconsistency with relative
price determination. Why would water, which
is essential to life, carry a price that is below that
of diamonds, whose use is far less critical?
Ricardo, the father of the labor theory of value,
tried to apply that theory to this case. He argued
that the cost of a commodity reflected the embedded
labor needed to bring that product to
market. Thus, he argued that water was relatively
cheap because it required less labor effort to
acquire than did diamonds.
While seeming to solve the dilemma, it was left
to Marshall to develop the correct answer to the
paradox. Marshall's answer can be seen in the
figure. Supply and demand curves for diamonds
(good 1) and water (good 2) are shown in the
two panels of the figure. As shown in the figure,
prices are determined where supply and demand
intersect in each market (points B and G), and
given the low quantity of diamonds, the equilibrium
price of diamonds exceeds that of water.
The important factor to note is that this is a marginal
condition. Prices measure the value of the
final unit consumed. The total value derived from
use is measured by the area under the demand curve up to the last unit, areas ABCD and FGHI,
for diamonds and water, respectively. Clearly,
even though the value of the last unit of diamonds
is higher than that of the last unit of water,
the cumulative value of water far exceeds that of
diamonds.
The solution to the paradox, therefore, differentiates
between marginal value (prices) and total
value. It is not necessary for the price of water to
be high to guarantee that it be used beneficially,
nor does a low price necessarily reflect an inappropriately
low total value for the resource.
Instead, the price serves to ration water to users
by applying the criterion that the value to those
using water has to be at least as high as the price
on the last unit, while those that do not receive
water must value it at less than that price.
California water prices
Misunderstanding of this paradox underlies some
of the fears about water markets expressed by agricultural
and political groups. Concern is high in
the agricultural regions that if farmers could sell
their water, they would do so. The high prices
currently paid by urban users for water are used as evidence that markets would allow those consumers
to bid up the price paid by farmers to a
high level. Given these prices, it is argued that
selling water would be more profitable than
growing crops, which would lead to il sharp
curtailment of agriculture.
In fact, these fears are overstated. High water
prices are observed in urban areas, but those
prices are not indicative of a market price for a
farmer's water. Urban prices are higher than agricultural
prices for two basic reasons. First, urban
prices are higher because the water has to be
pumped further and treated to meet higher quality
standards. In California, for example, these
costs can exceed $100 per acre foot in many
urban areas. Those charges would continue to
be applied, which would result in a significantly
higher urban price even with a market price at
the wholesale leveL Thus, a high urban price
does not necessarily imply a high price for water
at the farm level.More importantly, current high urban prices reflect
artificial limits on urban access to water.
While those prices reflect urban users'willingness
to pay given a fixed supply, their willingness
to pay is likely to fall off sharply as more water is
made available.
To see this point, return to the two figures. Let
the figures reflect the supply and demand for water
for two consumers, one urban (good 1), and
one agricultural (good 2). Because water is not
freely traded, the price for urban users is higher
than that for agricultural users given the limited
supply available to urban users. Consider a small
transfer to urban users, however, as indicated by
the shifting supply curves in each market. In that
case, a small increase in the supply of urban
water would cause a sharp drop in urban prices
(from B to E), while causing a small increase in
agricultural prices (from G to J). This asymmetric
effect on the prices of the two user groups is the
direct result of differences in the slopes of the
demand curves of the different groups.
As with the Diamond-Water paradox, price differentials
between agricultural users' willingness
to pay and urban users' willingness to pay reflect
differences in the marginal value of water given
available supplies. If supplies were allowed to
move between the two user groups, an equilibrium
price (differing only by transportation and
processing charges) would emerge that shifts a
minimal quantity of water to urban users. Thus,
the fact that urban users are currently willing to
pay a. higher price at the margin does not mean
that they would pay that price for a large quantity
of water offered by farmers.Evidence
Some recent evidence is suggestive of the potential
effect. Vaux and Howitt (1984) estimate that
price effects on agriculture and the magnitude
of water transferred in California would be relatively
small under a market system. Using updated
figures in 1991 dollars from that article,
Schmidt and Cannon (1991) found that average
agricultural water prices might increase as little
as $2.60 per acre foot-from $54.61 to $57.23while
urban prices would fall significantly. The
model also suggests that urban consumption
would increase by less than a million acre feet
per year. (Agriculture in California consumed
approximately 28.5 of the total 34 million acre
feet in 1985, which was the last "normal" year
of water deliveries.)
These asymmetric effects on urban and agricultuial
piices reflect the features of the diagram.
Urban prices are high because quantities are
very limited. However, if supplies increase, the
prices urban users are willing to pay would
drop off sharply because their demands are very
inelastic. In contrast, agricultural consumers'
demands are more elastic at current levels of
consumption. Consequently, agricultural users
would be willing to sell some water even with
relatively small increases in water prices. (Recent
studies by agricultural economists suggest that a
10 percent increase in prices would free up 4 to
7 percent of agriculture's water which would
translate to 20 to 40 percent more for nonagricultural
users. Moreover, these estimates are for
short run responses. Over the longer run,responses
are likely to be much larger as farmers
install new technologies that save water.)
The important implication from these studies is
that the disruption caused by moving to a water
market would be small. Most fundamentally, all
users of water have downward sloping demand
curves for water. Farmers derive greater value
from the first unit of water they use than from the
last unit, and while the last unit may carry a low
value, the cumulative value of their water use is
large. Thus, it is unreasonable to think that a
slight increase in the market price of water
would cause a farmer to stop all consumptionhe
would simply move back along his demand
curve and use less.
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