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Failed States, Collapsed States, We

Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators
ROBERT I. ROTBERG
1
Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their govern- ments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens. The rise and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a modern era when na- tional states constitute the building blocks of legitimate world order the violent disintegration and palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic, and Latin American states threaten the very foundation of that system. International organizations and big powers consequently find themselves sucked disconcert- ingly into a maelstrom of anomic internal conflict and messy humanitarian relief. Desirable international norms such as stability and predictability thus become difficult to achieve when so many of the globe’s newer nation-states waver precariously between weakness and failure, with some truly failing, or even collapsing. In a time of terror, moreover, appreciating the nature of and responding to the dynamics of nation-state failure have become central to criti- cal policy debates. How best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure are among the urgent questions of the twenty-first century. This book examines contemporary cases of nation-state collapse and fail- ure.1 It establishes clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure from generic weakness or apparent distress, and collapse from failure. It further ana- lyzes the nature of state weakness and advances reasons why some weak states
2 ROBERT I. ROTBERG
succumb to failure, or collapse, and why others in ostensibly more straightened circumstances remain weak and at risk without ever destructing. Characteriz- ing failed states is thus an important and relevant endeavor, especially because the phenomenon of state failure is under-researched, hitherto with imprecise definitions and a paucity of sharply argued, instructive, and well-delineated cases. Further, understanding exactly why weak states slide toward failure will help policymakers to design methods to prevent failure and, in the cases of states that nevertheless fail (or collapse), to revive them and assist in the re- building process. States are much more varied in their capacity and capability than they once were. They are more numerous than they were a half century ago, and the range of their population sizes, physical endowments, wealth, productivity, delivery systems, ambitions, and attainments is much more extensive than ever before. In 1914, in the wake of the crumbling of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, there were fifty-five recognized national polities. In 1919, there were fifty-nine nations. In 1950, that number had reached sixty-nine. Ten years later, after the attainment of independence in much of Africa, ninety were nations. After many more African, Asian, and Oceanic territories had become indepen- dent, and after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the number of nations jumped to 191; East Timor’s independence in 2002 brought that total to 192. Given such explosive numbers, the inherent fragility of many of the new recruits (fif- teen of Africa’s fifty-four states are landlocked), and the inherent navigational perils of the post–Cold War economic and political terrain, the possibility of failure among a subset of the total remains ever present.
Strength and Weakness
Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders). Hav- ing replaced the monarchs of old, modern states focus and answer the concerns and demands of citizenries. They organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamism of their own inter- nal economic, political, and social realities. States succeed or fail across all or some of these dimensions. But it is ac- cording to their performance—according to the levels of their effective deliv- ery of the most crucial political goods—that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed states. Political goods
CAUSES AND INDICATORS 3
are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and now make on states. They encompass expectations, conceiv- ably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/govern- ment and citizenry interactions.2 There is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as critical as
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Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and IndicatorsROBERT I. ROTBERG1Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their govern- ments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens. The rise and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a modern era when na- tional states constitute the building blocks of legitimate world order the violent disintegration and palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic, and Latin American states threaten the very foundation of that system. International organizations and big powers consequently find themselves sucked disconcert- ingly into a maelstrom of anomic internal conflict and messy humanitarian relief. Desirable international norms such as stability and predictability thus become difficult to achieve when so many of the globe’s newer nation-states waver precariously between weakness and failure, with some truly failing, or even collapsing. In a time of terror, moreover, appreciating the nature of and responding to the dynamics of nation-state failure have become central to criti- cal policy debates. How best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure are among the urgent questions of the twenty-first century. This book examines contemporary cases of nation-state collapse and fail- ure.1 It establishes clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure from generic weakness or apparent distress, and collapse from failure. It further ana- lyzes the nature of state weakness and advances reasons why some weak states2 ROBERT I. ROTBERG
succumb to failure, or collapse, and why others in ostensibly more straightened circumstances remain weak and at risk without ever destructing. Characteriz- ing failed states is thus an important and relevant endeavor, especially because the phenomenon of state failure is under-researched, hitherto with imprecise definitions and a paucity of sharply argued, instructive, and well-delineated cases. Further, understanding exactly why weak states slide toward failure will help policymakers to design methods to prevent failure and, in the cases of states that nevertheless fail (or collapse), to revive them and assist in the re- building process. States are much more varied in their capacity and capability than they once were. They are more numerous than they were a half century ago, and the range of their population sizes, physical endowments, wealth, productivity, delivery systems, ambitions, and attainments is much more extensive than ever before. In 1914, in the wake of the crumbling of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, there were fifty-five recognized national polities. In 1919, there were fifty-nine nations. In 1950, that number had reached sixty-nine. Ten years later, after the attainment of independence in much of Africa, ninety were nations. After many more African, Asian, and Oceanic territories had become indepen- dent, and after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the number of nations jumped to 191; East Timor’s independence in 2002 brought that total to 192. Given such explosive numbers, the inherent fragility of many of the new recruits (fif- teen of Africa’s fifty-four states are landlocked), and the inherent navigational perils of the post–Cold War economic and political terrain, the possibility of failure among a subset of the total remains ever present.
Strength and Weakness
Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders). Hav- ing replaced the monarchs of old, modern states focus and answer the concerns and demands of citizenries. They organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamism of their own inter- nal economic, political, and social realities. States succeed or fail across all or some of these dimensions. But it is ac- cording to their performance—according to the levels of their effective deliv- ery of the most crucial political goods—that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed states. Political goods
CAUSES AND INDICATORS 3
are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and now make on states. They encompass expectations, conceiv- ably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/govern- ment and citizenry interactions.2 There is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as critical as
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Gagal Serikat, Roboh Serikat, Amerika Lemah: Penyebab dan Indikator
ROBERT I. Rotberg
1
Nation-negara gagal karena mereka diguncang oleh kekerasan internal dan tidak bisa lagi memberikan barang politik yang positif untuk penghuninya. Para pemerintah mereka kehilangan legitimasi, dan sifat dari tertentu negara-bangsa itu sendiri menjadi tidak sah di mata dan di hati pluralitas yang berkembang warganya. Naik turunnya negara-bangsa tidak baru, tapi di era modern saat na- negara nasional merupakan blok bangunan dari tatanan dunia yang sah disintegrasi kekerasan dan kelemahan teraba dipilih Afrika, Asia, Oceanic, dan negara-negara Amerika Latin mengancam landasan sistem itu. Organisasi internasional dan negara-negara besar akibatnya menemukan diri mereka tersedot disconcert- ingly ke dalam pusaran konflik internal anomi dan bantuan kemanusiaan berantakan. Norma-norma internasional diinginkan seperti stabilitas dan prediktabilitas sehingga menjadi sulit dicapai ketika begitu banyak yang lebih baru negara-bangsa seluruh dunia ini goyah huyung antara kelemahan dan kegagalan, dengan beberapa benar-benar gagal, atau bahkan runtuh. Dalam waktu teror, apalagi, menghargai sifat dan merespons dinamika kegagalan negara-bangsa telah menjadi pusat criti- perdebatan kebijakan cal. Cara terbaik untuk memperkuat negara-negara lemah dan mencegah kegagalan negara adalah salah satu pertanyaan yang mendesak dari abad kedua puluh satu. Buku ini membahas kasus kontemporer runtuhnya negara-bangsa dan ure.1 fail Ini menetapkan kriteria yang jelas untuk membedakan keruntuhan dan kegagalan dari kelemahan generik atau distress jelas, dan keruntuhan dari kegagalan. Lebih lanjut ana lyzes sifat kelemahan negara dan kemajuan alasan mengapa beberapa negara lemah
2 ROBERT I. Rotberg
menyerah pada kegagalan, atau runtuh, dan mengapa orang lain dalam keadaan seolah-olah lebih diluruskan tetap lemah dan berisiko tanpa pernah merusak diri. Characteriz- ing gagal negara dengan demikian merupakan usaha yang penting dan relevan, terutama karena fenomena kegagalan negara adalah kurang diteliti, sampai sekarang dengan definisi tepat dan kekurangan tajam berpendapat, instruktif, dan kasus-kasus yang digambarkan. Selanjutnya, pemahaman persis mengapa negara-negara lemah meluncur menuju kegagalan akan membantu pembuat kebijakan untuk merancang metode untuk mencegah kegagalan dan, dalam kasus negara-negara yang tetap gagal (atau runtuh), untuk menghidupkan kembali mereka dan membantu dalam proses pembangunan ulang. Negara jauh lebih bervariasi dalam kapasitas dan kemampuan mereka daripada dulu. Mereka lebih banyak daripada mereka setengah abad yang lalu, dan berbagai ukuran mereka penduduk, wakaf fisik, kekayaan, produktivitas, sistem pengiriman, ambisi, dan pencapaian yang jauh lebih luas dari sebelumnya. Pada tahun 1914, di bangun dari ambruknya imperium Ottoman dan Austro-Hungaria, ada lima puluh lima politi nasional yang diakui. Pada tahun 1919, ada lima puluh sembilan negara. Pada tahun 1950, jumlah itu telah mencapai enam puluh sembilan. Sepuluh tahun kemudian, setelah pencapaian kemerdekaan di sebagian besar Afrika, sembilan puluh yang bangsa. Setelah banyak Afrika, Asia, dan wilayah Oceanic telah menjadi independen, dan setelah ledakan dari Uni Soviet, jumlah negara melonjak menjadi 191; Kemerdekaan Timor Timur pada tahun 2002 membawa jumlah itu untuk 192. nomor Mengingat seperti ledakan, kerapuhan melekat dari banyak anggota baru (remaja fif- dari Afrika lima puluh empat negara yang terkurung daratan), dan bahaya navigasi yang melekat pasca-Perang Dingin medan ekonomi dan politik, kemungkinan kegagalan di antara subset dari total tetap pernah hadir.
Kekuatan dan Kelemahan
Bangsa-negara ada untuk menyediakan metode desentralisasi memberikan politik (publik) barang ke orang yang hidup dalam parameter yang ditunjuk (perbatasan). Ing Hav- menggantikan raja tua, negara-negara modern fokus dan menjawab keprihatinan dan tuntutan warga negaranya. Mereka mengatur dan menyalurkan kepentingan rakyat mereka, sering tetapi tidak secara eksklusif sebagai kelanjutan dari tujuan dan nilai-nilai nasional. Mereka buffer atau memanipulasi kekuatan dan pengaruh eksternal, juara keprihatinan lokal atau tertentu pengikutnya, dan memediasi antara kendala dan tantangan dari arena internasional dan dinamika realitas mereka sendiri antar- nal ekonomi, politik, dan sosial. Negara berhasil atau gagal di semua atau sebagian dari dimensi ini. Tetapi ac- cording untuk kinerja sesuai dengan tingkat ery telah dijalankan efektif dari politik yang paling penting mereka barang-bahwa negara-negara yang kuat dapat dibedakan dari yang lemah, dan negara-negara lemah dari negara-negara yang gagal atau runtuh. Barang politik
PENYEBAB DAN INDIKATOR 3
adalah mereka tidak berwujud dan sulit untuk dihitung klaim bahwa warga pernah dibuat pada penguasa dan sekarang membuat pada negara. Mereka mencakup harapan, conceiv- cakap kewajiban, menginformasikan budaya politik lokal, dan bersama-sama memberikan konten dengan kontrak sosial antara penguasa dan memutuskan bahwa merupakan inti dari rezim / pemerintah dan warga interactions.2 Ada hirarki barang politik . Tidak ada yang sama pentingnya dengan
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